eapol: implement rekey support for authenticator
PATCH v2 1/4 eapol: implement rekey support for authenticator
The only changes required was to set the secure bit for message 1, reset the frame retry counter, and change the 2/4 verifier to use the rekey flag rather than ptk_complete. This is because we must set ptk_complete false in order to detect retransmissions of the 4/4 frame.
Initiating a rekey can now be done by simply calling eapol_start().
--- src/eapol.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/eapol.c +11 -3
@@ -1086,8 +1086,6 @@ static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)handshake_state_new_anonce (sm->handshake); - sm->handshake->ptk_complete = false; - sm->replay_counter++;memset (ek,0 ,EAPOL_FRAME_LEN (sm->mic_len));
@@ -1111,6 +1109,12 @@ static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)eapol_key_data_append (ek, sm->mic_len,HANDSHAKE_KDE_PMKID , pmkid,16 ); +if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete) { + ek->secure = true; + sm->rekey = true; + sm->handshake->ptk_complete = false; + } + ek->header.packet_len =L_CPU_TO_BE16 (EAPOL_FRAME_LEN (sm->mic_len) +EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN (ek, sm->mic_len) -4 );
@@ -1589,7 +1593,7 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_2_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,l_debug ("ifindex=%u" , sm->handshake->ifindex); -if (!eapol_verify_ptk_2_of_4 (ek, sm->handshake->ptk_complete)) +if (!eapol_verify_ptk_2_of_4 (ek, sm->rekey))return ;if (L_BE64_TO_CPU (ek->key_replay_counter) != sm->replay_counter)
@@ -2482,6 +2486,8 @@ static void eapol_eap_complete_cb(enum eap_result result, void *user_data)/* sm->mic_len will have been set in eapol_eap_results_cb */ + sm->frame_retry =0 ; +/* Kick off 4-Way Handshake */ eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry (NULL , sm); }
@@ -2873,6 +2879,8 @@ bool eapol_start(struct eapol_sm *sm)if (L_WARN_ON (!sm->handshake->have_pmk))return false; + sm->frame_retry =0 ; +/* Kick off handshake */ eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry (NULL , sm); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
PATCH v2 2/4 eapol: detect message 2/4 retransmits
If the authenticator has already set an snonce then the packet must be a retransmit. Handle this by sending 3/4 again but making sure to not reset the frame counter.
--- src/eapol.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
src/eapol.c +8 -2
@@ -1645,12 +1645,18 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_2_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm, sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation = ip_req_kde !=NULL ; } +/* +* If the snonce is already set don't reset the retry counter as this +* is a rekey. To be safe take the most recent snonce (in this frame) +* in case the station created a new one. +*/ +if (!sm->handshake->have_snonce) + sm->frame_retry =0 ; +memcpy (sm->handshake->snonce, ek->key_nonce,sizeof (sm->handshake->snonce)); sm->handshake->have_snonce = true; - sm->frame_retry =0 ; -eapol_ptk_3_of_4_retry (NULL , sm); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Denis Kenzior
AppliedRe: [PATCH v2 2/4] eapol: detect message 2/4 retransmits
Hi James,
Quoted 7 lines · James Prestwood
If the authenticator has already set an snonce then the packet must be a retransmit. Handle this by sending 3/4 again but making sure to not reset the frame counter.
--- src/eapol.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Applied, thanks.
Regards,
-Denis
PATCH v2 3/4 ap: support PTK rekeys
In reply to James PrestwoodThis adds support for rekeys to AP mode. A single timer is used and reset to the next station needing a rekey. A default rekey timer of 600 seconds is used unless the profile sets a timeout.
