netfilter: nf_tables: skip L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/2 netfilter: nf_tables: skip L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
The tproxy, osf, socket and exthdr (SCTP) expressions rely on the presence of transport layer headers to perform socket lookups, fingerprint matching, or chunk extraction. For fragmented packets, while the IP protocol remains constant across all fragments, only the first fragment contains the actual L4 header.
The expressions could be attached to a chain with a priority lower than -400, bypassing defragmentation. Or could be used in stateless environments where defragmentation is not happening at all. This could result in garbage data being used for the matching.
Add a check for pkt->fragoff so only unfragmented packets or the first fragment is processed.
---
v2: handled fragmented packets for socket expression too, squashed nftables expression commits into this one.
--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nft_osf.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 7 ++++++- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 8 ++++---- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +1 -1
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) +if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP || pkt->fragoff) goto err; do {
net/netfilter/nft_osf.c +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static void nft_osf_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,struct nf_osf_data data;struct tcphdr _tcph; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP ) { +if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
net/netfilter/nft_socket.c +6 -1
@@ -116,8 +116,13 @@ static void nft_socket_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,if (sk && !net_eq (nft_net (pkt),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (pkt->fragoff) { + regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ; +return ; + } sk =nft_socket_do_lookup (pkt); + }if (!sk) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;
net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c +4 -4
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ static void nft_tproxy_eval_v4(const struct nft_expr *expr,__be16 tport =0 ;struct sock *sk; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && - pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) { +if ((pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && + pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ static void nft_tproxy_eval_v6(const struct nft_expr *expr,memset (&taddr,0 ,sizeof (taddr)); -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && - pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) { +if ((pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && + pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 2/2 netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Multiple targets and matches relies on L4 header to operate. For fragmented packets, every fragment carries the transport protocol identifier, but only the first fragment contains the L4 header.
As the 'raw' table can be configured to run at priority -450 (before defragmentation at -400), the target/match can be reached before reassembly. In this case, non-first fragments have their payload incorrectly parsed as a TCP/UDP header. This would be of course a misconfiguration scenario. In most of the cases this just lead to a unreliable behavior for fragmented traffic.
Add a fragment check to ensure target/match only evaluates unfragmented packets or the first fragment in the stream.
---
v2: handled ecn, socket and tcpmss matches
--- net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_socket.c | 10 ++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c +9 -2
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }
@@ -95,6 +98,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr.ip, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }
@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;struct udphdr _hdr, *hp;struct sock *sk;const struct in6_addr *laddr;
@@ -113,8 +120,8 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)int thoff =0 ;int tproto; - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff)return NF_DROP ; hp =skb_header_pointer (skb, thoff,sizeof (_hdr), &_hdr);
net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c +3 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ static bool match_tcp(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)struct tcphdr _tcph;const struct tcphdr *th; +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* In practice, TCP match does this, so can't fail. But let's * be good citizens. */
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +3 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@static bool xt_osf_match_packet (const struct sk_buff *skb,struct xt_action_param *p) { +if (p->fragoff) +return false; +return nf_osf_match (skb,xt_family (p),xt_hooknum (p),xt_in (p),xt_out (p), p->matchinfo,xt_net (p), nf_osf_fingers); }
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +8 -2
@@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ socket_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par,if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false; sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;
@@ -116,8 +119,11 @@ socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false; sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;
net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +3 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/2 nf v2] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Hi Fernando,
Quoted 18 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +4
-1@@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ socket_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par,if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false; sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) · line 124
Quoted 7 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +3
-1@@ -116,8 +119,11 @@ socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false;
Your patch will work as intented in iptables over nf_tables, because it always sets on fragoff regardless user policy.
But, if ipv6_find_hdr() finds no layer 4 protocol, then fragoff remains zero, and pkt->flags does not set on NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO. There, in nftables, par->fragoff but itself is not reliable because maybe the layer 4 was not found.
Then, there is ip6_tables legacy which does not behave like ip_tables for fragments.
ip6t_do_table() only sets fragoff if IP6T_F_PROTO (-p in userspace) is used, unlike nftables which always sets on fragoff.
