Security Working Group - Wednesday November 25
This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting scheduled for this Wednesday November 25 at 10:00am PDT.
We'll discuss the following items on the agenda <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI/edit>, and anything else that comes up:
1. Phosphor user manager - default group roles
Access, agenda and notes are in the wiki:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group <https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group>
Re: Security Working Group - Wednesday November 25 - results
Quoted 5 lines · Joseph Reynolds
This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting scheduled for this Wednesday November 25 at 10:00am PDT.
We'll discuss the following items on the agenda <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI/edit>, and anything else that comes up:
1. Phosphor user manager - default group roles
Richard and Joseph went through the email thread and agreed on the solution for the ssh group. This includes the use case where SSH is enabled, but only special pre-created users are allowed to access it (such as manufacturing and service accounts).
We also discussed an image feature to disable SSH. Is there such an image feature in yocto/OpenEmbedded? If so, use it; otherwise add an option to openbmc. Specifically, if SSH is not present, then remove the “ssh” group privilege from the image (such as phosphor-user-manager).
We discussed the concept of “image type” as an image feature. A “development” image would have features such as SSH enabled and is intended for developers. A “production” image would have fewer (or different) features enabled and is intended for production servers. This might simplify testing. However, we did not discuss any specific features (beyond SSH).
Joseph mentioned that changing the SSH default was one of several desired changes...
Joseph is moving forward with a proof of concept (PoC) for a special pre-created “service” account that has a custom OEM “ServiceAgent” role that has the custom “PerformService” privilege. I believe all agreed that this privilege is needed to perform operations such as change a permanent MAC address or a FRU serial number.
(Joseph introduced the way we plan to authenticate the special-privilege pre-created users. Having a default password is problematic. The service user (person) will create a certificate pair, and work with the BMC admin to install the “public” copy onto the BMC. Details pending.)
(Joseph mentioned the “service” account is “special” in several ways: special authentication as mentioned above, and there are no APIs to delete or modify the account. The main idea is to prevent the admin user from escalating into the special account.)
We discussed if the OEM ServiceAgent role would be (A) a superset of the Administrator role, or (B) if it should be a subset of Administrator privileges plus the custom PerformService privilege. Option A is the use case currently needed. Option B may be more difficult to design, implement, document, test, and reason about.
We discussed the idea of making all these changes in BMCWeb and user-manager, and which would become image features.
Quoted 4 lines
Access, agenda and notes are in the wiki:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group <https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group>