ro hardening for the security subsystem
cover ro hardening for the security subsystem
Hi Folks,
Please review/test these patches which add some read-only hardening to the security subsystem.
In this series, the following are marked as __ro_after_init:
- LSM hooks
- Netfilter hooks used by security/
- the default IMA rules
I've also constified the SELinux Netlink permission tables, which will ensure they're located in an RO section.
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James Morris (4):
security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
security: mark nf ops in SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init
integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_init
selinux: constify nlmsg permission tables
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 8 ++++---- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 10 +++++----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 2 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines · James Morris
Hi Folks,
Please review/test these patches which add some read-only hardening to the security subsystem.
Quoted 8 lines
In this series, the following are marked as
__ro_after_init:- LSM hooks
- Netfilter hooks used bysecurity/
- the default IMA rulesI've also constified the SELinux Netlink permission tables, which will ensure they're located in an RO section.
A lot of the security subsystem is targeted during kernel write exploits, so I think this is very nice change to have. Thanks for doing this!
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security