LSM: Measure security module data
Subsystems (5)
v6 cover LSM: Measure security module data
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
IMA subsystem measures system files, command line arguments passed to kexec, boot aggregate, keys, etc. It can be used to measure critical data structures of security modules as well.
This change aims to address measuring critical data structures of security modules when they are initialized and when they are updated at runtime.
This series is based on commit 3db0d0c276a7 ("integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret") in next-integrity
Change log:
v6:
=> Use kvmalloc for payload data for early boot data measurement
since payload size may exceed the limit supported by kmalloc.
=> Fixed IMA policy rule match error when checking for IMA hook
func LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY.
=> Enable early boot data measurement and IMA hook func
LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY when SELinux is enabled.
v5:
=> Append timestamp to "event name" string in the call to
the IMA hooks so that LSM data is always measured by IMA.
=> Removed workqueue patch that was handling periodic checking
of the LSM data. This change will be introduced as a separate patch set while keeping this patch set focussed on measuring the LSM data on initialization and on updates at runtime.
=> Handle early boot measurement of LSM data.
v4:
=> Added LSM_POLICY func and IMA hook to measure LSM policy. => Pass SELinux policy data, instead of the hash of the policy,
to the IMA hook to measure.
=> Include "initialized" flag in SELinux measurement.
Also, measure SELinux state even when initialization is not yet completed. But measure SELinux policy only after initialization.
v3:
=> Loop through policy_capabilities to build the state data
to measure instead of hardcoding to current set of policy capabilities.
=> Added error log messages for failure conditions.
v2:
=> Pass selinux_state struct as parameter to the function
that measures SELinux data.
=> Use strings from selinux_policycap_names array for SELinux
state measurement.
=> Refactored security_read_policy() to alloc kernel or user
virtual memory and then read the SELinux policy.
v1:
=> Per Stephen Smalley's suggestion added selinux_state booleans
and hash of SELinux policy in the measured data for SELinux.
=> Call IMA hook from the security module directly instead of
redirecting through the LSM.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (4):
IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy
LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 + include/linux/ima.h | 14 ++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 45 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 64 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 36 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 174 ----------------- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++ security/selinux/measure.c | 150 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 ++++++- 18 files changed, 569 insertions(+), 222 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH v6 1/4 IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY to measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Update ima_match_rules() and ima_validate_rule() to check for the new func and ima_parse_rule() to handle the new func.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +9 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
@@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state: + + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf + + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy: + + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ng
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +30 -4
@@ -442,13 +442,21 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +return ((rule->func == func) && +ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred)); +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +return (rule->func == func); +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -1044,6 +1052,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case LSM_STATE : +case LSM_POLICY : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;
@@ -1176,6 +1196,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_CMDLINE ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && + strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && + strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY; else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.
I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls - finit_module, kexec_file_load - pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.
Mimi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.
Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via /sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.
Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?
Mimi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 46 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.
Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 50 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 45 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?
Quoted 9 lines
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
Mimi
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 62 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 50 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 45 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?Quoted 9 lines
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
I think that was the original approach. However, I had concerns with adding code to SELinux to compute a hash over the policy versus leaving that to IMA's existing policy and mechanism. If that's preferred I guess we can do it that way but seems less flexible and duplicative.
Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 67 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 62 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 50 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 45 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?Quoted 9 lines
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
Quoted 5 lines
I think that was the original approach. However, I had concerns with adding code to SELinux to compute a hash over the policy versus leaving that to IMA's existing policy and mechanism. If that's preferred I guess we can do it that way but seems less flexible and duplicative.
In AppArmor, we store the sha1 of the raw policy as the policy is loaded. The hash is exposed to userspace in apparmorfs. See commit 5ac8c355ae00 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform").
It has proved useful as a mechanism for debugging as sometimes the on-disk policy doesn't match the loaded policy and this can be a good way to check that while providing support to users. John also mentions checkpoint/restore in the commit message and I could certainly see how the policy hashes would be useful in that scenario.
When thinking through how Lakshmi's series could be extended for AppArmor support, I was thinking that the AppArmor policy measurement would be a measurement of these hashes that we already have in place.
Perhaps there's some general usefulness in storing/exposing an SELinux policy hash rather than only seeing it as duplicative property required this measurement series?
