RCU pathwalk race fixes

We still have some races in filesystem methods when exposed
to RCU pathwalk. The series below is a result of code audit (the second round of it) and it should deal with most of that stuff.
Exceptions: ntfs3 ->d_hash()/->d_compare() and ceph_d_revalidate(). Up to maintainers (a note for NTFS folks - when documentation says that a method may not block, it *does* imply that blocking allocations are to be avoided. Really).

Branch is 6.8-rc1-based; it lives in
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git fixes.pathwalk-rcu

Individual patches are in followups; ditto for code audit notes. Beginning of the latter should probably be converted into docs; if anyone is willing to help with such conversion, please say so - I'll be glad to answer any questions, etc.

If somebody wants to grab bits and pieces of that series into individual filesystem git trees, please say so. Same for any problems spotted in the patches, obviously. If nothing shows up, that goes into #fixes and into mainline.

Shortlog:
fs/super.c: don't drop ->s_user_ns until we free struct super_block itself rcu pathwalk: prevent bogus hard errors from may_lookup()
affs: free affs_sb_info with kfree_rcu()
exfat: move freeing sbi, upcase table and dropping nls into rcu-delayed helper
hfsplus: switch to rcu-delayed unloading of nls and freeing ->s_fs_info
afs: fix __afs_break_callback() / afs_drop_open_mmap() race
nfs: make nfs_set_verifier() safe for use in RCU pathwalk
nfs: fix UAF on pathwalk running into umount
procfs: move dropping pde and pid from ->evict_inode() to ->free_inode()
procfs: make freeing proc_fs_info rcu-delayed
fuse: fix UAF in rcu pathwalks
cifs_get_link(): bail out in unsafe case
ext4_get_link(): fix breakage in RCU mode

Diffstat:

 fs/affs/affs.h            |  1 +
 fs/affs/super.c           |  2 +-
 fs/afs/file.c             |  8 ++++++--
 fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h       |  1 +
 fs/exfat/nls.c            | 14 ++++----------
 fs/exfat/super.c          | 20 +++++++++++---------
 fs/ext4/symlink.c         |  8 +++++---
 fs/fuse/cuse.c            |  3 +--
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h          |  1 +
 fs/fuse/inode.c           | 15 +++++++++++----
 fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h   |  1 +
 fs/hfsplus/super.c        | 12 +++++++++---
 fs/namei.c                |  6 +++++-
 fs/nfs/client.c           | 13 ++++++++++---
 fs/nfs/dir.c              |  4 ++--
 fs/proc/base.c            |  2 --
 fs/proc/inode.c           | 19 ++++++++-----------
 fs/proc/root.c            |  2 +-
 fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c    |  3 +++
 fs/super.c                | 13 ++++---------
 include/linux/nfs_fs_sb.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/proc_fs.h   |  1 +
 22 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

Avoids fun races in RCU pathwalk... Same goes for freeing LSM shite hanging off super_block's arse.

---
 fs/super.c | 13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

index d35e85295489..d6efeba0d0ce 100644
@@ -274,9 +274,10 @@ static void destroy_super_work(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct super_block *s = container_of(work, struct super_block,
 							destroy_work);
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
+	security_sb_free(s);
+	put_user_ns(s->s_user_ns);
+	kfree(s->s_subtype);
+	for (int i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
 		percpu_free_rwsem(&s->s_writers.rw_sem[i]);
 	kfree(s);
 }

@@ -296,9 +297,6 @@ static void destroy_unused_super(struct super_block *s)
 	super_unlock_excl(s);
 	list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
 	list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
-	security_sb_free(s);
-	put_user_ns(s->s_user_ns);
-	kfree(s->s_subtype);
 	shrinker_free(s->s_shrink);
 	/* no delays needed */
 	destroy_super_work(&s->destroy_work);

@@ -409,9 +407,6 @@ static void __put_super(struct super_block *s)
 		WARN_ON(s->s_dentry_lru.node);
 		WARN_ON(s->s_inode_lru.node);
 		WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
-		security_sb_free(s);
-		put_user_ns(s->s_user_ns);
-		kfree(s->s_subtype);
 		call_rcu(&s->rcu, destroy_super_rcu);
 	}
 }

2.39.2

If lazy call of ->permission() returns a hard error, check that try_to_unlazy() succeeds before returning it. That both makes life easier for ->permission() instances and closes the race in ENOTDIR handling - it is possible that positive d_can_lookup() seen in link_path_walk() applies to the state *after* unlink() + mkdir(), while nd->inode matches the state prior to that.

Normally seeing e.g. EACCES from permission check in rcu pathwalk means that with some timings non-rcu pathwalk would've run into the same; however, running into a non-executable regular file in the middle of a pathname would not get to permission check - it would fail with ENOTDIR instead.

---
 fs/namei.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 4e0de939fea1..9342fa6a38c2 100644
@@ -1717,7 +1717,11 @@ static inline int may_lookup(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 {
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 		int err = inode_permission(idmap, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
-		if (err != -ECHILD || !try_to_unlazy(nd))
+		if (!err)		// success, keep going
+			return 0;
+		if (!try_to_unlazy(nd))
+			return -ECHILD;	// redo it all non-lazy
+		if (err != -ECHILD)	// hard error
 			return err;
 	}
 	return inode_permission(idmap, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);

2.39.2

one of the flags in it is used by ->d_hash()/->d_compare()

---
 fs/affs/affs.h  | 1 +
 fs/affs/super.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 60685ec76d98..2e612834329a 100644
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct affs_sb_info {
 	int work_queued;		/* non-zero delayed work is queued */
 	struct delayed_work sb_work;	/* superblock flush delayed work */
 	spinlock_t work_lock;		/* protects sb_work and work_queued */
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 #define AFFS_MOUNT_SF_INTL		0x0001 /* International filesystem. */

index 58b391446ae1..b56a95cf414a 100644
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static void affs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 		affs_brelse(sbi->s_root_bh);
 		kfree(sbi->s_prefix);
 		mutex_destroy(&sbi->s_bmlock);
-		kfree(sbi);
+		kfree_rcu(sbi, rcu);
 	}
 }
 

2.39.2

That stuff can be accessed by ->d_hash()/->d_compare(); as it is, we have a hard-to-hit UAF if rcu pathwalk manages to get into ->d_hash() on a filesystem that is in process of getting shut down.

Besides, having nls and upcase table cleanup moved from ->put_super() towards the place where sbi is freed makes for simpler failure exits.

---
 fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h |  1 +
 fs/exfat/nls.c      | 14 ++++----------
 fs/exfat/super.c    | 20 +++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

index 9474cd50da6d..361595433480 100644
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ struct exfat_sb_info {
 
 	spinlock_t inode_hash_lock;
 	struct hlist_head inode_hashtable[EXFAT_HASH_SIZE];
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 #define EXFAT_CACHE_VALID	0

index 705710f93e2d..afdf13c34ff5 100644
@@ -655,7 +655,6 @@ static int exfat_load_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb,
 	unsigned int sect_size = sb->s_blocksize;
 	unsigned int i, index = 0;
 	u32 chksum = 0;
-	int ret;
 	unsigned char skip = false;
 	unsigned short *upcase_table;
 

@@ -673,8 +672,7 @@ static int exfat_load_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb,
 		if (!bh) {
 			exfat_err(sb, "failed to read sector(0x%llx)",
 				  (unsigned long long)sector);
-			ret = -EIO;
-			goto free_table;
+			return -EIO;
 		}
 		sector++;
 		for (i = 0; i < sect_size && index <= 0xFFFF; i += 2) {

@@ -701,15 +699,12 @@ static int exfat_load_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb,
 
 	exfat_err(sb, "failed to load upcase table (idx : 0x%08x, chksum : 0x%08x, utbl_chksum : 0x%08x)",
 		  index, chksum, utbl_checksum);
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-free_table:
-	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
-	return ret;
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int exfat_load_default_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	int i, ret = -EIO;
+	int i;
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(sb);
 	unsigned char skip = false;
 	unsigned short uni = 0, *upcase_table;

@@ -740,8 +735,7 @@ static int exfat_load_default_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* FATAL error: default upcase table has error */
-	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
-	return ret;
+	return -EIO;
 }
 
 int exfat_create_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb)

index d9d4fa91010b..fcb658267765 100644
@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@ static void exfat_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 	exfat_free_bitmap(sbi);
 	brelse(sbi->boot_bh);
 	mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
-
-	unload_nls(sbi->nls_io);
-	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
 }
 
 static int exfat_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)

@@ -600,7 +597,7 @@ static int __exfat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb)
 	ret = exfat_load_bitmap(sb);
 	if (ret) {
 		exfat_err(sb, "failed to load alloc-bitmap");
-		goto free_upcase_table;
+		goto free_bh;
 	}
 
 	ret = exfat_count_used_clusters(sb, &sbi->used_clusters);

@@ -613,8 +610,6 @@ static int __exfat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb)
 
 free_alloc_bitmap:
 	exfat_free_bitmap(sbi);
-free_upcase_table:
-	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
 free_bh:
 	brelse(sbi->boot_bh);
 	return ret;

@@ -701,12 +696,10 @@ static int exfat_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 	sb->s_root = NULL;
 
 free_table:
-	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
 	exfat_free_bitmap(sbi);
 	brelse(sbi->boot_bh);
 
 check_nls_io:
-	unload_nls(sbi->nls_io);
 	return err;
 }
 

@@ -771,13 +764,22 @@ static int exfat_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void delayed_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = container_of(p, struct exfat_sb_info, rcu);
+
+	unload_nls(sbi->nls_io);
+	exfat_free_upcase_table(sbi);
+	exfat_free_sbi(sbi);
+}
+
 static void exfat_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = sb->s_fs_info;
 
 	kill_block_super(sb);
 	if (sbi)
-		exfat_free_sbi(sbi);
+		call_rcu(&sbi->rcu, delayed_free);
 }
 
 static struct file_system_type exfat_fs_type = {

2.39.2

->d_hash() and ->d_compare() use those, so we need to delay freeing them.

---
 fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h |  1 +
 fs/hfsplus/super.c      | 12 +++++++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 7ededcb720c1..012a3d003fbe 100644
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {
 	int work_queued;               /* non-zero delayed work is queued */
 	struct delayed_work sync_work; /* FS sync delayed work */
 	spinlock_t work_lock;          /* protects sync_work and work_queued */
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_WRITEBACKUP	0

index 1986b4f18a90..97920202790f 100644
@@ -277,6 +277,14 @@ void hfsplus_mark_mdb_dirty(struct super_block *sb)
 	spin_unlock(&sbi->work_lock);
 }
 
+static void delayed_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = container_of(p, struct hfsplus_sb_info, rcu);
+
+	unload_nls(sbi->nls);
+	kfree(sbi);
+}
+
 static void hfsplus_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(sb);

@@ -302,9 +310,7 @@ static void hfsplus_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 	hfs_btree_close(sbi->ext_tree);
 	kfree(sbi->s_vhdr_buf);
 	kfree(sbi->s_backup_vhdr_buf);
-	unload_nls(sbi->nls);
-	kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
-	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+	call_rcu(&sbi->rcu, delayed_free);
 }
 
 static int hfsplus_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)

2.39.2

In __afs_break_callback() we might check ->cb_nr_mmap and if it's non-zero do queue_work(&vnode->cb_work). In afs_drop_open_mmap() we decrement ->cb_nr_mmap and do flush_work(&vnode->cb_work) if it reaches zero.

