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Vulnerability Disclosure in net/

DISCUSSION Nicolas Bidron 5 participants 5 messages May 18, 2022 – May 26, 2022 Networking

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#0 lore raw

Hello,

We found a couple of bugs in net/net.s in the IP defragmentation function __net_defragment(). Below the writeup for the 2 bugs:

-----------BUG 1-----------

# Hole Descriptor Overwrite in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Leads to Arbitrary Out of Bounds Write Primitive (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | Critical 9.6 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

In u-boot/net/net.c the __net_defragment function line 900 through 1018.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a Hole Descriptor overwrite attack which ultimately leads to an arbitrary write primitve.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than IP_HDR_SIZE and strictly lower than IP_HDR_SIZE+8 will lead to a value for len comprised between 0 and 7. This will ultimately result in a truncated division by 8 resulting value of 0 forcing the hole metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.

This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
     static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
     static u16 first_hole, total_len;
     struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
     struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
     uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
     int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
     u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

     /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
     payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
     offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
     thisfrag = payload + offset8;
     start = offset8 * 8;
     len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows how the attacker can control the value of len to be strictly lower than 8 by issuing a packet with ip_len between 21 and 27 (IP_HDR_SIZE has a value of 20).

Also note that offset8 here is 0 which leads to thisfrag = payload.

```C
     } else if (h >= thisfrag) {
         /* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
         newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
         *newh = *h;
         h = newh;
         if (h->next_hole)
             payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
         if (h->prev_hole)
             payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
         else
             first_hole = (h - payload);

     } else {
```

Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path. Here, len / 8 evaluates to 0 leading to newh = thisfrag. Also note that first_hole here is 0 since h and payload point to the same location.

```C
     /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
     memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

Finally, in the above excerpt the memcpy overwrites the hole metadata since thisfrag and h both point to the same location. The hole metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the fragmented IP packet data. If len was crafted to be 6, last_byte, next_hole, and prev_hole of the first_hole can be controlled by the attacker.

Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the previously controlled hole metadata (next_hole) from the first packet.

### Recommendation

Handle cases where len is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when len is lower than 8.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length (ip_len) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).

----------BUG 2----------

# Large buffer overflow leads to DoS in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Code (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | High 7.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

u-boot/net/net.c lines 915 and 1011.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a buffer overflow through a specially crafted fragmented IP Datagram with an invalid Total Length which creates Denial of Service conditions.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than IP_HDR_SIZE will lead to a negative value for len which will ultimately result in a buffer overflow during the subsequent memcpy that uses len as it's count parameter.

This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting an invalid packet to include an unexpected ip_len value in the IP UDP header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet (21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
     static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
     static u16 first_hole, total_len;
     struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
     struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
     uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
     int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
     u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

     /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
     payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
     offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
     thisfrag = payload + offset8;
     start = offset8 * 8;
     len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows where the undeflow to a negative len value occurs if ip_len is set to a value strictly lower than 20 (IP_HDR_SIZE being 20). Also note that in the above excerpt the pkt_buff buffer has a size of CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to 64 KB depending on configurations.

```C
     /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
     memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

In the above excerpt the memcpy overflows the destination by attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's designed to hold CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG bytes at most which leads to a DoS.

### Recommendation

Stop processing of the packet if ip_len is lower than 21 (as defined by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34).

Nicolas Bidron, Nicolas Guigo

#1 lore raw
Quoted 220 lines · Nicolas Bidron

Hello,

We found a couple of bugs in net/net.s in the IP defragmentation function __net_defragment(). Below the writeup for the 2 bugs:

-----------BUG 1-----------

# Hole Descriptor Overwrite in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Leads to Arbitrary Out of Bounds Write Primitive (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | Critical 9.6 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

In u-boot/net/net.c the __net_defragment function line 900 through 1018.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a Hole Descriptor overwrite attack which ultimately leads to an arbitrary write primitve.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than IP_HDR_SIZE and strictly lower than IP_HDR_SIZE+8 will lead to a value for len comprised between 0 and 7. This will ultimately result in a truncated division by 8 resulting value of 0 forcing the hole metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.

