procfs: block chmod on /proc/thread-self/comm
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 procfs: block chmod on /proc/thread-self/comm
Due to an oversight in commit 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD, chmod operations on /proc/thread-self/comm were no longer blocked as they are on almost all other procfs files.
A very similar situation with /proc/self/environ was used to as a root exploit a long time ago, but procfs has SB_I_NOEXEC so this is simply a correctness issue.
Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
Ref: 6d76fa58b050 ("Don't allow chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files")
--- fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/proc/base.c +2 -1
@@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, }static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, };/*
tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c +4 -0
@@ -580,6 +580,10 @@ int run_syscall(int min, int max)CASE_TEST (chmod_net);EXPECT_SYSZR (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/net" ,0555 ));break ;CASE_TEST (chmod_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self" ,0555 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;CASE_TEST (chown_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chown ("/proc/self" ,0 ,0 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_root);EXPECT_SYSZR (euid0,chroot ("/" ));break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_blah);EXPECT_SYSER (1 ,chroot ("/proc/self/blah" ),-1 ,ENOENT );break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_exe);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chroot ("/proc/self/exe" ),-1 ,ENOTDIR );break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Willy Tarreau
maintainer+Cc Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> as this seems quite related to his finding about /proc/self/net:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/#b
Quoted 50 lines · Aleksa Sarai
Due to an oversight in commit
1b3044e39a89("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD, chmod operations on/proc/thread-self/commwere no longer blocked as they are on almost all other procfs files.A very similar situation with
/proc/self/environwas used to as a root exploit a long time ago, but procfs hasSB_I_NOEXECso this is simply a correctness issue.Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
Ref:6d76fa58b050("Don't allowchmod()on the /proc/<pid>/ files")Fixes 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE")Cc [email protected] # v4.7+Signed-off-by Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/proc/base.c +2
-1@@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, }static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, };/* tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c +4
-0@@ -580,6 +580,10 @@ int run_syscall(int min, int max)CASE_TEST (chmod_net);EXPECT_SYSZR (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/net" ,0555 ));break ;CASE_TEST (chmod_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self" ,0555 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;CASE_TEST (chown_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chown ("/proc/self" ,0 ,0 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_root);EXPECT_SYSZR (euid0,chroot ("/" ));break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_blah);EXPECT_SYSER (1 ,chroot ("/proc/self/blah" ),-1 ,ENOENT );break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_exe);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chroot ("/proc/self/exe" ),-1 ,ENOTDIR );break ;Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Quoted 4 lines · Willy Tarreau
+Cc Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> as this seems quite related to his finding about
/proc/self/net:
Yeah I saw this patch and (along with an earlier discussion with Christian on the topic of chmod on symlinks -- see [1]) lead us to find that there were three other cases where this happens unintentionally:
* /proc/self (on the symlink itself)
* /proc/thread-self (on the symlink itself)
* /proc/thread-self/comm
The first two will be fixed by [1] so fixing them isn't necessary.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
Signature · 4 lines
Aleksa Sarai Senior Software Engineer (Containers) SUSE Linux GmbH <https://www.cyphar.com/>
Quoted 24 lines · Aleksa Sarai
Due to an oversight in commit
1b3044e39a89("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD, chmod operations on/proc/thread-self/commwere no longer blocked as they are on almost all other procfs files.A very similar situation with
/proc/self/environwas used to as a root exploit a long time ago, but procfs hasSB_I_NOEXECso this is simply a correctness issue.Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
Ref:6d76fa58b050("Don't allowchmod()on the /proc/<pid>/ files")Fixes 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE")Cc [email protected] # v4.7+Signed-off-by Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/proc/base.c +0
-0
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, · line 3588
Quoted 7 lines
fs/proc/base.c +2
-1@@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, }static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, };
Given that this seems to be a recurring theme a more systematic aproach would help.
Something like the following (untested) patch:
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2649,6 +2649,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,set_nlink (inode,2 );/* Use getattr to fix if necessary */ if (p->iop) inode->i_op = p->iop; +WARN_ON (!inode->i_op->setattr);if (p->fop) inode->i_fop = p->fop; ei->op = p->op;
tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c int run_syscall(int min, int max) · line 586
Quoted 13 lines
fs/proc/base.c +0
-0/* tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c +4
-0@@ -580,6 +580,10 @@ int run_syscall(int min, int max)CASE_TEST (chmod_net);EXPECT_SYSZR (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/net" ,0555 ));break ;CASE_TEST (chmod_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self" ,0555 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;CASE_TEST (chown_self);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chown ("/proc/self" ,0 ,0 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_comm);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/comm" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_self_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ; +CASE_TEST (chmod_tid_environ);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chmod ("/proc/thread-self/environ" ,0777 ),-1 ,EPERM );break ;
I'm not a big fan of this, it abuses the nolibc testsuite to test core kernel functionality.
If this needs to be tested explicitly there is hopefully a better place.
Those existing tests focus on testing functionality provided by nolibc. The test chmod_net just got removed because it suffered from the same bug as /proc/thread-self/comm.
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c +0
-0CASE_TEST (chroot_root);EXPECT_SYSZR (euid0,chroot ("/" ));break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_blah);EXPECT_SYSER (1 ,chroot ("/proc/self/blah" ),-1 ,ENOENT );break ;CASE_TEST (chroot_exe);EXPECT_SYSER (proc,chroot ("/proc/self/exe" ),-1 ,ENOTDIR );break ;Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Christian Brauner
maintainerQuoted 43 lines · Thomas Weißschuh
Quoted 24 lines · Aleksa Sarai
Due to an oversight in commit
1b3044e39a89("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD, chmod operations on/proc/thread-self/commwere no longer blocked as they are on almost all other procfs files.A very similar situation with
/proc/self/environwas used to as a root exploit a long time ago, but procfs hasSB_I_NOEXECso this is simply a correctness issue.Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
Ref:6d76fa58b050("Don't allowchmod()on the /proc/<pid>/ files")Fixes 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE")Cc [email protected] # v4.7+Signed-off-by Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++- tools/testing/selftests/nolibc/nolibc-test.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/proc/base.c +0
-0fs/proc/base.c static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, · line 3588
Quoted 7 lines
fs/proc/base.c +2
-1@@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, }static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = { - .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, + .permission = proc_tid_comm_permission, };Given that this seems to be a recurring theme a more systematic aproach would help.
Something like the following (untested) patch:
fs/proc/base.c +0
-0
fs/proc/base.c static struct dentry *proc_pident_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, · line 2652
Quoted 4 lines
fs/proc/base.c +1
-0@@ -2649,6 +2649,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,set_nlink (inode,2 );/* Use getattr to fix if necessary */ if (p->iop) inode->i_op = p->iop; +WARN_ON (!inode->i_op->setattr);
Hm, no. This is hacky.
To fix this properly we will need to wean off notify_change() from falling back to simple_setattr() when no i_op->setattr() method is defined. To do that we will have to go through every filesystem and port all that rely on this fallback to set simple_setattr() explicitly as their i_op->setattr() method.
Christoph and I just discussed this in relation to another patch.
This is a bugfix so it should be as minimal as possible for easy backport.