The trouble is, there's nothing to prevent __afs_break_callback() from seeing ->cb_nr_mmap before the decrement and do queue_work() after both the decrement and flush_work(). If that happens, we might be in trouble - vnode might get freed before the queued work runs.

__afs_break_callback() is always done under ->cb_lock, so let's make sure that ->cb_nr_mmap can change from non-zero to zero while holding ->cb_lock (the spinlock component of it - it's a seqlock and we don't need to mess with the counter).

---
 fs/afs/file.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 3d33b221d9ca..ef2cc8f565d2 100644
@@ -417,13 +417,17 @@ static void afs_add_open_mmap(struct afs_vnode *vnode)
 
 static void afs_drop_open_mmap(struct afs_vnode *vnode)
 {
-	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&vnode->cb_nr_mmap))
+	if (atomic_add_unless(&vnode->cb_nr_mmap, -1, 1))
 		return;
 
 	down_write(&vnode->volume->open_mmaps_lock);
 
-	if (atomic_read(&vnode->cb_nr_mmap) == 0)
+	read_seqlock_excl(&vnode->cb_lock);
+	// the only place where ->cb_nr_mmap may hit 0
+	// see __afs_break_callback() for the other side...
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&vnode->cb_nr_mmap))
 		list_del_init(&vnode->cb_mmap_link);
+	read_sequnlock_excl(&vnode->cb_lock);
 
 	up_write(&vnode->volume->open_mmaps_lock);
 	flush_work(&vnode->cb_work);

2.39.2

nfs_set_verifier() relies upon dentry being pinned; if that's the case, grabbing ->d_lock stabilizes ->d_parent and guarantees that ->d_parent points to a positive dentry. For something we'd run into in RCU mode that is *not* true - dentry might've been through dentry_kill() just as we grabbed ->d_lock, with its parent going through the same just as we get to into nfs_set_verifier_locked(). It might get to detaching inode (and zeroing ->d_inode) before nfs_set_verifier_locked() gets to fetching that; we get an oops as the result.

That can happen in nfs{,4} ->d_revalidate(); the call chain in question is nfs_set_verifier_locked() <- nfs_set_verifier() <- nfs_lookup_revalidate_delegated() <- nfs{,4}_do_lookup_revalidate(). We have checked that the parent had been positive, but that's done before we get to nfs_set_verifier() and it's possible for memory pressure to pick our dentry as eviction candidate by that time. If that happens, back-to-back attempts to kill dentry and its parent are quite normal. Sure, in case of eviction we'll fail the ->d_seq check in the caller, but we need to survive until we return there...

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index c8ecbe999059..ac505671efbd 100644
@@ -1431,9 +1431,9 @@ static bool nfs_verifier_is_delegated(struct dentry *dentry)
 static void nfs_set_verifier_locked(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned long verf)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
-	struct inode *dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
+	struct inode *dir = d_inode_rcu(dentry->d_parent);
 
-	if (!nfs_verify_change_attribute(dir, verf))
+	if (!dir || !nfs_verify_change_attribute(dir, verf))
 		return;
 	if (inode && NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_READ))
 		nfs_set_verifier_delegated(&verf);

2.39.2

NFS ->d_revalidate(), ->permission() and ->get_link() need to access some parts of nfs_server when called in RCU mode:

	server->flags
	server->caps
	*(server->io_stats)
and, worst of all, call
	server->nfs_client->rpc_ops->have_delegation

(the last one - as NFS_PROTO(inode)->have_delegation()). We really don't want to RCU-delay the entire nfs_free_server() (it would have to be done with schedule_work() from RCU callback, since it can't be made to run from interrupt context), but actual freeing of nfs_server and ->io_stats can be done via call_rcu() just fine. nfs_client part is handled simply by making nfs_free_client() use kfree_rcu().

---
 fs/nfs/client.c           | 13 ++++++++++---
 include/linux/nfs_fs_sb.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 44eca51b2808..fbdc9ca80f71 100644
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ void nfs_free_client(struct nfs_client *clp)
 	put_nfs_version(clp->cl_nfs_mod);
 	kfree(clp->cl_hostname);
 	kfree(clp->cl_acceptor);
-	kfree(clp);
+	kfree_rcu(clp, rcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_free_client);
 

@@ -1006,6 +1006,14 @@ struct nfs_server *nfs_alloc_server(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_alloc_server);
 
+static void delayed_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct nfs_server *server = container_of(p, struct nfs_server, rcu);
+
+	nfs_free_iostats(server->io_stats);
+	kfree(server);
+}
+
 /*
  * Free up a server record
  */

