Skip to contentSkip to conversation

arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

PATCH Applied Liu Song 3 participants 4 messages Aug 26, 2022 – Sep 9, 2022

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Liu Song

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c                 | 10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -0
index d7f3090..1edc9a6 100644
@@ -3207,6 +3207,7 @@
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+					       nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
@@ -3631,6 +3632,10 @@
 			vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
 			option.
 
+	nospectre_bhb	[ARM64] Disable all mitigations for Spectre-BHB (branch
+			history injection) vulnerability. System may allow data leaks
+			with this option.
+
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +9 -1
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
 	isb();
 }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
 	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
maintainer Acked-by on v2 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Liu Song

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

If people want to disable this mitigation and know what they are doing, I have no objection:

(I guess that's more like 6.1 material)

Signature · 1 line
Catalin
maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 9 lines · Liu Song

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

If people want to disable this mitigation and know what they are doing, I have no objection:

Thanks!

Quoted 1 line

(I guess that's more like 6.1 material)

Yup, agreed. I take it you'll pick it up, then?

Will

maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Liu Song
Quoted 10 lines · Liu Song

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

[...]

Applied to arm64 (for-next/misc), thanks!

[1/1] arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

      https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/877ace9eab7d
Signature · 1 line
Catalin