bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting
PATCH 1/1 bpf: fix overflow in prog accounting
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ccb071e97fbd9ffe623a0d3977cc6d013bee93c ]
Commit aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging against prog->pages. Unlike map->pages, prog->pages are still subject to change when we need to expand the program through bpf_prog_realloc().
This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then prog->pages is not the same anymore as its original value that we used to bpf_prog_charge_memlock() on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around during bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock() when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock.
There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct bpf_prog that takes a snapshot of prog->pages at the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on struct bpf_prog would also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed is bpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine.
---
This fix was merged in Linux 4.10 but never backported to 4.9. The overflow has been occurring regularly when running Cilium's CI tests on kernel 4.9, so I would like to submit this patch for consideration to the 4.9 stable branch.
The initial patch applied with a minor conflict on include/linux/bpf.h, due to unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() backported in 6481835a9a5b ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf.h +11 -0
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type(u32 ufd, enum bpf_prog_type type);struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_add (struct bpf_prog *prog,int i);struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_inc (struct bpf_prog *prog);void bpf_prog_put (struct bpf_prog *prog); +int __bpf_prog_charge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages); +void __bpf_prog_uncharge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages);struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref (u32 ufd);struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get (struct fd f);
@@ -328,6 +330,15 @@ static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_inc(struct bpf_prog *prog)return ERR_PTR (-EOPNOTSUPP ); } +static inline int __bpf_prog_charge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void __bpf_prog_uncharge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages) +{ +} +static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled (void ) {return false;
kernel/bpf/core.c +13 -3
@@ -107,19 +107,29 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_realloc(struct bpf_prog *fp_old, unsigned int size,gfp_t gfp_flags =GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_extra_flags;struct bpf_prog *fp; +u32 pages, delta; +int ret;BUG_ON (fp_old ==NULL ); size =round_up (size,PAGE_SIZE ); -if (size <= fp_old->pages *PAGE_SIZE ) + pages = size /PAGE_SIZE ; +if (pages <= fp_old->pages)return fp_old; + delta = pages - fp_old->pages; + ret =__bpf_prog_charge (fp_old->aux->user, delta); +if (ret) +return NULL ; + fp =__vmalloc (size, gfp_flags,PAGE_KERNEL ); -if (fp !=NULL ) { +if (fp ==NULL ) { +__bpf_prog_uncharge (fp_old->aux->user, delta); + }else {kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield (fp, meta);memcpy (fp, fp_old, fp_old->pages *PAGE_SIZE ); - fp->pages = size /PAGE_SIZE ; + fp->pages = pages; fp->aux->prog = fp;/* We keep fp->aux from fp_old around in the new
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +28 -8
@@ -581,19 +581,39 @@ static void free_used_maps(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)kfree (aux->used_maps); } +int __bpf_prog_charge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages) +{ +unsigned long memlock_limit =rlimit (RLIMIT_MEMLOCK ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +unsigned long user_bufs; + +if (user) { + user_bufs =atomic_long_add_return (pages, &user->locked_vm); +if (user_bufs > memlock_limit) { +atomic_long_sub (pages, &user->locked_vm); +return -EPERM ; + } + } + +return 0 ; +} + +void __bpf_prog_uncharge (struct user_struct *user,u32 pages) +{ +if (user) +atomic_long_sub (pages, &user->locked_vm); +} +static int bpf_prog_charge_memlock (struct bpf_prog *prog) {struct user_struct *user =get_current_user (); -unsigned long memlock_limit; +int ret; - memlock_limit =rlimit (RLIMIT_MEMLOCK ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; - -atomic_long_add (prog->pages, &user->locked_vm); -if (atomic_long_read (&user->locked_vm) > memlock_limit) { -atomic_long_sub (prog->pages, &user->locked_vm); + ret =__bpf_prog_charge (user, prog->pages); +if (ret) {free_uid (user); -return -EPERM ; +return ret; } + prog->aux->user = user;return 0 ; }
@@ -602,7 +622,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock(struct bpf_prog *prog) {struct user_struct *user = prog->aux->user; -atomic_long_sub (prog->pages, &user->locked_vm); +__bpf_prog_uncharge (user, prog->pages);free_uid (user); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 45 lines · Quentin Monnet
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
5ccb071e97fbd9ffe623a0d3977cc6d013bee93c]Commit
aaac3ba95e4c("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs") made a wrong assumption of charging againstprog->pages. Unlikemap->pages,prog->pagesare still subject to change when we need to expand the program throughbpf_prog_realloc().This can for example happen during verification stage when we need to expand and rewrite parts of the program. Should the required space cross a page boundary, then
prog->pagesis not the same anymore as its original value that we used tobpf_prog_charge_memlock()on. Thus, we'll hit a wrap-around duringbpf_prog_uncharge_memlock()when prog is freed eventually. I noticed this that despite having unlimited memlock, programs suddenly refused to load with EPERM error due to insufficient memlock.There are two ways to fix this issue. One would be to add a cached variable to struct
bpf_progthat takes a snapshot ofprog->pagesat the time of charging. The other approach is to also account for resizes. I chose to go with the latter for a couple of reasons: i) We want accounting rather to be more accurate instead of further fooling limits, ii) adding yet another page counter on structbpf_progwould also be a waste just for this purpose. We also do want to charge as early as possible to avoid going into the verifier just to find out later on that we crossed limits. The only place that needs to be fixed isbpf_prog_realloc(), since only here we expand the program, so we try to account for the needed delta and should we fail, call-sites check for outcome anyway. On cBPF to eBPF migrations, we don't grab a reference to the user as they are charged differently. With that in place, my test case worked fine.Fixes aaac3ba95e4c ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs")Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>[Quentin: backport to 4.9: Adjust context in bpf.h ]Signed-off-by Quentin Monnet <[email protected]>---
This fix was merged in Linux 4.10 but never backported to 4.9. The overflow has been occurring regularly when running Cilium's CI tests on kernel 4.9, so I would like to submit this patch for consideration to the 4.9 stable branch.
Quoted 4 lines
The initial patch applied with a minor conflict on
include/linux/bpf.h, due tounprivileged_ebpf_enabled()backported in6481835a9a5b("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")
Now queued up, thanks.
greg k-h