This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
     static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
     static u16 first_hole, total_len;
     struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
     struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
     uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
     int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
     u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

     /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
     payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
     offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
     thisfrag = payload + offset8;
     start = offset8 * 8;
     len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows how the attacker can control the value of len to be strictly lower than 8 by issuing a packet with ip_len between 21 and 27 (IP_HDR_SIZE has a value of 20).

Also note that offset8 here is 0 which leads to thisfrag = payload.

```C
     } else if (h >= thisfrag) {
         /* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
         newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
         *newh = *h;
         h = newh;
         if (h->next_hole)
             payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
         if (h->prev_hole)
             payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
         else
             first_hole = (h - payload);

     } else {
```

Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path. Here, len / 8 evaluates to 0 leading to newh = thisfrag. Also note that first_hole here is 0 since h and payload point to the same location.

```C
     /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
     memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

Finally, in the above excerpt the memcpy overwrites the hole metadata since thisfrag and h both point to the same location. The hole metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the fragmented IP packet data. If len was crafted to be 6, last_byte, next_hole, and prev_hole of the first_hole can be controlled by the attacker.

Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the previously controlled hole metadata (next_hole) from the first packet.

### Recommendation

Handle cases where len is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when len is lower than 8.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length (ip_len) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).

----------BUG 2----------

# Large buffer overflow leads to DoS in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Code (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | High 7.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

u-boot/net/net.c lines 915 and 1011.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a buffer overflow through a specially crafted fragmented IP Datagram with an invalid Total Length which creates Denial of Service conditions.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than IP_HDR_SIZE will lead to a negative value for len which will ultimately result in a buffer overflow during the subsequent memcpy that uses len as it's count parameter.

This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting an invalid packet to include an unexpected ip_len value in the IP UDP header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet (21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
     static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
     static u16 first_hole, total_len;
     struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
     struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
     uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
     int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
     u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

     /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
     payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
     offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
     thisfrag = payload + offset8;
     start = offset8 * 8;
     len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows where the undeflow to a negative len value occurs if ip_len is set to a value strictly lower than 20 (IP_HDR_SIZE being 20). Also note that in the above excerpt the pkt_buff buffer has a size of CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to 64 KB depending on configurations.

```C
     /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
     memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

In the above excerpt the memcpy overflows the destination by attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's designed to hold CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG bytes at most which leads to a DoS.

### Recommendation

Quoted 8 lines

Stop processing of the packet if ip_len is lower than 21 (as defined by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34).

Nicolas Bidron, Nicolas Guigo

Hi Nicolas,
Thanks for the research.
I have read your description thoroughly, very interesting. I will implement fixes to the findings.
Thanks.
Ramon.

#2 lore raw

Hi Ramon,

Quoted 228 lines · Ramon Fried
Quoted 226 lines · Nicolas Bidron

Hello,

We found a couple of bugs in net/net.s in the IP defragmentation function __net_defragment(). Below the writeup for the 2 bugs:

-----------BUG 1-----------

# Hole Descriptor Overwrite in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Leads to Arbitrary Out of Bounds Write Primitive (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | Critical 9.6 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

In u-boot/net/net.c the __net_defragment function line 900 through 1018.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a Hole Descriptor overwrite attack which ultimately leads to an arbitrary write primitve.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than IP_HDR_SIZE and strictly lower than IP_HDR_SIZE+8 will lead to a value for len comprised between 0 and 7. This will ultimately result in a truncated division by 8 resulting value of 0 forcing the hole metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.

This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
      static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
      static u16 first_hole, total_len;
      struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
      struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
      uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
      int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
      u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

      /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
      payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
      offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
      thisfrag = payload + offset8;
      start = offset8 * 8;
      len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows how the attacker can control the value of len to be strictly lower than 8 by issuing a packet with ip_len between 21 and 27 (IP_HDR_SIZE has a value of 20).