Tyler
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 78 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 58 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 57 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 43 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 33 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
I think that was the original approach. However, I had concerns with adding code to SELinux to compute a hash over the policy versus leaving that to IMA's existing policy and mechanism. If that's preferred I guess we can do it that way but seems less flexible and duplicative.
In AppArmor, we store the sha1 of the raw policy as the policy is loaded. The hash is exposed to userspace in apparmorfs. See commit
5ac8c355ae00("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform").It has proved useful as a mechanism for debugging as sometimes the on-disk policy doesn't match the loaded policy and this can be a good way to check that while providing support to users. John also mentions checkpoint/restore in the commit message and I could certainly see how the policy hashes would be useful in that scenario.
Quoted 7 lines
When thinking through how Lakshmi's series could be extended for AppArmor support, I was thinking that the AppArmor policy measurement would be a measurement of these hashes that we already have in place.
Perhaps there's some general usefulness in storing/exposing an SELinux policy hash rather than only seeing it as duplicative property required this measurement series?
That would be a hash of the policy file that was last loaded via the selinuxfs interface for loading policy, not a hash of the in-memory policy data structures at the time of measurement (which is what this patch series is implementing). The duplicative part is with respect to selecting a hash algorithm and hashing the in-memory policy as part of the SELinux code rather than just passing the policy buffer to IMA for measurement like any other buffer. Userspace can already hash the in-memory policy data itself by running sha256sum or whatever on /sys/fs/selinux/policy, so we don't need to save or expose that separately.
Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
Quoted 84 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 82 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 58 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 57 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 43 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 33 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.
Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
I think that was the original approach. However, I had concerns with adding code to SELinux to compute a hash over the policy versus leaving that to IMA's existing policy and mechanism. If that's preferred I guess we can do it that way but seems less flexible and duplicative.
In AppArmor, we store the sha1 of the raw policy as the policy is loaded. The hash is exposed to userspace in apparmorfs. See commit
5ac8c355ae00("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform").It has proved useful as a mechanism for debugging as sometimes the on-disk policy doesn't match the loaded policy and this can be a good way to check that while providing support to users. John also mentions checkpoint/restore in the commit message and I could certainly see how the policy hashes would be useful in that scenario.
When thinking through how Lakshmi's series could be extended for AppArmor support, I was thinking that the AppArmor policy measurement would be a measurement of these hashes that we already have in place.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Perhaps there's some general usefulness in storing/exposing an SELinux policy hash rather than only seeing it as duplicative property required this measurement series?
That would be a hash of the policy file that was last loaded via the selinuxfs interface for loading policy, not a hash of the in-memory policy data structures at the time of measurement (which is what this patch series is implementing). The duplicative part is with respect to selecting a hash algorithm and hashing the in-memory policy as part of the SELinux code rather than just passing the policy buffer to IMA for measurement like any other buffer. Userspace can already hash the in-memory policy data itself by running sha256sum or whatever on
/sys/fs/selinux/policy, so we don't need to save or expose that separately.
yeah apparmor exposes full loaded policy data that userspace could hash independently too, the hashing done by the kernel just reduces the amount of data that userspace has to suck down if they trust the kernel to do the hash. Those hashes are also used by apparmor internally for the first part of a dedup check so exposing them cost very little.
The hashing of the in-memory data structures and variables is something we are not currently doing. If we were to do it hashing in-memory apparmor policy would be quite involved and that would be something I would rather have LSMs export an interface for rather than having IMA poke directly at the data structures (ie. apparmor specific code in apparmor).
As for computing a measurement based on the hash instead of the in-memory policy, while quicker that would not detect memory corruption/attacks that manage to modify policy via writing kernel memory. Whether that type of measurement is sufficient depends on what you are trying to achieve.
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 66 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 61 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 50 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 45 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 34 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Lakshmi,
There's still a number of other patch sets needing to be reviewed before my getting to this one. The comment below is from a high level.
Quoted 10 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement.
Define two new IMA policy func namely
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYto measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Updateima_match_rules()andima_validate_rule()to check for the new func andima_parse_rule()to handle the new func.I can understand wanting to measure the in kernel LSM memory state to make sure it hasn't changed, but policies are stored as files. Buffer measurements should be limited to those things that are not files.
