netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
The inet ingress hook runs before ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core(), so neither IPCB nor IP6CB has been initialized when nft_reject_inet passes a packet to nf_send_unreach() or nf_send_unreach6(). skb->cb can therefore retain metadata from an earlier protocol layer.
For IPv4, icmp_send() treats IPCB(skb)->opt as parsed IPv4 options. Stale option offsets can make __ip_options_echo() copy an attacker-controlled length into its 40-byte reply option buffer and overflow the stack. On an unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel, the IPv4 reproducer produced:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255
For IPv6, icmpv6_send() consumes IP6CB(skb) as parsed IPv6 metadata. It always uses iif for source selection and, when MIP6 is enabled, uses dsthao as an extension-header offset. These fields must not be stale.
For NF_INET_INGRESS, clear the address-family-specific control block and restore its input interface before constructing the ICMP error. This matches the initialization normally performed by ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core().
---
Changes in v2:
- Initialize IP6CB in nf_send_unreach6() for inet ingress.
- Preserve the IPv6 input interface before constructing the reply dst.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and validated by Trail of Bits.
Trail of Bits has an IPv4 reproducer for this bug that triggers the KASAN stack-out-of-bounds write in __ip_options_echo() and can share it if needed. A separate IPv6 test reaches nf_send_unreach6() from inet ingress and confirms that an ICMPv6 unreachable is constructed.
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 ++++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +6 -0
@@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook)if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ; +/* Inet ingress runs before IPv4 initializes IPCB. */ +if (hook ==NF_INET_INGRESS ) { +memset (IPCB (skb_in),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb_in))); +IPCB (skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; + } +if (skb_csum_unnecessary (skb_in) || !nf_reject_verify_csum (skb_in, dataoff, proto)) {icmp_send (skb_in,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , code,0 );
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +9 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <net/ip6_fib.h> #include <net/ip6_checksum.h> #include <net/netfilter/ipv6/nf_reject.h> +#include <net/dst_metadata.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/netfilter_bridge.h>
@@ -440,6 +441,14 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,if (hooknum ==NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev ==NULL ) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; +/* Inet ingress runs before IPv6 initializes IP6CB. */ +if (hooknum ==NF_INET_INGRESS ) { +memset (IP6CB (skb_in),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb_in))); +IP6CB (skb_in)->iif =skb_valid_dst (skb_in) ? +ip6_dst_idev (skb_dst (skb_in))->dev->ifindex : + skb_in->dev->ifindex; + } +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 80 lines · David Lee
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
The inet ingress hook runs before
ip_rcv_core()andip6_rcv_core(), so neither IPCB nor IP6CB has been initialized whennft_reject_inetpasses a packet tonf_send_unreach()ornf_send_unreach6().skb->cbcan therefore retain metadata from an earlier protocol layer.For IPv4,
icmp_send()treats IPCB(skb)->opt as parsed IPv4 options. Stale option offsets can make__ip_options_echo()copy an attacker-controlled length into its 40-byte reply option buffer and overflow the stack. On an unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel, the IPv4 reproducer produced:BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255For IPv6,
icmpv6_send()consumes IP6CB(skb) as parsed IPv6 metadata. It always uses iif for source selection and, when MIP6 is enabled, uses dsthao as an extension-header offset. These fields must not be stale.For
NF_INET_INGRESS, clear the address-family-specific control block and restore its input interface before constructing the ICMP error. This matches the initialization normally performed byip_rcv_core()andip6_rcv_core().Fixes 117ca1f8920c ("netfilter: nft_reject_inet: allow to use reject from inet ingress")Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyberSigned-off-by Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>Co-developed-by David Lee <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David Lee <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- Initialize IP6CB innf_send_unreach6()for inet ingress.
- Preserve the IPv6 input interface before constructing the reply dst.v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and validated by Trail of Bits.
Trail of Bits has an IPv4 reproducer for this bug that triggers the KASAN stack-out-of-bounds write in
__ip_options_echo()and can share it if needed. A separate IPv6 test reachesnf_send_unreach6()from inet ingress and confirms that an ICMPv6 unreachable is constructed.net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 ++++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +6
-0@@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook)if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ; +/* Inet ingress runs before IPv4 initializes IPCB. */ +if (hook ==NF_INET_INGRESS ) { +memset (IPCB (skb_in),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb_in))); +IPCB (skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; + } +if (skb_csum_unnecessary (skb_in) || !nf_reject_verify_csum (skb_in, dataoff, proto)) {icmp_send (skb_in,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , code,0 );net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +1
-0@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <net/ip6_fib.h> #include <net/ip6_checksum.h> #include <net/netfilter/ipv6/nf_reject.h> +#include <net/dst_metadata.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/netfilter_bridge.h>
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in, · line 449
Quoted 9 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +6
-0@@ -440,6 +441,14 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,if (hooknum ==NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev ==NULL ) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; +/* Inet ingress runs before IPv6 initializes IP6CB. */ +if (hooknum ==NF_INET_INGRESS ) { +memset (IP6CB (skb_in),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb_in))); +IP6CB (skb_in)->iif =skb_valid_dst (skb_in) ? +ip6_dst_idev (skb_dst (skb_in))->dev->ifindex : + skb_in->dev->ifindex;
Why do different? Maybe just use:
IP6CB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif;
like in the IPv4 chunk?
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +2
-0+ } +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ;Signature · 1 line
2.53.0