Skip to contentSkip to conversation

efi: consume random seed provided by loader

PATCH Superseded Ard Biesheuvel 3 participants 10 messages Sep 19, 2022 – Sep 20, 2022

Subsystems (3)

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

lore
Share & tools
lore

Ard Biesheuvel

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover efi: consume random seed provided by loader

Getting a random seed into the kernel very early is important for data structures that rely on the random number generator at initialization time, but hardware based RNGs may not become available until much later in the boot.

For this reason, the EFI stub will currently invoke the EFI RNG protocol to get a random seed from the hardware before tearing down the EFI boot services and performing the low level boot of the kernel proper. The generated seed is passed via a EFI configuration table, which is available very early, and so the random number generator comes up much earlier as well.

Any boot stage preceding the EFI stub can install configuration tables, so we can decide to expose the same mechanism to other loaders. This allows, e.g., systemd-boot to pass the seed it keeps in a file on the ESP without having to rely on PID #1 dd'ing it into /dev/random, which is much too late to be useful.

As suggested by Jason, let's use blake2s to combine seeds obtained via the config table and via the protocol if both are available, and throw in a personalization string for good measure.

Older kernels will simply supersede the bootloader provided seed, unless the RNG protocol is not available, in which case the bootloader seed will be forwarded untouched if one is present. This should not be an issue, but let's reduce the seed size to blake2's output size, and switch to the correct memory type in separate changes so they can be backported.

Cc Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Cc Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc Lennart Poettering <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

Ard Biesheuvel (3):
efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes
efi: random: Use 'ACPI reclaim' memory for random seed
efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol
output

 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c             |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile  |  4 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h |  2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c  | 83 ++++++++++++--------
 include/linux/efi.h                    |  4 +-
 lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c           |  2 +
 lib/crypto/blake2s.c                   |  7 +-
 7 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes

We no longer need at least 64 bytes of random seed to permit the early crng init to complete. The RNG is now based on Blake2s, so reduce the EFI seed size to the Blake2s hash size, which is sufficient for our purposes.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/efi.h        | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
index e4080ad96089..06b0755f32a2 100644
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
 		seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		if (seed != NULL) {
-			size = READ_ONCE(seed->size);
+			size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
 			early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		} else {
 			pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
include/linux/efi.h +1 -1
index d2b84c2fec39..7b015508c773 100644
@@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void);
 	arch_efi_call_virt_teardown();					\
 })
 
-#define EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE		64U
+#define EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE		32U // BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
 
 struct linux_efi_random_seed {
 	u32	size;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes

Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel

We no longer need at least 64 bytes of random seed to permit the early crng init to complete. The RNG is now based on Blake2s, so reduce the EFI seed size to the Blake2s hash size, which is sufficient for our purposes.

author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 efi: random: Use 'ACPI reclaim' memory for random seed

In reply to Ard Biesheuvel

EFI runtime services data is guaranteed to be preserved by the OS, making it a suitable candidate for the EFI random seed table, which may be passed to kexec kernels as well (after refreshing the seed), and so we need to ensure that the memory is preserved without support from the OS itself.

However, runtime services data is intended for allocations that are relevant to the implementations of the runtime services themselves, and so they are unmapped from the kernel linear map, and mapped into the EFI page tables that are active while runtime service invocations are in progress. None of this is needed for the RNG seed.

So let's switch to EFI 'ACPI reclaim' memory: in spite of the name, there is nothing exclusively ACPI about it, it is simply a type of allocation that carries firmware provided data which may or may not be relevant to the OS, and it is left up to the OS to decide whether to reclaim it after having consumed its contents.

Given that in Linux, we never reclaim these allocations, it is a good choice for the EFI RNG seed, as the allocation is guaranteed to survive kexec reboots.

One additional reason for changing this now is to align it with the upcoming recommendation for EFI bootloader provided RNG seeds, which must not use EFI runtime services code/data allocations.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +1 -1
index 24aa37535372..183dc5cdb8ed 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		return status;
 
-	status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
+	status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY,
 			     sizeof(*seed) + EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
 			     (void **)&seed);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

In reply to Ard Biesheuvel

Instead of blindly creating the EFI random seed configuration table if the RNG protocol is implemented and works, check whether such a EFI configuration table was provided by an earlier boot stage and if so, combine its contents with a Linux specific personalization string, and if available, mix in the output of the RNG protocol as well.

This can be used for, e.g., systemd-boot, to pass an additional seed to Linux in a way that can be consumed by the kernel very early. In that case, the following definitions should be used to pass the seed to the EFI stub:

  struct linux_efi_random_seed {
          u32     size; // of the 'seed' array in bytes
          u8      seed[];
  };

The memory for the struct must be allocated as EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY pool memory, and the address of the struct in memory should be installed as a EFI configuration table using the following GUID:

LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID 1ce1e5bc-7ceb-42f2-81e5-8aadf180f57b