--- src/ap.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+)
src/ap.c +114 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@#include "src/band.h" #include "src/common.h" +#define AP_DEFAULT_REKEY_SECONDS 600 +struct ap_state {struct netdev *netdev;struct l_genl_family *nl80211;
@@ -106,6 +108,9 @@ struct ap_state {struct l_dbus_message *scan_pending;struct l_queue *networks; +struct l_timeout *rekey_timeout; +unsigned int rekey_time; + bool started : 1; bool gtk_set : 1; bool netconfig_set_addr4 : 1;
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ struct sta_state {bool wsc_v2;struct l_dhcp_lease *ip_alloc_lease;bool ip_alloc_sent; +uint64_t rekey_time; bool ht_support : 1; bool ht_greenfield : 1;
@@ -345,6 +351,11 @@ static void ap_reset(struct ap_state *ap)l_queue_destroy (ap->networks, l_free); ap->networks =NULL ; } + +if (ap->rekey_timeout) { +l_timeout_remove (ap->rekey_timeout); + ap->rekey_timeout =NULL ; + } }static bool ap_event_done (struct ap_state *ap,bool prev_in_event)
@@ -377,6 +388,8 @@ static bool ap_event(struct ap_state *ap, enum ap_event_type event,return ap_event_done (ap, prev); } +static void ap_reset_rekey_timeout (struct ap_state *ap); +static void ap_del_station (struct sta_state *sta,uint16_t reason,bool disassociate) {
@@ -439,6 +452,89 @@ static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason,ap_event_done (ap, prev); } + +ap_reset_rekey_timeout (ap); +} + +static void ap_start_rekey (struct ap_state *ap,struct sta_state *sta) +{ +l_debug ("Rekey STA " MAC ,MAC_STR (sta->addr)); + +eapol_start (sta->sm); +} + +static void ap_rekey_timeout (struct l_timeout *timeout,void *user_data) +{ +struct ap_state *ap = user_data; + +l_timeout_remove (timeout); + +ap_reset_rekey_timeout (ap); +} + +/* +* Used to initiate any rekeys which are due and reset the rekey timer to the +* next soonest station needing a rekey. +* +* TODO: Could adapt this to also take into account the next GTK rekey and +* service that as well. But GTK rekeys are not yet supported in AP mode. +*/ +static void ap_reset_rekey_timeout (struct ap_state *ap) +{ +const struct l_queue_entry *e; +uint64_t now =l_time_now (); +uint64_t next =0 ; + +if (!ap->rekey_time) +return ; + +/* Find the station(s) that need a rekey and start it */ +for (e =l_queue_get_entries (ap->sta_states); e; e = e->next) { +struct sta_state *sta = e->data; + +if (!sta->associated || !sta->rsna) +continue ; + +if (l_time_before (now, sta->rekey_time)) { +uint64_t diff =l_time_diff (now, sta->rekey_time); + +/* Finding the next rekey time */ +if (next < diff) + next = diff; + +continue ; + } + +ap_start_rekey (ap, sta); + } + +/* +* Set the next rekey to the station needing it the soonest, or NULL +* if a single station and wait until the rekey is complete to reset +* the timer. +*/ +if (next) + ap->rekey_timeout =l_timeout_create (l_time_to_secs (next), + ap_rekey_timeout, ap,NULL ); +else + ap->rekey_timeout =NULL ; +} + +static void ap_set_sta_rekey_timer (struct ap_state *ap,struct sta_state *sta) +{ +if (!ap->rekey_time) +return ; + + sta->rekey_time =l_time_now () + ap->rekey_time -1 ; + +/* +* First/only station authenticated, set rekey timer. Any more stations +* will just set their rekey time and be serviced by the single callback +*/ +if (!ap->rekey_timeout) + ap->rekey_timeout =l_timeout_create ( +l_time_to_secs (ap->rekey_time), + ap_rekey_timeout, ap,NULL ); }static bool ap_sta_match_addr (const void *a,const void *b)
@@ -479,6 +575,8 @@ static void ap_new_rsna(struct sta_state *sta) sta->rsna = true; +ap_set_sta_rekey_timer (ap, sta); + event_data.mac = sta->addr; event_data.assoc_ies = sta->assoc_ies; event_data.assoc_ies_len = sta->assoc_ies_len;
@@ -1372,6 +1470,9 @@ static void ap_handshake_event(struct handshake_state *hs, sta->hs->go_ip_addr =IP4_FROM_STR (own_addr_str);break ; } +case HANDSHAKE_EVENT_REKEY_COMPLETE : +ap_set_sta_rekey_timer (ap, sta); +return ;default :break ; }
@@ -3628,6 +3729,19 @@ static int ap_load_config(struct ap_state *ap, const struct l_settings *config,l_strfreev (strvval); } +if (l_settings_has_key (config,"General" ,"RekeyTimeout" )) { +unsigned int uintval; + +if (!l_settings_get_uint (config,"General" , +"RekeyTimeout" , &uintval)) { +l_error ("AP [General].RekeyTimeout is not valid" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + ap->rekey_time = uintval *L_USEC_PER_SEC ; + }else + ap->rekey_time =AP_DEFAULT_REKEY_SECONDS *L_USEC_PER_SEC ; +/* * Since 5GHz won't ever support only CCK rates we can ignore this * setting on that band.
Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ap: support PTK rekeys
Hi James,
Quoted 7 lines · James Prestwood
This adds support for rekeys to AP mode. A single timer is used and reset to the next station needing a rekey. A default rekey timer of 600 seconds is used unless the profile sets a timeout.
--- src/ap.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+)
<snip>
src/ap.c static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 456
Quoted 6 lines
src/ap.c +2
-0@@ -439,6 +452,89 @@ static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason,ap_event_done (ap, prev); } + +ap_reset_rekey_timeout (ap);
Shouldn't you be cleaning up the timeout here?
Quoted 30 lines
src/ap.c +30
-0+} + +static void ap_start_rekey (struct ap_state *ap,struct sta_state *sta) +{ +l_debug ("Rekey STA " MAC ,MAC_STR (sta->addr)); + +eapol_start (sta->sm); +} + +static void ap_rekey_timeout (struct l_timeout *timeout,void *user_data) +{ +struct ap_state *ap = user_data; + +l_timeout_remove (timeout); + +ap_reset_rekey_timeout (ap); +} + +/* +* Used to initiate any rekeys which are due and reset the rekey timer to the +* next soonest station needing a rekey. +* +* TODO: Could adapt this to also take into account the next GTK rekey and +* service that as well. But GTK rekeys are not yet supported in AP mode. +*/ +static void ap_reset_rekey_timeout (struct ap_state *ap) +{ +const struct l_queue_entry *e; +uint64_t now =l_time_now (); +uint64_t next =0 ;
src/ap.c static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 496
Quoted 10 lines
src/ap.c +10
-0+ +if (!ap->rekey_time) +return ; + +/* Find the station(s) that need a rekey and start it */ +for (e =l_queue_get_entries (ap->sta_states); e; e = e->next) { +struct sta_state *sta = e->data; + +if (!sta->associated || !sta->rsna) +continue ;
Would checking sta->rekey_time == 0 also be worthwhile? For stas that haven't authenticated yet?