Changing how data is passed to the kernel has been happening for a while. For example, instead of passing the kernel module or kernel image in a buffer, the new syscalls -
finit_module,kexec_file_load- pass an open file descriptor. Similarly, instead of loading the IMA policy data, a pathname may be provided.Quoted 5 lines
Pre and post security hooks already exist for reading files. Instead
of adding IMA support for measuring the policy file data, update the mechanism for loading the LSM policy. Then not only will you be able to measure the policy, you'll also be able to require the policy be signed.Quoted 9 lines
To clarify, the policy being measured by this patch series is a serialized representation of the in-memory policy data structures being enforced by SELinux. Not the file that was loaded. Hence, this measurement would detect tampering with the in-memory policy data structures after the policy has been loaded. In the case of SELinux, one can read this serialized representation via
/sys/fs/selinux/policy. The result is not byte-for-byte identical to the policy file that was loaded but can be semantically compared via sediff and other tools to determine whether it is equivalent.Quoted 3 lines
Thank you for the clarification. Could the policy hash be included
with the other critical data? Does it really need to be measured independently?Quoted 9 lines
They were split into two separate functions because we wanted to be able to support using different templates for them (ima-buf for the state variables so that the measurement includes the original buffer, which is small and relatively fixed-size, and ima-ng for the policy because it is large and we just want to capture the hash for later comparison against known-good). Also, the state variables are available for measurement always from early initialization, whereas the policy is only available for measurement once we have loaded an initial policy.
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, measuring the policy separately from other critical data makes sense. Instead of measuring the policy, which is large, measure the policy hash.
Quoted 5 lines
I think that was the original approach. However, I had concerns with adding code to SELinux to compute a hash over the policy versus leaving that to IMA's existing policy and mechanism. If that's preferred I guess we can do it that way but seems less flexible and duplicative.
Whether IMA or SELinux calculates the in memory policy hash, it should not impact the original purpose of this patch set - measuring critical state. It's unclear whether this patch set needs to be limited to LSM critical state.
Measuring the in memory policy, if needed, should be a separate patch set.
Mimi
PATCH v6 2/4 IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianIMA subsystem needs to define IMA hooks that the security modules can call to measure state and policy data.
Define two new IMA hooks, namely ima_lsm_state() and ima_lsm_policy(), that the security modules can call to measure LSM state and LSM policy respectively. Return the status of the measurement operation from these two IMA hooks.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 14 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +14 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name,const void *buf, +int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);
@@ -104,6 +108,16 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_state (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_policy (const char *lsm_event_name, +const void *buf,int size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3 -3
@@ -267,9 +267,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, -const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size, +const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, +int pcr,const char *keyring);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +43 -7
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2.27.0
PATCH v6 3/4 LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianSELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime.
Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy() respectively.
Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
To verify the measurement check the following:
Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
=> enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
0 otherwise
For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
=> /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
=> /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
And, each of the policy capabilities files under
=> /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities
For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry.
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 4
--- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 +++ security/selinux/measure.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -0
@@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) }selinux_mark_disabled (state); +selinux_measure_state (state);pr_info ("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n" );
security/selinux/include/security.h +15 -0
@@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot (const struct selinux_state *state) +{ +return READ_ONCE (state->checkreqprot); +} +int security_mls_enabled (struct selinux_state *state);int security_load_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void *data,size_t len);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);size_t security_policydb_len (struct selinux_state *state);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif +#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32struct av_decision {u32 allowed;
security/selinux/measure.c new file +150 -0
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security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +3 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current));enforcing_set (state, new_value); +selinux_measure_state (state);if (new_value)avc_ss_reset (state->avc,0 );selnl_notify_setenforce (new_value);
@@ -678,6 +679,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ?1 :0 ; length = count; + +selinux_measure_state (fsi->state); out:kfree (page);return length;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +62 -9
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2.27.0
PATCH v6 4/4 IMA: Handle early boot data measurement
In reply to Lakshmi RamasubramanianThe current implementation of early boot measurement in the IMA subsystem is very specific to asymmetric keys. It does not handle measurement of other data such as Linux Security Module (LSM) data. Since most security modules are initialized very early in the boot cycle, data provided by those modules are not measured by IMA. Any other subsystem that initializes early in the boot cycle and needs IMA to measure their data would suffer from the same issue.
Update the early boot key measurement to handle any early boot data. Change the kernel configuration CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS to CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA so it can be used for enabling early boot data measurement. Change this new configuration to support SECURITY_SELINUX subsystem in addition to KEYS subsystem, which is currently supported. This can be extended to include more subsystems in the future by updating this kernel configuration.
