SECURITY.md: Update security contacts
PATCH 1/3 SECURITY.md: Update security contacts
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
--- SECURITY.md | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
SECURITY.md +0 -5
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ the issue before it is made public, but we will make every effort to address the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * Petr Lautrbach, [email protected] -* Nicolas Iooss, [email protected] - * (GPG fingerprint) E25E 254C 8EE4 D303 554B F5AF EC70 1A1D A494 C5EB -* Jeffrey Vander Stoep, [email protected] -* Joshua Brindle, [email protected] * James Carter, [email protected] * (GPG fingerprint) 4568 1128 449B 65F8 80C6 1797 3A84 A946 B4BA 62AE * Paul Moore, [email protected]
@@ -37,7 +33,6 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * (GPG fingerprint) 578C 4211 832F 0A7E A2C5 A7C2 21A4 6E60 3F74 4ECF * Jason Zaman, [email protected] * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF -* Steve Lawrence, [email protected] * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected] ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
PATCH 2/3 ci: Drop circleci config
We have not used circleci in many years, the configs are very out of date compared to the github actions so need to get cleaned up.
--- .circleci/config.yml | 41 ----------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 41 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .circleci/config.yml
.circleci/config.yml deleted +0 -41
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -# Configuration file for https://circleci.com/ - -version: 2 - -jobs: - build: - docker: - # Use a Python image from https://hub.docker.com/r/circleci/python/tags/ - - image: circleci/python:3.6 - - steps: - - checkout - - # Install dependencies - - run: sudo apt-get update -qq - - run: sudo apt-get install -qq bison clang clang-tools flex gawk gettext libaudit-dev libcap-dev libcap-ng-dev libcunit1-dev libdbus-glib-1-dev libpcre2-dev python3-dev python-dev ruby-dev swig xmlto - - - run: - name: Setup environment variables - command: | - echo 'export DESTDIR=$HOME/destdir' >> "$BASH_ENV" - echo 'export IS_CIRCLE_CI=1' >> "$BASH_ENV" - - # Download and install refpolicy headers for sepolgen tests - - run: - name: Download refpolicy Makefile - command: | - curl --location --retry 10 -o refpolicy.tar.bz2 https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/releases/download/RELEASE_2_20180701/refpolicy-2.20180701.tar.bz2 - tar -xvjf refpolicy.tar.bz2 - sed -e "s,^PREFIX :=.*,PREFIX := $DESTDIR/usr," -i refpolicy/support/Makefile.devel - sudo make -C refpolicy install-headers - sudo mkdir -p /etc/selinux - echo 'SELINUXTYPE=refpolicy' | sudo tee /etc/selinux/config - echo 'SELINUX_DEVEL_PATH = /usr/share/selinux/refpolicy' | sudo tee /etc/selinux/sepolgen.conf - sed -e "s,\"\(/usr/bin/[cs]\),\"$DESTDIR\1," -i python/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/module.py - - # Run clang's scan-build and store the result as artifacts - - run: ./scripts/run-scan-build - - store_artifacts: - path: scripts/output-scan-build - destination: output-scan-build
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 2/3] ci: Drop circleci config
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
We have not used circleci in many years, the configs are very out of date compared to the github actions so need to get cleaned up.
