request_key03: Refactor child process code
PATCH 1/3 request_key03: Refactor child process code
Split off child process code into separate functions.
Signed-off-by Martin Doucha <[email protected]>
---
This is the final patchset of my max_runtime fixes. I've tried to keep functional changes to a minimum. We can redesign the child processes to run for a fixed period of time later.
I've also tested the patchset on a vulnerable kernel and it successfully triggers the kernel bug.
.../syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c | 101 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c +58 -43
@@ -39,10 +39,65 @@static char *opt_bug; +static void run_child_add (const char *type,const char *payload,int effort) +{ +int i; + +/* +* Depending on the state of the key, add_key() should either succeed or +* fail with one of several errors: +* +* (1) key didn't exist at all: either add_key() should succeed (if the +* payload is valid), or it should fail with EINVAL (if the payload +* is invalid; this is needed for the "encrypted" and "trusted" key +* types because they have a quirk where the payload syntax differs +* for creating new keys vs. updating existing keys) +* +* (2) key was negative: add_key() should succeed +* +* (3) key was uninstantiated: add_key() should wait for the key to be +* negated, then fail with ENOKEY +* +* For now we also accept EDQUOT because the kernel frees up the keys +* quota asynchronously after keys are unlinked. So it may be hit. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i <100 * effort; i++) { +usleep (rand () %1024 ); +TEST (add_key (type,"desc" , payload,strlen (payload), +KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); +if (TST_RET <0 &&TST_ERR !=EINVAL &&TST_ERR !=ENOKEY && +TST_ERR !=EDQUOT ) { +tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO , +"unexpected error adding key of type '%s'" , + type); + } + +TEST (keyctl (KEYCTL_CLEAR ,KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); + +if (TST_RET <0 ) +tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO ,"unable to clear keyring" ); + } +} + +static void run_child_request (const char *type,int effort) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <5000 * effort; i++) { +TEST (request_key (type,"desc" ,"callout_info" , +KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); +if (TST_RET <0 &&TST_ERR !=ENOKEY &&TST_ERR !=ENOENT && +TST_ERR !=EDQUOT ) { +tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO , +"unexpected error requesting key of type '%s'" , + type); + } + } +} +static void test_with_key_type (const char *type,const char *payload,int effort) { -int i;int status;pid_t add_key_pid;pid_t request_key_pid;
@@ -68,56 +123,16 @@ static void test_with_key_type(const char *type, const char *payload,/* * Fork a subprocess which repeatedly tries to "add" a key of the given * type. This actually will try to update the key if it already exists. -* Depending on the state of the key, add_key() should either succeed or -* fail with one of several errors: -* -* (1) key didn't exist at all: either add_key() should succeed (if the -* payload is valid), or it should fail with EINVAL (if the payload -* is invalid; this is needed for the "encrypted" and "trusted" key -* types because they have a quirk where the payload syntax differs -* for creating new keys vs. updating existing keys) -* -* (2) key was negative: add_key() should succeed -* -* (3) key was uninstantiated: add_key() should wait for the key to be -* negated, then fail with ENOKEY -* -* For now we also accept EDQUOT because the kernel frees up the keys -* quota asynchronously after keys are unlinked. So it may be hit. */ add_key_pid =SAFE_FORK ();if (add_key_pid ==0 ) { -for (i =0 ; i <100 * effort; i++) { -usleep (rand () %1024 ); -TEST (add_key (type,"desc" , payload,strlen (payload), -KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); -if (TST_RET <0 &&TST_ERR !=EINVAL && -TST_ERR !=ENOKEY &&TST_ERR !=EDQUOT ) { -tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO , -"unexpected error adding key of type '%s'" , - type); - } -TEST (keyctl (KEYCTL_CLEAR ,KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); -if (TST_RET <0 ) { -tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO , -"unable to clear keyring" ); - } - } +run_child_add (type, payload, effort);exit (0 ); } request_key_pid =SAFE_FORK ();if (request_key_pid ==0 ) { -for (i =0 ; i <5000 * effort; i++) { -TEST (request_key (type,"desc" ,"callout_info" , -KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING )); -if (TST_RET <0 &&TST_ERR !=ENOKEY && -TST_ERR !=ENOENT &&TST_ERR !=EDQUOT ) { -tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO , -"unexpected error requesting key of type '%s'" , - type); - } - } +run_child_request (type, effort);exit (0 ); }
Signature · 5 lines
2.37.3 -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
PATCH 2/3 request_key03: Split test into 3 testcases
Signed-off-by Martin Doucha <[email protected]>
--- .../syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c | 70 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c +37 -33