Update LSM hooks namely ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy to utilize early boot measurement support.
--- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 37 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 174 ----------------- 9 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +2 -3
@@ -322,10 +322,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA) += ima_queue_data.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +21 -16
@@ -229,29 +229,34 @@ extern const char *const func_tokens[];struct modsig ; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA /* -* To track keys that need to be measured. +* To track data that needs to be measured. */ -struct ima_key_entry { +struct ima_data_entry {struct list_head list;void *payload;size_t payload_len; -char *keyring_name; +const char *event_name; +const char *event_data; +enum ima_hooks func; }; -void ima_init_key_queue (void ); -bool ima_should_queue_key (void ); -bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring,const void *payload, -size_t payload_len); -void ima_process_queued_keys (void ); +void ima_init_data_queue (void ); +bool ima_should_queue_data (void ); +bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name,const void *payload, +size_t payload_len,const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func); +void ima_process_queued_data (void );#else -static inline void ima_init_key_queue (void ) {} -static inline bool ima_should_queue_key (void ) {return false; } -static inline bool ima_queue_key (struct key *keyring, -const void *payload, -size_t payload_len) {return false; } -static inline void ima_process_queued_keys (void ) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ +static inline void ima_init_data_queue (void ) {} +static inline bool ima_should_queue_data (void ) {return false; } +static inline bool ima_queue_data (const char *event_name, +const void *payload, +size_t payload_len, +const char *event_data, +enum ima_hooks func) {return false; } +static inline void ima_process_queued_data (void ) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA */ /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +4 -2
@@ -37,8 +37,10 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,if (!payload || (payload_len ==0 ))return ; -if (ima_should_queue_key ()) - queued =ima_queue_key (keyring, payload, payload_len); +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (keyring->description, payload, + payload_len, keyring->description, +KEY_CHECK );if (queued)return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)if (rc !=0 )return rc; -ima_init_key_queue (); +ima_init_data_queue ();return rc; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +18 -4
@@ -846,6 +846,22 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +static int ima_measure_lsm_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int size, +enum ima_hooks func) +{ +bool queued = false; + +if (ima_should_queue_data ()) + queued =ima_queue_data (event_name, buf, size,NULL , func); + +if (queued) +return 0 ; + +return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, event_name, func, +0 ,NULL ); +} +/** * ima_measure_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state * @lsm_event_name: LSM event
@@ -860,8 +876,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf,if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size)return -EINVAL ; -return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, -LSM_STATE ,0 ,NULL ); +return ima_measure_lsm_data (lsm_event_name, buf, size,LSM_STATE ); }/**
@@ -878,8 +893,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf,if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size)return -EINVAL ; -return process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, size, lsm_event_name, -LSM_POLICY ,0 ,NULL ); +return ima_measure_lsm_data (lsm_event_name, buf, size,LSM_POLICY ); }static int __init init_ima (void )
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -1
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)ima_update_policy_flag ();/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ -ima_process_queued_keys (); +ima_process_queued_data (); }/* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c new file +190 -0
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security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c deleted +0 -174
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2.27.0
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
Quoted 19 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY when SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.
To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.
Please see Patch 1/4
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&
+ strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0)
+ entry->func = LSM_STATE;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) &&
+ strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0)
+ entry->func = LSM_POLICY;
And, if early boot measurement is needed for AppArmor the following change in IMA's Kconfig
Patch 4/4
+config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA
bool
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
default y
If you think calling this an "LSM feature" is not appropriate, please suggest a better phrase.
But like I said above, with minimal change in IMA other security modules can be supported to measure STATE and POLICY data.
-lakshmi
Quoted 20 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.
This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
Quoted 12 lines
Please see Patch 1/4
+ else if (
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_STATE;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_POLICY;And, if early boot measurement is needed for AppArmor the following change in IMA's
Kconfig
Quoted 8 lines
Patch 4/4
+config
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA
bool
+ depends onSECURITY_SELINUX|| (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS&&SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default yIf you think calling this an "LSM feature" is not appropriate, please suggest a better phrase.
In the code above you are under CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX. I would suggest that it's an SELinux feature, so you should be using SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY, as I suggested before. Just because SELinux has state and policy to measure doesn't mean that a different module might not have other data, such as history, that should be covered as well.
