get NULL pointer dereferences or #GP fault to infomation leakage
I wonder if this could be an issue.
Test on Ubuntu 16.04 with linux kernel 4.4.x, x86_64.
When a NULL-pointer-deref or a #GP fault
(e.g: access to 0xdead0000-xxxxxxxx) happens in kernel space, it seems that the kernel would kill the current process, then output the Oops message or "general protection fault" message.
So we can get these messages via dmesg or reading the /var/log/...
I think this may be a way to bypass the KASLR, could it be?
It is an issue because having KASLR enable without panic on oops is not really useful. Same apply to other mitigations that rely on randomness.
Quoted 13 lines · zerons
I wonder if this could be an issue.
Test on Ubuntu 16.04 with linux kernel 4.4.x,
x86_64.When a NULL-pointer-deref or a #GP fault
(e.g: access to 0xdead0000-xxxxxxxx) happens in kernel space, it seems that the kernel would kill the current process, then output the Oops message or "general protection fault" message.So we can get these messages via
dmesgor reading the/var/log/...I think this may be a way to bypass the KASLR, could it be?
Signature · 1 line
Thomas
If kernel panic on oops, then NULL pointer deref and others may cause a DoS. Maybe restrict user access to dmesg and other log files so that unprivileged users couldn't read log messages, or something like /proc/kallsyms(output 0000 if no permission). Then those faults stll be useless.
Quoted 21 lines · Thomas Garnier
It is an issue because having KASLR enable without panic on oops is not really useful. Same apply to other mitigations that rely on randomness.
Quoted 13 lines · zerons
I wonder if this could be an issue.
Test on Ubuntu 16.04 with linux kernel 4.4.x,
x86_64.When a NULL-pointer-deref or a #GP fault
(e.g: access to 0xdead0000-xxxxxxxx) happens in kernel space, it seems that the kernel would kill the current process, then output the Oops message or "general protection fault" message.So we can get these messages via
dmesgor reading the/var/log/...I think this may be a way to bypass the KASLR, could it be?
I agree that restricting access / filtering dmesg or equivalents is a good thing.
An oops highlights that something went wrong and the OS should not continue in this state. If you allow oops then an attacker might bruteforce KASLR offsets for the kernel base, have multiple attempts at an heap overflow or against a stack cookie. Many mitigations rely on the fact that the attacker have only one attempt.
Taking your example on NULL pointer deref. It can be a simple pointer not checked for NULL or a corrupted object. Not panicing leaves more room for an attacker to reliably exploit a vulnerability.
Btw, Kees wrote this list of recommended settings:
http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_
Project#Recommended_settings
Quoted 31 lines · zerons
If kernel panic on oops, then NULL pointer deref and others may cause a DoS.
Maybe restrict user access to dmesg and other log files so that unprivileged
users couldn't read log messages, or something like /proc/kallsyms(output 0000
if no permission). Then those faults stll be useless.Quoted 21 lines · Thomas Garnier
It is an issue because having KASLR enable without panic on oops is not really useful. Same apply to other mitigations that rely on randomness.
Quoted 13 lines · zerons
I wonder if this could be an issue.
Test on Ubuntu 16.04 with linux kernel 4.4.x,
x86_64.When a NULL-pointer-deref or a #GP fault
(e.g: access to 0xdead0000-xxxxxxxx) happens in kernel space, it seems that the kernel would kill the current process, then output the Oops message or "general protection fault" message.So we can get these messages via
dmesgor reading the/var/log/...I think this may be a way to bypass the KASLR, could it be?
Signature · 1 line
Thomas
Yes, thanks for your reply, I didn't think that through.:)
Quoted 53 lines · Thomas Garnier
I agree that restricting access / filtering dmesg or equivalents is a good thing.
An oops highlights that something went wrong and the OS should not continue in this state. If you allow oops then an attacker might bruteforce KASLR offsets for the kernel base, have multiple attempts at an heap overflow or against a stack cookie. Many mitigations rely on the fact that the attacker have only one attempt.
Taking your example on NULL pointer deref. It can be a simple pointer not checked for NULL or a corrupted object. Not panicing leaves more room for an attacker to reliably exploit a vulnerability.
Btw, Kees wrote this list of recommended settings:
http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_
Project#Recommended_settingsQuoted 31 lines · zerons
If kernel panic on oops, then NULL pointer deref and others may cause a DoS.
Maybe restrict user access to dmesg and other log files so that unprivileged
users couldn't read log messages, or something like /proc/kallsyms(output 0000
if no permission). Then those faults stll be useless.Quoted 21 lines · Thomas Garnier
It is an issue because having KASLR enable without panic on oops is not really useful. Same apply to other mitigations that rely on randomness.
Quoted 13 lines · zerons
I wonder if this could be an issue.
Test on Ubuntu 16.04 with linux kernel 4.4.x,
x86_64.When a NULL-pointer-deref or a #GP fault
(e.g: access to 0xdead0000-xxxxxxxx) happens in kernel space, it seems that the kernel would kill the current process, then output the Oops message or "general protection fault" message.So we can get these messages via
dmesgor reading the/var/log/...I think this may be a way to bypass the KASLR, could it be?