@@ -37,6 +37,30 @@#include "tst_test.h" #include "lapi/keyctl.h" +static struct test_case { +const char *type; +const char *payload; +int effort; +} testcase_list[] = { +/* +* Briefly test the "encrypted" and/or "trusted" key types when +* availaible, mainly to reproduce CVE-2017-15299. +*/ + {"encrypted" ,"update user:foo 32" ,2 }, + {"trusted" ,"update" ,2 }, + +/* +* Test the "user" key type for longer, mainly in order to reproduce +* CVE-2017-15951. However, without the fix for CVE-2017-15299 as well, +* WARNs may show up in the kernel log. +* +* Note: the precise iteration count is arbitrary; it's just intended to +* be enough to give a decent chance of reproducing the bug, without +* wasting too much time. +*/ + {"user" ,"payload" ,20 }, +}; +static char *opt_bug;static void run_child_add (const char *type,const char *payload,int effort)
@@ -95,29 +119,29 @@ static void run_child_request(const char *type, int effort) } } -static void test_with_key_type (const char *type,const char *payload, -int effort) +static void do_test (unsigned int n) {int status;pid_t add_key_pid;pid_t request_key_pid;bool info_only; +struct test_case *tc = testcase_list + n;TEST (keyctl (KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING ,NULL ));if (TST_RET <0 )tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO ,"failed to join new session keyring" ); -TEST (add_key (type,"desc" , payload,strlen (payload), +TEST (add_key (tc->type,"desc" , tc->payload,strlen (tc->payload),KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING ));if (TST_RET <0 &&TST_ERR !=EINVAL ) {if (TST_ERR ==ENODEV ) {tst_res (TCONF ,"kernel doesn't support key type '%s'" , - type); + tc->type);return ; }tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO ,"unexpected error checking whether key type '%s' is supported" , - type); + tc->type); }/*
@@ -126,13 +150,13 @@ static void test_with_key_type(const char *type, const char *payload,*/ add_key_pid =SAFE_FORK ();if (add_key_pid ==0 ) { -run_child_add (type, payload, effort); +run_child_add (tc->type, tc->payload, tc->effort);exit (0 ); } request_key_pid =SAFE_FORK ();if (request_key_pid ==0 ) { -run_child_request (type, effort); +run_child_request (tc->type, tc->effort);exit (0 ); }
@@ -149,11 +173,11 @@ static void test_with_key_type(const char *type, const char *payload,if (WIFEXITED (status) &&WEXITSTATUS (status) ==0 ) {tst_res (info_only ?TINFO :TPASS ,"didn't crash while updating key of type '%s'" , - type); + tc->type); }else if (WIFSIGNALED (status) &&WTERMSIG (status) ==SIGKILL ) {tst_res (info_only ?TINFO :TFAIL ,"kernel oops while updating key of type '%s'" , - type); + tc->type); }else {tst_brk (TBROK ,"add_key child %s" ,tst_strstatus (status)); }
@@ -163,39 +187,19 @@ static void test_with_key_type(const char *type, const char *payload,if (WIFEXITED (status) &&WEXITSTATUS (status) ==0 ) {tst_res (info_only ?TINFO :TPASS ,"didn't crash while requesting key of type '%s'" , - type); + tc->type); }else if (WIFSIGNALED (status) &&WTERMSIG (status) ==SIGKILL ) {tst_res (info_only ?TINFO :TFAIL ,"kernel oops while requesting key of type '%s'" , - type); + tc->type); }else {tst_brk (TBROK ,"request_key child %s" ,tst_strstatus (status)); } } -static void do_test (void ) -{ -/* -* Briefly test the "encrypted" and/or "trusted" key types when -* availaible, mainly to reproduce CVE-2017-15299. -*/ -test_with_key_type ("encrypted" ,"update user:foo 32" ,2 ); -test_with_key_type ("trusted" ,"update" ,2 ); - -/* -* Test the "user" key type for longer, mainly in order to reproduce -* CVE-2017-15951. However, without the fix for CVE-2017-15299 as well, -* WARNs may show up in the kernel log. -* -* Note: the precise iteration count is arbitrary; it's just intended to -* be enough to give a decent chance of reproducing the bug, without -* wasting too much time. -*/ -test_with_key_type ("user" ,"payload" ,20 ); -} -static struct tst_test test = { - .test_all = do_test, + .test = do_test, + .tcnt =ARRAY_SIZE (testcase_list), .forks_child =1 , .options = (struct tst_option []) { {"b:" , &opt_bug,"Bug to test for (cve-2017-15299 or cve-2017-15951; default is both)" },
Signature · 5 lines
2.37.3 -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
PATCH 3/3 request_key03: Add max_runtime and make children runtime-aware
In reply to Martin DouchaSigned-off-by Martin Doucha <[email protected]>
--- .../kernel/syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/request_key/request_key03.c +12 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ static void run_child_add(const char *type, const char *payload, int effort)if (TST_RET <0 )tst_brk (TBROK |TTERRNO ,"unable to clear keyring" ); + +if (!tst_remaining_runtime ()) { +tst_res (TINFO ,"add_key() process runtime exceeded" ); +break ; + } } }
@@ -116,6 +121,12 @@ static void run_child_request(const char *type, int effort)"unexpected error requesting key of type '%s'" , type); } + +if (!tst_remaining_runtime ()) { +tst_res (TINFO , +"request_key() process runtime exceeded" ); +break ; + } } }
@@ -201,6 +212,7 @@ static struct tst_test test = { .test = do_test, .tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(testcase_list), .forks_child = 1, + .max_runtime = 20, .options = (struct tst_option []) { {"b:" , &opt_bug,"Bug to test for (cve-2017-15299 or cve-2017-15951; default is both)" }, {}
Signature · 5 lines
2.37.3 -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi!
Pushed, thanks.
Signature · 5 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected] -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp