rust: Upgrade 1.66.0 -> 1.66.1
PATCH 1/1 rust: Upgrade 1.66.0 -> 1.66.1
Changes:
Added validation of SSH host keys for git URLs in Cargo (CVE-2022-46176)
---
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{cargo_1.66.0.bb => cargo_1.66.1.bb} | 0
.../rust/{libstd-rs_1.66.0.bb => libstd-rs_1.66.1.bb} | 0
...t-cross-canadian_1.66.0.bb => rust-cross-canadian_1.66.1.bb} | 0
.../rust/{rust-llvm_1.66.0.bb => rust-llvm_1.66.1.bb} | 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc | 2 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{rust_1.66.0.bb => rust_1.66.1.bb} | 0
6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{cargo_1.66.0.bb => cargo_1.66.1.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{libstd-rs_1.66.0.bb => libstd-rs_1.66.1.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{rust-cross-canadian_1.66.0.bb => rust-cross-canadian_1.66.1.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{rust-llvm_1.66.0.bb => rust-llvm_1.66.1.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rust/{rust_1.66.0.bb => rust_1.66.1.bb} (100%)meta/recipes-devtools/rust/cargo_1.66.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rust/cargo_1.66.0.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/libstd-rs_1.66.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rust/libstd-rs_1.66.0.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-cross-canadian_1.66.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-cross-canadian_1.66.0.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-llvm_1.66.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-llvm_1.66.0.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ RUST_VERSION ?= "${@d.getVar('PV').split('-')[0]}" SRC_URI += "https://static.rust-lang.org/dist/rustc-${RUST_VERSION}-src.tar.xz;name=rust" -SRC_URI[rust.sha256sum] = "0dc176e34fae9871f855a6ba4cb30fa19d69c5b4428d29281a07419c4950715c" +SRC_URI[rust.sha256sum] = "07ac4e6c93e0d8ecfaf3b86c4c78bbbde3f5be675f0334e7fb343cb4a0b81ebe" SRC_URI:append:class-target:pn-libstd-rs = "\ file://0001-Do-not-use-LFS64-on-linux-with-musl.patch;patchdir=../.. \
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust_1.66.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust_1.66.0.bb +0 -0
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Quoted 2 lines · Alex Kiernan via lists.openembedded.org
Changes:
Added validation of SSH host keys for git URLs in Cargo (CVE-2022-46176)
Thanks Alex!
According to:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46176
"All Rust versions containing Cargo before 1.66.1 are vulnerable. "
so we'll have to fix:
kirkstone and langdale.
Sundeep, Naveen, or anyone,
Please find out what the upstream Rust team's plan is for older releases.
If they aren't going to release a dot update, we'll have to start back-porting the patches listed here:
https://github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/main/patches/CVE-2022-46176
Signature · 2 lines
# Randy MacLeod # Wind River Linux
Topic created on Rust community https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older-releases/18152
Based on the community feedback we will take a decision for Kirkstone & Langdale branches update.
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current stable relases.
https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.
So, for the Kirkstone & Langdale we've to back port the CVE fix.
Quoted 3 lines · Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current stable relases.
https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.
The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be the PREFERRED_VERSION but keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as crater that builds the world for any significant rust change.
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time, then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or anything else encounters a problem.
../Randy
1) https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Stable_Release_and_LTS#LTS_.E2.80.9CMixin.E2.80.9D_repositories
Quoted 11 lines
So, for the Kirkstone & Langdale we've to back port the CVE fix.
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# Randy MacLeod # Wind River Linux
Quoted 22 lines · Randy MacLeod
On 2023-01-16 10:20, Kokkonda, Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current stable relases.
https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older
-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be thePREFERRED_VERSIONbut keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing
and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as crater that builds the
world for any significant rust change.
Quoted 7 lines
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time,
then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or
anything else encounters a problem.
I'm afraid I don't like option 2. We don't do this for anything else so we're now inventing some new policy. Either the upgrade is what we decide is right or it isn't, I don't really like the idea of hedging our bets and providing two versions, one of which nobody will use until they're forced. It will also make security scans tricky as is the issue dealt with or not?
Just for context, going back in time OE used to be awash with many version of recipes and I'm reluctant to go back there as it was horrible. They were added for exactly this kind of reasoning, which at first seemed like a good idea.
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 38 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 22 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 6 lines · Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current
stable relases.https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older
-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be thePREFERRED_VERSIONbut keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update
from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing
and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as
crater that builds the
world for any significant rust change.Quoted 7 lines
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time,
then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or
anything else encounters a problem.I'm afraid I don't like option 2. We don't do this for anything else so we're now inventing some new policy. Either the upgrade is what we decide is right or it isn't, I don't really like the idea of hedging our bets and providing two versions, one of which nobody will use until they're forced. It will also make security scans tricky as is the issue dealt with or not?
Quoted 4 lines
Just for context, going back in time OE used to be awash with many version of recipes and I'm reluctant to go back there as it was horrible. They were added for exactly this kind of reasoning, which at first seemed like a good idea.
Okay, make sense, option 1 it is!
../Randy
Quoted 6 lines
Cheers,
Richard
Signature · 2 lines
# Randy MacLeod # Wind River Linux
Option 1 looks like a new policy too. If we can upgrade rust across many major versions in a stable release, then why not other items?
Alex
Quoted 68 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 38 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 22 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 6 lines · Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current
stable relases.https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older
-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be thePREFERRED_VERSIONbut keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update
from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing
and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as
crater that builds the
world for any significant rust change.Quoted 7 lines
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time,
then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or
anything else encounters a problem.I'm afraid I don't like option 2. We don't do this for anything else so we're now inventing some new policy. Either the upgrade is what we decide is right or it isn't, I don't really like the idea of hedging our bets and providing two versions, one of which nobody will use until they're forced. It will also make security scans tricky as is the issue dealt with or not?
Quoted 4 lines
Just for context, going back in time OE used to be awash with many version of recipes and I'm reluctant to go back there as it was horrible. They were added for exactly this kind of reasoning, which at first seemed like a good idea.
Okay, make sense, option 1 it is!
../Randy
Quoted 6 lines
Cheers,
Richard
--
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Kanavin
Option 1 looks like a new policy too. If we can upgrade rust across many major versions in a stable release, then why not other items?
According to the stable release "rules" option 1 would require an exception granted by the TSC. Otherwise it is a no go.
So it seems to me that this is a classic case for using a mix-in layer.
Steve
Quoted 69 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 68 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 38 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 6 lines · Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current
stable relases.https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older
-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be thePREFERRED_VERSIONbut keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update
from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing
and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as
crater that builds the
world for any significant rust change.Quoted 7 lines
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time,
then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or
anything else encounters a problem.I'm afraid I don't like option 2. We don't do this for anything else so we're now inventing some new policy. Either the upgrade is what we decide is right or it isn't, I don't really like the idea of hedging our bets and providing two versions, one of which nobody will use until they're forced. It will also make security scans tricky as is the issue dealt with or not?
Quoted 4 lines
Just for context, going back in time OE used to be awash with many version of recipes and I'm reluctant to go back there as it was horrible. They were added for exactly this kind of reasoning, which at first seemed like a good idea.
Okay, make sense, option 1 it is!
../Randy
Quoted 6 lines
Cheers,
Richard
--
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Quoted 4 lines · Steve Sakoman
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Kanavin
Option 1 looks like a new policy too. If we can upgrade rust across many major versions in a stable release, then why not other items?
In oe-core we have a trivial exception for vim but of course it's an application not a toolchain.
Similarly, in other layers, applications such as Chromium (and Tensorflow?) only maintain one version and users are expected to upgrade to get bug fixes.
The Rust developers / community seems to want their software to work in a similar way. They have a quite exhaustive test suite (Crater) to check for regressions. I'll look for some actual test results from Crater and reply here when I find them. I not sure what to make of the "Rust Editions" and how they'd fit into our distro support but the clear mandate from upstream is that only the 'stable' release is supported.
https://doc.rust-lang.org/edition-guide/editions/index.html
I think there's an argument to be made that until Rust releases 2.x, we just update to the latest version. If you haven't please read:
Assuming that some day, Rust-2.x is released, then one would hope that 1.x would be maintained for a few years on it's own branch but again the semantic versioning rules would allow them to release say 1.288, 1.289, ... and at that time, it would likely be more clear that we should be following the 1.x releases for older branches and 2.x releases for newer branches.
Quoted 4 lines
According to the stable release "rules" option 1 would require an exception granted by the TSC. Otherwise it is a no go.
So it seems to me that this is a classic case for using a mix-in layer.
Once I have enough data, I'll present it here and if it makes sense to ask the TSC, we can do that.
Upstream is not backporting fixes for a CVE such as this or for less notable bug fixes, so we'd be giving up those improvements. I suppose we'd only backport
bug fixes should someone encounter the bug or it becomes equally notable.
So far, there haven't been many Rust/Cargo CVEs so maybe we're making
too big a deal out of this. I certainly don't miss the deluge of memory management CVEs that C/C++ applications suffer from!
Sundeep,
Please also try to backporting the fixes to say Cargo/Rust for kirkstone. This CVE resulted in ~10 patches so it's hopefully one
of the more complicated back ports and will prove to be a good test case.
../Randy
Quoted 67 lines
Steve
Quoted 64 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 63 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 37 lines · Randy MacLeod
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 6 lines · Sundeep via lists.openembedded.org
Rust community said the security fixes are only for the current
stable relases.https://internals.rust-lang.org/t/cargo-cve-2022-46176-fix-for-older
-releases/18152/3?u=sundeep-kokkonda
For old release we've to backport the patches ourselves.The other alternatives are
1. upgrade to 1.66.1 on older branches,
2. add 1.66.1, which will be thePREFERRED_VERSIONbut keep the older version for those who are risk averse,
3. add a mix-in layer (1) with the upgrade to 1.66.1.
For langdale, we'd update from 1.63 and for kirkstone, we'd update
from 1.59
See the link above for a discussion about what Fedora/RHEL and other distros are doing
and a description of the rust / crates.io test system known as
crater that builds the
world for any significant rust change.Quoted 7 lines
Is there any objection to doing 2 and if we don't see any problems after some time,
then removing the older version?
Sundeep,
If no one object, please update kirkstone and see if librsvg or python-cryptography or
anything else encounters a problem.I'm afraid I don't like option 2. We don't do this for anything else so we're now inventing some new policy. Either the upgrade is what we decide is right or it isn't, I don't really like the idea of hedging our bets and providing two versions, one of which nobody will use until they're forced. It will also make security scans tricky as is the issue dealt with or not?
Quoted 4 lines
Just for context, going back in time OE used to be awash with many version of recipes and I'm reluctant to go back there as it was horrible. They were added for exactly this kind of reasoning, which at first seemed like a good idea.
Okay, make sense, option 1 it is!
../Randy
Quoted 5 lines
Cheers,
Richard
--
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Signature · 2 lines
# Randy MacLeod # Wind River Linux
Quoted 3 lines · Randy MacLeod
So far, there haven't been many Rust/Cargo CVEs so maybe we're making
too big a deal out of this. I certainly don't miss the deluge of memory management CVEs that C/C++ applications suffer from!
For what it's worth I'm with you here, and I actually have an even more radical view (that may offend some - apologies). I think this whole 'CVE backporting' business is both enormously wasteful and never complete (or even close to it). Backporting CVEs and the stable release policy is basically a cover-up for bad (or altogether absent) CI at the project users side. If you upgrade a component, and it causes trouble, the trouble should be caught by pipeline, and not in the end product when the update has shipped.
The saner policy would have been 'a Yocto stable release contains component versions all within their support windows by respective upstreams'. If the only supported version is the latest one, then so be it.
Alex
Hi,
Quoted 5 lines · Alexander Kanavin
Quoted 3 lines · Randy MacLeod
So far, there haven't been many Rust/Cargo CVEs so maybe we're making
too big a deal out of this. I certainly don't miss the deluge of memory management CVEs that C/C++ applications suffer from!
Quoted 8 lines
For what it's worth I'm with you here, and I actually have an even more radical view (that may offend some - apologies). I think this whole 'CVE backporting' business is both enormously wasteful and never complete (or even close to it). Backporting CVEs and the stable release policy is basically a cover-up for bad (or altogether absent) CI at the project users side. If you upgrade a component, and it causes trouble, the trouble should be caught by pipeline, and not in the end product when the update has shipped.
It's usually not lack of CI, continuous integration, but lack of testing coverage which is visible as risk management where any changes are avoided and someties FUD replaces hard facts. A CI run may not show that SW compatibility or some use cases are broken. In the worst case this is detected by customers after SW has been deployed in the field.
Quoted 4 lines
The saner policy would have been 'a Yocto stable release contains component versions all within their support windows by respective upstreams'. If the only supported version is the latest one, then so be it.
When mainting yocto SW stack for a long time, I made the distinction between development tools and target SW. Basically all -native and nativesdk- recipes and those target recipes which are not in the product by default are development tools.
Development tools can be updated to new versions to fix severe bugs and CVEs. For target SW, this can be done if ABI compatibility is preserved, or in case of severe issues where ABI is part of the problem or backporting the fix is more risky than an update, but this requires a managed transition with the product platform where all users of the SW are checked. ABI compatibility is important because frequently real products often need to integrate binaries where source code is not available to the bitbake build.
With this approach, I've updated tools and compiler versions. I would not mind similar policy in upstream. Maintaining multiple rust/cargo versions well is not likely going to happen so I'd accept this and accept same updates in all branches.
If the same tool version works well and is tested in another yocto branch and there are no major issues porting the same changes to another LTS branch, this gives confidence that the update is ok.
Cheers,
-Mikko
Quoted 18 lines · Mikko Rapeli
Hi,
Quoted 5 lines · Alexander Kanavin
Quoted 3 lines · Randy MacLeod
So far, there haven't been many Rust/Cargo CVEs so maybe we're making
too big a deal out of this. I certainly don't miss the deluge of memory management CVEs that C/C++ applications suffer from!Quoted 8 lines
For what it's worth I'm with you here, and I actually have an even more radical view (that may offend some - apologies). I think this whole 'CVE backporting' business is both enormously wasteful and never complete (or even close to it). Backporting CVEs and the stable release policy is basically a cover-up for bad (or altogether absent) CI at the project users side. If you upgrade a component, and it causes trouble, the trouble should be caught by pipeline, and not in the end product when the update has shipped.
