xfsprogs: don't allow udisks to automount XFS filesystems with no prompt
RFC PATCH 1/1 xfsprogs: don't allow udisks to automount XFS filesystems with no prompt
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then it will. Including mangled XFS filesystems!
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the shitstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
[Does this actually stop udisks? I turned off all automounting at the DE level years ago because I'm not that stupid.]
--- configure.ac | 1 + include/builddefs.in | 2 ++ m4/package_services.m4 | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scrub/64-xfs.rules | 10 ++++++++++ scrub/Makefile | 9 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scrub/64-xfs.rules
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ AC_HAVE_SG_IO AC_HAVE_HDIO_GETGEO AC_CONFIG_SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR +AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR if test "$enable_blkid" = yes; then AC_HAVE_BLKID_TOPO
include/builddefs.in +2 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ HAVE_SYSTEMD = @have_systemd@ SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR = @systemd_system_unit_dir@ HAVE_CROND = @have_crond@ CROND_DIR = @crond_dir@ +HAVE_UDEV = @have_udev@ +UDEV_RULE_DIR = @udev_rule_dir@ HAVE_LIBURCU_ATOMIC64 = @have_liburcu_atomic64@ HAVE_MEMFD_CLOEXEC = @have_memfd_cloexec@ HAVE_MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL = @have_memfd_noexec_seal@
m4/package_services.m4 +42 -0
45 lines not on this page · raw message
scrub/64-xfs.rules new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"
scrub/Makefile +9 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ endif endif # scrub_prereqs +UDEV_RULES = 64-xfs.rules +ifeq ($(HAVE_UDEV),yes) + INSTALL_SCRUB += install-udev +endif + HFILES = \ common.h \ counter.h \
@@ -180,6 +185,10 @@ install-scrub: default $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(XFS_SCRUB_ALL_PROG) $(PKG_SBIN_DIR) $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(PKG_STATE_DIR) +install-udev: $(UDEV_RULES) + $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(UDEV_RULE_DIR) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(UDEV_RULES) $(UDEV_RULE_DIR) + install-dev: -include .dep
Quoted 10 lines · Darrick J. Wong
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
Quoted 4 lines
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then it will. Including mangled XFS filesystems!
*nod*
Quoted 2 lines
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
If only I had a dollar for every time I've deleted a similar rant...
Quoted 9 lines
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the shitstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
Yup, this seems like a right thing to do given the lack of action from the userspace side of the fence.
[ The argument that "prompting the user to ask if they trust the device teaches them to ignore security prompts" is just stupid. We have persistent identifiers in filesystems - keep a database of known trusted identifiers and only prompt for "is this a trusted device" when an unknown device is inserted. Other desktop OS's have been doing this for years.... ]
Quoted 2 lines
[Does this actually stop udisks? I turned off all automounting at the DE level years ago because I'm not that stupid.]
Yeah, I turned off all the DE level automount stuff years ago, too. It's the first thing I do when setting up a new machine for anyone, too.
.....
Quoted 6 lines
scrub/64-xfs.rules new file +0
-0
scrub/64-xfs.rules line 10
Quoted 10 lines
scrub/64-xfs.rules new file +10
-0@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"
I think this is correct, but the lack of documentation on how udev rules and overrides are supposed to work doesn't help me one bit.
Ok, just tracked it through - only gvfs and clevis actually look at udisks_block_get_hint_auto() from udisks, so at least the gnome and lxde/lxqt desktop environments will no longer automount XFS filesystems. Who knows what magic is needed for other DEs, but this is a good start.
-Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]
Quoted 16 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 10 lines · Darrick J. Wong
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
Quoted 4 lines
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then it will. Including mangled XFS filesystems!
Quoted 6 lines
*nod*
Quoted 2 lines
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
If only I had a dollar for every time I've deleted a similar rant...
I do, and I'm raking in the Benjamins!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpMvS1Q1sos
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the shitstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
Yup, this seems like a right thing to do given the lack of action from the userspace side of the fence.
Quoted 6 lines
[ The argument that "prompting the user to ask if they trust the device teaches them to ignore security prompts" is just stupid. We have persistent identifiers in filesystems - keep a database of known trusted identifiers and only prompt for "is this a trusted device" when an unknown device is inserted. Other desktop OS's have been doing this for years.... ]
Not to mention that having a prompt at least stops the evil maid from waking up your laptop, plugging in a usb stick, and being able to mount crap in your system without even having to unlock it.
But. I'm preaching to the choir here.
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 2 lines
[Does this actually stop udisks? I turned off all automounting at the DE level years ago because I'm not that stupid.]
Yeah, I turned off all the DE level automount stuff years ago, too. It's the first thing I do when setting up a new machine for anyone, too.
.....
Quoted 6 lines
scrub/64-xfs.rules new file +0
-0scrub/64-xfs.rules line 10
Quoted 10 lines
scrub/64-xfs.rules new file +10
-0@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"I think this is correct, but the lack of documentation on how udev rules and overrides are supposed to work doesn't help me one bit.
Quoted 5 lines
Ok, just tracked it through - only gvfs and clevis actually look at
udisks_block_get_hint_auto()from udisks, so at least the gnome and lxde/lxqt desktop environments will no longer automount XFS filesystems. Who knows what magic is needed for other DEs, but this is a good start.
Hah, we could encode that too?
kde5:
[General]
AutomountEnabled=false
AutomountOnPlugin=false
AutomountOnLogin=false
AutomountUnknownDevices=false
gnome3:
[org.gnome.desktop.media-handling]
automount=false
automount-open=false
autorun-never=true
gnome2:
/apps/nautilus/preferences/media_automount false
/apps/nautilus/preferences/media_autorun_never true
/apps/nautilus/preferences/media_autorun_never true
/apps/nautilus/preferences/media_autorun_x_content_open_folder []
Quoted 2 lines
Reviewed-by Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Thanks!
--D
Quoted 4 lines
-Dave.
Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected]