security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 security: fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
security_secid_to_secctx is called by the bpf_lsm hook and a successful return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer isn't initialized when CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, with the default return from kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.
This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)! [ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! [ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in: [ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13 [ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450 [ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0 [ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000 [ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 [ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1 [ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f [ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20 [ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300 [ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059 [ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace: [ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4 [ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90 [ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930 [ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0 [ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8 [ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160 [ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8 [ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70 [ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340 [ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108 [ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88 [ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4 [ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180 [ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000) [ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]--- [ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004 [ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none [ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
Rework the so the default return value is -EOPNOTSUPP.
There are likely other callbacks such as security_inode_getsecctx() that may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code better needs to audit them.
Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
--- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -1
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
James,
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.
Thanks
Quoted 89 lines · Anders Roxell
security_secid_to_secctxis called by thebpf_lsmhook and a successful return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer isn't initialized whenCONFIG_BPF_LSMis enabled, with the default return fromkernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)! [ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! [ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in: [ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13 [ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450 [ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0 [ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000 [ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 [ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1 [ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f [ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20 [ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300 [ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059 [ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace: [ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4 [ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90 [ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930 [ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0 [ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8 [ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160 [ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8 [ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70 [ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340 [ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108 [ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88 [ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4 [ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180 [ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000) [ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]--- [ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004 [ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none [ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---Rework the so the default return value is
-EOPNOTSUPP.There are likely other callbacks such as
security_inode_getsecctx()that may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code better needs to audit them.Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
CC Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Fixes 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")Signed-off-by Anders Roxell <[email protected]>--- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1
-2@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen) --2.20.1
Quoted 5 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
James,
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.
Routing via your tree is fine.
Quoted 94 lines
Thanks
Quoted 89 lines · Anders Roxell
security_secid_to_secctxis called by thebpf_lsmhook and a successful return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer isn't initialized whenCONFIG_BPF_LSMis enabled, with the default return fromkernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)! [ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! [ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in: [ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13 [ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450 [ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0 [ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000 [ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 [ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1 [ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f [ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20 [ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300 [ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059 [ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace: [ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4 [ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90 [ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930 [ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0 [ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8 [ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160 [ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8 [ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70 [ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340 [ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108 [ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88 [ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4 [ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180 [ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000) [ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]--- [ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004 [ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none [ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---Rework the so the default return value is
-EOPNOTSUPP.There are likely other callbacks such as
security_inode_getsecctx()that may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code better needs to audit them.Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
CC Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Fixes 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")Signed-off-by Anders Roxell <[email protected]>--- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1
-2@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen) --2.20.1
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines · James Morris
Quoted 5 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
James,
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.Routing via your tree is fine.
Perfect.
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks everyone.
Quoted 8 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 5 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
James,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.Routing via your tree is fine.
Perfect.
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks everyone.
Looks like it was a wrong fix.
It breaks audit like this:
sudo auditctl -e 0
[ 88.400296] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.400976] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.401597] audit: type=1305 audit(1589584951.198:89): op=set audit_enabled=0 old=1 auid=0 ses=1 res=0 [ 88.402691] audit: type=1300 audit(1589584951.198:89): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=52 a0=3 a1=7ffe42a37400 a2=34 a3=0 items=0 ppid=2250 pid=2251 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 se) [ 88.405587] audit: type=1327 audit(1589584951.198:89):
proctitle=617564697463746C002D650030
Error sending enable request (Operation not supported)
when CONFIG_LSM= has "bpf" in it.
KP, Anders,
please take a look.
Quoted 32 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 8 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 5 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
James,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.Routing via your tree is fine.
Perfect.
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks everyone.Looks like it was a wrong fix.
It breaks audit like this:
sudo auditctl -e 0[ 88.400296] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.400976] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.401597] audit: type=1305 audit(1589584951.198:89): op=set audit_enabled=0 old=1 auid=0 ses=1 res=0 [ 88.402691] audit: type=1300 audit(1589584951.198:89): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=52 a0=3 a1=7ffe42a37400 a2=34 a3=0 items=0 ppid=2250 pid=2251 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 se) [ 88.405587] audit: type=1327 audit(1589584951.198:89):
Quoted 4 lines
proctitle=617564697463746C002D650030
Error sending enable request (Operation not supported)when
CONFIG_LSM=has "bpf" in it.
Do you have more than one LSM enabled? It looks like the problem with security_secid_to_secctx() is now that it returns an error if any of the LSMs fail and the caller expects it to succeed if at least one of them sets the secdata pointer.
The problem earlier was that the call succeeded even though no LSM had set the pointer.
What is the behavior we actually expect from this function if multiple LSM are loaded?