Quoted 4 lines
It's usually not lack of CI, continuous integration, but lack of testing coverage which is visible as risk management where any changes are avoided and someties FUD replaces hard facts. A CI run may not show that SW compatibility or some use cases are broken.
We've been running with rust in production for a couple of years, I think we hit our first instance of an upgrade issue last week - a ureq crate upgrade changed something (I suspect in its pooling code) which meant that we ended up using all file descriptors. Wasn't caught in CI as nothing ran for long enough, but was caught in test (we still need to get to the root cause - right now we just rolled back that crate).
But over that time we've aggressively upgraded rust from something like 1.48 to 1.66.1, all the crates we build against and to the best of my knowledge this is the first time we've been tripped up.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The saner policy would have been 'a Yocto stable release contains component versions all within their support windows by respective upstreams'. If the only supported version is the latest one, then so be it.
When mainting yocto SW stack for a long time, I made the distinction between development tools and target SW. Basically all -native and nativesdk- recipes and those target recipes which are not in the product by default are development tools.
Development tools can be updated to new versions to fix severe bugs and CVEs. For target SW, this can be done if ABI compatibility is preserved, or in case of severe issues where ABI is part of the problem or backporting the fix is more risky than an update, but this requires a managed transition with the product platform where all users of the SW are checked. ABI compatibility is important because frequently real products often need to integrate binaries where source code is not available to the bitbake build.
Quoted 9 lines
With this approach, I've updated tools and compiler versions. I would not mind similar policy in upstream. Maintaining multiple
rust/cargoversions well is not likely going to happen so I'd accept this and accept same updates in all branches.If the same tool version works well and is tested in another yocto branch and there are no major issues porting the same changes to another LTS branch, this gives confidence that the update is ok.
For vendor reasons, we're stuck on thud (I know...), however we've a pile of backports so we can mostly just pick current recipes out of master or stable branches (python packages are the one which we're coming up against now as a blocker - fortunately we've expunged python from our target code base).
My view for a very long time has been that you basically have to stay very close to the most current release of whatever upstream code you're consuming, otherwise you're doomed to spending more and more of your life finding/fixing issues (security or otherwise) which were long since addressed upstream.
Signature · 1 line
Alex Kiernan
@Randy,
To summarize the discussion, I should try -
1. Upgrade Kirkstone/Lagdale rust to 1.66.1 and
2. backporting the fixes of Cargo/Rust for kirkstone (patches given in https://github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/main/patches/CVE-2022-46176 )
Is this correct?
--
Sundeep K.
Quoted 8 lines · Randy MacLeod
<snip>
The Rust developers / community seems to want their software to work in a similar way.
They have a quite exhaustive test suite (Crater) to check for regressions. I'll look for some actual test results from Crater and reply here when I find them.
There is a Crater <https://github.com/rust-lang/crater> chapter in the Rust docs <https://rustc-dev-guide.rust-lang.org/tests/crater.html>
I haven't found any test runs/results in their GitHub actions yet... There is rust-toolstate
<https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/rust-toolstate>, but it only shows the status per commit, not the test case results.
Ah, perhaps these are the Crater tests?
https://github.com/rust-lang-ci/rust/actions
<https://github.com/rust-lang-ci/rust/actions>
Quoted 5 lines
I not sure what to make of the "Rust Editions" and how they'd fit into our distro support
but the clear mandate from upstream is that only the 'stable' release is supported.
Quoted 9 lines
https://doc.rust-lang.org/edition-guide/editions/index.html
I think there's an argument to be made that until Rust releases 2.x, we just update
to the latest version. If you haven't please read:
Fedora's Josh Stone mentioned that they keep the latest rust
<https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/rust> packaged for all supported Fedora releases:
https://packages.fedoraproject.org/pkgs/rust/rust/
Debian is on 1.64 even for experimental
<https://salsa.debian.org/rust-team/rust>. Stable releases are on _much_ older versions <https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/rustc>.
Ubuntu <https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rustc> is on 1.65.
It will be interesting to see what the distros do to handle this situation.
<snip>
Quoted 8 lines
Sundeep,
Please also try to backporting the fixes to say Cargo/Rust for kirkstone. This CVE resulted in ~10 patches so it's hopefully one
of the more complicated back ports and will prove to be a good test case.The patch series for CVE-2022-46176
<https://github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/main/patches/CVE-2022-46176>
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../Randy
<snip>
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# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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