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mtdchar: fix integer overflow in read/write ioctls

PATCH RESEND Applied Dan Carpenter 2 participants 3 messages Sep 30, 2025 – Oct 22, 2025

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#0 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v2 1/1 mtdchar: fix integer overflow in read/write ioctls

The "req.start" and "req.len" variables are u64 values that come from the user at the start of the function. We mask away the high 32 bits of "req.len" so that's capped at U32_MAX but the "req.start" variable can go up to U64_MAX which means that the addition can still integer overflow.

Use check_add_overflow() to fix this bug.

Fixes 095bb6e44eb1 ("mtdchar: add MEMREAD ioctl")
Fixes 6420ac0af95d ("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl")

---
v2: fix the tags.
RESEND: I sent this last year but it wasn't applied.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +4 -2
index 8dc4f5c493fc..335c702633ff 100644
@@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_write_req __user *argp)
 	uint8_t *datbuf = NULL, *oobbuf = NULL;
 	size_t datbuf_len, oobbuf_len;
 	int ret = 0;
+	u64 end;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&req, argp, sizeof(req)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -618,7 +619,7 @@ mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_write_req __user *argp)
 	req.len &= 0xffffffff;
 	req.ooblen &= 0xffffffff;
 
-	if (req.start + req.len > mtd->size)
+	if (check_add_overflow(req.start, req.len, &end) || end > mtd->size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	datbuf_len = min_t(size_t, req.len, mtd->erasesize);
@@ -698,6 +699,7 @@ mtdchar_read_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_read_req __user *argp)
 	size_t datbuf_len, oobbuf_len;
 	size_t orig_len, orig_ooblen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	u64 end;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&req, argp, sizeof(req)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -724,7 +726,7 @@ mtdchar_read_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_read_req __user *argp)
 	req.len &= 0xffffffff;
 	req.ooblen &= 0xffffffff;
 
-	if (req.start + req.len > mtd->size) {
+	if (check_add_overflow(req.start, req.len, &end) || end > mtd->size) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
maintainer
#1 lore raw

Hi Dan,

Quoted 7 lines · Dan Carpenter

The "req.start" and "req.len" variables are u64 values that come from the user at the start of the function. We mask away the high 32 bits of "req.len" so that's capped at U32_MAX but the "req.start" variable can go up to U64_MAX which means that the addition can still integer overflow.

Use check_add_overflow() to fix this bug.

Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 095bb6e44eb1 ("mtdchar: add MEMREAD ioctl")
Fixes 6420ac0af95d ("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl")

---
v2: fix the tags.
RESEND: I sent this last year but it wasn't applied.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

I don't know why, perhaps it got filtered as SPAM, I don't know, but I'm sorry about that.

I've just "closed" next, so I'll queue this in a fixes PR on top of v5.18-rc1.

Thanks,
Miquèl

maintainer Applied
#2 lore raw
In reply to Dan Carpenter
Quoted 8 lines · Dan Carpenter

The "req.start" and "req.len" variables are u64 values that come from the user at the start of the function. We mask away the high 32 bits of "req.len" so that's capped at U32_MAX but the "req.start" variable can go up to U64_MAX which means that the addition can still integer overflow.

Use check_add_overflow() to fix this bug.

[...]

Applied to mtd/fixes, thanks!

[1/1] mtdchar: fix integer overflow in read/write ioctls

      commit: e4185bed738da755b191aa3f2e16e8b48450e1b8

Patche(s) should be available on mtd/linux.git and will be part of the next PR (provided that no robot complains by then).

Kind regards,
Miquèl