@@ -1031,10 +1039,9 @@ void nfs_free_server(struct nfs_server *server)
 
 	ida_destroy(&server->lockowner_id);
 	ida_destroy(&server->openowner_id);
-	nfs_free_iostats(server->io_stats);
 	put_cred(server->cred);
-	kfree(server);
 	nfs_release_automount_timer();
+	call_rcu(&server->rcu, delayed_free);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_free_server);
 

index cd797e00fe35..92de074e63b9 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct nfs_client {
 	char			cl_ipaddr[48];
 	struct net		*cl_net;
 	struct list_head	pending_cb_stateids;
+	struct rcu_head		rcu;
 };
 
 /*

@@ -265,6 +266,7 @@ struct nfs_server {
 	const struct cred	*cred;
 	bool			has_sec_mnt_opts;
 	struct kobject		kobj;
+	struct rcu_head		rcu;
 };
 
 /* Server capabilities */

2.39.2

that keeps both around until struct inode is freed, making access to them safe from rcu-pathwalk

---
 fs/proc/base.c  |  2 --
 fs/proc/inode.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

index 98a031ac2648..18550c071d71 100644
@@ -1878,8 +1878,6 @@ void proc_pid_evict_inode(struct proc_inode *ei)
 		hlist_del_init_rcu(&ei->sibling_inodes);
 		spin_unlock(&pid->lock);
 	}
-
-	put_pid(pid);
 }
 
 struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,

index b33e490e3fd9..05350f3c2812 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 
 static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	struct proc_dir_entry *de;
 	struct ctl_table_header *head;
 	struct proc_inode *ei = PROC_I(inode);
 

@@ -38,17 +37,8 @@ static void proc_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	clear_inode(inode);
 
 	/* Stop tracking associated processes */
-	if (ei->pid) {
+	if (ei->pid)
 		proc_pid_evict_inode(ei);
-		ei->pid = NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* Let go of any associated proc directory entry */
-	de = ei->pde;
-	if (de) {
-		pde_put(de);
-		ei->pde = NULL;
-	}
 
 	head = ei->sysctl;
 	if (head) {

@@ -80,6 +70,13 @@ static struct inode *proc_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
 
 static void proc_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	struct proc_inode *ei = PROC_I(inode);
+
+	if (ei->pid)
+		put_pid(ei->pid);
+	/* Let go of any associated proc directory entry */
+	if (ei->pde)
+		pde_put(ei->pde);
 	kmem_cache_free(proc_inode_cachep, PROC_I(inode));
 }
 

2.39.2

makes proc_pid_ns() safe from rcu pathwalk (put_pid_ns() is still synchronous, but that's not a problem - it does rcu-delay everything that needs to be)

---
 fs/proc/root.c          | 2 +-
 include/linux/proc_fs.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index b55dbc70287b..06a297a27ba3 100644
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	kill_anon_super(sb);
 	put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
-	kfree(fs_info);
+	kfree_rcu(fs_info, rcu);
 }
 
 static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {

index de407e7c3b55..0b2a89854440 100644
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct proc_fs_info {
 	kgid_t pid_gid;
 	enum proc_hidepid hide_pid;
 	enum proc_pidonly pidonly;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 static inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb_info(struct super_block *sb)

2.39.2

->permission(), ->get_link() and ->inode_get_acl() might dereference ->s_fs_info (and, in case of ->permission(), ->s_fs_info->fc->user_ns as well) when called from rcu pathwalk.

Freeing ->s_fs_info->fc is rcu-delayed; we need to make freeing ->s_fs_info and dropping ->user_ns rcu-delayed too.

---
 fs/fuse/cuse.c   |  3 +--
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |  1 +
 fs/fuse/inode.c  | 15 +++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index 91e89e68177e..b6cad106c37e 100644
@@ -474,8 +474,7 @@ static int cuse_send_init(struct cuse_conn *cc)
 
 static void cuse_fc_release(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 {
-	struct cuse_conn *cc = fc_to_cc(fc);
-	kfree_rcu(cc, fc.rcu);
+	kfree(fc_to_cc(fc));
 }
 
 /**

index 1df83eebda92..bcbe34488862 100644
@@ -888,6 +888,7 @@ struct fuse_mount {
 
 	/* Entry on fc->mounts */
 	struct list_head fc_entry;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 static inline struct fuse_mount *get_fuse_mount_super(struct super_block *sb)

index 2a6d44f91729..516ea2979a90 100644
@@ -930,6 +930,14 @@ void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_mount *fm,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_init);
 
+static void delayed_release(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct fuse_conn *fc = container_of(p, struct fuse_conn, rcu);
+
+	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
+	fc->release(fc);
+}
+
 void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 {
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&fc->count)) {

@@ -941,13 +949,12 @@ void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 		if (fiq->ops->release)
 			fiq->ops->release(fiq);
 		put_pid_ns(fc->pid_ns);
-		put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
 		bucket = rcu_dereference_protected(fc->curr_bucket, 1);
 		if (bucket) {
 			WARN_ON(atomic_read(&bucket->count) != 1);
 			kfree(bucket);
 		}
-		fc->release(fc);
+		call_rcu(&fc->rcu, delayed_release);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_put);

@@ -1366,7 +1373,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_send_init);
 void fuse_free_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 {
 	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fc->devices));
-	kfree_rcu(fc, rcu);
+	kfree(fc);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_free_conn);
 

@@ -1902,7 +1909,7 @@ static void fuse_sb_destroy(struct super_block *sb)
 void fuse_mount_destroy(struct fuse_mount *fm)
 {
 	fuse_conn_put(fm->fc);
-	kfree(fm);
+	kfree_rcu(fm, rcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fuse_mount_destroy);
 

2.39.2

Miklos,

FYI, this is now merged and conflicts with:

dc076c73b9f9 ("fuse: implement ioctls to manage backing files")

from fuse/for-next:

--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@@ -1373,7 -1398,9 +1405,13 @@@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_send_init)
void fuse_free_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc)

  {
        WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fc->devices));

++<<<<<<< HEAD
+ kfree(fc);
++=======
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH))
+ fuse_backing_files_free(fc);
+ kfree_rcu(fc, rcu);
++>>>>>>> fuse/for-next
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_free_conn);

Note that fuse_backing_files_free() calls fuse_backing_id_free() => fuse_backing_free() => kfree_rcu()

Should we move fuse_backing_files_free() into
fuse_conn_put() above fuse_dax_conn_free()?

