aio: Fix use after free bugs
Jan Kara
reviewercover aio: Fix use after free bugs
Hi Al,
The following two patches fix use after free bugs in AIO code. I'm not
completely sure you're the right one to merge these but hopefully yes ;). Could you please merge them? Thanks.
Honza
Jan Kara
reviewerPATCH 1/2 fs: Fix aio rcu ioctx lookup
From: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
aio-dio-invalidate-failure GPFs in aio_put_req from io_submit.
lookup_ioctx doesn't implement the rcu lookup pattern properly. rcu_read_lock does not prevent refcount going to zero, so we might take a refcount on a zero count ioctx.
Fix the bug by atomically testing for zero refcount before incrementing.
[JK: Added comment into the code]
--- fs/aio.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +24 -11
@@ -239,15 +239,23 @@ static void __put_ioctx(struct kioctx *ctx)call_rcu (&ctx->rcu_head, ctx_rcu_free); } -#define get_ioctx (kioctx) do { \ - BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(kioctx)->users) <= 0); \ - atomic_inc(&(kioctx)->users); \ -} while (0) -#define put_ioctx (kioctx) do { \ - BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(kioctx)->users) <= 0); \ - if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&(kioctx)->users))) \ - __put_ioctx(kioctx); \ -} while (0) +static inline void get_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +BUG_ON (atomic_read (&kioctx->users) <=0 ); +atomic_inc (&kioctx->users); +} + +static inline int try_get_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +return atomic_inc_not_zero (&kioctx->users); +} + +static inline void put_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +BUG_ON (atomic_read (&kioctx->users) <=0 ); +if (unlikely (atomic_dec_and_test (&kioctx->users))) +__put_ioctx (kioctx); +}/* ioctx_alloc * Allocates and initializes an ioctx. Returns an ERR_PTR if it failed.
@@ -601,8 +609,13 @@ static struct kioctx *lookup_ioctx(unsigned long ctx_id)rcu_read_lock ();hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (ctx, n, &mm->ioctx_list, list) { -if (ctx->user_id == ctx_id && !ctx->dead) { -get_ioctx (ctx); +/* +* RCU protects us against accessing freed memory but +* we have to be careful not to get a reference when the +* reference count already dropped to 0 (ctx->dead test +* is unreliable because of races). +*/ +if (ctx->user_id == ctx_id && !ctx->dead &&try_get_ioctx (ctx)){ ret = ctx;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Jan Kara
reviewerPATCH 2/2 fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
In reply to Jan KaraA race can occur when io_submit() races with io_destroy():
CPU1 CPU2io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Now do_io_submit() holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx) - frees ctx with active AIOs
We solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either io_destroy() waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.
--- fs/aio.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +15 -0
@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); +/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/ +if (ctx->dead) { +spin_unlock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_put_req; + }aio_run_iocb (req);if (!list_empty (&ctx->run_list)) {/* drain the run list */
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
PATCH 2/2 fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
Quoted 34 lines
A race can occur when
io_submit()races withio_destroy():CPU1 CPU2
io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx =lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Nowdo_io_submit()holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx)- frees ctx with active AIOsWe solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either
io_destroy()waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jan Kara <[email protected]>CC Nick Piggin <[email protected]>---
fs/aio.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/aio.c +0
-0@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);
fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1654
Quoted 10 lines
fs/aio.c +10
-0+/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/
When reading this comment, and with all of the recient discussions I had with Paul in the smp ipi thread (especially with resepect to third party writes), I looked to see that the spinlock was paired with the
spinlock to set dead in io_destroy. It is not. It took me some time
to find that the paired lock is actually in wait_for_all_aios. Also, dead is also set in aio_cancel_all which is under the same spinlock.
Please update this lack of memory barrier comment to reflect the locking.
fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1662
Quoted 8 lines
fs/aio.c +5
-0+if (ctx->dead) { +spin_unlock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_put_req; + }aio_run_iocb (req);if (!list_empty (&ctx->run_list)) {/* drain the run list */
thanks,
milton
Jan Kara
reviewerRe: [2/2] fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
Quoted 52 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 34 lines
A race can occur when
io_submit()races withio_destroy():CPU1 CPU2
io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx =lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Nowdo_io_submit()holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx)- frees ctx with active AIOsWe solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either
io_destroy()waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jan Kara <[email protected]>CC Nick Piggin <[email protected]>---
fs/aio.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/aio.c +0
-0@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1654
Quoted 10 lines
fs/aio.c +10
-0+/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/ When reading this comment, and with all of the recient discussions I had with Paul in the smp ipi thread (especially with resepect to third party writes), I looked to see that the spinlock was paired with the
spinlock to set dead inio_destroy. It is not. It took me some time
to find that the paired lock is actually inwait_for_all_aios. Also, dead is also set inaio_cancel_allwhich is under the same spinlock.