I realize that IMA already has compile time dependencies to determine which xattrs to measure. There's no reason that the xattr list couldn't be determined at boot time, with each security module providing the XATTR_NAME values it uses.
Quoted 6 lines
But like I said above, with minimal change in IMA other security modules can be supported to measure STATE and POLICY data.
-lakshmi
Quoted 26 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 25 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Please see Patch 1/4
+ else if (
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_STATE;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_POLICY;And, if early boot measurement is needed for AppArmor the following change in IMA's
KconfigPatch 4/4
+config
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA
bool
+ depends onSECURITY_SELINUX|| (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS&&SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
If you think calling this an "LSM feature" is not appropriate, please suggest a better phrase.
In the code above you are under
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX. I would suggest that it's an SELinux feature, so you should be usingSELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, as I suggested before. Just because SELinux has state and policy to measure doesn't mean that a different module might not have other data, such as history, that should be covered as well.
In addition to SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposed LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY func values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.
So the current proposed rules:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
Would become:
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinux
The following rules would be rejected:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smack
Of course, the apparmor and smack rules could/would be allowed when proper support is in place.
Tyler
Quoted 13 lines
I realize that IMA already has compile time dependencies to determine which xattrs to measure. There's no reason that the xattr list couldn't be determined at boot time, with each security module providing the
XATTR_NAMEvalues it uses.Quoted 6 lines
But like I said above, with minimal change in IMA other security modules can be supported to measure STATE and POLICY data.
-lakshmi
Quoted 31 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 30 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 28 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
When both the security modules are enabled, IMA policy validator would look like below:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ||
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)) &&
strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0)
entry->func = LSM_STATE;Similar one for LSM_POLICY validation.
Both SELinux and AppArmor can call ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy() to measure state and policy respectively.
I don't think we should go the route of defining IMA hooks per security module (i.e., SELINUX_STATE, APPARMOR_STATE, SELINUX_POLICY, etc.) Instead keep the hook generic that any SM could use - which is what I have tried to address in this patch series.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Please see Patch 1/4
+ else if (
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_STATE;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_POLICY;And, if early boot measurement is needed for AppArmor the following change in IMA's
KconfigPatch 4/4
+config
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA
bool
+ depends onSECURITY_SELINUX|| (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS&&SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
default y
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
If you think calling this an "LSM feature" is not appropriate, please suggest a better phrase.
In the code above you are under
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX. I would suggest that it's an SELinux feature, so you should be usingSELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, as I suggested before. Just because SELinux has state and policy to measure doesn't mean that a different module might not have other data, such as history, that should be covered as well.
Good point - if other SMs have data besides state and policy, we can define IMA hooks to measure that as well.
But I still think it is not the right approach to call this SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY - it will lead to unnecessary code duplication in IMA as more SMs are onboarded, in my opinion. Correct me if I am wrong.
-lakshmi
Quoted 40 lines
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxThe following rules would be rejected:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smackOf course, the apparmor and smack rules could/would be allowed when proper support is in place.
Quoted 13 lines
I realize that IMA already has compile time dependencies to determine which xattrs to measure. There's no reason that the xattr list couldn't be determined at boot time, with each security module providing the
XATTR_NAMEvalues it uses.Quoted 6 lines
But like I said above, with minimal change in IMA other security modules can be supported to measure STATE and POLICY data.
-lakshmi
Quoted 35 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 34 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 32 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 20 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 19 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
I think Casey is talking about now (when AppArmor is not supported by this feature) and you're talking about the future (when AppArmor may be supported by this feature).
Now, a "measure func=LSM_STATE" rule would be accepted by the IMA policy parser but do nothing for the AppArmor LSM. The rule may do something in the future but there's no difference in feedback to the IMA policy author between now and the future.
Tyler
Quoted 97 lines
When both the security modules are enabled, IMA policy validator would look like below:
if (
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)||IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)) && strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) entry->func = LSM_STATE;Similar one for
LSM_POLICYvalidation.Both SELinux and AppArmor can call
ima_measure_lsm_state()andima_measure_lsm_policy()to measure state and policy respectively.I don't think we should go the route of defining IMA hooks per security module (i.e.,
SELINUX_STATE,APPARMOR_STATE,SELINUX_POLICY, etc.) Instead keep the hook generic that any SM could use - which is what I have tried to address in this patch series.Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Please see Patch 1/4
+ else if (
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_STATE;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)&& +strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY")== 0) +entry->func=LSM_POLICY;And, if early boot measurement is needed for AppArmor the following change in IMA's
KconfigPatch 4/4
+config
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA
bool
+ depends onSECURITY_SELINUX|| (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS&&SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
default yQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
If you think calling this an "LSM feature" is not appropriate, please suggest a better phrase.