Arnd
Quoted 11 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <linux-kernel- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Arnd Bergmann
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2020 1:05 AM
To: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>; Anders Roxell <[email protected]>; Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>; Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>; LKML <[email protected]>; Network Development <[email protected]>; bpf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: fix the default value ofsecid_to_secctxhook
I would *really* appreciate it if discussions about the LSM infrastructure where done on the linux-security-module mail list. (added to CC).
Quoted 52 lines
Quoted 32 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 8 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 5 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
James,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.Routing via your tree is fine.
Perfect.
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks everyone.Looks like it was a wrong fix.
It breaks audit like this:
sudo auditctl -e 0[ 88.400296] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.400976] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.401597] audit: type=1305 audit(1589584951.198:89): op=set audit_enabled=0 old=1 auid=0 ses=1 res=0 [ 88.402691] audit: type=1300 audit(1589584951.198:89): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=52 a0=3 a1=7ffe42a37400 a2=34 a3=0 items=0 ppid=2250 pid=2251 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 se) [ 88.405587] audit: type=1327 audit(1589584951.198:89):Quoted 4 lines
proctitle=617564697463746C002D650030
Error sending enable request (Operation not supported)when
CONFIG_LSM=has "bpf" in it.Do you have more than one LSM enabled? It looks like the problem with
security_secid_to_secctx()is now that it returns an error if any of the LSMs fail and the caller expects it to succeed if at least one of them sets the secdata pointer.The problem earlier was that the call succeeded even though no LSM had set the pointer.
What is the behavior we actually expect from this function if multiple LSM are loaded?
Arnd
Quoted 11 lines · Casey
Quoted 11 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <linux-kernel- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Arnd Bergmann
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2020 1:05 AM
To: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>; Anders Roxell <[email protected]>; Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>; Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>; LKML <[email protected]>; Network Development <[email protected]>; bpf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: fix the default value ofsecid_to_secctxhook
Quoted 39 lines
I would *really* appreciate it if discussions about the LSM infrastructure where done on the linux-security-module mail list. (added to CC).
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 26 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 4 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
On Wed, 13 May 2020, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
James,
since you took the previous similar patch are you going to pick this one up as well?
Or we can route it via bpf tree to Linus asap.Routing via your tree is fine.
Perfect.
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks everyone.Looks like it was a wrong fix.
It breaks audit like this:
sudo auditctl -e 0[ 88.400296] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.400976] audit: error in audit_log_task_context [ 88.401597] audit: type=1305 audit(1589584951.198:89): op=set audit_enabled=0 old=1 auid=0 ses=1 res=0 [ 88.402691] audit: type=1300 audit(1589584951.198:89): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=52 a0=3 a1=7ffe42a37400 a2=34 a3=0 items=0 ppid=2250 pid=2251 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 se) [ 88.405587] audit: type=1327 audit(1589584951.198:89):Quoted 4 lines
proctitle=617564697463746C002D650030
Error sending enable request (Operation not supported)when
CONFIG_LSM=has "bpf" in it.Do you have more than one LSM enabled? It looks like the problem with
security_secid_to_secctx()is now that it returns an error if any of the LSMs fail and the caller expects it to succeed if at least one of them sets the secdata pointer.
security_secid_to_secctx() is not currently stackable (I'm looking at 5.7-rc6) even for this simple case. call_int_hook() does bail-on-fail and will try all hooks registered, looking for a failure.
You need to replace the call_int_hook() with an explicit hlist_for_each_entry(), as is done in security_inode_getsecurity().
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
The problem earlier was that the call succeeded even though no LSM had set the pointer.
What is the behavior we actually expect from this function if multiple LSM are loaded?
Arnd
Quoted 63 lines · Anders Roxell
security_secid_to_secctxis called by thebpf_lsmhook and a successful return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer isn't initialized whenCONFIG_BPF_LSMis enabled, with the default return fromkernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)! [ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! [ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in: [ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13 [ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450 [ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0 [ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0 [ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000 [ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 [ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1 [ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f [ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20 [ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300 [ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059 [ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace: [ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc [ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4 [ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90 [ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930 [ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0 [ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8 [ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160 [ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8 [ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70 [ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340 [ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108 [ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88 [ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4 [ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180 [ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000) [ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]--- [ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004 [ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none [ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---Rework the so the default return value is
-EOPNOTSUPP.There are likely other callbacks such as
security_inode_getsecctx()that may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code better needs to audit them.
Quoted 5 lines
Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
CC Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Fixes 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")Signed-off-by Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
Note, this patch should have been sent to me and cc'd the LSM list.
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>