x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RetBleed
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RetBleed
For retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -1
@@ -5212,10 +5212,12 @@ ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest perf impact. + ibpb,nosmt - like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. unret - force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + unret,nosmt - like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP is not available. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();
@@ -1181,7 +1181,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
@@ -2346,10 +2347,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" ); return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Kim Phillips
For retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it,
Because?
Quoted 14 lines
and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
Fixes 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 5214
Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -5212,10 +5212,12 @@ ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest perf impact.
You should put some blurb here about STIBP and why it is being enabled, where present.
Quoted 34 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-1+ ibpb,nosmt - like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. unret - force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + unret,nosmt - like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP is not available. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at runarch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3
-2@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();@@ -1181,7 +1181,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) · line 2354
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3
-2@@ -2346,10 +2347,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" );
Well, you can't lump those together.
You can't especially say "Vulnerable" and "IBPB" in one line.
To quote from the BTC paper:
"Software may choose to perform an IBPB command on entry into privileged code in order to avoid any previous branch prediction information from subsequently being used. This effectively mitigates all forms of BTC for scenarios like user-to-supervisor or VM-to-hypervisor attacks."
Especially if we disable SMT only on !STIBP parts:
if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
(retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);If there are AMD parts which have IBPB but DO NOT have STIBP, then you can say "Vulnerable... IBPB" but then you need to check for !STIBP and issue that on a separate line.
I'd say...
Signature · 2 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Kim Phillips
For retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it,
Because?
See "6.1.2 IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety":
Did you want me to re-quote the whitepaper, or reference it, or paraphrase it, or...?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
Fixes 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 5214
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -5212,10 +5212,12 @@ ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest perf impact.You should put some blurb here about STIBP and why it is being enabled, where present.
unret didn't have it, was just copying unret's entry, but, ok, will do for both now.
How about:
"{unret,ibpb} alone does not stop sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't."
Quoted 28 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) · line 2354
Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-2@@ -2346,10 +2347,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n");Well, you can't lump those together.
Quoted 1 line
You can't especially say "Vulnerable" and "IBPB" in one line.
To quote from the BTC paper:
"Software may choose to perform an IBPB command on entry into privileged code in order to avoid any previous branch prediction information from subsequently being used. This effectively mitigates all forms of BTC for scenarios like user-to-supervisor or VM-to-hypervisor attacks."
Especially if we disable SMT only on !STIBP parts:
if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) cpu_smt_disable(false);
Quoted 5 lines
If there are AMD parts which have IBPB but DO NOT have STIBP, then you can say "Vulnerable... IBPB" but then you need to check for !STIBP and issue that on a separate line.
I'd say...
Those messages only get printed on non-AMD hardware?
Kim
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Kim Phillips
Quoted 3 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Kim Phillips
For retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Because?
See "6.1.2 IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety":
Did you want me to re-quote the whitepaper, or reference it, or paraphrase it, or...?
I would like for our commit messages to be fully standalone and explain in detail why a change is being done. So that when doing git archeology months, years from now it is perfectly clear why a change was needed.
This holds especially true for the CPU vuln nightmares.
So please explain the "why" of your change. In your own words.
Quoted 3 lines
"{unret,ibpb} alone does not stop sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't."
Pretty much. I'd even explain each case explicitly:
ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on
basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest perf impact. On AMD, it also enables STIBP if present.
ibpb,nosmt - like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP
is not available. This is the alternative for systems which do not have STIBP.
Quoted 1 line
Those messages only get printed on non-AMD hardware?
See, I got confused by our spaghetti code from hell. ;-\
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v2 1/1 x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RetBleed
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
"Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation."
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, the also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -5
@@ -5237,20 +5237,30 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. + AMD-based unret and ibpb mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling + threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors + that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't. + off - no mitigation auto - automatically select a migitation auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). - ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + ibpb - [AMD] Mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest - perf impact. - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + perf impact. It also enables STIBP if + present. + ibpb,nosmt - [AMD] Like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. + unret - [AMD] Force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP - is not available. + unret,nosmt - [AMD] Like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();
@@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
@@ -2320,10 +2321,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" ); return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Quoted 11 lines · Kim Phillips
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-1Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. + AMD-based unret and ibpb mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling + threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors + that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't. * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is - * forced for UNRET. + * forced for UNRET or IBPB.
