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selinux: implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks

PATCH In review [email protected] 4 participants 10 messages Aug 1, 2025 – Aug 6, 2025 SELinux security module

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 selinux: implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +48 -0
index 335fbf76cdd2..bffddffe0b25 100644
@@ -7154,6 +7154,52 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 	token->security = NULL;
 	kfree(bpfsec);
 }
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+	u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+				   NULL);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	u16 sclass;
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+	u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, sclass, av, NULL);
+}
+
 #endif
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
@@ -7525,6 +7571,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
maintainer Reviewed-by Tested-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 11:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

I agree with the approach - it is consistent with how tokens are used. I suppose we could perform a process-based check in selinux_bpf_token_create() if it was generic, or add one to each of these hooks if we want a different permission for different cmd or cap values.

We may need to wrap these checks with a new policy capability (see security/selinux/include/policycap.h and related code) to avoid breaking compatibility on existing systems using BPF tokens, if any.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 73 lines
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +48 -1
index 335fbf76cdd2..bffddffe0b25 100644
@@ -7154,6 +7154,52 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
        token->security = NULL;
        kfree(bpfsec);
 }
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       int ret;
+
+       switch (cmd) {
+       case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       default:
+               ret = 0;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+       u16 sclass;
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+       switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+       case 0:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+               break;
+       case 1:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+               break;
+       default:
+               pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, sclass, av, NULL);
+}
+
 #endif
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
@@ -7525,6 +7571,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
--

2.50.1

maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 11:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

Quoted 5 lines

I agree with the approach - it is consistent with how tokens are used. I suppose we could perform a process-based check in selinux_bpf_token_create() if it was generic, or add one to each of these hooks if we want a different permission for different cmd or cap values.

Ah, actually that doesn't look viable at least for the token capable checks, since those look like they can occur from outside of process context if I am reading the code correctly.

Quoted 84 lines

We may need to wrap these checks with a new policy capability (see security/selinux/include/policycap.h and related code) to avoid breaking compatibility on existing systems using BPF tokens, if any.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 73 lines
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +48 -1
index 335fbf76cdd2..bffddffe0b25 100644
@@ -7154,6 +7154,52 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
        token->security = NULL;
        kfree(bpfsec);
 }
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       int ret;
+
+       switch (cmd) {
+       case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       default:
+               ret = 0;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+       u16 sclass;
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+       switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+       case 0:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+               break;
+       case 1:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+               break;
+       default:
+               pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, sclass, av, NULL);
+}
+
 #endif
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
@@ -7525,6 +7571,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
--

2.50.1

maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 11:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

Quoted 5 lines

I agree with the approach - it is consistent with how tokens are used. I suppose we could perform a process-based check in selinux_bpf_token_create() if it was generic, or add one to each of these hooks if we want a different permission for different cmd or cap values.

Quoted 4 lines

Ah, actually that doesn't look viable at least for the token capable checks, since those look like they can occur from outside of process context if I am reading the code correctly.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Eric Suen has also been working on a SELinux BPF token implementation too, and I believe he is planning to post it upstream for review soon.

I do expect we'll need to have a discussion about the access controls, especially the labels involved, as BPF tokens are quite bit different from many of the other SELinux access controls.

--
paul-moore.com

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 18 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 11:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

Quoted 5 lines

I agree with the approach - it is consistent with how tokens are used. I suppose we could perform a process-based check in selinux_bpf_token_create() if it was generic, or add one to each of these hooks if we want a different permission for different cmd or cap values.

Quoted 4 lines

Ah, actually that doesn't look viable at least for the token capable checks, since those look like they can occur from outside of process context if I am reading the code correctly.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines

Eric Suen has also been working on a SELinux BPF token implementation too, and I believe he is planning to post it upstream for review soon.

I do expect we'll need to have a discussion about the access controls, especially the labels involved, as BPF tokens are quite bit different from many of the other SELinux access controls.

Eric - note that Daniel also posted a patch for the selinux-testsuite to exercise these hooks and checks based on the Linux kernel self-test for bpf tokens, see
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ7DBDnZEFvgpe58K4B+4kZdOqUGMHvGC2vKt-4Zget=Hg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t

Paul - it would be good to avoid such duplication of effort in the future, maybe we should be tracking such things in the GitHub project?

Quoted 6 lines

--
paul-moore.com

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley

Eric - note that Daniel also posted a patch for the selinux-testsuite to exercise these hooks and checks based on the Linux kernel self-test for bpf tokens, see
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ7DBDnZEFvgpe58K4B+4kZdOqUGMHvGC2vKt-4Zget=Hg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t

FWIW, I believe Eric has some basic tests too, although I will admit to losing track of that aspect, as we have had several months of setbacks lately due to package building, email, etc.

Quoted 2 lines

Paul - it would be good to avoid such duplication of effort in the future, maybe we should be tracking such things in the GitHub project?

Yes, it's unfortunate when we see duplicated work, but thankfully it happens very rarely in our case. We can track things on GitHub, but with development happening largely on the mailing list I'm skeptical about how successful that will end up being. Our GH related efforts have been very mixed thus far. Another option might simply be to tell people to announce a development effort on the mailing list, although I can see that having problems too.

If there are some positives, it may be that both Daniel and Eric's work are still in the early stages, so there is likely room for the two of them to cooperate together on a solution. Daniel, Eric, what do you think about that?