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>
Quoted 56 lines
--- .circleci/config.yml | 41 ----------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 41 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .circleci/config.yml.circleci/config.yml deleted +0
-42@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -# Configuration file for https://circleci.com/ - -version: 2 - -jobs: - build: - docker: - # Use a Python image from https://hub.docker.com/r/circleci/python/tags/ - - image: circleci/python:3.6 - - steps: - - checkout - - # Install dependencies - - run: sudo apt-get update -qq - - run: sudo apt-get install -qq bison clang clang-tools flex gawk gettext libaudit-dev libcap-dev libcap-ng-dev libcunit1-dev libdbus-glib-1-dev libpcre2-dev python3-dev python-dev ruby-dev swig xmlto - - - run: - name: Setup environment variables - command: | - echo 'export DESTDIR=$HOME/destdir' >> "$BASH_ENV" - echo 'export IS_CIRCLE_CI=1' >> "$BASH_ENV" - - # Download and install refpolicy headers for sepolgen tests - - run: - name: Download refpolicy Makefile - command: | - curl --location --retry 10 -o refpolicy.tar.bz2 https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/releases/download/RELEASE_2_20180701/refpolicy-2.20180701.tar.bz2 - tar -xvjf refpolicy.tar.bz2 - sed -e "s,^PREFIX :=.*,PREFIX := $DESTDIR/usr," -i refpolicy/support/Makefile.devel - sudo make -C refpolicy install-headers - sudo mkdir -p /etc/selinux - echo 'SELINUXTYPE=refpolicy' | sudo tee /etc/selinux/config - echo 'SELINUX_DEVEL_PATH = /usr/share/selinux/refpolicy' | sudo tee /etc/selinux/sepolgen.conf - sed -e "s,\"\(/usr/bin/[cs]\),\"$DESTDIR\1," -i python/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/module.py - - # Run clang's scan-build and store the result as artifacts - - run: ./scripts/run-scan-build - - store_artifacts: - path: scripts/output-scan-build - destination: output-scan-build --2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 2/3] ci: Drop circleci config
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
We have not used circleci in many years, the configs are very out of date compared to the github actions so need to get cleaned up.
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
PATCH 3/3 RFC: SECURITY.md: Rough draft of codifying the maintainer process
In reply to Jason ZamanSince security issues are quite rare, best to codify the processes so when they come along we can fall back to this and dont forget any steps.
--- SECURITY.md | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
SECURITY.md +26 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected] +If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free to send +to any and the maintainers will handle it internally. + ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues Upon disclosure of a bug, the maintainers should work together to investigate
@@ -57,3 +60,26 @@ lists. * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/oss-security + +### Maintainer Process + +This is the process maintainers will follow upon receiving a security notification. + +1. Make sure all appropriate SELinux maintainers are notified. Regardless of + which maintainer was initially contacted, others should be looped in. This + may also include the kernel maintainers if relevant to the issue. +2. After an initial review of the issue, maintainers will agree on one person + to be main point of contact. The response to the initial mail may come from a + different maintainer. If the initial mail was PGP signed/encrypted, the + replies will also be PGP signed/encrypted with one of the above keys. +3. Maintainers will work together in private to verify and fix the issue. For + larger fixes, this might involve a github private fork within a draft github + security advisory. +4. Maintainers will prepare the fix as soon as reasonable. Maintainers may + invite the reporter to the draft security advisory or private fork to help + verifying the fix. +5. We will aim to release the fix publicly quickly, but may request an embargo + period up to 90 days if the complexity of the issue requires it or if + severity of the issue requires coordinated rollout amongst distros. +6. Public disclosure will involve pushing the fix to the public repo and + publishing the security advisory on Github and to the mailing list.
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] RFC: SECURITY.md: Rough draft of codifying the maintainer process
Quoted 3 lines · Jason Zaman
Since security issues are quite rare, best to codify the processes so when they come along we can fall back to this and dont forget any steps.
don't or do not
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>--- SECURITY.md | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)SECURITY.md +0
-0
SECURITY.md the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. · line 39
Quoted 5 lines
SECURITY.md +2
-0@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected] +If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free to send +to any and the maintainers will handle it internally.
