dm verity: Add support for signature verification with 2nd keyring
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 dm verity: Add support for signature verification with 2nd keyring
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new configuration DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING to enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring (with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel (kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted keyring.
---
Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Changes since v1:
* Extend the commit message (asked by Jarkko Sakkinen).
* Rename the Kconfig "help" keyword according to commit 84af7a6194e4 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'").
--- drivers/md/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++++- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/Kconfig +12 -1
@@ -530,11 +530,22 @@ config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support" depends on DM_VERITY select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION - help + help Add ability for dm-verity device to be validated if the pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7 signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree. + By default, rely on the builtin trusted keyring. + + If unsure, say N. + +config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING + bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification with secondary keyring" + depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + Rely on the secondary trusted keyring to verify dm-verity signatures. + If unsure, say N. config DM_VERITY_FEC
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c +7 -2
@@ -119,8 +119,13 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len, } ret =verify_pkcs7_signature (root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data, - sig_len,NULL ,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE , -NULL ,NULL ); + sig_len, +#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +#else +NULL , +#endif +VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL );return ret; }
base-commit: bbf5c979011a099af5dc76498918ed7df445635b
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Quoted 24 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new configuration
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGto enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring (with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel (kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted keyring.Cc Alasdair Kergon <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Cc Jaskaran Khurana <[email protected]>Cc Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Cc Milan Broz <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Changes since v1:
* Extend the commit message (asked by Jarkko Sakkinen).
* Rename theKconfig"help" keyword according to commit84af7a6194e4("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'").
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a Kconfig CONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then per-device override)?
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
Regardless, I really don't see why a Kconfig knob is appropriate.
Mike
Quoted 58 lines
--- drivers/md/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++++- drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/md/Kconfig +12
-1@@ -530,11 +530,22 @@ config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support" depends on DM_VERITY select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION - help + help Add ability for dm-verity device to be validated if the pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7 signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree. + By default, rely on the builtin trusted keyring. + + If unsure, say N. + +config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING + bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification with secondary keyring" + depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + Rely on the secondary trusted keyring to verify dm-verity signatures. + If unsure, say N. config DM_VERITY_FECdrivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c +7
-2@@ -119,8 +119,13 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len, } ret =verify_pkcs7_signature (root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data, - sig_len,NULL ,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE , -NULL ,NULL ); + sig_len, +#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +#else +NULL , +#endif +VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL );return ret; }base-commit:
bbf5c979011a099af5dc76498918ed7df445635bSignature · 1 line
2.28.0
Quoted 35 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 24 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new configuration
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGto enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring (with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel (kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted keyring.Cc Alasdair Kergon <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Cc Jaskaran Khurana <[email protected]>Cc Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Cc Milan Broz <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Changes since v1:
* Extend the commit message (asked by Jarkko Sakkinen).
* Rename theKconfig"help" keyword according to commit84af7a6194e4("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'").
Quoted 4 lines
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then per-device override)?
The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 3 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
Quoted 2 lines
Regardless, I really don't see why a
Kconfigknob is appropriate.
Moreover, a Kconfig knob makes sense as much as DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY, MODULE_SIG_FORCE and other similar authentication mechanisms. Indeed, when using these configurations, we want the kernel to enforce a specific policy.
Obviously, we can't make the DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG relies on the secondary trusted keyring without important security implications for systems already using this configuration (and then the builtin trusted keyring as the unique source of trust).
Quoted 59 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 35 lines · Mike Snitzer
Quoted 24 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new configuration
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGto enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring (with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel (kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted keyring.Cc Alasdair Kergon <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Cc Jaskaran Khurana <[email protected]>Cc Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>Cc Milan Broz <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Changes since v1:
* Extend the commit message (asked by Jarkko Sakkinen).
* Rename theKconfig"help" keyword according to commit84af7a6194e4("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over '---help---'").Quoted 4 lines
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then per-device override)?The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
I meant that when DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG is set, dm-verity signature becomes mandatory. This new configuration DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING extend this trust to the secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring.
So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Regardless, I really don't see why a
Kconfigknob is appropriate.Moreover, a
Kconfigknob makes sense as much asDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG,IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,MODULE_SIG_FORCEand other similar authentication mechanisms. Indeed, when using these configurations, we want the kernel to enforce a specific policy.Obviously, we can't make the
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGrelies on the secondary trusted keyring without important security implications for systems already using this configuration (and then the builtin trusted keyring as the unique source of trust).
Quoted 36 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 24 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 4 lines · Mike Snitzer
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then per-device override)?The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
I meant that when
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGis set, dm-verity signature becomes mandatory. This new configurationDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGextend this trust to the secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring.
Quoted 4 lines
So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time.
Well, I understand why you need a config option here.
And using the secondary keyring actually makes much more sense to me than the original approach.
But please do not forget that dm-verity is sometimes used in different contexts where such strict in-kernel certificate trust is unnecessary. With your configure options set, you deliberately remove the possibility to configure such devices.
I understand that it is needed for "trusted" systems, but we should be clear in the documentation.
Maybe also add note to /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.rst ? We already mention DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG there.
The current userspace configuration through veritysetup does not need any patches for your patch, correct?
Thanks,
Milan
Quoted 43 lines · Milan Broz
Quoted 37 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 5 lines · Mike Snitzer
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then
per-device override)?The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
I meant that when
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGis set, dm-verity signature becomes mandatory. This new configurationDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGextend this trust to the secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring.Quoted 4 lines
So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time.
Quoted 8 lines
Well, I understand why you need a config option here.
And using the secondary keyring actually makes much more sense to me than the original approach.But please do not forget that dm-verity is sometimes used in different contexts where such strict in-kernel certificate trust is unnecessary. With your configure options set, you deliberately remove the possibility to configure such devices.
It doesn't make sense to set DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG in generic distro because such policy is configured at build time in the kernel with hardcoded CAs. If the new option is not set then nothing change. I don't see why it could be an issue for use cases we previously defined (with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG).
Quoted 6 lines
I understand that it is needed for "trusted" systems, but we should be clear
in the documentation.
Maybe also add note to /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.rst ?
We already mentionDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGthere.
The current documentation remains true. DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG.
Quoted 3 lines
The current userspace configuration through veritysetup does not need any patches for your patch, correct?
Right, it's only different from the kernel point of view.
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
Milan
It seems that there is no more question. Mike, Alasdair, could you please consider to merge this into the tree?
Quoted 80 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 43 lines · Milan Broz
Quoted 37 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 5 lines · Mike Snitzer
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then
per-device override)?The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
I meant that when
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGis set, dm-verity signature becomes mandatory. This new configurationDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGextend this trust to the secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring.Quoted 4 lines
So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time.
Quoted 8 lines
Well, I understand why you need a config option here.
And using the secondary keyring actually makes much more sense to me than the original approach.But please do not forget that dm-verity is sometimes used in different contexts where such strict in-kernel certificate trust is unnecessary. With your configure options set, you deliberately remove the possibility to configure such devices.
It doesn't make sense to set
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGin generic distro because such policy is configured at build time in the kernel with hardcoded CAs. If the new option is not set then nothing change. I don't see why it could be an issue for use cases we previously defined (withDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG).Quoted 6 lines
I understand that it is needed for "trusted" systems, but we should be clear
in the documentation.
Maybe also add note to /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.rst ?
We already mentionDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGthere.The current documentation remains true.
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGdepends onDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG.Quoted 3 lines
The current userspace configuration through veritysetup does not need any patches for your patch, correct?
Right, it's only different from the kernel point of view.
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
Milan
Quoted 73 lines · Mickaël Salaün
It seems that there is no more question. Mike, Alasdair, could you please consider to merge this into the tree?
Quoted 69 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 43 lines · Milan Broz
Quoted 37 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 5 lines · Mike Snitzer
Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a
KconfigCONFIG knob? Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but then
per-device override)?The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the builtin trusted keyring.
To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary keyring fallback. Is that really desirable?
That is already the current state (on purpose).
I meant that when
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGis set, dm-verity signature becomes mandatory. This new configurationDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGextend this trust to the secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring.Quoted 4 lines
So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time.
Quoted 8 lines
Well, I understand why you need a config option here.
And using the secondary keyring actually makes much more sense to me than the original approach.But please do not forget that dm-verity is sometimes used in different contexts where such strict in-kernel certificate trust is unnecessary. With your configure options set, you deliberately remove the possibility to configure such devices.
It doesn't make sense to set
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGin generic distro because such policy is configured at build time in the kernel with hardcoded CAs. If the new option is not set then nothing change. I don't see why it could be an issue for use cases we previously defined (withDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG).Quoted 6 lines
I understand that it is needed for "trusted" systems, but we should be clear
in the documentation.
Maybe also add note to /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.rst ?
We already mentionDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIGthere.The current documentation remains true.
DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRINGdepends onDM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG.
Yes, while true that doesn't change the fact that documenting DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING is useful to potential consumers of baseline DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG.
Please update Documentation and post v3, I'll get it merged for 5.11.
Thanks,
Mike