Skip to contentSkip to conversation

f2fs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds Read KASAN bug in f2fs_getxattr()

PATCH In review qasdev 2 participants 2 messages Jan 7, 2025 – Jan 8, 2025 F2FS file system

lore
Share & tools
lore

qasdev

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 f2fs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds Read KASAN bug in f2fs_getxattr()

In f2fs_getxattr(), the function lookup_all_xattrs() allocates a 12-byte (base_size) buffer for an inline extended attribute. However, when __find_inline_xattr() calls __find_xattr(), it uses the macro "list_for_each_xattr(entry, addr)", which starts by calling XATTR_FIRST_ENTRY(addr). This skips a 24-byte struct f2fs_xattr_header at the beginning of the buffer, causing an immediate out-of-bounds read in a 12-byte allocation. The subsequent !IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(entry) check then dereferences memory outside the allocated region, triggering the slab-out-of bounds read.

This patch prevents the out-of-bounds read by adding a check to bail out early if inline_size is too small and does not account for the header plus the 4-byte value that IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY reads.

Fixes 388a2a0640e1 ("f2fs: remove redundant sanity check in sanity_check_inode()")
---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
index 3f3874943679..cf82646bca0e 100644
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
 	if (!xnid && !inline_size)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
+	if (inline_size < sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_header) + sizeof(__u32))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
 	*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(inode) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
 	txattr_addr = xattr_alloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, is_inline);
 	if (!txattr_addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
maintainer
#1 lore raw

Hi Qasim,

Quoted 10 lines · qasdev

In f2fs_getxattr(), the function lookup_all_xattrs() allocates a 12-byte (base_size) buffer for an inline extended attribute. However, when __find_inline_xattr() calls __find_xattr(), it uses the macro "list_for_each_xattr(entry, addr)", which starts by calling XATTR_FIRST_ENTRY(addr). This skips a 24-byte struct f2fs_xattr_header at the beginning of the buffer, causing an immediate out-of-bounds read in a 12-byte allocation. The subsequent !IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(entry) check then dereferences memory outside the allocated region, triggering the slab-out-of bounds read.

Quoted 3 lines

This patch prevents the out-of-bounds read by adding a check to bail out early if inline_size is too small and does not account for the header plus the 4-byte value that IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY reads.

Thank you very much for analyzing this issue, the root cause you figured out makes sense to me.

Can you please check the patch in below link? It seems it can fix this issue as well? IIUC.

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected]/

Thanks,

Quoted 25 lines
Fixes 388a2a0640e1 ("f2fs: remove redundant sanity check in sanity_check_inode()")
---
  fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 3 +++
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +3 -0
index 3f3874943679..cf82646bca0e 100644
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
  	if (!xnid && !inline_size)
  		return -ENODATA;
 
+	if (inline_size < sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_header) + sizeof(__u32))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
  	*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(inode) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
  	txattr_addr = xattr_alloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, is_inline);
  	if (!txattr_addr)