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boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

PATCH In review Daniel Golle via U-Boot 3 participants 10 messages Jul 21 – Jul 28

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v3 cover boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

A signed FIT configuration can delegate the integrity of a (potentially large) root filesystem image to the kernel's dm-verity instead of having U-Boot hash the whole payload at boot: the FIT carries a "dm-verity" subnode with the roothash, salt and block parameters, U-Boot passes the roothash to Linux through the dm-mod.create bootargs, and dm-verity then validates the filesystem block by block against it.

For that to be safe the roothash has to be trusted, and in a signed configuration the only thing that establishes trust is the configuration signature. The roothash was not covered by it. fit_config_add_hash() collected the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode into the signed region, but not the dm-verity subnode, so the roothash, the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, was left unsigned.

The result is a verified-boot bypass for the root filesystem: an attacker who can rewrite the boot medium can replace the filesystem, recompute a matching dm-verity tree, write the new roothash into the unsigned dm-verity subnode, and the configuration signature still verifies. dm-verity then faithfully validates the malicious filesystem against the attacker's roothash.

This series closes the gap.

v3: address comments by Simon Glass
* factor tools/image-host.c's node-path collection into patch 1 too, mirroring the boot-side helper, so both the sign side and the verify side share the same shape and stay easy to compare
* use present tense for the pre-patch code description in patch 2; document the dm-verity subnode in the rebuilt node list in doc/usage/fit/signature.rst and note the signature coverage in doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst
* in the unit test, bound-check fdt_find_regions()'s returned count the same way fit_config_check_sig() does, tamper the digest through the buffer instead of casting away const, and note in a comment that the digest check stands in for the whole dm-verity node
* fix test_fit_verity_roothash_signed(), which never actually ran: its ITS baked the tmpdir prefix into the /incbin/() paths while dtc also resolves incbin paths relative to the .its file's own directory, so the path was searched doubled and mkimage always failed

v2: address comments by Tom Rini
* drop the VISIBLE_IF_UT visibility macro; fit_config_get_signed_nodes() is now simply non-static (previously the function would end up being inlined, so there *is* a real cost to this)
* document test_fit_verity_sign.py with pydoc docstrings including an ITS example, and add a page under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module is rendered in the generated documentation
* collect Reviewed-by tags on patches 1 and 2

Daniel Golle (3):
boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()
boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature
test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config
signature

 boot/image-fit-sig.c                        | 108 +++++++----
 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst |  10 +
 doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst                 |   5 +
 doc/usage/fit/signature.rst                 |   2 +-
 include/image.h                             |  23 +++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                      | 200 +++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py       | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/image-host.c                          |  94 ++++++---
 8 files changed, 578 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py

base-commit: 042e45e026c77227319a426940577856ffe62e7b

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/3 boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

Both the boot-side and host-side fit_config_add_hash() repeat the same sequence to append a node's path to the hashed-node list three times:
for the image node, for each hash subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper, fit_config_add_node(), in each file, with no functional change.

---
v3: also factor out tools/image-host.c's fit_config_add_hash(), which
had the same duplication, per Simon Glass's review; this keeps the sign-side and verify-side node list construction easy to compare. Kept Tom's Reviewed-by: the boot-side code he reviewed is unchanged and the host-side addition mechanically mirrors the same pattern.

v2: no changes

 boot/image-fit-sig.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 tools/image-host.c   | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
boot/image-fit-sig.c +44 -29
index fe7ca6e4ab5..3357ec92116 100644
@@ -230,6 +230,37 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_add_node() - Append one node's path to the hashed-node list
+ *
+ * @fit:		FIT blob
+ * @noffset:		Offset of the node whose path should be added
+ * @node_inc:		Array of path pointers to fill
+ * @count:		Pointer to current count (updated on return)
+ * @max_nodes:		Maximum entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:		Buffer for packed path strings
+ * @buf_used:		Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
+ * @buf_len:		Total size of @buf
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
+ */
+static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
+			       int *count, int max_nodes, char *buf,
+			       int *buf_used, int buf_len)
+{
+	int ret, len;
+
+	if (*count >= max_nodes)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
+	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
+	*buf_used += len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
@@ -250,18 +281,12 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			       char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
 			       char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
 {
-	int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
+	int noffset, hash_count, ret;
 