So par->fragoff is unreliable in ip6_tables legacy, and ipv6_find_hdr() is called over and over again ip6_packet_match() loop for each rule.
One way would be to call ipv6_find_hdr() inconditionally from ip6_tables legacy, but that belongs to a different patch and that would be touch core ip6_tables legacy.
Rewinding a bit, coming to back to the original issue: osf only supports ipv4 :-)
Quoted 22 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +1
-0sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +3
-0@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/2 nf v2] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Quoted 32 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi Fernando,
Quoted 18 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +4
-1@@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ socket_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par,if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false; sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;net/netfilter/xt_socket.c socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) · line 124
Quoted 7 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +3
-1@@ -116,8 +119,11 @@ socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false;Your patch will work as intented in iptables over
nf_tables, because it always sets on fragoff regardless user policy.
Quoted 4 lines
But, if
ipv6_find_hdr()finds no layer 4 protocol, then fragoff remains zero, andpkt->flagsdoes not set onNFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO. There, in nftables,par->fragoffbut itself is not reliable because maybe the layer 4 was not found.
This is where pkt->tprot comes into play. I think this series is fine with nf_tables, it is just ip6_tables legacy that lags behind.
Quoted 39 lines
Then, there is
ip6_tableslegacy which does not behave likeip_tablesfor fragments.
ip6t_do_table()only sets fragoff ifIP6T_F_PROTO(-p in userspace) is used, unlike nftables which always sets on fragoff.So
par->fragoffis unreliable inip6_tableslegacy, andipv6_find_hdr()is called over and over againip6_packet_match()loop for each rule.One way would be to call
ipv6_find_hdr()inconditionally fromip6_tableslegacy, but that belongs to a different patch and that would be touch coreip6_tableslegacy.Rewinding a bit, coming to back to the original issue: osf only supports ipv4 :-)
Quoted 22 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +1
-0sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +3
-0@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH 2/2 nf v2] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 33 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 32 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi Fernando,
Quoted 18 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +4
-1@@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ socket_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par,if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false; sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;net/netfilter/xt_socket.c socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) · line 124
Quoted 7 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +3
-1@@ -116,8 +119,11 @@ socket_mt6_v1_v2_v3(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)if (sk && !net_eq (xt_net (par),sock_net (sk))) sk =NULL ; -if (!sk) +if (!sk) { +if (par->fragoff) +return false;Your patch will work as intented in iptables over
nf_tables, because it always sets on fragoff regardless user policy.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But, if
ipv6_find_hdr()finds no layer 4 protocol, then fragoff remains zero, andpkt->flagsdoes not set onNFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO. There, in nftables,par->fragoffbut itself is not reliable because maybe the layer 4 was not found.This is where
pkt->tprotcomes into play. I think this series is fine withnf_tables, it is justip6_tableslegacy that lags behind.
Hm, I didn't know this. Thanks for explaining. Then xt_socket is safe for IPv6 as the code does:
tproto = ipv6_find_hdr(skb, &thoff, -1, NULL, NULL);
if (tproto < 0) {
pr_debug("unable to find transport header in IPv6
packet, dropping\n");
return NULL;
}at nf_socket_get_sock_v6()
Okay, let me re-send adjusting the IPv6 part..
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Then, there is
ip6_tableslegacy which does not behave likeip_tablesfor fragments.
ip6t_do_table()only sets fragoff ifIP6T_F_PROTO(-p in userspace) is used, unlike nftables which always sets on fragoff.So
par->fragoffis unreliable inip6_tableslegacy, andipv6_find_hdr()is called over and over againip6_packet_match()loop for each rule.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
One way would be to call
ipv6_find_hdr()inconditionally fromip6_tableslegacy, but that belongs to a different patch and that would be touch coreip6_tableslegacy.Rewinding a bit, coming to back to the original issue: osf only supports ipv4 :-)
Right, but we need to fix this everywhere not only in osf.
Thanks,
Fernando.
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +1
-0sk =nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (xt_net (par), skb,xt_in (par)); + }if (sk) {bool wildcard;net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +3
-0@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0