KVM: SVM: Don't intercept IRET when injecting NMI and vNMI is enabled
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 1/1 KVM: SVM: Don't intercept IRET when injecting NMI and vNMI is enabled
When vNMI is enabled, rely entirely on hardware to correctly handle NMI blocking, i.e. don't intercept IRET to detect when NMIs are no longer blocked. KVM already correctly ignores svm->nmi_masked when vNMI is enabled, so the effect of the bug is essentially an unnecessary VM-Exit.
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets V_NMI_MASK in the guest state.
---
Santosh, can you verify that I didn't break vNMI? I don't have access to the right hardware. Thanks!
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +9 -2
@@ -3569,8 +3569,15 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ; - svm->nmi_masked = true; -svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +/* +* No need to manually track NMI masking when vNMI is enabled, hardware +* automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK as appropriate, including the +* case where software directly injects an NMI. +*/ +if (!is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }
base-commit: 86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487
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2.42.0.609.gbb76f46606-goog
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 4 lines
When vNMI is enabled, rely entirely on hardware to correctly handle NMI blocking, i.e. don't intercept IRET to detect when NMIs are no longer blocked. KVM already correctly ignores
svm->nmi_maskedwhen vNMI is enabled, so the effect of the bug is essentially an unnecessary VM-Exit.
I would re-phrase this like that:
KVM intercepts IRET for two reasons:
- To track NMI masking to be able to know at any point of time if NMI is masked.
- To track NMI window (to inject another NMI after IRET finishes executing).
When L1 uses vNMI, both cases are fulfilled by the vNMI hardware:
- NMI masking state resides in V_NMI_BLOCKING bit of int_ctl and can be read by KVM at will.
- vNMI hardware injects the NMIs autonomically every time NMI is unblocked.
Thus there is no need to intercept IRET while vNMI is active.
However, even when vNMI is active in L1, the svm_inject_nmi() can still be called to do a direct NMI injection to support the case when KVM is trying to inject two NMIs simultaneously.
In this case there is no need to enable IRET interception.
Note that the effect of this bug is essentially an unnecessary VM-Exit.
Also note that even when vNMI is supported and used, running a nested guest disables vNMI of the L1 guest, thus IRET will still be intercepted. In this case if the nested VM exit happens before the NMI is delivered, an unnecessary VM exit can still happen but this is even less likely.
Quoted 6 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.
I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
Quoted 36 lines
Fixes fa4c027a7956 ("KVM: x86: Add support for SVM's Virtual NMI")Cc Santosh Shukla <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>---
Santosh, can you verify that I didn't break vNMI? I don't have access to the right hardware. Thanks!
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +9
-2@@ -3569,8 +3569,15 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ; - svm->nmi_masked = true; -svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +/* +* No need to manually track NMI masking when vNMI is enabled, hardware +* automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK as appropriate, including the +* case where software directly injects an NMI. +*/ +if (!is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }
Quoted 1 line
base-commit:
86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487
Note that while nested, the 'is_vnmi_enabled()' will return false because L1's vnmi is indeed disabled (I wonder if is_vnmi_enabled should be renamed is_l1_vnmi_enabled() to clarify this),
So when nested VM exit happens, that intercept can still continue to be true, which should not cause an issue but this is still something to keep in mind.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 5 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
I strongly disagree, this blurb in the APM directly affects the patch. If hardware didn't set V_NMI_MASK, then the patch would need to be at least this:
--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6 -2
@@ -3569,8 +3569,12 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ; - svm->nmi_masked = true; -svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +if (is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |=V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK ; + }else { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }
base-commit: 86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487
Signature · 1 line
and maybe even more to deal with canceled injection.
У вт, 2023-10-10 у 07:46 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 8 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 7 lines
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 5 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
I strongly disagree, this blurb in the APM directly affects the patch. If hardware didn't set
V_NMI_MASK, then the patch would need to be at least this:
I don't see how 'the blurb in the APM' relates to the removal of the IRET intercept, which is what this patch is about.
If the hardware was not to set the V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK during EVENTINJ NMI injection, we would have had a bigger problem, a problem which would have to be addressed before this patch, because kvm reads back the V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK
(see: svm_get_nmi_mask()) to check if NMI is blocked, something that has no relation to the IRET interception.
Best regards,
Maxim Levtsky
Quoted 23 lines
--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6
-2@@ -3569,8 +3569,12 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ; - svm->nmi_masked = true; -svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +if (is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |=V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK ; + }else { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }base-commit:
86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Maxim Levitsky
У вт, 2023-10-10 у 07:46 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 12 lines · Maxim Levitsky
Quoted 10 lines
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 5 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I strongly disagree, this blurb in the APM directly affects the patch. If hardware didn't set
V_NMI_MASK, then the patch would need to be at least this:I don't see how 'the blurb in the APM' relates to the removal of the IRET intercept, which is what this patch is about.
No, it's not *just* about IRET interception. This patch also guards:
svm->nmi_masked = true;
If the reader doesn't already know that hardware sets V_NMI_BLOCK_MASK on direct injection, as was the case for me when I stumbled upon this issue, it's not at all obvious that not doing something analogous to setting nmi_masked is correct.
I mentioned only IRET interception in the shortlog because that's the only practical impact of the change. I can massage the shortlog if it's confusing/misleading, but I really don't want to drop the reference to hardware setting V_NMI_BLOCK_MASK.
Quoted 26 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Maxim Levitsky
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 5 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
I strongly disagree, this blurb in the APM directly affects the patch. If hardware didn't set
V_NMI_MASK, then the patch would need to be at least this:--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-1@@ -3569,8 +3569,12 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ; - svm->nmi_masked = true;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 3580
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6
-1-svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +if (is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |=V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK ; + }else { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }
quick testing worked fine, KUT test ran fine and tested for non-nested mode so far. Will do more nested testing and share the feedback.
Thanks,
Santosh
Quoted 1 line
base-commit:
86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487
Quoted 11 lines · Santosh Shukla
Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines · Maxim Levitsky
У пн, 2023-10-09 у 14:29 -0700, Sean Christopherson пише:
Quoted 5 lines
Note, per the APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly directly injects an NMI:
If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets
V_NMI_MASKin the guest state.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think that this comment is not needed in the commit message. It describes a different unrelated concern and can be put somewhere in the code but not in the commit message.
I strongly disagree, this blurb in the APM directly affects the patch. If hardware didn't set
V_NMI_MASK, then the patch would need to be at least this:
HW sets the V_NMI_MASK.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0@@ -3569,8 +3569,12 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)return ;
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 3580
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6
-2- svm->nmi_masked = true; -svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); +if (is_vnmi_enabled (svm)) { + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |=V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK ; + }else { + svm->nmi_masked = true; +svm_set_iret_intercept (svm); + } ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections; }quick testing worked fine, KUT test ran fine and tested for non-nested mode so far. Will do more nested testing and share the feedback.
Sean - I have tested original patch[1] for nested and KUT, worked fine.
Thanks,
Santosh
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
SantoshQuoted 1 line
base-commit:
86701e115030e020a052216baa942e8547e0b487