I'd recommend sending to both rather than any to avoid potential loss/delay. We should also mention that private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on GitHub,
so another option is to submit via:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security/advisories
Quoted 35 lines
SECURITY.md +24
-1+ ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues Upon disclosure of a bug, the maintainers should work together to investigate@@ -57,3 +60,26 @@ lists. * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/oss-security + +### Maintainer Process + +This is the process maintainers will follow upon receiving a security notification. + +1. Make sure all appropriate SELinux maintainers are notified. Regardless of + which maintainer was initially contacted, others should be looped in. This + may also include the kernel maintainers if relevant to the issue. +2. After an initial review of the issue, maintainers will agree on one person + to be main point of contact. The response to the initial mail may come from a + different maintainer. If the initial mail was PGP signed/encrypted, the + replies will also be PGP signed/encrypted with one of the above keys. +3. Maintainers will work together in private to verify and fix the issue. For + larger fixes, this might involve a github private fork within a draft github + security advisory. +4. Maintainers will prepare the fix as soon as reasonable. Maintainers may + invite the reporter to the draft security advisory or private fork to help + verifying the fix. +5. We will aim to release the fix publicly quickly, but may request an embargo + period up to 90 days if the complexity of the issue requires it or if + severity of the issue requires coordinated rollout amongst distros. +6. Public disclosure will involve pushing the fix to the public repo and + publishing the security advisory on Github and to the mailing list. --2.54.0
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] RFC: SECURITY.md: Rough draft of codifying the maintainer process
Quoted 22 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines · Jason Zaman
Since security issues are quite rare, best to codify the processes so when they come along we can fall back to this and dont forget any steps.
don't or do not
Quoted 14 lines
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>--- SECURITY.md | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)SECURITY.md +0
-0@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected]
Quoted 8 lines
SECURITY.md the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. · line 39
Quoted 2 lines
SECURITY.md +2
-0+If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free to send +to any and the maintainers will handle it internally.I'd recommend sending to both rather than any to avoid potential loss/delay. We should also mention that private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on GitHub,
so another option is to submit via:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security/advisories
We may also want to add something like the following to SECURITY.md:
Bugs in libsepol that only affect policy compilers (checkpolicy, checkmodule, secilc) are not considered
security vulnerabilities. The policy compilers are typically run without any privileges and attackers who
can feed them arbitrary inputs can do more interesting things. We will fix such bugs but will not create
security advisories for them.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 36 lines
SECURITY.md +24
-1+ ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues Upon disclosure of a bug, the maintainers should work together to investigate@@ -57,3 +60,26 @@ lists. * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/oss-security + +### Maintainer Process + +This is the process maintainers will follow upon receiving a security notification. + +1. Make sure all appropriate SELinux maintainers are notified. Regardless of + which maintainer was initially contacted, others should be looped in. This + may also include the kernel maintainers if relevant to the issue. +2. After an initial review of the issue, maintainers will agree on one person + to be main point of contact. The response to the initial mail may come from a + different maintainer. If the initial mail was PGP signed/encrypted, the + replies will also be PGP signed/encrypted with one of the above keys. +3. Maintainers will work together in private to verify and fix the issue. For + larger fixes, this might involve a github private fork within a draft github + security advisory. +4. Maintainers will prepare the fix as soon as reasonable. Maintainers may + invite the reporter to the draft security advisory or private fork to help + verifying the fix. +5. We will aim to release the fix publicly quickly, but may request an embargo + period up to 90 days if the complexity of the issue requires it or if + severity of the issue requires coordinated rollout amongst distros. +6. Public disclosure will involve pushing the fix to the public repo and + publishing the security advisory on Github and to the mailing list. --2.54.0
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] RFC: SECURITY.md: Rough draft of codifying the maintainer process
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
SECURITY.md the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. · line 39
Quoted 2 lines · Jason Zaman
SECURITY.md +2
-0+If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free to send +to any and the maintainers will handle it internally.I'd recommend sending to both rather than any to avoid potential loss/delay. We should also mention that private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on GitHub,
so another option is to submit via:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security/advisories
Quoted 3 lines
We may also want to add something like the following to SECURITY.md:
Bugs in libsepol that only affect policy compilers (checkpolicy, checkmodule, secilc) are not considered
I would also add the semodule-utils (semodule_expand/link/package) as well to the list above.
Quoted 5 lines
security vulnerabilities. The policy compilers are typically run without any privileges and attackers who
can feed them arbitrary inputs can do more interesting things. We will fix such bugs but will not create
security advisories for them.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] RFC: SECURITY.md: Rough draft of codifying the maintainer process
Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
SECURITY.md the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. · line 39
Quoted 2 lines · Jason Zaman
SECURITY.md +2
-0+If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free to send +to any and the maintainers will handle it internally.I'd recommend sending to both rather than any to avoid potential loss/delay. We should also mention that private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on GitHub,
so another option is to submit via:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security/advisories
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We may also want to add something like the following to SECURITY.md:
Bugs in libsepol that only affect policy compilers (checkpolicy, checkmodule, secilc) are not consideredI would also add the semodule-utils (semodule_expand/link/package) as well to the list above.
Maybe don't list any components, but just state that issues that require an attacker controlled policy source are bugs, but not security issues
Johannes
Signature · 4 lines
GPG Key EE16 6BCE AD56 E034 BFB3 3ADD 7BF7 29D5 E7C8 1FA0 Subkey fingerprint: 250F 43F5 F7CE 6F1E 9C59 4F95 BC27 DD9D 2CC4 FD66 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg, Germany www.suse.com, Geschäftsführer: Jochen Jaser, Andrew McDonald, Abhinav Puri, (HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg)
Quoted 6 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>
Quoted 31 lines
--- SECURITY.md | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)SECURITY.md +0
-6@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ the issue before it is made public, but we will make every effort to address the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * Petr Lautrbach, [email protected] -* Nicolas Iooss, [email protected] - * (GPG fingerprint) E25E 254C 8EE4 D303 554B F5AF EC70 1A1D A494 C5EB -* Jeffrey Vander Stoep, [email protected] -* Joshua Brindle, [email protected] * James Carter, [email protected] * (GPG fingerprint) 4568 1128 449B 65F8 80C6 1797 3A84 A946 B4BA 62AE * Paul Moore, [email protected]@@ -37,7 +33,6 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. * (GPG fingerprint) 578C 4211 832F 0A7E A2C5 A7C2 21A4 6E60 3F74 4ECF * Jason Zaman, [email protected] * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF -* Steve Lawrence, [email protected] * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected] ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues --2.54.0
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Quoted 6 lines
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Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
It would be great if Android could still be included here. I'd like to propose myself for inclusion, if that's possible. Thanks.
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Thiébaud Weksteen
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Quoted 8 lines
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Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>It would be great if Android could still be included here. I'd like to propose myself for inclusion, if that's possible. Thanks.
I believe the goal was to limit the number of people who receive vulnerability reports to active maintainers. Unfortunately, none of the Google/Android folks currently listed are active contributors which is why I believe the patch removes them (and others) from the contact list. Like almost all Open Source projects, the best way to stay informed of these things is to establish yourself as an active contributor over a period of time. I can't speak to how the userspace maintainers view your activity thus far, however, from my perspective you have made some nice contributions but only over a limited period of time. I would like to see you demonstrate a continued involvement over a longer period (historically this has been an issue for Google contributors).
I also know there has been some discussion regarding notifying distros prior to a wider, public security advisory release, although I'm not certain of the current status of that idea.
--
paul-moore.com
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Thiébaud Weksteen
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Quoted 8 lines
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Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>It would be great if Android could still be included here. I'd like to propose myself for inclusion, if that's possible. Thanks.
Quoted 12 lines
I believe the goal was to limit the number of people who receive vulnerability reports to active maintainers. Unfortunately, none of the Google/Android folks currently listed are active contributors which is why I believe the patch removes them (and others) from the contact list. Like almost all Open Source projects, the best way to stay informed of these things is to establish yourself as an active contributor over a period of time. I can't speak to how the userspace maintainers view your activity thus far, however, from my perspective you have made some nice contributions but only over a limited period of time. I would like to see you demonstrate a continued involvement over a longer period (historically this has been an issue for Google contributors).
No worries, that makes sense. Thanks for the honest feedback Paul.
Stephen Smalley
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Zaman
Part of the annual cleanup of security contacts, drop people that are not as active committers currently. Thanks for all the work over the years!
Quoted 5 lines
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Signed-off-by Jason Zaman <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
I re-based this on top of Nicolas' patch removing himself and merged the first two,
leaving the third one (the RFC PATCH) for another spin based on feedback.