src/ap.c static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 505
Quoted 9 lines
src/ap.c +9
-0+ +if (l_time_before (now, sta->rekey_time)) { +uint64_t diff =l_time_diff (now, sta->rekey_time); + +/* Finding the next rekey time */ +if (next < diff) + next = diff; + +continue ;
Ok, so you try to find the next soonest (absolute) rekey_time to schedule the next timeout. Might be easier to just set next to ~0 and loop over the stations using l_time_before(sta->rekey_time, next), setting next as needed.
src/ap.c static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 508
Quoted 3 lines
src/ap.c +3
-0+ } + +ap_start_rekey (ap, sta);
And looks like this starts a rekey for any stations that we somehow missed? How does this happen?
src/ap.c static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 520
Quoted 12 lines
src/ap.c +12
-0+ } + +/* +* Set the next rekey to the station needing it the soonest, or NULL +* if a single station and wait until the rekey is complete to reset +* the timer. +*/ +if (next) + ap->rekey_timeout =l_timeout_create (l_time_to_secs (next), + ap_rekey_timeout, ap,NULL ); +else + ap->rekey_timeout =NULL ;
Are you sure the rekey_timeout is destroyed here?
Might be easier to use l_timeout_modify instead of creating/destroying it all the time?
Review static void ap_del_station(struct sta_state *sta, uint16_t reason, · line 522
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+} +
Regards,
-Denis
PATCH v2 4/4 doc: Document RekeyTimeout for AP profiles
In reply to James Prestwood--- src/iwd.ap.rst | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
src/iwd.ap.rst +7 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ The group ``[General]`` contains general AP configuration. ensure the country is set, and that the desired frequency/channel is unrestricted. + * - RekeyTimeout + - Timeout for PTK rekeys (seconds) + + The time interval at which the AP starts a rekey for a given station. If + not provided a default value of 600 seconds is used. A value of 0 will + disable PTK rekeys completely. + Network Authentication Settings -------------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] doc: Document RekeyTimeout for AP profiles
Hi James,
Quoted 9 lines · James Prestwood
--- src/iwd.ap.rst | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)src/iwd.ap.rst +0
-0
src/iwd.ap.rst The group ``[General]`` contains general AP configuration. · line 75
Quoted 9 lines
src/iwd.ap.rst +6
-0@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ The group ``[General]`` contains general AP configuration. ensure the country is set, and that the desired frequency/channel is unrestricted. + * - RekeyTimeout + - Timeout for PTK rekeys (seconds) + + The time interval at which the AP starts a rekey for a given station. If + not provided a default value of 600 seconds is used. A value of 0 will + disable PTK rekeys completely.
So the default should be 0 (disabled). Many older Linux kernels can't support pairwise rekeys without (the potential) for leaking cleartext packets during the process. iwd checks for the presence of NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0. If the driver isn't capable of this, we actually disconnect when the Authenticator requests a rekey.
src/iwd.ap.rst The group ``[General]`` contains general AP configuration. · line 79
Quoted 4 lines
src/iwd.ap.rst +1
-0+ Network Authentication Settings -------------------------------
Regards,
-Denis
Hi James,
Quoted 11 lines · James Prestwood
The only changes required was to set the secure bit for message 1, reset the frame retry counter, and change the 2/4 verifier to use the rekey flag rather than
ptk_complete. This is because we must setptk_completefalse in order to detect retransmissions of the 4/4 frame.Initiating a rekey can now be done by simply calling
eapol_start().--- src/eapol.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
<snip>
src/eapol.c static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm) · line 1117
Quoted 10 lines
src/eapol.c +6
-0@@ -1111,6 +1109,12 @@ static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)eapol_key_data_append (ek, sm->mic_len,HANDSHAKE_KDE_PMKID , pmkid,16 ); +if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete) { + ek->secure = true; + sm->rekey = true; + sm->handshake->ptk_complete = false; + } +
Hmm, shouldn't ek->secure always be set to sm->rekey? I'm thinking of retransmissions. Lets say we start a rekey with eapol_start(). ptk_complete is true, so the first transmit of the 1/4 packet will set ek->secure to true. But on subsequent retransmissions, this if() statement won't be hit due to ptk_complete being false. So ek->secure won't be set properly, no?
src/eapol.c static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm) · line 1120
Quoted 3 lines
src/eapol.c +0
-0ek->header.packet_len =L_CPU_TO_BE16 (EAPOL_FRAME_LEN (sm->mic_len) +EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN (ek, sm->mic_len) -4 );
Regards,
-Denis