hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
PATCH v3 1/1 hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64).
A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng.
Concrete impact is inside the guest:
- Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.
- Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.
KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)
Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport.
With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.
---
Changes in v3:
- No functional change from v2. Reposting the v2 clamp after the v2 thread went quiet on linux-crypto. Michael S. Tsirkin reconfirmed off-list that clamping the device-reported used.len at sizeof(vi->data) addresses his earlier concern, so this resends that fix unchanged.
- Rebased onto v7.1-rc4. copy_data() is unchanged since 2023, so the clamp applies as-is, and the KASAN reproduction above was re-run on v7.1-rc4 (stock splats, patched boots clean).
Changes in v2 (Michael S. Tsirkin review):
- move the bound check from random_recv_done() into copy_data(), so the clamp sits immediately next to the memcpy() it protects.
- clamp to sizeof(vi->data) rather than substituting len = 0, so a previously-working but buggy device that occasionally over-reports used.len does not start returning zero-length reads.
- add array_index_nospec() on vi->data_idx to defeat a speculative out-of-bounds read given the malicious-backend threat model.
- expand the commit message with the /dev/hwrng observation path and the hypervisor plus guest-root cooperation scenario.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +21 -2
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <asm/barrier.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/hw_random.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/virtio.h>
@@ -69,8 +70,26 @@ static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi)static unsigned int copy_data (struct virtrng_info *vi,void *buf,unsigned int size) { - size = min_t(unsigned int, size, vi->data_avail); -memcpy (buf, vi->data + vi->data_idx, size); +unsigned int idx, avail; + +/* +* vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and +* vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A +* malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past +* sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index +* with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be +* steered into adjacent slab memory, including under +* speculation. +*/ + avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); +if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { + vi->data_avail =0 ; +request_entropy (vi); +return 0 ; + } + size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size); vi->data_idx += size; vi->data_avail -= size;if (vi->data_avail ==0 )
base-commit: a1f173eb51db0dc78536334729ef832c62d6c65a
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Herbert Xu
maintainerdrivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);
I don't see how nospec can help here. Please enlighten me.
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);I don't see how nospec can help here. Please enlighten me.
All the "malicious device" things are confusing. Spectre things - doubly so.
So if an access is speculated then CPU might speculate feeding a kernel secret into RNG. And then the speculated RNG value maybe can be also speculatively be used by some kernel code as an index
to trigger a cache access, finally leaking the secret?
Maybe?
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Herbert Xu
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);All the "malicious device" things are confusing. Spectre things - doubly so.
Quoted 6 lines
So if an access is speculated then CPU might speculate feeding a kernel secret into RNG. And then the speculated RNG value maybe can be also speculatively be used by some kernel code as an index
to trigger a cache access, finally leaking the secret?Maybe?
The way Spectre works is if you have an actual instruction using idx directly. I don't see how that translates to memcpy.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 16 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 15 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Herbert Xu
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);All the "malicious device" things are confusing. Spectre things - doubly so.
So if an access is speculated then CPU might speculate feeding a kernel secret into RNG. And then the speculated RNG value maybe can be also speculatively be used by some kernel code as an index
to trigger a cache access, finally leaking the secret?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Maybe?
The way Spectre works is if you have an actual instruction using idx directly. I don't see how that translates to memcpy.
I am not sure it has to be direct:
if (malicious_idx > SIZE)
return;
src += malicious_idx;memcpy(&value, src, ...)
....
hash = complex_hash_of(value)
....
return p[hash * 512];
is IIUC still a valid spectre v1 gadget leaking a value beyong SIZE, or did I miss something?
And rng is a kind of a complex hash, but I also think in that "...." in the kernel is probably large enough to close any transient execution window.
So sure, we can drop this.
Quoted 5 lines
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 18 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 16 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Herbert Xu
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);All the "malicious device" things are confusing. Spectre things - doubly so.
So if an access is speculated then CPU might speculate feeding a kernel secret into RNG. And then the speculated RNG value maybe can be also speculatively be used by some kernel code as an index
to trigger a cache access, finally leaking the secret?Maybe?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The way Spectre works is if you have an actual instruction using idx directly. I don't see how that translates to memcpy.
I am not sure it has to be direct:
if (
malicious_idx> SIZE)return;src +=
malicious_idx;
Wait but vi->data_idx isn't even under the hypervisor's control.
It's an index maintained by our own driver. So how can it be malicious?
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 19 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 18 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 16 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Herbert Xu
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) · line 92
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Bommarito
drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +3
-0+ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx =array_index_nospec (vi->data_idx,sizeof (vi->data)); +memcpy (buf, vi->data + idx, size);All the "malicious device" things are confusing. Spectre things - doubly so.
So if an access is speculated then CPU might speculate feeding a kernel secret into RNG. And then the speculated RNG value maybe can be also speculatively be used by some kernel code as an index
to trigger a cache access, finally leaking the secret?Maybe?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The way Spectre works is if you have an actual instruction using idx directly. I don't see how that translates to memcpy.
I am not sure it has to be direct:
if (
malicious_idx> SIZE)return;src +=
malicious_idx;
Quoted 10 lines
Wait but
vi->data_idxisn't even under the hypervisor's control.It's an index maintained by our own driver. So how can it be malicious?
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
data_avail is under hypervisor control
avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data));
if (vi->data_idx >= avail) {
vi->data_idx = 0;and maybe this can speculate past the if?
I agree, this is all speculation )
Signature · 1 line
MST
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
data_availis under hypervisor controlavail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { vi->data_idx = 0;and maybe this can speculate past the if?
I agree, this is all speculation )
Either it is vulnerable to Spectre, or it isn't. Adding nospec markers when you're not sure is cargo cult programming.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 7 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
data_availis under hypervisor controlavail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { vi->data_idx = 0;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
and maybe this can speculate past the if?
I agree, this is all speculation )
Either it is vulnerable to Spectre, or it isn't. Adding nospec markers when you're not sure is cargo cult programming.
AKA defence is depth programming)
Alright we can drop this. No biggie.
Signature · 1 line
MST
Quoted 2 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
AKA defence is depth programming)
Alright we can drop this. No biggie.
Sorry for the delay. I'll ship a v4 without the nospec
Thanks,
Mike