Quoted 1 line
Please update this lack of memory barrier comment to reflect the locking.
Hum, sorry but I don't understand. The above message wants to say thatio_destroy() does
ctx->dead = 1
barrier (implied by a spin_unlock)
wait for reqs_active to get to 0
while io_submit() does
increment reqs_active
barrier (implied by a spin_lock - on a different lock but that does not
matter as we only need the barrier semantics)
check ctx->dead
So if io_submit() gets past ctx->dead check, io_destroy() will certainly wait for our reference in reqs_active to be released.
I don't see any lock pairing needed here... But maybe I miss something.
Honza
Quoted 12 lines
fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1662
Quoted 9 lines
fs/aio.c +5
-0+if (ctx->dead) { +spin_unlock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_put_req; + }aio_run_iocb (req);if (!list_empty (&ctx->run_list)) {/* drain the run list */ thanks,
milton
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Re: [2/2] fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
Hi. I chatted with Paul a bit to clarify my thoughts.
Quoted 53 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 52 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 34 lines
A race can occur when
io_submit()races withio_destroy():CPU1 CPU2
io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx =lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Nowdo_io_submit()holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx)- frees ctx with active AIOsWe solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either
io_destroy()waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jan Kara <[email protected]>CC Nick Piggin <[email protected]>---
fs/aio.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/aio.c +0
-0@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1654
Quoted 10 lines
fs/aio.c +10
-0+/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/ When reading this comment, and with all of the recient discussions I had with Paul in the smp ipi thread (especially with resepect to third party writes), I looked to see that the spinlock was paired with the
spinlock to set dead inio_destroy. It is not. It took me some time
to find that the paired lock is actually inwait_for_all_aios. Also, dead is also set inaio_cancel_allwhich is under the same spinlock.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Please update this lack of memory barrier comment to reflect the locking.
This locking description is wrong:
Quoted 4 lines
Hum, sorry but I don't understand. The above message wants to say that
io_destroy()does
ctx->dead= 1
barrier (implied by aspin_unlock)
no spin_unlock only does a release barrier.
Quoted 1 line
wait for
reqs_activeto get to 0
This read can move up into the spinlocked region (up to the lock acquire).
Quoted 5 lines
while
io_submit()does
incrementreqs_active
barrier (implied by aspin_lock- on a different lock but that does not
matter as we only need the barrier semantics)
No only an acquire barrier, old writes can move into the spinlock region
Quoted 1 line
check
ctx->dead
the increment can move down past this check to the unlock here.
Quoted 7 lines
So if
io_submit()gets pastctx->deadcheck,io_destroy()will certainly wait for our reference inreqs_activeto be released.I don't see any lock pairing needed here... But maybe I miss something.
Honza
spin lock and unlock are only half barriers as described in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt
Now, as I said, the code is ok because the active count is read and written under ctx->ctx_lock, and aio_cancel_all sets dead under that lock.
But the comment needs to reflect that and not just the the code is under in some random spin_lock region instead of a memory barrier,
which is not sufficient. Bad lock descriptions leads to making bad
code in the future, either through copying it to another context or though future work removing the additional constraints not mentioned.
So please, comment which locks are being used here, as what you described is not enough.
thanks,
milton
Jan Kara
reviewerRe: [2/2] fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
Hi,
Quoted 75 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 53 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 52 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 34 lines
A race can occur when
io_submit()races withio_destroy():CPU1 CPU2
io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx =lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Nowdo_io_submit()holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx)- frees ctx with active AIOsWe solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either
io_destroy()waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jan Kara <[email protected]>CC Nick Piggin <[email protected]>---
fs/aio.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/aio.c +0
-0@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1654
Quoted 10 lines
fs/aio.c +10
-0+/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/ When reading this comment, and with all of the recient discussions I had with Paul in the smp ipi thread (especially with resepect to third party writes), I looked to see that the spinlock was paired with the
spinlock to set dead inio_destroy. It is not. It took me some time
to find that the paired lock is actually inwait_for_all_aios. Also, dead is also set inaio_cancel_allwhich is under the same spinlock.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Please update this lack of memory barrier comment to reflect the locking.
This locking description is wrong:
Quoted 4 lines
Hum, sorry but I don't understand. The above message wants to say that
io_destroy()does
ctx->dead= 1
barrier (implied by aspin_unlock)no
spin_unlockonly does a release barrier.Quoted 1 line
wait for
reqs_activeto get to 0This read can move up into the spinlocked region (up to the lock acquire).
Quoted 5 lines
while
io_submit()does
incrementreqs_active
barrier (implied by aspin_lock- on a different lock but that does not
matter as we only need the barrier semantics)
Quoted 5 lines
No only an acquire barrier, old writes can move into the spinlock region
Quoted 1 line
check
ctx->deadthe increment can move down past this check to the unlock here.
Ah OK, you're right. I was typing too fast and thinking too slow ;).
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 6 lines
So if
io_submit()gets pastctx->deadcheck,io_destroy()will certainly wait for our reference inreqs_activeto be released.I don't see any lock pairing needed here... But maybe I miss something.
Honza
spin lock and unlock are only half barriers as described in
Documentation/memory-barriers.txtNow, as I said, the code is ok because the active count is read and written under
ctx->ctx_lock, andaio_cancel_allsets dead under that lock.
Quoted 8 lines
But the comment needs to reflect that and not just the the code is under in some random
spin_lockregion instead of a memory barrier,
which is not sufficient. Bad lock descriptions leads to making bad
code in the future, either through copying it to another context or though future work removing the additional constraints not mentioned.So please, comment which locks are being used here, as what you described is not enough.
Yep, I'll improve the comment. Thanks for explanation.
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Jan Kara
reviewerRe: [2/2] fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
Hello,
Quoted 104 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 75 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 53 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 52 lines · Milton Miller
Quoted 34 lines
A race can occur when
io_submit()races withio_destroy():CPU1 CPU2
io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx =lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Nowdo_io_submit()holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx)- frees ctx with active AIOsWe solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either
io_destroy()waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jan Kara <[email protected]>CC Nick Piggin <[email protected]>---
fs/aio.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/aio.c +0
-0@@ -1642,6 +1642,21 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);fs/aio.c static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, · line 1654
Quoted 10 lines
fs/aio.c +10
-0+/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. +* The check here is reliable since io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before +* waiting for outstanding IO. Thus if we don't see ctx->dead set here, +* io_destroy() waits for our IO to finish. +* The check is inside ctx->ctx_lock to avoid extra memory barrier +* in this fast path... +*/ When reading this comment, and with all of the recient discussions I had with Paul in the smp ipi thread (especially with resepect to third party writes), I looked to see that the spinlock was paired with the
spinlock to set dead inio_destroy. It is not. It took me some time
to find that the paired lock is actually inwait_for_all_aios. Also, dead is also set inaio_cancel_allwhich is under the same spinlock.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Please update this lack of memory barrier comment to reflect the locking.
This locking description is wrong:
Quoted 4 lines
Hum, sorry but I don't understand. The above message wants to say that
io_destroy()does
ctx->dead= 1
barrier (implied by aspin_unlock)no
spin_unlockonly does a release barrier.Quoted 1 line
wait for
reqs_activeto get to 0This read can move up into the spinlocked region (up to the lock acquire).
Quoted 5 lines
while
io_submit()does
incrementreqs_active
barrier (implied by aspin_lock- on a different lock but that does not
matter as we only need the barrier semantics)Quoted 5 lines
No only an acquire barrier, old writes can move into the spinlock region
Quoted 1 line
check
ctx->deadthe increment can move down past this check to the unlock here.
Ah OK, you're right. I was typing too fast and thinking too slow ;).
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 6 lines
So if
io_submit()gets pastctx->deadcheck,io_destroy()will certainly wait for our reference inreqs_activeto be released.I don't see any lock pairing needed here... But maybe I miss something.
Honza
spin lock and unlock are only half barriers as described in
Documentation/memory-barriers.txtNow, as I said, the code is ok because the active count is read and written under
ctx->ctx_lock, andaio_cancel_allsets dead under that lock.But the comment needs to reflect that and not just the the code is under in some random
spin_lockregion instead of a memory barrier,
which is not sufficient. Bad lock descriptions leads to making bad
code in the future, either through copying it to another context or though future work removing the additional constraints not mentioned.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So please, comment which locks are being used here, as what you described is not enough.
Yep, I'll improve the comment. Thanks for explanation.
Do you like this comment better?
/*
* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a
* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO
* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. The
* check here is reliable: io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before waiting
* for outstanding IO and the barrier between these two is realized by
* unlock of mm->ioctx_lock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Analogously we
* increment ctx->reqs_active before checking for ctx->dead and the
* barrier is realized by unlock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Thus if we
* don't see ctx->dead set here, io_destroy() waits for our IO to
* finish.
*/
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Kara
Hi Al,
The following two patches fix use after free bugs in AIO code. I'm not
completely sure you're the right one to merge these but hopefully yes ;). Could you please merge them? Thanks.
I've always pushed aio changes through akpm, fwiw.
Cheers,
Jeff