EVM hmac security fix
Subsystems (3)
James Morris
maintainerPlease pull this patch for the EVM code, which fixes CVE-2016-2085.
The following changes since commit c05235d50f681bf685e7290cae05ab3b4fa493f3:
Merge tag 'gpio-v4.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linusw/linux-gpio (2016-02-11 11:25:55 -0800)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git for-linus
Ryan Ware (1):
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
---
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1
Author: Ryan Ware <[email protected]> Date: Thu Feb 11 15:58:44 2016 -0800
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +2 -1
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized;
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, calc.digest);if (rc)break ; - rc =memcmp (xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc =crypto_memneq (xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,sizeof (calc.digest));if (rc) rc = -EINVAL ;