In the code above you are under
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX. I would suggest that it's an SELinux feature, so you should be usingSELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, as I suggested before. Just because SELinux has state and policy to measure doesn't mean that a different module might not have other data, such as history, that should be covered as well.Good point - if other SMs have data besides state and policy, we can define IMA hooks to measure that as well.
But I still think it is not the right approach to call this
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY- it will lead to unnecessary code duplication in IMA as more SMs are onboarded, in my opinion. Correct me if I am wrong.-lakshmi
Quoted 40 lines
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxThe following rules would be rejected:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smackOf course, the apparmor and smack rules could/would be allowed when proper support is in place.
Quoted 13 lines
I realize that IMA already has compile time dependencies to determine which xattrs to measure. There's no reason that the xattr list couldn't be determined at boot time, with each security module providing the
XATTR_NAMEvalues it uses.Quoted 6 lines
But like I said above, with minimal change in IMA other security modules can be supported to measure STATE and POLICY data.
-lakshmi
Quoted 41 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 40 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 38 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 26 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 25 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
I think Casey is talking about now (when AppArmor is not supported by this feature) and you're talking about the future (when AppArmor may be supported by this feature).
Got it - thanks for clarifying.
But with the current code if SELinux is enabled on the system, but AppArmor is not and the IMA policy contains "measure func=LSM_STATE" then the policy will be rejected as "-EINVAL". So the policy author would get a feedback even now.
Correct me if I am wrong.
-lakshmi
Quoted 49 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 41 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 40 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 38 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 26 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 25 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
I think Casey is talking about now (when AppArmor is not supported by this feature) and you're talking about the future (when AppArmor may be supported by this feature).
Quoted 5 lines
Got it - thanks for clarifying.
But with the current code if SELinux is enabled on the system, but AppArmor is not and the IMA policy contains "measure func=LSM_STATE" then the policy will be rejected as "
-EINVAL".
The AppArmor policy load? Yes, the load will fail.
What Casey is talking about is when SELinux and AppArmor are enabled in the kernel config but AppArmor is active. This scenario is true in distro kernels such as Ubuntu's kernel:
$ grep -e CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX= -e CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR= /boot/config-5.4.0-42-generic CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm lockdown,capability,yama,apparmor
Casey also likely has LSM stacking in mind here where SELinux and AppArmor could both be active at the same time but the LSM stacking series is not yet applied.
Tyler
Quoted 4 lines
So the policy author would get a feedback even now. Correct me if I am wrong.
-lakshmi
Quoted 52 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 37 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 36 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 35 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 25 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 23 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
Quoted 11 lines
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism. I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYwhen SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.Quoted 7 lines
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To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which LSMs are going to be measured.
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
Quoted 8 lines
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I think Casey is talking about now (when AppArmor is not supported by this feature) and you're talking about the future (when AppArmor may be supported by this feature).
Got it - thanks for clarifying.
But with the current code if SELinux is enabled on the system, but AppArmor is not and the IMA policy contains "measure func=LSM_STATE" then the policy will be rejected as "
-EINVAL".The AppArmor policy load? Yes, the load will fail.
What Casey is talking about is when SELinux and AppArmor are enabled in the kernel config but AppArmor is active. This scenario is true in distro kernels such as Ubuntu's kernel:
Quoted 5 lines
$ grep -e CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX= -e CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR= /boot/config-5.4.0-42-generic CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm lockdown,capability,yama,apparmor
Yes. This is one reason that a compile time check is inappropriate. You also have the case with SELinux where you can unload the module. It's deprecated, but still possible.
If you boot with SELinux compiled in, but with security=none on the boot line you also have a case where the compile time check is inappropriate.
Quoted 3 lines
Casey also likely has LSM stacking in mind here where SELinux and AppArmor could both be active at the same time but the LSM stacking series is not yet applied.