Nit: could you please capitalize the acronyms & instruction names consistently? Human eyesight is case sensitive.
Ie. it should be UNRET and IBPB everywhere.
Thanks,
Ingo
PATCH v3 1/1 x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RetBleed
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
"Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation."
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, the also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
---
v3: "unret and ibpb mitigations" -> "UNRET and IBPB mitigations" (Mingo) v2: Justify and explain STIBP's role with IBPB (Boris)
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -5
@@ -5260,20 +5260,30 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. + AMD-based UNRET and IBPB mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling + threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors + that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't. + off - no mitigation auto - automatically select a migitation auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). - ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + ibpb - [AMD] Mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest - perf impact. - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + perf impact. It also enables STIBP if + present. + ibpb,nosmt - [AMD] Like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. + unret - [AMD] Force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP - is not available. + unret,nosmt - [AMD] Like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();
@@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
@@ -2320,10 +2321,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" ); return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Kim Phillips
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
"Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation."
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, the also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
Fixes 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
---
v3: "unret and ibpb mitigations" -> "UNRET and IBPB mitigations" (Mingo) v2: Justify and explain STIBP's role with IBPB (Boris).../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Any specific reason you don't want this also backported to the stable kernel branches that have the other retbleed fixes in them?
thanks,
greg k-h
PATCH v4 1/1 x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RetBleed
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
"Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation."
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, the also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
---
v4: Cc: stable (Greg K-H) v3: "unret and ibpb mitigations" -> "UNRET and IBPB mitigations" (Mingo) v2: Justify and explain STIBP's role with IBPB (Boris)
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +15 -5
@@ -5260,20 +5260,30 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. + AMD-based UNRET and IBPB mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads influencing the predictions of other sibling + threads. For that reason, we use STIBP on processors + that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors that don't. + off - no mitigation auto - automatically select a migitation auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). - ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + ibpb - [AMD] Mitigate short speculation windows on basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest - perf impact. - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + perf impact. It also enables STIBP if + present. + ibpb,nosmt - [AMD] Like ibpb, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. + unret - [AMD] Force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP - is not available. + unret,nosmt - [AMD] Like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();
@@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
@@ -2320,10 +2321,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" ); return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RETBleed
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 08 Aug 2022 09:32:33 -05:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 08 Aug 2022 19:12:17 +02:00
x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for IBPB mitigated RETBleed
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion, Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation.
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT vulnerability status accordingly.
[ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which
doesn't work here. ]
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 29 +++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +++--- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +21 -8
@@ -5209,20 +5209,33 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. + AMD-based UNRET and IBPB mitigations alone do not stop + sibling threads from influencing the predictions of other + sibling threads. For that reason, STIBP is used on pro- + cessors that support it, and mitigate SMT on processors + that don't. + off - no mitigation auto - automatically select a migitation auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). - ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on - basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest - perf impact. - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, - only effective on AMD f15h-f17h - based systems. - unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP - is not available. + ibpb - On AMD, mitigate short speculation + windows on basic block boundaries too. + Safe, highest perf impact. It also + enables STIBP if present. Not suitable + on Intel. + ibpb,nosmt - Like "ibpb" above but will disable SMT + when STIBP is not available. This is + the alternative for systems which do not + have STIBP. + unret - Force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based + systems. + unret,nosmt - Like unret, but will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. This is the alternative for + systems which do not have STIBP. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)/* * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is -* forced for UNRET. +* forced for UNRET or IBPB. */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation ();ssb_select_mitigation ();
@@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && mode !=SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED )pr_info ("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n" );
@@ -2320,10 +2321,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)static ssize_t retbleed_show_state (char *buf) { -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ) { +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || + retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ) {if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n" ); +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n" ); return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],