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io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed()

PATCH In review Hamza Mahfooz 4 participants 13 messages Jan 27, 2025 – Feb 7, 2025

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed()

Have io_uring_allowed() return an error code directly instead of true/false. This is needed for follow-up work to guard io_uring_setup() with LSM.

---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +14 -7
index 7bfbc7c22367..c2d8bd4c2cfc 100644
@@ -3789,29 +3789,36 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
 	return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
-static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 {
 	int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled);
 	kgid_t io_uring_group;
 
 	if (disabled == 2)
-		return false;
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (disabled == 0 || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return true;
+		goto allowed_lsm;
 
 	io_uring_group = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, sysctl_io_uring_group);
 	if (!gid_valid(io_uring_group))
-		return false;
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!in_group_p(io_uring_group))
+		return -EPERM;
 
-	return in_group_p(io_uring_group);
+allowed_lsm:
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
 		struct io_uring_params __user *, params)
 {
-	if (!io_uring_allowed())
-		return -EPERM;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = io_uring_allowed();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return io_uring_setup(entries, params);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
 security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -0
index e2f1ce37c41e..9eb313bd0c93 100644
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_allowed, void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
include/linux/security.h +5 -0
index 980b6c207cad..3e68f8468a22 100644
@@ -2362,6 +2362,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
 extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
 extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void);
 #else
 static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
@@ -2375,6 +2376,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
index c2d8bd4c2cfc..9df7b3b556ef 100644
@@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 allowed_lsm:
-	return 0;
+	return security_uring_allowed();
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
security/security.c +12 -0
index 143561ebc3e8..c9fae447327e 100644
@@ -5999,6 +5999,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 /**
security/selinux/hooks.c +14 -0
index 7b867dfec88b..fb37e87df226 100644
@@ -7137,6 +7137,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
+			    NULL);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
@@ -7390,6 +7403,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
 #endif
 
 	/*
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
index 03e82477dce9..8a8f3908aac8 100644
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "perf_event",
 	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
 	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
-	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
+	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
 	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
 	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 3 lines · Hamza Mahfooz

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely interacting with LSMs.

Quoted 128 lines
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
 security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -0
index e2f1ce37c41e..9eb313bd0c93 100644
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_allowed, void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
include/linux/security.h +5 -0
index 980b6c207cad..3e68f8468a22 100644
@@ -2362,6 +2362,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
 extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
 extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void);
 #else
 static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
@@ -2375,6 +2376,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
index c2d8bd4c2cfc..9df7b3b556ef 100644
@@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 allowed_lsm:
-	return 0;
+	return security_uring_allowed();
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
security/security.c +12 -0
index 143561ebc3e8..c9fae447327e 100644
@@ -5999,6 +5999,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 /**
security/selinux/hooks.c +14 -0
index 7b867dfec88b..fb37e87df226 100644
@@ -7137,6 +7137,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
+			    NULL);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
@@ -7390,6 +7403,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
 #endif
 
 	/*
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
index 03e82477dce9..8a8f3908aac8 100644
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "perf_event",
 	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
 	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
-	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
+	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
 	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
 	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
 };
maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 3 lines · Hamza Mahfooz

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely interacting with LSMs.

That's not how this works Casey, unless you're seeing something different?

This is an additional access control point for io_uring, largely to simplify what a LSM would need to do to help control a process' access to io_uring, it does not replace any of the io_uring LSM hooks or access control points.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 3 lines · Hamza Mahfooz

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely interacting with LSMs.

That's not how this works Casey, unless you're seeing something different?

Yes, it's just me being paranoid. When a mechanism is introduced that makes it easy to disable a system feature in the LSM environment I start hearing voices saying "You can't use security and the cool thing together", and the developers of "the cool thing" wave hands and say "just disable it" and it never gets properly integrated. I have seen this so many times it makes me wonder how anything ever does get made to work in multiple configurations.

Quoted 5 lines

This is an additional access control point for io_uring, largely to simplify what a LSM would need to do to help control a process' access to io_uring, it does not replace any of the io_uring LSM hooks or access control points.

What I see is "LSM xyzzy has an issue with io_uring? Just create a io_uring_allowed() hook that always disables io_uring." LSM xyzzy never gets attention from the io_uring developers because, as far as they care, the problem is solved.

maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 3 lines · Hamza Mahfooz

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely interacting with LSMs.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

That's not how this works Casey, unless you're seeing something different?

