mm/madvise: remove CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 mm/madvise: remove CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) currently requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN when not acting on the caller's own mm. This is maximally restrictive, and perpetuates existing issues with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Remove this requirement.
When acting on an external process' memory, the biggest concerns for process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) are (1) being able to influence process performance by moving memory, possibly between nodes, that is mapped into the address space of external process(es), (2) defeat of address-space-layout randomization, and (3), being able to increase process RSS and memcg usage, possibly causing memcg OOM.
process_madvise(2) already enforces CAP_SYS_NICE and PTRACE_MODE_READ (in PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS mode). A process with these credentials can already accomplish (1) and (2) via move_pages(MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL), and (3) via process_madvise(MADV_WILLNEED).
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) may also circumvent sysfs THP settings. When acting on one's own memory (which is equivalent to madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)), this is deemed acceptable, since aside from the possibility of hoarding available hugepages (which is currently already possible) no harm to the system can be done. When acting on an external process' memory, circumventing sysfs THP settings should provide no additional threat compared to the ones listed. As such, imposing additional capabilities (such as CAP_SETUID, as a way to ensure the caller could have just altered the sysfs THP settings themselves) provides no extra protection.
--- mm/madvise.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/madvise.c +3 -5
@@ -1170,16 +1170,14 @@ madvise_behavior_valid(int behavior) } } -static bool -process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior,struct task_struct *task) +static bool process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior) {switch (behavior) {case MADV_COLD :case MADV_PAGEOUT :case MADV_WILLNEED : -return true;case MADV_COLLAPSE : -return task == current ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return true;default :return false; }
@@ -1457,7 +1455,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec, goto free_iov; } -if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior, task)) { +if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior)) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto release_task; }
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1.455.g008518b4e5-goog
Hasn't this been discussed during the MADV_COLLAPSE submission? What has changed? Does this need more time to settle with the consensus?
Quoted 67 lines · Zach O'Keefe
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)currently requiresCAP_SYS_ADMINwhen not acting on the caller's own mm. This is maximally restrictive, and perpetuates existing issues withCAP_SYS_ADMIN. Remove this requirement.When acting on an external process' memory, the biggest concerns for
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)are (1) being able to influence process performance by moving memory, possibly between nodes, that is mapped into the address space of external process(es), (2) defeat of address-space-layout randomization, and (3), being able to increase process RSS and memcg usage, possibly causing memcg OOM.
process_madvise(2)already enforcesCAP_SYS_NICEandPTRACE_MODE_READ(inPTRACE_MODE_FSCREDSmode). A process with these credentials can already accomplish (1) and (2) viamove_pages(MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL), and (3) viaprocess_madvise(MADV_WILLNEED).
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)may also circumvent sysfs THP settings. When acting on one's own memory (which is equivalent tomadvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)), this is deemed acceptable, since aside from the possibility of hoarding available hugepages (which is currently already possible) no harm to the system can be done. When acting on an external process' memory, circumventing sysfs THP settings should provide no additional threat compared to the ones listed. As such, imposing additional capabilities (such asCAP_SETUID, as a way to ensure the caller could have just altered the sysfs THP settings themselves) provides no extra protection.Fixes 7ec952341312 ("mm/madvise: add MADV_COLLAPSE to process_madvise()")Signed-off-by Zach O'Keefe <[email protected]>--- mm/madvise.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)mm/madvise.c +3
-5@@ -1170,16 +1170,14 @@ madvise_behavior_valid(int behavior) } } -static bool -process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior,struct task_struct *task) +static bool process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior) {switch (behavior) {case MADV_COLD :case MADV_PAGEOUT :case MADV_WILLNEED : -return true;case MADV_COLLAPSE : -return task == current ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return true;default :return false; }@@ -1457,7 +1455,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec, goto free_iov; } -if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior, task)) { +if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior)) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto release_task; }Signature · 1 line
2.37.1.455.g008518b4e5-goog
Signature · 2 lines
Michal Hocko SUSE Labs
Quoted 65 lines · Michal Hocko
Hasn't this been discussed during the
MADV_COLLAPSEsubmission? What has changed? Does this need more time to settle with the consensus?Quoted 60 lines · Zach O'Keefe
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)currently requiresCAP_SYS_ADMINwhen not acting on the caller's own mm. This is maximally restrictive, and perpetuates existing issues withCAP_SYS_ADMIN. Remove this requirement.When acting on an external process' memory, the biggest concerns for
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)are (1) being able to influence process performance by moving memory, possibly between nodes, that is mapped into the address space of external process(es), (2) defeat of address-space-layout randomization, and (3), being able to increase process RSS and memcg usage, possibly causing memcg OOM.
