x86/mtrr: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all access
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 x86/mtrr: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all access
Zhang Xiaoxu noted that physical address locations for MTRR were visible to non-root users, which could be considered an information leak. In discussing[1] the options for solving this, it sounded like just moving the capable check into open() was the first step. If this breaks userspace, then we will have a test case for the more conservative approaches discussed in the thread. In summary:
- MTRR should check capabilities at open time (or retain the checks on the opener's permissions for later checks).
- changing the DAC permissions might break something that expects to open mtrr when not uid 0.
- if we leave the DAC permissions alone and just move the capable check to the opener, we should get the desired protection. (i.e. check against CAP_SYS_ADMIN not just the wider uid 0.)
- if that still breaks things, as in userspace expects to be able to read other parts of the file as non-uid-0 and non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then we need to censor the contents using the opener's permissions. For example, as done in other /proc cases, like commit 51d7b120418e ("/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users").
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/201911110934.AC5BA313@keescook/
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 21 ++------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c +2 -19
@@ -101,9 +101,6 @@ mtrr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t * ppos)int length;size_t linelen; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; -memset (line,0 ,LINE_SIZE ); len =min_t (size_t, len,LINE_SIZE -1 );
@@ -226,8 +223,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_ADD_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true, file,0 );
@@ -236,24 +231,18 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_SET_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);break ;case MTRRIOC_DEL_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_DEL_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_del (sentry.base, sentry.size, file,0 );break ;case MTRRIOC_KILL_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_KILL_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_del (-1 , sentry.base, sentry.size);break ;case MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY :
@@ -279,8 +268,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true, file,1 );
@@ -289,8 +276,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_SET_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_add_page (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);break ;
@@ -298,16 +283,12 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_del (sentry.base, sentry.size, file,1 );break ;case MTRRIOC_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_del_page (-1 , sentry.base, sentry.size);break ;case MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY :
@@ -381,6 +362,8 @@ static int mtrr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)return -EIO ;if (!mtrr_if->get)return -ENXIO ; +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ;return single_open (file, mtrr_seq_show,NULL ); }
Signature · 5 lines
2.17.1 -- Kees Cook
Quoted 24 lines · Kees Cook
Zhang Xiaoxu noted that physical address locations for MTRR were visible to non-root users, which could be considered an information leak. In discussing[1] the options for solving this, it sounded like just moving the capable check into
open()was the first step. If this breaks userspace, then we will have a test case for the more conservative approaches discussed in the thread. In summary:- MTRR should check capabilities at open time (or retain the checks on the opener's permissions for later checks).
- changing the DAC permissions might break something that expects to open mtrr when not uid 0.
- if we leave the DAC permissions alone and just move the capable check to the opener, we should get the desired protection. (i.e. check against
CAP_SYS_ADMINnot just the wider uid 0.)- if that still breaks things, as in userspace expects to be able to read other parts of the file as non-uid-0 and non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then we need to censor the contents using the opener's permissions. For example, as done in other /proc cases, like commit
51d7b120418e("/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users").
Quoted 7 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/201911110934.AC5BA313@keescook/
Reported-by Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 21 ++------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Yap, LGTM, thanks!
However, as it has a user-visible impact and it is not an urgent thing to have in the tree, I'd not queue this now but after the merge window is done so that we have a maximum time of exposure in linux-next and we can have ample time to addres fallout.
/me puts it on the list for after the merge window.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 21 ++------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)Yap, LGTM, thanks!
Reviewed-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/mtrr branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/mtrr branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 4fc265a9c9b258ddd7eafbd0dbfca66687c3d8aa Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4fc265a9c9b258ddd7eafbd0dbfca66687c3d8aa Author: Kees Cook <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 13:09:21 -08:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 09:24:24 +01:00
x86/mtrr: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all access
Zhang Xiaoxu noted that physical address locations for MTRR were visible to non-root users, which could be considered an information leak. In discussing[1] the options for solving this, it sounded like just moving the capable check into open() was the first step.
If this breaks userspace, then we will have a test case for the more conservative approaches discussed in the thread. In summary:
- MTRR should check capabilities at open time (or retain the checks on the opener's permissions for later checks).
- changing the DAC permissions might break something that expects to open mtrr when not uid 0.
- if we leave the DAC permissions alone and just move the capable check to the opener, we should get the desired protection. (i.e. check against CAP_SYS_ADMIN not just the wider uid 0.)
- if that still breaks things, as in userspace expects to be able to read other parts of the file as non-uid-0 and non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then we need to censor the contents using the opener's permissions. For example, as done in other /proc cases, like commit
51d7b120418e ("/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users").
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/201911110934.AC5BA313@keescook/
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 21 ++------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c +2 -19
@@ -101,9 +101,6 @@ mtrr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t * ppos)int length;size_t linelen; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; -memset (line,0 ,LINE_SIZE ); len =min_t (size_t, len,LINE_SIZE -1 );
@@ -226,8 +223,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_ADD_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true, file,0 );
@@ -236,24 +231,18 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_SET_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);break ;case MTRRIOC_DEL_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_DEL_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_del (sentry.base, sentry.size, file,0 );break ;case MTRRIOC_KILL_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_KILL_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_del (-1 , sentry.base, sentry.size);break ;case MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY :
@@ -279,8 +268,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_add (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true, file,1 );
@@ -289,8 +276,6 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_SET_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_add_page (sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);break ;
@@ -298,16 +283,12 @@ mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_file_del (sentry.base, sentry.size, file,1 );break ;case MTRRIOC_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY :#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT case MTRRIOC32_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY :#endif -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; err =mtrr_del_page (-1 , sentry.base, sentry.size);break ;case MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY :
@@ -410,6 +391,8 @@ static int mtrr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)return -EIO ;if (!mtrr_if->get)return -ENXIO ; +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ;return single_open (file, mtrr_seq_show,NULL ); }