That will avoid the merge conflict and still be correct. no?

Thanks,
Amir.

Looks like a good cleanup.

Force-pushed to fuse.git#for-next.

Thanks,
Miklos

FYI, the version that you pushed will generate a minor conflict with

                }
-               fc->release(fc);
+               call_rcu(&fc->rcu, delayed_release);
        }

}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_conn_put);

If you move fuse_backing_files_free() to the start of the function, I think merge conflict will be avoided:

void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc)

 {
        if (refcount_dec_and_test(&fc->count)) {
                struct fuse_iqueue *fiq = &fc->iq;
                struct fuse_sync_bucket *bucket;

+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH))

+                       fuse_backing_files_free(fc);
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUSE_DAX))
                        fuse_dax_conn_free(fc);

Thanks,
Amir.

Yeah, but I don't think it's worth messing with this just to avoid a conflict.

Thanks,
Miklos

->d_revalidate() bails out there, anyway. It's not enough to prevent getting into ->get_link() in RCU mode, but that could happen only in a very contrieved setup. Not worth trying to do anything fancy here unless ->d_revalidate() stops kicking out of RCU mode at least in some cases.

---
 fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

index e902de4e475a..630e74628dfe 100644
@@ -1172,6 +1172,9 @@ const char *cifs_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	char *target_path;
 
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
 	target_path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!target_path)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

2.39.2

I may be missing some additional change or proposed future change - but it looks like the patch to add check for null dentry in cifs_get_link causes
an extra call to cifs_get_link in pick_link() (in namei.c - see below), so would be slightly slower than leaving code as is in cifs_get_link

                if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
                        res = get(NULL, inode, &last->done);
                        if (res == ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) && try_to_unlazy(nd))
                                res = get(link->dentry, inode, &last->done);

cifs.ko doesn't use or check the dentry in cifs_get_link since the symlink target is stored in the cifs inode, not accessed via the dentry, so wasn't clear to me
from the patch description why we would care if dentry is null in cifs_get_link()

Thanks,

Steve

The very first thing you do in there is a GFP_KERNEL allocation. You can't do that under rcu_read_lock(), for obvious reasons.

So if you ever get there (and it takes a somewhat convoluted setup - you need to bind a cifs symlink over a file on a local filesystem), you need to
* carefully grab references to all dentries involved,
verify that they are still valid, etc.
* drop rcu_read_lock()
before you can get on with fetching the symlink target.

That's precisely what try_to_unlazy() in the fragment you've quoted is doing.

NULL dentry argument passed to ->get_link() is the way it is told that we are in RCU pathwalk mode; anyone who can't handle that should just return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) and be done with that. The caller will switch to the non-RCU mode (with references pinned, etc.) and call again.

*IF* you can tell the symlink body without blocking (e.g. you have some cached information from the last time you've asked the server and have reasons to trust it to be still valid), sure, you can return it without dropping out of RCU mode.

It would be fairly useless for CIFS, since ->d_revalidate() of CIFS dentries would reject RCU mode anyway. That's what normally saves you from having ->get_link() called that way, but it's not guaranteed - there are convoluted setups that avoid having ->d_revalidate() called first.

See the description of RCU mode filesystem exposure in the last posting in this thread for more details.

PS: if you decide to go for handling RCU pathwalk mode in CIFS, you definitely want to read the first half of
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20240204022743.GI2087318@ZenIV/
or whatever it eventually turns into. It obviously needs quite a bit of massage before it starts to resemble proper docs - currently it's just the summary I'd put together while going through the audit: which methods are exposed, how can they tell, what is and what is not guaranteed for them, etc., with a bit of "why does VFS bother with something that unpleasant" thrown into the mix as an explanation.

Any assistance with turning that into a coherent text would be very welcome - I think that description of RCU pathwalk regarding its impact on the filesystems would be useful.

1) errors from ext4_getblk() should not be propagated to caller unless we are really sure that we would've gotten the same error in non-RCU pathwalk.
2) we leak buffer_heads if ext4_getblk() is successful, but bh is not uptodate.

---
 fs/ext4/symlink.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 75bf1f88843c..645240cc0229 100644
@@ -92,10 +92,12 @@ static const char *ext4_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 
 	if (!dentry) {
 		bh = ext4_getblk(NULL, inode, 0, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT);
-		if (IS_ERR(bh))
-			return ERR_CAST(bh);
-		if (!bh || !ext4_buffer_uptodate(bh))
+		if (IS_ERR(bh) || !bh)
 			return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+		if (!ext4_buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
+			brelse(bh);
+			return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+		}
 	} else {
 		bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, 0, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(bh))

2.39.2

Hah, I once had the same patch for the userns bit because I was wondering about that,

(Independent of whether or not this is pretty the s_user_ns should probably be a separate type so it can't be confused with other namespaces when checking permissions. Maybe I should respin my series for that if I find the time.)

Below are my notes from that code audit; a part of that would probably be useful for filesystem maintainers - right now it's between the braindump and usable documentation. If anyone finds it useful - great; if somebody helps with turning that into proper documentation - even better.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRELIMINARY NOTE: it is possible for a lazy pathwalk to run into a dentry on a filesystem that is getting shut down. Here's how:
* have two threads sharing fs_struct chdir'ed on that filesystem.
* lazy-umount it, so that the only thing holding it alive is
cwd of these threads.
* one of the threads does relative pathname resolution
and gets to e.g. ->d_hash(). It's holding rcu_read_lock().
* at the same time another thread does fchdir(), moving to
different directory. set_fs_pwd() flips to the new place and does mntput() on the old one. No RCU delays here, we calculate the refcount of that mount and see that we are dropping the last reference. We make sure that the first thread will fail when it comes to legitimize_mnt() and do this:

			init_task_work(&mnt->mnt_rcu, __cleanup_mnt);
			if (!task_work_add(task, &mnt->mnt_rcu, TWA_RESUME))
				return;

As we leave the syscall, we have __cleanup_mnt() run; it calls cleanup_mnt() on our mount, which hits deactivate_super(). That was the last reference to superblock.

Voila - we have a filesystem shutdown right under the nose of
a thread running in ->d_hash() of something on that filesystem.
Mutatis mutandis, one can arrange the same for other methods
called by rcu pathwalk.

It's not easy to hit (especially if you want to get through the
entire ->kill_sb() before the first thread gets through ->d_hash()), and it's probably impossible on the real hardware; on KVM it might be borderline doable. However, it is possible and I would not swear that other ways of arranging the same thing are equally hard to hit.

The bottom line: methods that can be called in RCU mode need to
be careful about the per-superblock objects destruction. [end of note]

Exposure of filesystem code to lockless environment, or
the ways in which RCU pathwalk may fuck filesystem maintainer over.

Filesystem methods can usually count upon VFS-provided warranties
regarding the stability of objects they are called to act upon; at the very least, they can expect the dentries/inodes/superblocks involved to remain live throughout the operation.

Life would be much more painful without that; however, such
warranties do not come for free. The problem is that access patterns are heavily biased; every system call getting an absolute pathname will have to start at root directory, etc. Having each of them in effect write "I'd been here" on the same memory objects would cost quite a bit. As the result, we try to keep the fast path stores-free, bumping no
refcounts and taking no locks. Details are described elsewhere, but the
bottom line for filesystems is that some methods may be called with much looser warranties than usual. Of course, from the filesystem POV each of those is a potential source of headache - you are asked to operate on an object that might start to be torn down right under you, possibly along with the filesystem instance it lives on.

The list of the methods that could run into that fun:

method | indication that the call is unsafe | unstable objects
->d_hash(d, ...) | none - any call might be | d
->d_compare(d, ...) | none - any call might be | d
->d_revalidate(d, f) | f & LOOKUP_RCU | d
->d_manage(d, f) | f | d
->permission(i, m) | m & MAY_NOT_BLOCK | i
->get_link(d, i, ...) | d == NULL | i
->get_inode_acl(i, t, f)| f == LOOKUP_RCU | i

Additionally, callback set by set_delayed_call() from unsafe call of
->get_link() will be run in the same environment; that one is usually not a problem, though.

For the sake of completeness, three of LSM methods
(->inode_permission(), ->inode_follow_link() and ->task_to_inode()) might be called in similar environment, but that's a problem for LSM crowd, not for filesystem folks.

Any method call is, of course, required not to crash - no stepping on
freed memory, etc. All of the unsafe calls listed above are done under rcu_read_lock(), so they are not allowed to block. Further requirements vary between the methods.

Before going through the list of affected methods, several notes on
the things that _are_ guaranteed:
* if a reference to struct dentry is passed to such call, it will
not be freed until the method returns. The same goes for a reference to
struct inode and to struct super_block pointed to by ->d_sb or ->i_sb members of dentry and inode resp. Any of those might be in process of being torn down or enter such state right under us; the entire point of those unsafe calls is that we make them without telling anyone they'd need to wait for us.
* following ->d_parent and ->d_inode of such dentries is fine,
provided that it's done by READ_ONCE() (for ->d_inode the preferred form is d_inode_rcu(dentry)). The value of ->d_parent is never going to be NULL and it will again point to a struct dentry that will not be freed until the method call finishes. The value of ->d_inode might be NULL; if non-NULL, it'll be pointing to a struct inode that will not be freed until the method call finishes.
* none of the inodes passed to an unsafe call could have reached
fs/inode.c:evict() before the caller grabbed rcu_read_lock().
* for inodes 'not freed' means 'not entered ->free_inode()', so
anything that won't be destroyed until ->free_inode() is safe to access. Anything synchronously destroyed in ->evict_inode() or ->destroy_inode() is not safe; however, one can count upon the call_rcu() callbacks issued in those yet to be entered. Note that unlike dentries and superblocks, inodes are embedded into filesystem-private objects; anything stored directly in the containing object is safe to access.
* for dentries anything destroyed by ->d_prune() (synchronously or
not) is not safe; the same goes for the things synchronously destroyed by ->d_release(). However, call_rcu() callbacks issued in ->d_release() are yet to be entered.
* for superblocks we can count upon call_rcu() callbacks issued
from inside the ->kill_sb() (including the ones issued from ->put_super()) yet to be entered.
* NOTE: we can not count upon the things like ->d_parent
being positive (or a directory); a race with rename()+rmdir()+mknod() and you might find a FIFO as parent's inode. NULL is even easier - just have the dentry *and* its ex-parent already past dentry_kill() (which is a normal situation for eviction on memory pressure) and there you go. Normally such pathologies are prevented by the locking (and dentry refcounting), but... the entire point of that stuff is to avoid informing anyone that we are there, so those mechanisms are bypassed. What's more, if dentry is not pinned by refcount, grabbing its ->d_lock will *not* suffice to prevent that kind of mess - the scenario with eviction by memory pressure won't be prevented by that; you might have grabbed ->d_lock only after the dentry_kill() had released it, and at that point ->d_parent still points to what used to be the parent, but there's nothing to prevent its eviction.
* [with fix in this series] for superblocks we can count
upon ->s_user_ns still being pinned and ->s_security have not been freed yet.

	1. ->d_compare().

	For ->d_compare() we just need to make sure it won't crash

when called for dying dentry - an incorrect return value won't harm the caller in such case. False positives and false negatives alike - the callers take care of that. To be pedantic, make that "false positives do not cause problems unless they have ->d_manage()", but ->d_manage() is present only on autofs and there's no autofs ->d_compare() instances.

[[ footnote:
Some callers prevent being called for dying dentry (holding
->d_lock and having verified !d_unhashed() or finding it in the list of inode's aliases under ->i_lock). For those the scenario in question simply cannot arise.
Some follow the match with lockref_get_not_dead() and treat
the failure as mismatch. That takes care of false positives, and false negatives on dying dentry are still correct - we simply pretend to have lost the race.
The only caller that does not fit into the classes above is
__d_lookup_rcu_op_compare(). There we sample ->d_seq and verify !d_unhashed() before calling ->d_compare(). That is not enough to prevent dentry from starting to die right under us; however, the sampled value of ->d_seq will be rechecked when the caller gets to step_into(), so for a false positive we will end up with a mismatch. The corner case around ->d_manage() is due to the handle_mounts() done before step_into() gets to ->d_seq validation...
]]

	There is no indication that ->d_compare() is called in RCU mode;

the majority of callers are such, anyway, so we need to cope with that. VFS guarantees that dentry won't be freed under us; the same goes for the superblock pointed to by its ->d_sb. Name points to memory object that won't get freed under us and length does not exceed the size of that object. The contents of that object is *NOT* guaranteed to be stable; d_move() might race with us, modifying the name. However, in that case we are free to return an arbitrary result - the callers will take care of both false positives and false negatives in such case. The name we are comparing dentry with (passed in qstr) is stable, thankfully...

If we need to access any other data, it's up to the filesystem
to protect it. In practice it means that destruction of fs-private part of superblock (and possibly unicode tables hanging off it, etc.) might need to be RCU-delayed.

*IF* you want the behaviour that varies depending upon the parent
directory, you get to be very careful with READ_ONCE() and watch out for the object lifetimes.

Basically, if the things get that tricky, ask for help.
Currently there are two such instances in the tree - proc_sys_compare() and generic_ci_d_compare(). Both are... special.

	2. ->d_hash().

	For ->d_hash() on a dying dentry we are free to report any hash

value; the only extra requirement is that we should not return stray hard errors. In other words, if we return anything other than 0 or -ECHILD, we'd better make sure that this error would've been correct before the parent started dying. Since ->d_hash() error-reporting is usually done to reject unacceptable names (too long, contain unsuitable characters for this filesystem, etc.), that's really not a problem - hard errors depend only upon the name, not the parent.

Again, VFS guarantees that freeing of dentry and of the superblock
pointed to by dentry->d_sb won't happen under us. The name passed to us (in qstr) is stable. If you need anything beyond that, you are in the same situation as with ->d_compare(). Might want to RCU-delay freeing private part of superblock (if that's what we need to access), might want the same for some objects hanging off that (unicode tables, etc.). If you need something beyond that - ask for help.

3. ->d_revalidate().

For this one we do have an indication of call being unsafe -
flags & LOOKUP_RCU. With ->d_revalidate we are always allowed to bail out and return -ECHILD; that will have the caller drop out of RCU mode. We definitely need to do that if revalidate would require any kind of IO, mutex-taking, etc.; we can't block in RCU mode.

	Quite a few instances of ->d_revalidate() simply treat LOOKUP_RCU

in flags as "return -ECHILD and be done with that"; it's guaranteed to do the right thing, but you lose the benefits of RCU pathwalks whenever you run into such dentry.

Same as with the previous methods, we are guaranteed that
dentry and dentry->d_sb won't be freed under us. We are also guaranteed that ->d_parent (which is *not* stable, so use READ_ONCE) points to a struct dentry that won't get freed under us. As always with ->d_parent, it's not NULL - for a detached dentry it will point to dentry itself. d_inode_rcu() of dentry and its parent will be either NULL or will
point to a struct inode that won't get freed under us. Anything beyond
than that is not guaranteed. We may find parent to be negative - it can happen if we race with d_move() and removal of old parent. In that case just return -ECHILD and be done with that.

On non-RCU side you could use dget_parent() instead - that
would give a positive dentry and its ->d_inode would remain stable. dget_parent() has to be paired with dput(), though, so it's not usable in RCU mode.

If you need fs-private objects associated with dentry, its parent
inode(s) or superblock - see the general notes above on how to access those.