process_madvise(2)already enforcesCAP_SYS_NICEandPTRACE_MODE_READ(inPTRACE_MODE_FSCREDSmode). A process with these credentials can already accomplish (1) and (2) viamove_pages(MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL), and (3) viaprocess_madvise(MADV_WILLNEED).
process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)may also circumvent sysfs THP settings. When acting on one's own memory (which is equivalent tomadvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)), this is deemed acceptable, since aside from the possibility of hoarding available hugepages (which is currently already possible) no harm to the system can be done. When acting on an external process' memory, circumventing sysfs THP settings should provide no additional threat compared to the ones listed. As such, imposing additional capabilities (such asCAP_SETUID, as a way to ensure the caller could have just altered the sysfs THP settings themselves) provides no extra protection.Fixes 7ec952341312 ("mm/madvise: add MADV_COLLAPSE to process_madvise()")Signed-off-by Zach O'Keefe <[email protected]>--- mm/madvise.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)mm/madvise.c +2
-4@@ -1170,16 +1170,14 @@ madvise_behavior_valid(int behavior) } } -static bool -process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior,struct task_struct *task) +static bool process_madvise_behavior_valid (int behavior) {switch (behavior) {case MADV_COLD :case MADV_PAGEOUT :case MADV_WILLNEED : -return true;case MADV_COLLAPSE : -return task == current ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return true;default :return false; }@@ -1457,7 +1455,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec, goto free_iov; }
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
mm/madvise.c +1
-2-if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior, task)) { +if (!process_madvise_behavior_valid (behavior)) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto release_task; } --2.37.1.455.g008518b4e5-goog
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
Hey Michal,
Thanks for taking the time to take a look at this.
"mm/madvise: add MADV_COLLAPSE to process_madvise()" in the v7 series ended with me mentioning a couple options, but ultimately I didn't present a solution, and no consensus was reached[1]. After taking a closer look, this is my proposal for what I believe to be the best path forward. It should be squashed into the original patch. What do you think?
Thanks again,
Zach
On Tue 02-08-22 02:48:33, Zach O'Keefe wrote:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
"mm/madvise: add
MADV_COLLAPSEtoprocess_madvise()" in the v7 series ended with me mentioning a couple options, but ultimately I didn't present a solution, and no consensus was reached[1]. After taking a closer look, this is my proposal for what I believe to be the best path forward. It should be squashed into the original patch. What do you think?
If it is agreed that the CAP_SYS_ADMIN is too strict of a requirement then yes, this should be squashed into the original patch. There is no real reason to create a potential bisection headache by changing the permission model in a later patch.
From my POV, I would agree that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is just too strict of a requirement.
I didn't really have time to follow recent discussions but I would argue that the operation is not really destructive or seriously harmful. All applications can already have their memory (almost) equally THP collapsed by khupaged with the proposed process_madvise semantic.
NOHUGEMEM and prctl opt out from THP are both honored AFAIU and the only difference is the global THP killswitch behavior which I do not think warrants the strongest CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (especially because it doesn't really control all kinds of THPs).
If there is a userspace agent collapsing memory and causing problems then it can be easily fixed in the userspace. And I find that easier to do than putting the bar so high that userspace agents would be unfeasible because of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (which is nono in many cases as it would allow essentially full control of other stuff). So from practical POV, risking an extended RSS is really a negligible risk to lose a potentially useful feature for all others.
Just my 2c
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks again,
Zach
Signature · 2 lines
Michal Hocko SUSE Labs
Quoted 9 lines · Michal Hocko
On Tue 02-08-22 02:48:33, Zach O'Keefe wrote:
[...]Quoted 5 lines
"mm/madvise: add
MADV_COLLAPSEtoprocess_madvise()" in the v7 series ended with me mentioning a couple options, but ultimately I didn't present a solution, and no consensus was reached[1]. After taking a closer look, this is my proposal for what I believe to be the best path forward. It should be squashed into the original patch. What do you think?