Also note that offset8 here is 0 which leads to thisfrag = payload.

```C
      } else if (h >= thisfrag) {
          /* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
          newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
          *newh = *h;
          h = newh;
          if (h->next_hole)
              payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
          if (h->prev_hole)
              payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
          else
              first_hole = (h - payload);

      } else {
```

Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path. Here, len / 8 evaluates to 0 leading to newh = thisfrag. Also note that first_hole here is 0 since h and payload point to the same location.

```C
      /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
      memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

Finally, in the above excerpt the memcpy overwrites the hole metadata since thisfrag and h both point to the same location. The hole metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the fragmented IP packet data. If len was crafted to be 6, last_byte, next_hole, and prev_hole of the first_hole can be controlled by the attacker.

Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the previously controlled hole metadata (next_hole) from the first packet.

### Recommendation

Handle cases where len is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when len is lower than 8.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length (ip_len) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).

----------BUG 2----------

# Large buffer overflow leads to DoS in U-Boot IP Packet Defragmentation Code (CVE-TBD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|Project | U-Boot |
|Project URL | https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot |
|Versions affected | all versions up to commit TBD |
|Systems affected | All systems defining `CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG` |
|CVE identifier | TBD |
|Advisory URL | TBD |
|Risk | High 7.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H) |
|Authors | Nicolas Guigo, Nicolas Bidron |

### Summary

U-boot is a popular boot loader for embedded systems with implementations for a large number of architectures and prominent in most linux based embedded systems.

### Location

u-boot/net/net.c lines 915 and 1011.

### Impact

The U-Boot implementation of [RFC815](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc815) IP DATAGRAM REASSEMBLY ALGORITHMS is susceptible to a buffer overflow through a specially crafted fragmented IP Datagram with an invalid Total Length which creates Denial of Service conditions.

### Description

In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of ip->ip_len (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than IP_HDR_SIZE will lead to a negative value for len which will ultimately result in a buffer overflow during the subsequent memcpy that uses len as it's count parameter.

This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting an invalid packet to include an unexpected ip_len value in the IP UDP header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet (21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.

```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
      static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
      static u16 first_hole, total_len;
      struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
      struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
      uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
      int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
      u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

      /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
      payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
      offset8 =  (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
      thisfrag = payload + offset8;
      start = offset8 * 8;
      len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```

The last line of the previous excerpt from u-boot/net/net.c shows where the undeflow to a negative len value occurs if ip_len is set to a value strictly lower than 20 (IP_HDR_SIZE being 20). Also note that in the above excerpt the pkt_buff buffer has a size of CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to 64 KB depending on configurations.

```C
      /* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
      memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```

In the above excerpt the memcpy overflows the destination by attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's designed to hold CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG bytes at most which leads to a DoS.

### Recommendation

Stop processing of the packet if ip_len is lower than 21 (as defined by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34).

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Nicolas Bidron, Nicolas Guigo

Hi Nicolas,
Thanks for the research.
I have read your description thoroughly, very interesting. I will implement fixes to the findings.

Thanks for looking into this. I wanted to give it a shot as well but got side-tracked. Could you keep me in CC on any patch you have for this?

Thanks a lot.
Matthias

#3 lore raw
In reply to Ramon Fried

Hi Ramon,

Quoted 4 lines · Ramon Fried

Hi Nicolas,
Thanks for the research.
I have read your description thoroughly, very interesting. I will implement fixes to the findings.

Is it enough to add the check below?

net/net.c +0 -0
@@ -906,6 +906,9 @@ static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct

ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)

        uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
        int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
        u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);

+
+ if (ip->ip_len < 28)
+ return NULL;

        /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
        payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
#4 lore raw

Hi Fabio

Quoted 15 lines · Fabio Estevam

Hi Ramon,

Quoted 4 lines · Ramon Fried

Hi Nicolas,
Thanks for the research.
I have read your description thoroughly, very interesting. I will implement fixes to the findings.

Is it enough to add the check below?

net/net.c static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct · line 913

Quoted 8 lines
net/net.c +3 -0
@@ -906,6 +906,9 @@ static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct
 ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
        uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
        int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
        u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
+
+       if (ip->ip_len < 28)
+               return NULL;
 

If you comment on it up or nobody will remember what is 28 tomorrow

Michael

Quoted 2 lines
net/net.c +0 -0
        /* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
        payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
Signature · 11 lines
Michael Nazzareno Trimarchi
Co-Founder & Chief Executive Officer
M. +39 347 913 2170
[email protected]
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Amarula Solutions BV
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