Yes, it's just me being paranoid. When a mechanism is introduced that makes it easy to disable a system feature in the LSM environment I start hearing voices saying "You can't use security and the cool thing together", and the developers of "the cool thing" wave hands and say "just disable it" and it never gets properly integrated. I have seen this so many times it makes me wonder how anything ever does get made to work in multiple configurations.

While there is plenty of precedent regarding paranoia over kernel changes outside the LSM, and yes, I do agree that there are likely some configurations that aren't tested (or make little sense for that matter), I don't believe that to be the case here. The proposed LSM hook is simply another access control, and it makes it much easier for LSMs without full and clear anonymous inode controls to apply access controls to io_uring.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

This is an additional access control point for io_uring, largely to simplify what a LSM would need to do to help control a process' access to io_uring, it does not replace any of the io_uring LSM hooks or access control points.

What I see is "LSM xyzzy has an issue with io_uring? Just create a io_uring_allowed() hook that always disables io_uring." LSM xyzzy never gets attention from the io_uring developers because, as far as they care, the problem is solved.

To be honest, I wouldn't expect the io_uring developers (or any kernel subsystem maintainer outside the LSMs) to worry about a specific LSM. The io_uring developers should be focused on ensuring that the LSM hooks for io_uring are updated as necessary and called from all of the right locations as io_uring continues to evolve. If there is a problem with LSM xyzzy because it provides a buggy LSM callback for the io_uring LSM hooks, that is a xyzzy issue not an io_uring issue.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 17 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 3 lines · Hamza Mahfooz

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely interacting with LSMs.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

That's not how this works Casey, unless you're seeing something different?

Yes, it's just me being paranoid. When a mechanism is introduced that makes it easy to disable a system feature in the LSM environment I start hearing voices saying "You can't use security and the cool thing together", and the developers of "the cool thing" wave hands and say "just disable it" and it never gets properly integrated. I have seen this so many times it makes me wonder how anything ever does get made to work in multiple configurations.

Quoted 7 lines

While there is plenty of precedent regarding paranoia over kernel changes outside the LSM, and yes, I do agree that there are likely some configurations that aren't tested (or make little sense for that matter), I don't believe that to be the case here. The proposed LSM hook is simply another access control, and it makes it much easier for LSMs without full and clear anonymous inode controls to apply access controls to io_uring.

I can't say I agree that it's an access control because although it is specific to a process it isn't specific to an object. You can still access the set of objects using other means. It is a mechanism control, preventing use of io_uring entirely.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

This is an additional access control point for io_uring, largely to simplify what a LSM would need to do to help control a process' access to io_uring, it does not replace any of the io_uring LSM hooks or access control points.

What I see is "LSM xyzzy has an issue with io_uring? Just create a io_uring_allowed() hook that always disables io_uring." LSM xyzzy never gets attention from the io_uring developers because, as far as they care, the problem is solved.

Quoted 7 lines

To be honest, I wouldn't expect the io_uring developers (or any kernel subsystem maintainer outside the LSMs) to worry about a specific LSM. The io_uring developers should be focused on ensuring that the LSM hooks for io_uring are updated as necessary and called from all of the right locations as io_uring continues to evolve. If there is a problem with LSM xyzzy because it provides a buggy LSM callback for the io_uring LSM hooks, that is a xyzzy issue not an io_uring issue.

I'm much more concerned about bugs in io_uring than in xyzzy. The io_uring people have been pretty good about addressing LSM issues, so it's not a huge deal, but I never like seeing switches to turn off features because security is active.

If no one else shares my concern you can put my comments down to the ravings of the lunatic fringe and ignore them.

maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler

I can't say I agree that it's an access control because although it is specific to a process it isn't specific to an object. You can still access the set of objects using other means. It is a mechanism control, preventing use of io_uring entirely.

I see your argument and raise you "capabilities".

Granted, we could have a fairly lively debate about the merits of capabilities, which I'm not encouraging here, I'm only mentioning it as a counterpoint and evidence that there is precedent for things like this as "access control".

Quoted 7 lines

I'm much more concerned about bugs in io_uring than in xyzzy. The io_uring people have been pretty good about addressing LSM issues, so it's not a huge deal, but I never like seeing switches to turn off features because security is active.

If no one else shares my concern you can put my comments down to the ravings of the lunatic fringe and ignore them.

Fair enough. FWIW, I appreciate the discussion, even if we didn't quite reach consensus this time around.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

In reply to Hamza Mahfooz
Quoted 7 lines · On Jan 27, 2025 Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]> wrote:

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
 security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Thanks Hamza, this looks good to me, but we need to wait until we get an ACK from Jens on path 1/2; he's pretty responsive so I don't think we'll have to wait too long.

