target/i386: sev: Add cmdline option to enable the Allowed SEV Features feature
RFC 1/1 target/i386: sev: Add cmdline option to enable the Allowed SEV Features feature
The Allowed SEV Features feature allows the host kernel to control which SEV features it does not want the guest to enable [1].
This has to be explicitly opted-in by the user because it has the ability to break existing VMs if it were set automatically.
Currently, both the PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic features require the Allowed SEV Features feature to be set.
Based on a similar patch written for Secure TSC [2].
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250[2] https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/4b2288dc6025ba32519ee8d202ca72d565cbbab7
--- qapi/qom.json | 6 ++++- target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
qapi/qom.json +5 -1
@@ -948,13 +948,17 @@ # designated guest firmware page for measured boot with -kernel # (default: false) (since 6.2) # +# @allowed-sev-features: true if secure allowed-sev-features feature +# is to be enabled in an SEV-ES or SNP guest. (default: false) +# # Since: 9.1 ## { 'struct': 'SevCommonProperties', 'data': { '*sev-device': 'str', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32', - '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } + '*kernel-hashes': 'bool', + '*allowed-sev-features': 'bool' } } ## # @SevGuestProperties:
target/i386/sev.c +60 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
target/i386/sev.h +2 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void);#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT 0x10000#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG 0x80000 +#define SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES BIT_ULL(63) + typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext { char *setup_data; size_t setup_size;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 9 lines · Kim Phillips
The Allowed SEV Features feature allows the host kernel to control which SEV features it does not want the guest to enable [1].
This has to be explicitly opted-in by the user because it has the ability to break existing VMs if it were set automatically.
Currently, both the PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic features require the Allowed SEV Features feature to be set.
Quoted 7 lines
Based on a similar patch written for Secure TSC [2].
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250[2] https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/4b2288dc6025ba32519ee8d202ca72d565cbbab7
Despite that URL, that commit also does not appear to be merged into the QEMU git repo, and indeed I can't find any record of it even being posted as a patch for review on qemu-devel.
This is horribly misleading to reviewers, suggesting that the referenced patch was already accepted :-(
Quoted 13 lines
Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- qapi/qom.json | 6 ++++- target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)qapi/qom.json +0
-0
qapi/qom.json line 952
Quoted 5 lines
qapi/qom.json +2
-0@@ -948,13 +948,17 @@ # designated guest firmware page for measured boot with -kernel # (default: false) (since 6.2) # +# @allowed-sev-features: true if secure allowed-sev-features feature +# is to be enabled in an SEV-ES or SNP guest. (default: false)
Missing 'since' annotation.
Quoted 63 lines
qapi/qom.json +3
-1+# # Since: 9.1 ## { 'struct': 'SevCommonProperties', 'data': { '*sev-device': 'str', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32', - '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } + '*kernel-hashes': 'bool', + '*allowed-sev-features': 'bool' } } ## # @SevGuestProperties:target/i386/sev.c +28
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {uint32_t cbitpos;uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;bool kernel_hashes; +uint64_t vmsa_features;/* runtime state */ uint8_t api_major;@@ -411,6 +412,33 @@ sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)return sev_common ? sev_common->reduced_phys_bits :0 ; } +static __u64 +sev_supported_vmsa_features (void ) +{ +uint64_t supported_vmsa_features =0 ; +struct kvm_device_attr attr = { + .group =KVM_X86_GRP_SEV , + .attr =KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES , + .addr = (unsigned long ) &supported_vmsa_features + }; + +bool sys_attr =kvm_check_extension (kvm_state,KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES ); +if (!sys_attr) { +return 0 ; + } + +int rc =kvm_ioctl (kvm_state,KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR , &attr); +if (rc <0 ) { +if (rc != -ENXIO ) { +warn_report ("KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR(0, KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES) " +"error: %d" , rc); + } +return 0 ; + } + +return supported_vmsa_features; +} +static SevInfo *sev_get_info (void ) {SevInfo *info;@@ -1524,6 +1552,20 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)case KVM_X86_SNP_VM : {struct kvm_sev_init args = {0 };
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1564
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+if (sev_es_enabled ()) { +__u64 vmsa_features, supported_vmsa_features; + + supported_vmsa_features =sev_supported_vmsa_features (); + vmsa_features = sev_common->vmsa_features; +if ((vmsa_features & supported_vmsa_features) != vmsa_features) { +error_setg (errp,"%s: requested sev feature mask (0x%llx) " +"contains bits not supported by the host kernel " +" (0x%llx)" , __func__, vmsa_features, + supported_vmsa_features);
This logic is being applied unconditionally, and not connected to the setting of the new 'allowed-sev-features' flag value. Is that correct ?
Will this end up breaking existing deployed guests, or is this a scenario that would have been blocked with an error later on regardless ?
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1565
Quoted 1 line
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+return -1 ;
Malformed indentation.
Quoted 55 lines
target/i386/sev.c +21
-0+ } + args.vmsa_features = vmsa_features; + } ret =sev_ioctl (sev_common->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_INIT2 , &args, &fw_error);break ; }@@ -2044,6 +2086,19 @@ static void sev_common_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)SEV_COMMON (obj)->kernel_hashes = value; } +static bool +sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +return SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features &SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,bool value,Error **errp) +{ +if (value) +SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features |=SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} +static void sev_common_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,void *data) {@@ -2061,6 +2116,11 @@ sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) sev_common_set_kernel_hashes);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"kernel-hashes" ,"add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot" ); +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , + sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features, + sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , +"Enable the Allowed SEV Features feature" ); } static voidtarget/i386/sev.h +2
-0@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void);#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT 0x10000#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG 0x80000 +#define SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES BIT_ULL(63) + typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext { char *setup_data; size_t setup_size;Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Quoted 16 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 15 lines · Kim Phillips
The Allowed SEV Features feature allows the host kernel to control which SEV features it does not want the guest to enable [1].
This has to be explicitly opted-in by the user because it has the ability to break existing VMs if it were set automatically.
Currently, both the PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic features require the Allowed SEV Features feature to be set.
Based on a similar patch written for Secure TSC [2].
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
Quoted 8 lines
Despite that URL, that commit also does not appear to be merged into the QEMU git repo, and indeed I can't find any record of it even being posted as a patch for review on qemu-devel.
This is horribly misleading to reviewers, suggesting that the referenced patch was already accepted :-(
Apologies, that was not the intent. I'll remove it from the next version.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
target/i386/sev.c +0
-0@@ -1524,6 +1552,20 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)case KVM_X86_SNP_VM : {struct kvm_sev_init args = {0 };
Quoted 14 lines
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1564
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+if (sev_es_enabled ()) { +__u64 vmsa_features, supported_vmsa_features; + + supported_vmsa_features =sev_supported_vmsa_features (); + vmsa_features = sev_common->vmsa_features; +if ((vmsa_features & supported_vmsa_features) != vmsa_features) { +error_setg (errp,"%s: requested sev feature mask (0x%llx) " +"contains bits not supported by the host kernel " +" (0x%llx)" , __func__, vmsa_features, + supported_vmsa_features);This logic is being applied unconditionally, and not connected to the setting of the new 'allowed-sev-features' flag value. Is that correct ?
That's correct.
Quoted 3 lines
Will this end up breaking existing deployed guests, or is this a scenario that would have been blocked with an error later on regardless ?
It would have been blocked regardless by this check in kvm's __sev_guest_init:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.13.2/source/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c#L418
I've addressed all your other comments.
Thank you for your review,
Kim
Quoted 60 lines · Kim Phillips
The Allowed SEV Features feature allows the host kernel to control which SEV features it does not want the guest to enable [1].
This has to be explicitly opted-in by the user because it has the ability to break existing VMs if it were set automatically.
Currently, both the PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic features require the Allowed SEV Features feature to be set.
Based on a similar patch written for Secure TSC [2].
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250[2] https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/4b2288dc6025ba32519ee8d202ca72d565cbbab7
Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- qapi/qom.json | 6 ++++- target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)qapi/qom.json +5
-1@@ -948,13 +948,17 @@ # designated guest firmware page for measured boot with -kernel # (default: false) (since 6.2) # +# @allowed-sev-features: true if secure allowed-sev-features feature +# is to be enabled in an SEV-ES or SNP guest. (default: false) +# # Since: 9.1 ## { 'struct': 'SevCommonProperties', 'data': { '*sev-device': 'str', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32', - '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } + '*kernel-hashes': 'bool', + '*allowed-sev-features': 'bool' } } ## # @SevGuestProperties:target/i386/sev.c +1
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {uint32_t cbitpos;uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;bool kernel_hashes; +uint64_t vmsa_features;/* runtime state */ uint8_t api_major;
target/i386/sev.c sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) · line 416
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0@@ -411,6 +412,33 @@ sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)return sev_common ? sev_common->reduced_phys_bits :0 ; } +static __u64 +sev_supported_vmsa_features (void )
s/sev_/sev_get_/ ?
Quoted 29 lines
target/i386/sev.c +25
-0+{ +uint64_t supported_vmsa_features =0 ; +struct kvm_device_attr attr = { + .group =KVM_X86_GRP_SEV , + .attr =KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES , + .addr = (unsigned long ) &supported_vmsa_features + }; + +bool sys_attr =kvm_check_extension (kvm_state,KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES ); +if (!sys_attr) { +return 0 ; + } + +int rc =kvm_ioctl (kvm_state,KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR , &attr); +if (rc <0 ) { +if (rc != -ENXIO ) { +warn_report ("KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR(0, KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES) " +"error: %d" , rc); + } +return 0 ; + } + +return supported_vmsa_features; +} +static SevInfo *sev_get_info (void ) {SevInfo *info;
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1555
Quoted 4 lines
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0@@ -1524,6 +1552,20 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)case KVM_X86_SNP_VM : {struct kvm_sev_init args = {0 }; +if (sev_es_enabled ()) {
Shouldn't this be
if (sev_es_enabled() && (sev_common->vmsa_features & SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES)) {
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1556
Quoted 1 line
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+__u64 vmsa_features, supported_vmsa_features;
s/__u64/uint64_t/ ?
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1566
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+ + supported_vmsa_features =sev_supported_vmsa_features (); + vmsa_features = sev_common->vmsa_features; +if ((vmsa_features & supported_vmsa_features) != vmsa_features) { +error_setg (errp,"%s: requested sev feature mask (0x%llx) " +"contains bits not supported by the host kernel " +" (0x%llx)" , __func__, vmsa_features, + supported_vmsa_features); +return -1 ; + }
Add a blank line
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1568
Quoted 2 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0+ args.vmsa_features = vmsa_features; + }
Add a blank line
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 48 lines
target/i386/sev.c +18
-0ret =sev_ioctl (sev_common->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_INIT2 , &args, &fw_error);break ; }@@ -2044,6 +2086,19 @@ static void sev_common_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)SEV_COMMON (obj)->kernel_hashes = value; } +static bool +sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +return SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features &SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,bool value,Error **errp) +{ +if (value) +SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features |=SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} +static void sev_common_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,void *data) {@@ -2061,6 +2116,11 @@ sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) sev_common_set_kernel_hashes);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"kernel-hashes" ,"add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot" ); +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , + sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features, + sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , +"Enable the Allowed SEV Features feature" ); } static voidtarget/i386/sev.h +2
-0@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void);#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT 0x10000#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG 0x80000 +#define SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES BIT_ULL(63) + typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext { char *setup_data; size_t setup_size;
Quoted 101 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 60 lines · Kim Phillips
The Allowed SEV Features feature allows the host kernel to control which SEV features it does not want the guest to enable [1].
This has to be explicitly opted-in by the user because it has the ability to break existing VMs if it were set automatically.
Currently, both the PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic features require the Allowed SEV Features feature to be set.
Based on a similar patch written for Secure TSC [2].
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250[2] https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/4b2288dc6025ba32519ee8d202ca72d565cbbab7
Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- qapi/qom.json | 6 ++++- target/i386/sev.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)qapi/qom.json +5
-1@@ -948,13 +948,17 @@ # designated guest firmware page for measured boot with -kernel # (default: false) (since 6.2) # +# @allowed-sev-features: true if secure allowed-sev-features feature +# is to be enabled in an SEV-ES or SNP guest. (default: false) +# # Since: 9.1 ## { 'struct': 'SevCommonProperties', 'data': { '*sev-device': 'str', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32', - '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } } + '*kernel-hashes': 'bool', + '*allowed-sev-features': 'bool' } } ## # @SevGuestProperties:target/i386/sev.c +1
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {uint32_t cbitpos;uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;bool kernel_hashes; +uint64_t vmsa_features;/* runtime state */ uint8_t api_major;target/i386/sev.c sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) · line 416
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0@@ -411,6 +412,33 @@ sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)return sev_common ? sev_common->reduced_phys_bits :0 ; } +static __u64 +sev_supported_vmsa_features (void )s/sev_/sev_get_/ ?
Quoted 32 lines
target/i386/sev.c +25
-0+{ +uint64_t supported_vmsa_features =0 ; +struct kvm_device_attr attr = { + .group =KVM_X86_GRP_SEV , + .attr =KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES , + .addr = (unsigned long ) &supported_vmsa_features + }; + +bool sys_attr =kvm_check_extension (kvm_state,KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES ); +if (!sys_attr) { +return 0 ; + } + +int rc =kvm_ioctl (kvm_state,KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR , &attr); +if (rc <0 ) { +if (rc != -ENXIO ) { +warn_report ("KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR(0, KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES) " +"error: %d" , rc); + } +return 0 ; + } + +return supported_vmsa_features; +} +static SevInfo *sev_get_info (void ) {SevInfo *info;@@ -1524,6 +1552,20 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)case KVM_X86_SNP_VM : {struct kvm_sev_init args = {0 };
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1555
Quoted 1 line
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+if (sev_es_enabled ()) {Shouldn't this be
if (
sev_es_enabled()&& (sev_common->vmsa_features&SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES)) {
Actually, I guess it doesn't matter. The vmsa_features field will be 0 by default and only be set if "allowed-sev-features=on" is specified. So doing this will just error out a bit earlier than KVM erroring out on the INIT2 call if some vmsa_feature bit is set that KVM doesn't know about.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 74 lines
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1556
Quoted 2 lines
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+__u64 vmsa_features, supported_vmsa_features;s/__u64/uint64_t/ ?
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1566
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+ + supported_vmsa_features =sev_supported_vmsa_features (); + vmsa_features = sev_common->vmsa_features; +if ((vmsa_features & supported_vmsa_features) != vmsa_features) { +error_setg (errp,"%s: requested sev feature mask (0x%llx) " +"contains bits not supported by the host kernel " +" (0x%llx)" , __func__, vmsa_features, + supported_vmsa_features); +return -1 ; + }Add a blank line
target/i386/sev.c static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) · line 1568
Quoted 2 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0+ args.vmsa_features = vmsa_features; + }Add a blank line
Thanks,
TomQuoted 48 lines
target/i386/sev.c +18
-0ret =sev_ioctl (sev_common->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_INIT2 , &args, &fw_error);break ; }@@ -2044,6 +2086,19 @@ static void sev_common_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)SEV_COMMON (obj)->kernel_hashes = value; } +static bool +sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +return SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features &SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} + +static void +sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features (Object *obj,bool value,Error **errp) +{ +if (value) +SEV_COMMON (obj)->vmsa_features |=SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES ; +} +static void sev_common_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,void *data) {@@ -2061,6 +2116,11 @@ sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) sev_common_set_kernel_hashes);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"kernel-hashes" ,"add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot" ); +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , + sev_snp_guest_get_allowed_sev_features, + sev_snp_guest_set_allowed_sev_features); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"allowed-sev-features" , +"Enable the Allowed SEV Features feature" ); } static voidtarget/i386/sev.h +2
-0@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void);#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT 0x10000#define SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG 0x80000 +#define SEV_VMSA_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES BIT_ULL(63) + typedef struct SevKernelLoaderContext { char *setup_data; size_t setup_size;