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#6 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley

Eric - note that Daniel also posted a patch for the selinux-testsuite to exercise these hooks and checks based on the Linux kernel self-test for bpf tokens, see
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ7DBDnZEFvgpe58K4B+4kZdOqUGMHvGC2vKt-4Zget=Hg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t

FWIW, I believe Eric has some basic tests too, although I will admit to losing track of that aspect, as we have had several months of setbacks lately due to package building, email, etc.

Quoted 2 lines

Paul - it would be good to avoid such duplication of effort in the future, maybe we should be tracking such things in the GitHub project?

Yes, it's unfortunate when we see duplicated work, but thankfully it happens very rarely in our case. We can track things on GitHub, but with development happening largely on the mailing list I'm skeptical about how successful that will end up being. Our GH related efforts have been very mixed thus far. Another option might simply be to tell people to announce a development effort on the mailing list, although I can see that having problems too.

Quoted 4 lines

If there are some positives, it may be that both Daniel and Eric's work are still in the early stages, so there is likely room for the two of them to cooperate together on a solution. Daniel, Eric, what do you think about that?

I would be happy to work with Eric on a solution. Looking forward to seeing his patch once it gets posted.

#7 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Daniel Durning
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley

Eric - note that Daniel also posted a patch for the selinux-testsuite to exercise these hooks and checks based on the Linux kernel self-test for bpf tokens, see
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ7DBDnZEFvgpe58K4B+4kZdOqUGMHvGC2vKt-4Zget=Hg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t

FWIW, I believe Eric has some basic tests too, although I will admit to losing track of that aspect, as we have had several months of setbacks lately due to package building, email, etc.

Quoted 2 lines

Paul - it would be good to avoid such duplication of effort in the future, maybe we should be tracking such things in the GitHub project?

Yes, it's unfortunate when we see duplicated work, but thankfully it happens very rarely in our case. We can track things on GitHub, but with development happening largely on the mailing list I'm skeptical about how successful that will end up being. Our GH related efforts have been very mixed thus far. Another option might simply be to tell people to announce a development effort on the mailing list, although I can see that having problems too.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

If there are some positives, it may be that both Daniel and Eric's work are still in the early stages, so there is likely room for the two of them to cooperate together on a solution. Daniel, Eric, what do you think about that?

I would be happy to work with Eric on a solution. Looking forward to seeing his patch once it gets posted.

Thanks a lot, Daniel. I was actually hesitant to send out my changes since you

already have test changes prepared, and I didn’t want to step on your toes.

Really appreciate your openness to collaborate.

I'll send out my patch soon and make sure to reference your test work in the

description.

#8 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Eric Suen
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel Durning
Quoted 21 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley

Eric - note that Daniel also posted a patch for the selinux-testsuite to exercise these hooks and checks based on the Linux kernel self-test for bpf tokens, see
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ7DBDnZEFvgpe58K4B+4kZdOqUGMHvGC2vKt-4Zget=Hg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t

FWIW, I believe Eric has some basic tests too, although I will admit to losing track of that aspect, as we have had several months of setbacks lately due to package building, email, etc.

Quoted 2 lines

Paul - it would be good to avoid such duplication of effort in the future, maybe we should be tracking such things in the GitHub project?

Yes, it's unfortunate when we see duplicated work, but thankfully it happens very rarely in our case.  We can track things on GitHub, but with development happening largely on the mailing list I'm skeptical about how successful that will end up being.  Our GH related efforts have been very mixed thus far.  Another option might simply be to tell people to announce a development effort on the mailing list, although I can see that having problems too.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

If there are some positives, it may be that both Daniel and Eric's work are still in the early stages, so there is likely room for the two of them to cooperate together on a solution.  Daniel, Eric, what do you think about that?

I would be happy to work with Eric on a solution. Looking forward to seeing his patch once it gets posted.

Thanks a lot, Daniel. I was actually hesitant to send out my changes since you

Quoted 9 lines

already have test changes prepared, and I didn’t want to step on your toes.

Really appreciate your openness to collaborate.

I'll send out my patch soon and make sure to reference your test work in the

description.

Daniel - I just posted my patch. It's available here: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/

Over the next couple of days, I'll build and run your test changes against it to check for any unexpected issues.

maintainer
#9 lore raw
In reply to Stephen Smalley
Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 11:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Daniel Durning <[email protected]>

Implement bpf_token_cmd and bpf_token_capable hooks for SELinux. For both hooks we check against the token SID, to support delegation. We could add a further check based on process SID when the token is first created.

I agree with the approach - it is consistent with how tokens are used. I suppose we could perform a process-based check in selinux_bpf_token_create() if it was generic, or add one to each of these hooks if we want a different permission for different cmd or cap values.

Quoted 3 lines

We may need to wrap these checks with a new policy capability (see security/selinux/include/policycap.h and related code) to avoid breaking compatibility on existing systems using BPF tokens, if any.

I have added some notes with links to examples of how to add a new SELinux policy capability to the SELinux kernel Getting Started guide at:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/Getting-Started#adding-a-new-selinux-policy-capability

Quoted 80 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 73 lines
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +48 -1
index 335fbf76cdd2..bffddffe0b25 100644
@@ -7154,6 +7154,52 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
        token->security = NULL;
        kfree(bpfsec);
 }
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       int ret;
+
+       switch (cmd) {
+       case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+                                  NULL);
+               break;
+       default:
+               ret = 0;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+       u16 sclass;
+       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
+       u32 sid = bpfsec->sid;
+       u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+
+       switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+       case 0:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
+               break;
+       case 1:
+               sclass = SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
+               break;
+       default:
+               pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, sclass, av, NULL);
+}
+
 #endif
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
@@ -7525,6 +7571,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_capable, selinux_bpf_token_capable),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
--

2.50.1