Note that doing so is safe even on kernels that were built without this patch applied, but the seed will simply be overwritten with a seed derived from the EFI RNG protocol, if available. The recommended seed size is 32 bytes, anything beyond that is mixed in but not reflected in the final seed size.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile  |  4 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h |  2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c  | 79 ++++++++++++--------
 include/linux/efi.h                    |  2 -
 lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c           |  2 +
 lib/crypto/blake2s.c                   |  7 +-
 6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +4 -0
index d0537573501e..3b3c67001566 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
 lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
 				   file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \
 				   skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \
+				   libcrypto-blake2s.o libcrypto-blake2s-generic.o \
 				   alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
@@ -63,6 +64,9 @@ efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
 $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
+$(obj)/libcrypto-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/crypto/%.c FORCE
+	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
+
 lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_GENERIC_STUB)	+= efi-stub.o fdt.o string.o \
 				   $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(efi-deps-y))
 
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +2 -0
index b0ae0a454404..fc32897de5e8 100644
@@ -873,6 +873,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out);
 efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
 			      unsigned long *addr, unsigned long random_seed);
 
+void efi_random_get_seed(void);
+
 efi_status_t check_platform_features(void);
 
 void *get_efi_config_table(efi_guid_t guid);
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +47 -32

113 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/efi.h +0 -2
index 7b015508c773..95542148d9d7 100644
@@ -1142,8 +1142,6 @@ void efi_check_for_embedded_firmwares(void);
 static inline void efi_check_for_embedded_firmwares(void) { }
 #endif
 
-efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void);
-
 #define arch_efi_call_virt(p, f, args...)	((p)->f(args))
 
 /*
lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c +2 -0
index 75ccb3e633e6..5d16b5a59618 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic);
 
+#ifdef MODULE
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>");
+#endif
lib/crypto/blake2s.c +5 -2
index 98e688c6d891..dbae6d83027b 100644
@@ -58,15 +58,18 @@ void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
 
+#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS)
 static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
 {
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
-	    WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
+	if (WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
 		return -ENODEV;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
+#endif
+#ifdef MODULE
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>");
+#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 3/3
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

Quoted 23 lines · Ard Biesheuvel

Instead of blindly creating the EFI random seed configuration table if the RNG protocol is implemented and works, check whether such a EFI configuration table was provided by an earlier boot stage and if so, combine its contents with a Linux specific personalization string, and if available, mix in the output of the RNG protocol as well.

This can be used for, e.g., systemd-boot, to pass an additional seed to Linux in a way that can be consumed by the kernel very early. In that case, the following definitions should be used to pass the seed to the EFI stub:

  struct linux_efi_random_seed {
          u32     size; // of the 'seed' array in bytes
          u8      seed[];
  };

The memory for the struct must be allocated as EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY pool memory, and the address of the struct in memory should be installed as a EFI configuration table using the following GUID:

LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID 1ce1e5bc-7ceb-42f2-81e5-8aadf180f57b

Quoted 8 lines

Note that doing so is safe even on kernels that were built without this patch applied, but the seed will simply be overwritten with a seed derived from the EFI RNG protocol, if available. The recommended seed size is 32 bytes, anything beyond that is mixed in but not reflected in the final seed size.

(And I suppose you can trim those quotation marks in the suggested-by tag, since it's a git trailer rather than an email header.)

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

In reply to Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 132 lines · Ard Biesheuvel

Instead of blindly creating the EFI random seed configuration table if the RNG protocol is implemented and works, check whether such a EFI configuration table was provided by an earlier boot stage and if so, combine its contents with a Linux specific personalization string, and if available, mix in the output of the RNG protocol as well.

This can be used for, e.g., systemd-boot, to pass an additional seed to Linux in a way that can be consumed by the kernel very early. In that case, the following definitions should be used to pass the seed to the EFI stub:

  struct linux_efi_random_seed {
          u32     size; // of the 'seed' array in bytes
          u8      seed[];
  };

The memory for the struct must be allocated as EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY pool memory, and the address of the struct in memory should be installed as a EFI configuration table using the following GUID:

LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID 1ce1e5bc-7ceb-42f2-81e5-8aadf180f57b

Note that doing so is safe even on kernels that were built without this patch applied, but the seed will simply be overwritten with a seed derived from the EFI RNG protocol, if available. The recommended seed size is 32 bytes, anything beyond that is mixed in but not reflected in the final seed size.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile  |  4 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h |  2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c  | 79 ++++++++++++--------
 include/linux/efi.h                    |  2 -
 lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c           |  2 +
 lib/crypto/blake2s.c                   |  7 +-
 6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +4 -0
index d0537573501e..3b3c67001566 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT                       := n
 lib-y                          := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
                                   file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \
                                   skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \
+                                  libcrypto-blake2s.o libcrypto-blake2s-generic.o \
                                   alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
@@ -63,6 +64,9 @@ efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
 $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE
        $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
+$(obj)/libcrypto-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/crypto/%.c FORCE
+       $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
+
 lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_GENERIC_STUB) += efi-stub.o fdt.o string.o \
                                   $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(efi-deps-y))
 
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +2 -0
index b0ae0a454404..fc32897de5e8 100644
@@ -873,6 +873,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out);
 efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
                              unsigned long *addr, unsigned long random_seed);
 
