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binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release()

PATCH Superseded Carlos Llamas 2 participants 3 messages Jun 6 – Jun 19

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v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Carlos Llamas

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release()

When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired.

This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN:

==================================================================

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715

  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c
   [...]

  Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s:
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150
   binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354
   binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c
   [...]

  Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8
   binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec
   binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c
   [...]
  ==================================================================

In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

Fixes 7a4408c6bd3e ("binder: make sure accesses to proc/thread are safe")
---
 drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +5 -1
index 9e6194224593..09bc052186cf 100644
@@ -1658,7 +1658,11 @@ static void binder_txn_latency_free(struct binder_transaction *t)
 
 static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t)
 {
-	struct binder_proc *target_proc = t->to_proc;
+	struct binder_proc *target_proc;
+
+	spin_lock(&t->lock);
+	target_proc = t->to_proc;
+	spin_unlock(&t->lock);
 
 	if (target_proc) {
 		binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.1032.g2f8565e1d1-goog
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 56 lines · Carlos Llamas

When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired.

This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN:

==================================================================

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715

  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c
   [...]

  Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s:
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150
   binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354
   binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c
   [...]

  Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8
   binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec
   binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c
   [...]
  ==================================================================

In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

Fixes 7a4408c6bd3e ("binder: make sure accesses to proc/thread are safe")
---
 drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +0 -0
index 9e6194224593..09bc052186cf 100644

drivers/android/binder.c static void binder_txn_latency_free(struct binder_transaction *t) · line 1665

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/android/binder.c +5 -1
@@ -1658,7 +1658,11 @@ static void binder_txn_latency_free(struct binder_transaction *t)
 
 static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t)
 {
-	struct binder_proc *target_proc = t->to_proc;
+	struct binder_proc *target_proc;
+
+	spin_lock(&t->lock);
+	target_proc = t->to_proc;
+	spin_unlock(&t->lock);

Although I don't think this fixes all issues here, as we discussed more in private, this does fix the specific UAF referenced in this patch, so:

The logic is that either binder_free_transaction() reads a non-null target_proc, in which case we take the inner proc lock and fully synchronize with the entirety of binder_thread_release(), or we read a null target_proc in which case the transaction spinlock ensures that we wait for the part of binder_thread_release() touching this particular 'struct binder_transaction'.

Alice

Quoted 5 lines
drivers/android/binder.c +0 -0
 	if (target_proc) {
 		binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.1032.g2f8565e1d1-goog
author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Alice Ryhl

Although I don't think this fixes all issues here, as we discussed more in private, this does fix the specific UAF referenced in this patch, so:

Thanks. I've managed to reproduce the UAF that you pointed out. It was a bit tricky but I have a fix for it now. C binder just keeps proving we should switch over to Rust ASAP.

It doesn't seem like Greg has picked up this patch yet, so I'll resend this as v2 along with a separate fix for the UAF you reported.

Cheers,
Carlos Llamas