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lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled

PATCH In review Coiby Xu 2 participants 4 messages Dec 30, 2022 – Jan 3, 2023

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Coiby Xu

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled

A kernel builder may not enable KEXEC_SIG and some architectures like ppc64 simply don't have KEXEC_SIG. In these cases, unless both IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled, lockdown doesn't prevent unsigned kernel image from being kexec'ed via the kexec_file_load syscall whereas it could prevent one via the kexec_load syscall. Mandate signature verification for those cases.

Fixes 155bdd30af17 ("kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down")
Cc Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Bohac <[email protected]>
Cc David Howells <[email protected]>

---
v3
- add lockdown tests to explain why kexec_file_load failed [Mimi]

v2
- collect reviewed-by tag from Mimi
- s/mandate_signatute_verification/mandate_signature_verification [Mimi]
- return the status of kexec_image_verify_sig correctly when signature verification is not mandated
---

 kernel/kexec_file.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/kexec_file.c +17 -9
index dd5983010b7b..2c1054ab21ef 100644
@@ -125,6 +125,17 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 	image->image_loader_data = NULL;
 }
 
+static bool mandate_signature_verification(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
+	 * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
+	 * down.
+	 */
+	return !ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
+	       security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
@@ -168,13 +179,7 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 			return ret;
 		}
 
-		/*
-		 * If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
-		 * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
-		 * down.
-		 */
-		if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
-		    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
+		if (mandate_signature_verification())
 			return -EPERM;
 
 		pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
@@ -211,10 +216,13 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 	ret = kimage_validate_signature(image);
-
+#else
+	if (mandate_signature_verification())
+		ret = -EPERM;
+#endif
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
-#endif
+
 	/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
 	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
 		ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, 0, &image->initrd_buf,
Signature · 7 lines
2.38.1


_______________________________________________
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 selftests/kexec: enable lockdown tests

When lockdown is enabled, kexec_load syscall should always fail.

For kexec_file_load, when lockdown is enabled, it should
- fail of missing PE signature when KEXEC_SIG is enabled
- fail of missing IMA signature when KEXEC_SIG is disabled

Before this patch, test_kexec_load.sh fails (false positive) and test_kexec_file_load.sh fails without a reason when lockdown enabled and KEXEC_SIG disabled,

    # kexec_load failed [FAIL]
    not ok 1 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_load.sh # exit=1
    # kexec_file_load failed [PASS]
    ok 2 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_file_load.sh

After this patch, test_kexec_load.sh succeeds and test_kexec_file_load.sh fails with the correct reason when lockdown enabled and KEXEC_SIG disabled,

    # kexec_load failed [PASS]
    ok 1 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_load.sh
    # kexec_file_load failed (missing IMA sig) [PASS]
    ok 2 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_file_load.sh
---
 .../selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh       | 16 +++++++++++
 .../selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh   | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh        | 12 ++++++---
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh +16 -0
index 641ef05863b2..06c298b46788 100755
@@ -110,6 +110,22 @@ get_secureboot_mode()
 	return $secureboot_mode;
 }
 
+is_lockdown_enabled()
+{
+	local ret=0
+
+	if [ -f /sys/kernel/security/lockdown ] \
+	     && ! grep -qs "\[none\]" /sys/kernel/security/lockdown; then
+		ret=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_info "lockdown not enabled"
+	fi
+
+	return $ret
+}
+
 require_root_privileges()
 {
 	if [ $(id -ru) -ne 0 ]; then
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +27 -0
index c9ccb3c93d72..790f96938083 100755
@@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
 			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
 		fi
 
+		if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 1 ] \
+		     && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+		fi
+
+		if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+		     && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+		fi
+
 		if [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 1 ] \
 		    && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
 	            && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ]; then
@@ -181,6 +191,16 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
 		log_pass "$failed_msg (possibly missing IMA sig)"
 	fi
 
+	if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 1 ] \
+	    && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+	fi
+
+	if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 0 ] \
+	    && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+	fi
+
 	log_pass "$failed_msg"
 	return 0
 }
@@ -215,6 +235,10 @@ kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE=y" \
 	"kexec signed kernel image required"
 kexec_sig_required=$?
 
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG=y" \
+	"KEXEC_SIG enabled"
+kexec_sig_enabled=$?
+
 kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y" \
 	"PE signed kernel image required"
 pe_sig_required=$?
@@ -225,6 +249,9 @@ ima_sig_required=$?
 get_secureboot_mode
 secureboot=$?
 
+is_lockdown_enabled
+lockdown=$?
+
 # Are there pe and ima signatures
 if [ "$(get_arch)" == 'ppc64le' ]; then
 	pe_signed=0
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh +9 -3
index 49c6aa929137..0542887866c0 100755
@@ -28,18 +28,24 @@ arch_policy=$?
 get_secureboot_mode
 secureboot=$?
 
-# kexec_load should fail in secure boot mode and CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY enabled
+is_lockdown_enabled
+lockdown=$?
+
+# kexec_load should fail in either
+#   a) secure boot mode and CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY enabled
+# or
+#   b) lockdown enabled
 kexec --load $KERNEL_IMAGE > /dev/null 2>&1
 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
 	kexec --unload
-	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ]; then
+	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 -a $arch_policy -eq 1 ] || [ $lockdown -eq 1 ]; then
 		log_fail "kexec_load succeeded"
 	elif [ $ima_appraise -eq 0 -o $arch_policy -eq 0 ]; then
 		log_info "Either IMA or the IMA arch policy is not enabled"
 	fi
 	log_pass "kexec_load succeeded"
 else
-	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ] ; then
+	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 -a $arch_policy -eq 1 ] || [ $lockdown -eq 1 ]; then
 		log_pass "kexec_load failed"
 	else
 		log_fail "kexec_load failed"
Signature · 7 lines
2.38.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/kexec: enable lockdown tests

Hi Coiby,

Quoted 5 lines · Coiby Xu

When lockdown is enabled, kexec_load syscall should always fail.

For kexec_file_load, when lockdown is enabled, it should
- fail of missing PE signature when KEXEC_SIG is enabled
- fail of missing IMA signature when KEXEC_SIG is disabled

Appended kernel image signatures are supported, but differently on powerpc and s390. For s390, KEXEC_SIG is enabled. For completeness the above statements should reflect appended signatures.

Quoted 61 lines

Before this patch, test_kexec_load.sh fails (false positive) and test_kexec_file_load.sh fails without a reason when lockdown enabled and KEXEC_SIG disabled,

    # kexec_load failed [FAIL]
    not ok 1 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_load.sh # exit=1
    # kexec_file_load failed [PASS]
    ok 2 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_file_load.sh

After this patch, test_kexec_load.sh succeeds and test_kexec_file_load.sh fails with the correct reason when lockdown enabled and KEXEC_SIG disabled,

    # kexec_load failed [PASS]
    ok 1 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_load.sh
    # kexec_file_load failed (missing IMA sig) [PASS]
    ok 2 selftests: kexec: test_kexec_file_load.sh
---
 .../selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh       | 16 +++++++++++
 .../selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh   | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh        | 12 ++++++---
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh +16 -0
index 641ef05863b2..06c298b46788 100755
@@ -110,6 +110,22 @@ get_secureboot_mode()
 	return $secureboot_mode;
 }
 
+is_lockdown_enabled()
+{
+	local ret=0
+
+	if [ -f /sys/kernel/security/lockdown ] \
+	     && ! grep -qs "\[none\]" /sys/kernel/security/lockdown; then
+		ret=1
+	fi
+
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_info "lockdown not enabled"
+	fi
+
+	return $ret
+}
+
 require_root_privileges()
 {
 	if [ $(id -ru) -ne 0 ]; then
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +0 -0
index c9ccb3c93d72..790f96938083 100755

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh kexec_file_load_test() · line 145

Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +4 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
 			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
 		fi
 
+		if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 1 ] \
+		     && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+		fi

CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG being enabled does not require signature verification to be enforced. When the CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY is enabled, IMA requires kexec signature verification. Also on s390, CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG verifies an appended signature, not a PE signature. Instead of the "missing PE sig" message, perhaps indicate lockdown requires kexec signature verification.

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh kexec_file_load_test() · line 151

Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +6 -0
+
+		if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+		     && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+		fi
+

Similarly, only if IMA is enabled and requires the kexec signature verficiation should this message be emitted. Perhaps a single generic lockdown message would be sufficient for both.

Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +0 -0
 		if [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 1 ] \
 		    && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
 	            && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ]; then
@@ -181,6 +191,16 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
 		log_pass "$failed_msg (possibly missing IMA sig)"
 	fi
 

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh kexec_file_load_test() · line 203

Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh +10 -0
+	if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 1 ] \
+	    && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+	fi
+
+	if [ $lockdown -eq 1 ] && [ $kexec_sig_enabled -eq 0 ] \
+	    && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+	fi
+

Similar comments as above.

Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi
maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Coiby Xu

Hi Coiby,

Quoted 6 lines · Coiby Xu

A kernel builder may not enable KEXEC_SIG and some architectures like ppc64 simply don't have KEXEC_SIG. In these cases, unless both IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled, lockdown doesn't prevent unsigned kernel image from being kexec'ed via the kexec_file_load syscall whereas it could prevent one via the kexec_load syscall. Mandate signature verification for those cases.

The phrase "unless both IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled" doesn't reflect the code. IMA could contain a custom policy rule which requires the kexec kernel image signature verification as well. Refer to the comment now in mandate_signature_verification().

thanks,

Mimi