+void efi_random_get_seed(void);
+
 efi_status_t check_platform_features(void);
 
 void *get_efi_config_table(efi_guid_t guid);
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +11 -15
index 183dc5cdb8ed..87fcd73ef615 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <asm/efi.h>
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
 
 #include "efistub.h"
 
@@ -49,60 +50,74 @@ efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out)
        return efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL, size, out);
 }
 
+static char const pstr[] = "Linux EFI Stub RNG Seed Label v1";
+
 /**
  * efi_random_get_seed() - provide random seed as configuration table
  *
  * The EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL is used to read random bytes. These random bytes are
  * saved as a configuration table which can be used as entropy by the kernel
  * for the initialization of its pseudo random number generator.
- *
- * If the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL is not available or there are not enough random bytes
- * available, the configuration table will not be installed and an error code
- * will be returned.
- *
- * Return:     status code
  */
-efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
+void efi_random_get_seed(void)
 {
        efi_guid_t rng_proto = EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
        efi_guid_t rng_algo_raw = EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM_RAW;
        efi_guid_t rng_table_guid = LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID;
        efi_rng_protocol_t *rng = NULL;
        struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed = NULL;
+       struct blake2s_state state;
+       unsigned int total_len = 0;
        efi_status_t status;
 
-       status = efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &rng_proto, NULL, (void **)&rng);
-       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-               return status;
+       // grab the EFI RNG protocol, if it exists
+       efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &rng_proto, NULL, (void **)&rng);
 
-       status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY,
-                            sizeof(*seed) + EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE,
-                            (void **)&seed);
-       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-               return status;
+       // grab the seed provided by the previous boot stages
+       seed = get_efi_config_table(LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID);
+

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out) · line 88

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +10 -0
+       // if neither exists, there is little we can do
+       if (!seed && !rng)
+               return;
+
+       blake2s_init(&state, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
+       blake2s_update(&state, pstr, sizeof(pstr) - 1);
+
+       if (seed) {
+               blake2s_update(&state, (void *)&seed->size, sizeof(seed->size));
+               blake2s_update(&state, seed->bits, seed->size);

Since this is never freed, and also just for hygiene, add:

memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));

Reviewed-by on v1 3/3
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

In reply to Ard Biesheuvel

On Mo, 19.09.22 18:09, Ard Biesheuvel ([email protected]) wrote:

Heya!

Looks excellent!

I was wondering though, shouldn't the memory the seed data is stored in be zeroed out when you dispose of it, just for safety?

Quoted 12 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +4 -7
+	if (rng) {
+		const int sz = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+		u8 bits[EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
 
-	if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
-		/*
-		 * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
-		 * is not implemented.
-		 */
-		status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL,
-					EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
+		status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, &rng_algo_raw, sz, bits);

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out) · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +9 -0
+		if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
+			/*
+			 * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
+			 * is not implemented.
+			 */
+			status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL, sz, bits);
 
+		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
+			blake2s_update(&state, (void *)&sz, sizeof(sz));
+			blake2s_update(&state, bits, sz);

So, here, shouldn't bitſ[] be zeroed out?

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out) · line 117

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +1 -1
-	seed->size = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+	blake2s_final(&state, seed->bits);

And here, shouldn't the state struct be zeroed out? (or does blake2s_final() do that implicitly?

Looks excellent otherwise!

Will-be-used-by systemd
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

Quoted 32 lines · Lennart Poettering

On Mo, 19.09.22 18:09, Ard Biesheuvel ([email protected]) wrote:

Heya!

Looks excellent!

I was wondering though, shouldn't the memory the seed data is stored in be zeroed out when you dispose of it, just for safety?

Quoted 12 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +4 -7
+     if (rng) {
+             const int sz = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+             u8 bits[EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
 
-     if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
-             /*
-              * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
-              * is not implemented.
-              */
-             status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL,
-                                     EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
+             status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, &rng_algo_raw, sz, bits);

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out) · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +9 -0
+             if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
+                     /*
+                      * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm
+                      * is not implemented.
+                      */
+                     status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL, sz, bits);
 
+             if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
+                     blake2s_update(&state, (void *)&sz, sizeof(sz));
+                     blake2s_update(&state, bits, sz);
Quoted 8 lines

So, here, shouldn't bitſ[] be zeroed out?

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c efi_status_t efi_get_random_bytes(unsigned long size, u8 *out) · line 117

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +1 -1
-     seed->size = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+     blake2s_final(&state, seed->bits);

And here, shouldn't the state struct be zeroed out? (or does blake2s_final() do that implicitly?

Yes, Jason pointed that out as well. (Twice, actually :-))

Quoted 4 lines

Looks excellent otherwise!

Will-be-used-by systemd

Thanks, much appreciated.

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output

In reply to Lennart Poettering
Quoted 2 lines · Lennart Poettering

I was wondering though, shouldn't the memory the seed data is stored in be zeroed out when you dispose of it, just for safety?

I mentioned the same. I think Ard is gonna handle that for v2, in addition to freeing the prior seed's allocation.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

+ blake2s_final(&state, seed->bits);

And here, shouldn't the state struct be zeroed out? (or does blake2s_final() do that implicitly?

In this case, blake2s_final does it implicitly.