As far as the return/label issue in patch 1/2, as long as there are no other issues, and you are okay with the change, I can fix that up when merging your patches.

--
paul-moore.com

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()

Quoted 17 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · On Jan 27, 2025 Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]> wrote:

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So, add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
 security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines

Thanks Hamza, this looks good to me, but we need to wait until we get an ACK from Jens on path 1/2; he's pretty responsive so I don't think we'll have to wait too long.

As far as the return/label issue in patch 1/2, as long as there are no other issues, and you are okay with the change, I can fix that up when merging your patches.

Ya, that sounds good to me, thanks!

Quoted 3 lines

--
paul-moore.com

maintainer
#10 lore raw
In reply to Hamza Mahfooz
Quoted 22 lines · On Jan 27, 2025 Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]> wrote:

Have io_uring_allowed() return an error code directly instead of true/false. This is needed for follow-up work to guard io_uring_setup() with LSM.

---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
index 7bfbc7c22367..c2d8bd4c2cfc 100644
@@ -3789,29 +3789,36 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
 	return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
-static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 {

io_uring/io_uring.c static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params) · line 3801

Quoted 10 lines
io_uring/io_uring.c +2 -2
 	int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled);
 	kgid_t io_uring_group;
 
 	if (disabled == 2)
-		return false;
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (disabled == 0 || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return true;
+		goto allowed_lsm;

I'd probably just 'return 0;' here as the "allowed_lsm" goto label doesn't make a lot of sense until patch 2/2, but otherwise this looks okay to me.

Jens, are you okay with this patch? If yes, can we get an ACK from you?

Quoted 28 lines
io_uring/io_uring.c +11 -4
 	io_uring_group = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, sysctl_io_uring_group);
 	if (!gid_valid(io_uring_group))
-		return false;
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!in_group_p(io_uring_group))
+		return -EPERM;
 
-	return in_group_p(io_uring_group);
+allowed_lsm:
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
 		struct io_uring_params __user *, params)
 {
-	if (!io_uring_allowed())
-		return -EPERM;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = io_uring_allowed();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return io_uring_setup(entries, params);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1

--
paul-moore.com

maintainer
#11 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · On Jan 27, 2025 Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]> wrote:

Have io_uring_allowed() return an error code directly instead of true/false. This is needed for follow-up work to guard io_uring_setup() with LSM.

---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +2 -2
index 7bfbc7c22367..c2d8bd4c2cfc 100644
@@ -3789,29 +3789,36 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
 	return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
-static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 {
 	int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled);
 	kgid_t io_uring_group;
 
 	if (disabled == 2)
-		return false;
+		return -EPERM;
 
Quoted 7 lines

io_uring/io_uring.c static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params) · line 3801

Quoted 3 lines
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
 	if (disabled == 0 || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return true;
+		goto allowed_lsm;

I'd probably just 'return 0;' here as the "allowed_lsm" goto label doesn't make a lot of sense until patch 2/2, but otherwise this looks okay to me.

Agree, get rid of this unnecessary goto.

Quoted 1 line

Jens, are you okay with this patch? If yes, can we get an ACK from you?

With that change, yep I'm fine with both of these and you can add my acked-by to them.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer
#12 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 30 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · On Jan 27, 2025 Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]> wrote:

Have io_uring_allowed() return an error code directly instead of true/false. This is needed for follow-up work to guard io_uring_setup() with LSM.

---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +2 -2
index 7bfbc7c22367..c2d8bd4c2cfc 100644
@@ -3789,29 +3789,36 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
     return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
-static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 {
     int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled);
     kgid_t io_uring_group;
 
     if (disabled == 2)
-            return false;
+            return -EPERM;
 
Quoted 7 lines

io_uring/io_uring.c static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params) · line 3801

Quoted 3 lines
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
     if (disabled == 0 || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-            return true;
+            goto allowed_lsm;

I'd probably just 'return 0;' here as the "allowed_lsm" goto label doesn't make a lot of sense until patch 2/2, but otherwise this looks okay to me.

Quoted 1 line

Agree, get rid of this unnecessary goto.

Done. Converted to return in patch 1/2 and brought the goto/label back in patch 2/2.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Jens, are you okay with this patch? If yes, can we get an ACK from you?

With that change, yep I'm fine with both of these and you can add my acked-by to them.

Great. Both patches have now been merged into lsm/dev, thanks everyone!

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com