-	if (*count >= max_nodes)
-		return -ENOSPC;
-
-	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-			   buf_len - *buf_used);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return -ENOENT;
-	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-	*buf_used += len;
+	ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, image_noffset, node_inc, count,
+				  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
 	hash_count = 0;
@@ -273,15 +298,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 		if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
 			    strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
 			continue;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 		hash_count++;
 	}
 
@@ -296,15 +316,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
 		if (noffset < 0)
 			return -EIO;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
tools/image-host.c +47 -26

104 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v3 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Golle

boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

Both the boot-side and host-side fit_config_add_hash() repeat the same sequence to append a node's path to the hashed-node list three times:
for the image node, for each hash subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper, fit_config_add_node(), in each file, with no functional change.

Quoted 6 lines

boot/image-fit-sig.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------

 tools/image-host.c   | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/3 boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

In reply to Daniel Golle via U-Boot

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only adds the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.

An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the root filesystem.

Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.

---
v3: use present tense for the pre-patch code description, per Simon
Glass's review; document the dm-verity subnode in the rebuilt node list in doc/usage/fit/signature.rst and note the signature coverage in doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst. The tools/image-host.c hunk now calls the patch 1 helper instead of duplicating the pattern inline (no functional change). Kept Tom's Reviewed-by: the functional change he reviewed is unchanged; the rest is doc/message wording and a mechanical refactor.
v2: no changes

 boot/image-fit-sig.c        | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst |  5 +++++
 doc/usage/fit/signature.rst |  2 +-
 tools/image-host.c          | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
boot/image-fit-sig.c +19 -4
index 3357ec92116..f7ab036dcb5 100644
@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
- * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
- * subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
+ * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher and
+ * dm-verity subnode paths (each if present) to the packed buffer.
  *
  * @fit:		FIT blob
  * @image_noffset:	Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
@@ -322,6 +322,21 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			return ret;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -329,8 +344,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
- * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
- * cipher subnodes.
+ * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
+ * cipher and dm-verity subnodes.
  *
  * Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
  * default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst +5 -0
index 800a18fceae..76030c751ae 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ typically be obtained from its output.
 The ``digest`` and ``salt`` byte arrays correspond to the hex-encoded
 ``Root hash`` and ``Salt`` printed by ``veritysetup format``.
 
+When the configuration is signed, ``digest`` and ``salt`` are covered by
+the configuration signature (see :doc:`signature`), so the roothash
+cannot be swapped out for a matching one without invalidating the
+signature.
+
 Optional boolean properties (when present, they are collected and appended
 as dm-verity optional parameters with hyphens converted to underscores):
 
doc/usage/fit/signature.rst +1 -1
index da08cc75c3a..64bada2f58f 100644
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ however, U-Boot does not read 'hashed-nodes'. Instead it rebuilds the node
 list from the configuration's own image references (kernel, fdt, ramdisk,
 etc.), since 'hashed-nodes' is not itself covered by the signature. The
 rebuilt list always includes the root node, the configuration node, each
-referenced image node and its hash/cipher subnodes.
+referenced image node and its hash, cipher and dm-verity subnodes.
 
 The image is walked in order and each tag processed as follows:
 
tools/image-host.c +21 -0
index fd2ef99d399..16a5ad6c22d 100644
@@ -1287,6 +1287,27 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			return ret;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset,
+				     FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to get dm-verity node in configuration '%s/%s' image '%s': %s\n",
+				conf_name, sig_name, iname,
+				fdt_strerror(noffset));
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, conf_name,
+					  sig_name, iname);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v3 2/3
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

Quoted 20 lines · Daniel Golle

boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only adds the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.

An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the root filesystem.

Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.

Quoted 8 lines

boot/image-fit-sig.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----

 doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst |  5 +++++
 doc/usage/fit/signature.rst |  2 +-
 tools/image-host.c          | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
#5 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/3 test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

In reply to Daniel Golle via U-Boot

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.

Add two independent checks of this property:

- test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed proves the check can fail. A matching page is added under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module documentation is rendered with the rest of the generated docs.

- test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the exact node list the configuration signature is computed over, turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash bytes fall inside a signed region and that tampering them changes the hash. It needs no private key, so it also runs on real devices and uses the same hash path a device would.

To let the unit test build the signed-region node list, rename the config node-list helper to fit_config_get_signed_nodes(), make it non-static and declare it in image.h.

---
v3: address comments by Simon Glass
* assert fdt_find_regions()'s returned count stays within the region array bound, matching the check fit_config_check_sig() enforces, instead of only checking it is non-zero
* tamper the roothash through buf[digest_off] instead of casting away the const from fdt_getprop()'s return value
* note in a comment that the digest tamper stands in for the whole dm-verity node, since salt lives in the same node and is covered by the same region
* fix test_fit_verity_roothash_signed(), which never actually ran:
its ITS baked the tmpdir prefix into the /incbin/() paths while dtc also resolves incbin paths relative to the .its file's own directory (same as tmpdir here), so the path was searched doubled ("tmpdir/tmpdir/kernel.bin") and mkimage always failed with "No such file or directory". Use bare filenames in the ITS and let dtc resolve them; drop the now-unused %(tmpdir)s substitution.

v2: address comments by Tom Rini
* drop the VISIBLE_IF_UT visibility macro and simply make fit_config_get_signed_nodes() non-static
* convert the comment block in test_fit_verity_sign.py into a module docstring, add an ITS example and add a page under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module is rendered in the generated documentation

 boot/image-fit-sig.c                        |  14 +-
 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst |  10 +
 include/image.h                             |  23 +++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                      | 200 +++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py       | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 442 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py
boot/image-fit-sig.c +7 -7
index f7ab036dcb5..a0c50bba4cf 100644
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 }
 
 /**
- * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
  * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
@@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
  * Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
  */
-static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
-				    char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
-				    char *buf, int buf_len)
+int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+				char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+				char *buf, int buf_len)
 {
 	const char *conf_name;
 	int image_count;
@@ -500,9 +500,9 @@ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
 	}
 
 	/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
-	count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
-					 node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
-					 hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
+	count = fit_config_get_signed_nodes(fit, conf_noffset,
+					    node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
+					    hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
 	if (count < 0) {
 		*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
 		return -1;
doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst new file +10 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..94a39b08952
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+test_fit_verity_sign
+====================
+
+.. automodule:: test_fit_verity_sign
+   :synopsis:
+   :member-order: bysource
+   :members:
+   :undoc-members:
include/image.h +23 -0
index 4b3c9c87bf5..db7de2d446d 100644
@@ -1893,6 +1893,29 @@ struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
 		struct fdt_region *fdt_regions, int count,
 		struct image_region *region);
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes covered by a config
+ *				   signature
+ *
+ * Collects the paths of the nodes that the configuration signature is
+ * computed over: the root node, the configuration node, and for each image
+ * referenced by the configuration its node, its hash subnodes and its cipher
+ * and dm-verity subnodes. The result is the same node list used when creating
+ * and verifying the signature, and is suitable for passing to
+ * fdt_find_regions().
+ *
+ * @fit:	FIT blob
+ * @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
+ * @node_inc:	Array to fill with pointers to packed path strings
+ * @max_nodes:	Number of entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:	Buffer for the packed null-terminated path strings
+ * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
+ * Return: number of entries written to @node_inc, or -ve on error
+ */
+int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+				char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+				char *buf, int buf_len);
+
 static inline int fit_image_check_target_arch(const void *fdt, int node)
 {
 #ifndef USE_HOSTCC
test/boot/fit_verity.c +200 -0

209 lines not on this page · raw message

test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py new file +202 -0

202 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
Reviewed-by on v3 3/3
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

Quoted 30 lines · Daniel Golle

test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.

Add two independent checks of this property:

- test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed proves the check can fail. A matching page is added under doc/develop/pytest/ so the module documentation is rendered with the rest of the generated docs.

- test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the exact node list the configuration signature is computed over, turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash bytes fall inside a signed region and that tampering them changes the hash. It needs no private key, so it also runs on real devices and uses the same hash path a device would.

To let the unit test build the signed-region node list, rename the config node-list helper to fit_config_get_signed_nodes(), make it non-static and declare it in image.h.

Quoted 8 lines

boot/image-fit-sig.c | 14 +-

 doc/develop/pytest/test_fit_verity_sign.rst |  10 ++
 include/image.h                             |  23 ++++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                      | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py       | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 442 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
#7 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Golle via U-Boot

Hi Daniel,

Quoted 1 line · Daniel Golle

v3: address comments by Simon Glass

Thanks for the rework - the doc additions in signature.rst and dm-verity.rst read well, and the test fix is a good catch.

I still think we should state the compatibility break explicitly
somehow: because U-Boot rebuilds the node list rather than trusting hashed-nodes, an image signed by an older mkimage that carries a dm-verity subnode stops verifying under this fix, and an image signed by the new mkimage does not verify on an older U-Boot.

The new language in dm-verity.rst documents the security property (the roothash can no longer be swapped out), but it doesn't warn that deployed images must be re-signed after upgrading and that mixed old/new fleets need care.

The break is unavoidable I think and I may be overthinking all this, but it would be nice to avoid people getting confused.

Regards,
Simon

#8 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Daniel,

Quoted 1 line · Daniel Golle

v3: address comments by Simon Glass

Thanks for the rework - the doc additions in signature.rst and dm-verity.rst read well, and the test fix is a good catch.

I still think we should state the compatibility break explicitly
somehow: because U-Boot rebuilds the node list rather than trusting hashed-nodes, an image signed by an older mkimage that carries a dm-verity subnode stops verifying under this fix, and an image signed by the new mkimage does not verify on an older U-Boot.

Quoted 7 lines

The new language in dm-verity.rst documents the security property (the roothash can no longer be swapped out), but it doesn't warn that deployed images must be re-signed after upgrading and that mixed old/new fleets need care.

The break is unavoidable I think and I may be overthinking all this, but it would be nice to avoid people getting confused.

Technically you are right, there could be, but I strongly believe there aren't any "deployments" of this right now.

The whole mechanism is built in order to be deployed as part of the **upcoming** OpenWrt bootstd method. As of today, there aren't currently any deployments using dm-verity on OpenWrt with this mechanism (apart from some boards on my desk at least, and people who have tried the PoC[1] -- which is/was a PoC and obviously subject to changes as part of upstream review and standartization)

[1]: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/22177

#9 lore raw

Hi Daniel,

Quoted 28 lines · Daniel Golle
Quoted 15 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Daniel,

Quoted 1 line · Daniel Golle

v3: address comments by Simon Glass

Thanks for the rework - the doc additions in signature.rst and dm-verity.rst read well, and the test fix is a good catch.

I still think we should state the compatibility break explicitly
somehow: because U-Boot rebuilds the node list rather than trusting hashed-nodes, an image signed by an older mkimage that carries a dm-verity subnode stops verifying under this fix, and an image signed by the new mkimage does not verify on an older U-Boot.

Quoted 7 lines

The new language in dm-verity.rst documents the security property (the roothash can no longer be swapped out), but it doesn't warn that deployed images must be re-signed after upgrading and that mixed old/new fleets need care.

The break is unavoidable I think and I may be overthinking all this, but it would be nice to avoid people getting confused.

Technically you are right, there could be, but I strongly believe there aren't any "deployments" of this right now.

Quoted 6 lines

The whole mechanism is built in order to be deployed as part of the **upcoming** OpenWrt bootstd method. As of today, there aren't currently any deployments using dm-verity on OpenWrt with this mechanism (apart from some boards on my desk at least, and people who have tried the PoC[1] -- which is/was a PoC and obviously subject to changes as part of upstream review and standartization)

OK I see...and you would know :-) So that's fine, thanks.

Regards,
Simon

Quoted 2 lines

[1]: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/22177