It isn't in Linus' kernel, but is available in Ubuntu. The audit/IMA rule selection get hairy in the multiple security module case, but you don't need to add that for the proposed scheme to be flawed.
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Tyler
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So the policy author would get a feedback even now. Correct me if I am wrong.
-lakshmi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Tyler Hicks
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinux
Quoted 6 lines
The following rules would be rejected:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smack
Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how
firmware was loaded. There will be a single firmware enumeration.
Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in multiple places. Is there really a need from a policy perspective for
differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind? The
data being measured should include some identifying information.
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Mimi
Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 14 lines · Tyler Hicks
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxQuoted 6 lines
The following rules would be rejected:
measure func=LSM_STATE
measure func=LSM_POLICY
measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smack
Quoted 7 lines
Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how
firmware was loaded. There will be a single firmware enumeration.Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in multiple places. Is there really a need from a policy perspective for
differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind? The
data being measured should include some identifying information.
Yes Mimi - SELinux is including the identifying information in the "event name" field. Please see a sample measurement of STATE and POLICY for SELinux below:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
Quoted 4 lines
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"?
I think that is a good idea.
-lakshmi
Quoted 36 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 14 lines · Tyler Hicks
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxQuoted 6 lines
The following rules would be rejected:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICY
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smackQuoted 7 lines
Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how firmware was loaded.?? There will be a single firmware enumeration.
Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in multiple places.? Is there really a need from a policy perspective for differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind??? The data being measured should include some identifying information.
Yes Mimi - SELinux is including the identifying information in the "event name" field. Please see a sample measurement of STATE and POLICY for SELinux below:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
Quoted 8 lines
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
Quoted 4 lines
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"?
Policy, state, history or whim, it should be up to the security module to determine what data it cares about, and how it should be measured. Smack does not keep its policy in a single blob of data, it uses lists which can be modified at will. Your definition of the behavior for LSM_POLICY wouldn't work for Smack. That doesn't mean that there isn't a viable way to measure the Smack policy, it just means that IMA isn't the place for it. If SELinux wants its data measured, SELinux should be providing the mechanism to do it.
I guess that I'm agreeing with you in part. If you want a generic measurement of "critical data", you don't need to assign a type to it, you have the caller (a security module, a device driver or whatever) identify itself and how it is going to deal with the data. That's very different from what you've done to date.
Quoted 4 lines
I think that is a good idea.
?-lakshmi
Quoted 55 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 36 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 14 lines · Tyler Hicks
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxQuoted 6 lines
The following rules would be rejected:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICY
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smackQuoted 7 lines
Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how firmware was loaded.?? There will be a single firmware enumeration.
Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in multiple places.? Is there really a need from a policy perspective for differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind??? The data being measured should include some identifying information.
Yes Mimi - SELinux is including the identifying information in the "event name" field. Please see a sample measurement of STATE and POLICY for SELinux below:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
Quoted 8 lines
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
Quoted 4 lines
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"?Policy, state, history or whim, it should be up to the security module to determine what data it cares about, and how it should be measured. Smack does not keep its policy in a single blob of data, it uses lists which can be modified at will. Your definition of the behavior for
LSM_POLICYwouldn't work for Smack. That doesn't mean that there isn't a viable way to measure the Smack policy, it just means that IMA isn't the place for it. If SELinux wants its data measured, SELinux should be providing the mechanism to do it.
Quoted 5 lines
I guess that I'm agreeing with you in part. If you want a generic measurement of "critical data", you don't need to assign a type to it, you have the caller (a security module, a device driver or whatever) identify itself and how it is going to deal with the data. That's very different from what you've done to date.
Agree.
Like Stephen had stated earlier, the reason we kept separate hooks (STATE and POLICY) is because the data for state is usually small and therefore we measure the entire data. Whereas, policy data is usually quite large (a few MB) and hence we measure a hash of the policy.
If change to a generic measurement of "critical data", at the least IMA should provide a way to measure "data" and "hash(data)".
And, with the caller providing the identifying information, there would be no need to call it "LSM_STATE" or "SELINUX_STATE" or such.
-lakshmi
Quoted 62 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 55 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 36 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Quoted 23 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 14 lines · Tyler Hicks
In addition to
SELINUX_STATEandSELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider the proposedLSM_STATEandLSM_POLICYfunc values but require an "lsm" rule conditional.So the current proposed rules:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICYWould become:
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinuxQuoted 6 lines
The following rules would be rejected:
? measure func=LSM_STATE
? measure func=LSM_POLICY
? measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor
? measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smackQuoted 7 lines
Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how firmware was loaded.?? There will be a single firmware enumeration.
Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in multiple places.? Is there really a need from a policy perspective for differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind??? The data being measured should include some identifying information.
Yes Mimi - SELinux is including the identifying information in the "event name" field. Please see a sample measurement of STATE and POLICY for SELinux below:
10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
Quoted 8 lines
10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271
Quoted 4 lines
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"?Policy, state, history or whim, it should be up to the security module to determine what data it cares about, and how it should be measured. Smack does not keep its policy in a single blob of data, it uses lists which can be modified at will. Your definition of the behavior for
LSM_POLICYwouldn't work for Smack. That doesn't mean that there isn't a viable way to measure the Smack policy, it just means that IMA isn't the place for it. If SELinux wants its data measured, SELinux should be providing the mechanism to do it.Quoted 5 lines
I guess that I'm agreeing with you in part. If you want a generic measurement of "critical data", you don't need to assign a type to it, you have the caller (a security module, a device driver or whatever) identify itself and how it is going to deal with the data. That's very different from what you've done to date.
Quoted 3 lines
Agree.
Like Stephen had stated earlier, the reason we kept separate hooks (STATE and POLICY) is because the data for state is usually small and therefore we measure the entire data. Whereas, policy data is usually quite large (a few MB) and hence we measure a hash of the policy.
SELinux should determine how it wants its data measured. SELinux, not IMA, should determine if some "critical data" be measured in total, by its hash or as a count of policy rules. It would be handy for IMA to supply functions to do data blobs and hashes, but it should be up to the caller to decide if they meet their needs.
Quoted 8 lines
If change to a generic measurement of "critical data", at the least IMA should provide a way to measure "data" and "hash(data)".
And, with the caller providing the identifying information, there would be no need to call it "
LSM_STATE" or "SELINUX_STATE" or such.?-lakshmi
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should be limited to LSMs, will clarify this.
Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks
LSM_STATEandLSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"?Policy, state, history or whim, it should be up to the security module to determine what data it cares about, and how it should be measured. Smack does not keep its policy in a single blob of data, it uses lists which can be modified at will. Your definition of the behavior for
LSM_POLICYwouldn't work for Smack. That doesn't mean that there isn't a viable way to measure the Smack policy, it just means that IMA isn't the place for it. If SELinux wants its data measured, SELinux should be providing the mechanism to do it.Quoted 5 lines
I guess that I'm agreeing with you in part. If you want a generic measurement of "critical data", you don't need to assign a type to it, you have the caller (a security module, a device driver or whatever) identify itself and how it is going to deal with the data. That's very different from what you've done to date.
Agree.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like Stephen had stated earlier, the reason we kept separate hooks (STATE and POLICY) is because the data for state is usually small and therefore we measure the entire data. Whereas, policy data is usually quite large (a few MB) and hence we measure a hash of the policy.
SELinux should determine how it wants its data measured. SELinux, not IMA, should determine if some "critical data" be measured in total, by its hash or as a count of policy rules. It would be handy for IMA to supply functions to do data blobs and hashes, but it should be up to the caller to decide if they meet their needs.
Per feedback from you all, my colleague Tushar has posted a patch series that defines a generic IMA hook to measure critical data from other subsystems (such as SELinux, AppArmor, Device-Mapper targets, etc.)
Link to the patch series is given below:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11711249/
Shortly I will re-post the SELinux state and hash of policy measurement patch that will be based on the above patch series.
thanks,
-lakshmi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 18 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
Agreed. Without reviewing the patch set in depth, I'm not quite sure why this patch set needs to be limited to measuring just LSM critical
data and can't be generalized. The patch set could be titled "ima:
measuring critical data" or "ima: measuring critical kernel data". Measuring SELinux critical data would be an example of its usage.
For an example, refer to the ima_file_check hook, which is an example of IMA being called directly, not via an LSM hook.
Mimi
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
From a high level review, "Critical data structures" should be the focus of this patch set. Measuring "critical data structures" should
be independent of measuring the "policy" being loaded. The in memory
policy hash could be an example of data included in the "critical data structures".
Keep this patch set simple.
Mimi