Quoted 4 lines
If it is agreed that the
CAP_SYS_ADMINis too strict of a requirement then yes, this should be squashed into the original patch. There is no real reason to create a potential bisection headache by changing the permission model in a later patch.
Sorry about the confusion here. Assumed (incorrectly) that Andrew would kindly squash this in mm-unstable since I added the Fixes: tag. Next time I'll add some explicit verbiage saying it should be squashed.
Quoted 8 lines
From my POV, I would agree that
CAP_SYS_ADMINis just too strict of a requirement.I didn't really have time to follow recent discussions but I would argue that the operation is not really destructive or seriously harmful. All applications can already have their memory (almost) equally THP collapsed by khupaged with the proposed
process_madvisesemantic.
Quoted 4 lines
NOHUGEMEM and prctl opt out from THP are both honored AFAIU and the only difference is the global THP killswitch behavior which I do not think warrants the strongest
CAP_SYS_ADMINcapability (especially because it doesn't really control all kinds of THPs).
Ya. In fact, I don't think the ignoring the THP sysfs controls warrants any additional capability (set alone CAPS_SYS_ADMIN), since a malicious program can't really inflict any more damage than they would with CAP_SYS_NICE and PTRACE_MODE_READ.
Quoted 8 lines
If there is a userspace agent collapsing memory and causing problems then it can be easily fixed in the userspace. And I find that easier to do than putting the bar so high that userspace agents would be unfeasible because of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN(which is nono in many cases as it would allow essentially full control of other stuff). So from practical POV, risking an extended RSS is really a negligible risk to lose a potentially useful feature for all others.
Agreed.
Thanks for taking the time, Michal!
Zach
Quoted 10 lines
Just my 2c
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks again,
Zach--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
Quoted 48 lines · Zach O'Keefe
Quoted 9 lines · Michal Hocko
On Tue 02-08-22 02:48:33, Zach O'Keefe wrote:
[...]Quoted 5 lines
"mm/madvise: add
MADV_COLLAPSEtoprocess_madvise()" in the v7 series ended with me mentioning a couple options, but ultimately I didn't present a solution, and no consensus was reached[1]. After taking a closer look, this is my proposal for what I believe to be the best path forward. It should be squashed into the original patch. What do you think?Quoted 4 lines
If it is agreed that the
CAP_SYS_ADMINis too strict of a requirement then yes, this should be squashed into the original patch. There is no real reason to create a potential bisection headache by changing the permission model in a later patch.Sorry about the confusion here. Assumed (incorrectly) that Andrew would kindly squash this in mm-unstable since I added the Fixes: tag. Next time I'll add some explicit verbiage saying it should be squashed.
Quoted 8 lines
From my POV, I would agree that
CAP_SYS_ADMINis just too strict of a requirement.I didn't really have time to follow recent discussions but I would argue that the operation is not really destructive or seriously harmful. All applications can already have their memory (almost) equally THP collapsed by khupaged with the proposed
process_madvisesemantic.Quoted 4 lines
NOHUGEMEM and prctl opt out from THP are both honored AFAIU and the only difference is the global THP killswitch behavior which I do not think warrants the strongest
CAP_SYS_ADMINcapability (especially because it doesn't really control all kinds of THPs).Ya. In fact, I don't think the ignoring the THP sysfs controls warrants any additional capability (set alone
CAPS_SYS_ADMIN), since a malicious program can't really inflict any more damage than they would withCAP_SYS_NICEandPTRACE_MODE_READ.Quoted 8 lines
If there is a userspace agent collapsing memory and causing problems then it can be easily fixed in the userspace. And I find that easier to do than putting the bar so high that userspace agents would be unfeasible because of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN(which is nono in many cases as it would allow essentially full control of other stuff). So from practical POV, risking an extended RSS is really a negligible risk to lose a potentially useful feature for all others.
Quoted 1 line
Agreed.
+1
Quoted 15 lines
Thanks for taking the time, Michal!
ZachQuoted 10 lines
Just my 2c
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks again,
Zach--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs