i2c: cp2615: Validate read length before copying
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 i2c: cp2615: Validate read length before copying
The read_len field comes from the untrusted USB payload, which could potentially exceed the client's originally requested buffer length or MAX_I2C_SIZE, allowing an out-of-bounds read and write.
Limit read_len to the maximum size of the response buffer and return -EPROTO for an invalid response.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c +7 -2
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ cp2615_i2c_send(struct usb_interface *usbif, struct cp2615_i2c_transfer *i2c_w) }static int -cp2615_i2c_recv (struct usb_interface *usbif,unsigned char tag,void *buf) +cp2615_i2c_recv (struct usb_interface *usbif,unsigned char tag,void *buf,int len) {struct usb_device *usbdev =interface_to_usbdev (usbif);struct cp2615_iop_msg *msg;
@@ -160,6 +160,11 @@ cp2615_i2c_recv(struct usb_interface *usbif, unsigned char tag, void *buf)return -EIO ; } +if (i2c_r->read_len > len || i2c_r->read_len >MAX_I2C_SIZE ) { +kfree (msg); +return -EPROTO ; + } + res =cp2615_check_status (i2c_r->status);if (!res)memcpy (buf, &i2c_r->data, i2c_r->read_len);
@@ -236,7 +241,7 @@ cp2615_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msgs, int num) ret =cp2615_i2c_send (usbif, &i2c_w);if (ret)break ; - ret =cp2615_i2c_recv (usbif, i2c_w.tag, msg->buf); + ret =cp2615_i2c_recv (usbif, i2c_w.tag, msg->buf, msg->len); }if (ret <0 )return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
…
Quoted 2 lines
Limit
read_lento the maximum size of the response buffer and return-EPROTOfor an invalid response.
* How do you think about to add any tags (like “Fixes” and “Cc”) accordingly?
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst?h=v7.2#n145
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst?h=v7.2#n34
* Please avoid duplicate source code also for improved implementations of functions like cp2615_i2c_recv().
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst?h=v7.2#n526
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.2/source/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c#L138-L169
* How do you think about to increase the application of scope-based resource management?
Regards,
Markus
Andi Shyti
maintainerHi Triet,
Quoted 3 lines · Triet Hoang
The
read_lenfield comes from the untrusted USB payload, which could potentially exceed the client's originally requested buffer length orMAX_I2C_SIZE, allowing an out-of-bounds read and write.
have you experienced any issue yourself or are you just speculating based on the code?
Andi
Quoted 4 lines
Limit
read_lento the maximum size of the response buffer and return-EPROTOfor an invalid response.Signed-off-by Triet Hoang <[email protected]>
On Thu, 20 Aug 2026 10:28:22 -0500, Andi wrote
Quoted 2 lines
have you experienced any issue yourself or are you just speculating based on the code?
Hi Andi,
Thanks for replying. I just speculating based on the code.
BR,
Triet
Andi Shyti
maintainerHi Triet,
Quoted 5 lines · Triet Hoang
On Thu, 20 Aug 2026 10:28:22 -0500, Andi wrote
Quoted 2 lines
have you experienced any issue yourself or are you just speculating based on the code?
Thanks for replying. I just speculating based on the code.
I'm sorry, but I'm going to drop this as I don't see it as necessary.
As Markus pointed out, if this failure could actually happen, it would result in a driver failure and the patch should then be treated as a bug fix. However, I don't want to fix hypothetical bugs based on speculation or an AI-generated guess.
Thanks,
Andi