f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
PATCH 1/1 f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit 4f5a100f87f32cb65d4bb1ad282a08c92f6f591e upstream.
The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true.
There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file
Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.
--- fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/file.c +9 -0
@@ -2103,10 +2103,13 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_start_atomic_write(struct file *filp)struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (inode);struct inode *pinode;loff_t isize;int ret; +if (!(filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE )) +return -EBADF ; +if (!inode_owner_or_capable (mnt_userns, inode))return -EACCES ;if (!S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2200,10 +2203,13 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write(struct file *filp) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp);struct user_namespace *mnt_userns =file_mnt_user_ns (filp);int ret; +if (!(filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE )) +return -EBADF ; +if (!inode_owner_or_capable (mnt_userns, inode))return -EACCES ; ret =mnt_want_write_file (filp);if (ret)
@@ -2232,10 +2238,13 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_abort_atomic_write(struct file *filp) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp);struct user_namespace *mnt_userns =file_mnt_user_ns (filp);int ret; +if (!(filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE )) +return -EBADF ; +if (!inode_owner_or_capable (mnt_userns, inode))return -EACCES ; ret =mnt_want_write_file (filp);if (ret)
base-commit: aa4cd140bba57b7064b4c7a7141bebd336d32087
Signature · 1 line
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
Sasha Levin via Linux-f2fs-devel
AppliedQuoted 23 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit
4f5a100f87f32cb65d4bb1ad282a08c92f6f591eupstream.The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for
inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID,inode_owner_or_capable()immediately returns true.There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:
-
F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE+F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITEcan truncate an inode to size 0
-F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE+F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITEcan revert changes another process concurrently made to a fileFix it by requiring
FMODE_WRITEfor these operations, just like forF2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 88b88a667971 ("f2fs: support atomic writes")Signed-off-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Chao Yu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
I've queued these backports, thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha