crypto: rsassa-pkcs1: use constant-time comparison for digest and signature verification
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 crypto: rsassa-pkcs1: use constant-time comparison for digest and signature verification
Replace memcmp() with crypto_memneq() for cryptographic digest and signature comparisons to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c: RSA signature digest verification used memcmp which can leak valid prefix length via timing analysis, user data could reach the leaky comparison via the digest argument to verify.
--- crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c +1 -1
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 4 - comparison of digest with out_buf */ if (dlen != dst_len - pos)return -EKEYREJECTED ; -if (memcmp (digest, out_buf + pos, dlen) !=0 ) +if (crypto_memneq (digest, out_buf + pos, dlen))return -EKEYREJECTED ;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 9 lines · David C.C.M. Gall
Replace
memcmp()withcrypto_memneq()for cryptographic digest and signature comparisons to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c: RSA signature digest verification used memcmp which can leak valid prefix length via timing analysis, user data could reach the leaky comparison via the digest argument to verify.Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by David C.C.M. Gall <[email protected]>
While we should use crypto_memneq() on MACs, auth tags, and other secret data, I don't think we should let it creep into domains where it is clearly not needed, like public key signature verification.
- Eric
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 7 lines · David C.C.M. Gall
Replace
memcmp()withcrypto_memneq()for cryptographic digest and signature comparisons to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c: RSA signature digest verification used memcmp which can leak valid prefix length via timing analysis, user data could reach the leaky comparison via the digest argument to verify.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by David C.C.M. Gall <[email protected]>While we should use
crypto_memneq()on MACs, auth tags, and other secret data, I don't think we should let it creep into domains where it is clearly not needed, like public key signature verification.
But isn't this user-controlled data and so a user could use it to figure out the key?
thanks,
greg k-h
Ignat Korchagin
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 9 lines · David C.C.M. Gall
Replace
memcmp()withcrypto_memneq()for cryptographic digest and signature comparisons to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c: RSA signature digest verification used memcmp which can leak valid prefix length via timing analysis, user data could reach the leaky comparison via the digest argument to verify.Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by David C.C.M. Gall <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
While we should use
crypto_memneq()on MACs, auth tags, and other secret data, I don't think we should let it creep into domains where it is clearly not needed, like public key signature verification.But isn't this user-controlled data and so a user could use it to figure out the key?
This is signature verification with a public key. So the user knows the key already.
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Ignat
Quoted 24 lines · Ignat Korchagin
Quoted 13 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 9 lines · David C.C.M. Gall
Replace
memcmp()withcrypto_memneq()for cryptographic digest and signature comparisons to prevent timing side-channel attacks.
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c: RSA signature digest verification used memcmp which can leak valid prefix length via timing analysis, user data could reach the leaky comparison via the digest argument to verify.Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by David C.C.M. Gall <[email protected]>Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
While we should use
crypto_memneq()on MACs, auth tags, and other secret data, I don't think we should let it creep into domains where it is clearly not needed, like public key signature verification.But isn't this user-controlled data and so a user could use it to figure out the key?
This is signature verification with a public key. So the user knows the key already.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Ignat
Nevermind, my reasoning on how this method is used was faulty. The crypto_memneq call does not protect against digest forgery, the public key is already available to anyone attempting verification, so an attacker can compute the padding/digest offline without needing the kernel's comparison at all, timing or otherwise.
That said, this function already uses crypto_memneq for the hash-prefix check a few lines above. I'd argue for consistency it's worth using it for the digest comparison too.
David
Lukas Wunner
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · David Gall
That said, this function [
rsassa_pkcs1_verify()] already usescrypto_memneq()for the hash-prefix check a few lines above. I'd argue for consistency it's worth using it for the digest comparison too.
I'd prefer the other way round, i.e. to use memcmp() for the hash_prefix comparison.
Thanks,
Lukas