4. ->d_manage()

Can be called in RCU mode; gets an argument telling it if it has
been called so. Pretty much autofs-only; for everyone's sanity sake, don't inflict more of those on the kernel. Definitely don't do that without asking first...

5. ->permission()

Can be called in RCU mode; that is indicated by MAY_NOT_BLOCK
in mask, and it can only happen for MAY_EXEC checks on directories. In RCU mode it is not allowed to block, and it is allowed to bail out by returning -ECHILD. It might be called for an inode that is getting
torn down, possibly along with its filesystem. Errors other than -ECHILD
should only be returned if they would've been returned in non-RCU mode; several instances in procfs currently (6.5) run afoul of that one. That's an instructive example, BTW - what happens is that proc_pid_permission() uses proc_get_task() to find the relevant process. proc_get_task() uses PID reference stored in struct proc_inode our inode is embedded into; inode can't have been freed yet, so fetching ->pid member in that is safe. However, using the value you've fetched is a different story
- proc_evict_inode() would have passed it to put_pid() and replaced it with NULL. Unsafe caller has no way to tell if that is happening right under it. Solution: stop zeroing ->pid in proc_evict_inode() and move put_pid() from proc_pid_evict_inode() to proc_free_inode(). That's not all that is needed (there's access to procfs-private part of superblock as well), but it does make a good example of how such stuff can be dealt with.

Note that idmap argument is safe on all calls - its destruction
is rcu-delayed.

The amount of headache is seriously reduced (for now) by the fact
that a lot of instances boil down to generic_permission() (which will do the right thing in RCU mode) when mask is MAY_EXEC | MAY_NOT_BLOCK. If we ever extend RCU mode to other ->permission() callers, the thing will get interesting; that's not likely to happen, though, unless access(2) goes there [this is NOT a suggestion, folks].

6. ->get_link()

Again, this can be called in RCU mode. Even if your
->d_revalidate() always returns -ECHILD in RCU mode and kicks the pathwalk out of it, you can't assume that ->get_link() won't be reached; binding a symlink on a regular file on another filesystem is possible
and that's all it takes for RCU pathwalk to get there. NULL dentry
argument is an indicator of unsafe call; if you can't handle it, just return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD). Any allocations you need to do (and with this method you really might need that) should be done with GFP_ATOMIC in the unsafe case.

Whatever you pass to set_delayed_call() is going to be called
in the same mode as ->get_link() itself; not a problem for most of the instances. The string you return needs to stay there until the callback gets called or, if no callback is set, until at least the freeing of inode. As usual, for an unsafe call the inode might be in process of teardown, possibly along with the hosting filesystem. The usual considerations apply. The same, BTW, applies to whatever you set in ->i_link - it must stay around at least until ->free_inode().

7. ->get_inode_acl()

Very limited exposure for that one - unsafe call is possible
only if you explicitly set ACL_DONT_CACHE as cached ACL value. Only two filesystems (fuse and overlayfs) even bother. Unsafe call is indicated by explicit flag (the third argument of the method), bailout is done by returning ERR_PTR(-CHILD) and the usual considerations apply for any access to data structures you might need to do.

List of potentially relevant instances:

d_hash:
adfs_hash()
safe; dereferences ->s_fs_info, which is freed by kfree_rcu() from ->put_super(). All errors are directory-independent.
affs_hash_dentry()
UAF; checks a bit in object referenced to by ->s_fs_info ->s_fs_info is freed (synchronously) by ->kill_sb().
Fixed by switch to kfree_rcu() ("affs: free affs_sb_info with kfree_rcu()") All errors are directory-independent.
affs_intl_hash_dentry()
same as affs_hash_dentry() above.
cifs_ci_hash()
safe; uses ->s_fs_info->local_nls.
->s_fs_info is freed from delayed_free(), via call_rcu() from cifs_umount() from ->kill_sb(). ->local_nls is dropped in the same place.
All errors are directory-independent.
efivarfs_d_hash()
safe - no access to fs objects.
All errors are directory-independent.
exfat_d_hash()
UAF; uses ->s_fs_info->nls_io and ->s_fs_info->vol_utbl. ->s_fs_info and ->vol_utbl are freed (synchronously) from ->kill_sb(). ->nls_io is dropped (also synchronously)
from ->put_super(). All errors are directory-independent. Fixed by moving freeing all that stuff into a rcu-delayed helper called from ->kill_sb() ("exfat: move freeing sbi, upcase table and dropping nls into rcu-delayed helper").
exfat_utf8_d_hash()
UAF; similar to exfat_d_hash(), except that ->nls_io is not used. Fix of exfat_d_hash() covers that one.
generic_ci_d_hash()
safe; probably would be more idiomatic to use d_inode_rcu() in there...
gfs2_dhash()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
hfs_hash_dentry()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
hfsplus_hash_dentry()
UAF (and oops); access to ->s_fs_info->nls. Dropped and freed (and ->s_fs_info zeroed) in ->put_super(). Fixed by making their destruction rcu-delayed ("hfsplus: switch to rcu-delayed unloading of nls and freeing ->s_fs_info"). Might be worth moving that from ->put_super() to ->kill_sb(), but that's a separate story... All errors are directory-independent.
hpfs_hash_dentry()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
isofs_hashi()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
isofs_hashi_ms()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
isofs_hash_ms()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
jfs_ci_hash()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
msdos_hash()
safe - dereferences ->s_fs_info, freeing is rcu-delayed
(in delayed_free(), from ->put_super()).
All errors are directory-independent.
vfat_hash()
safe - no access to fs objects.
No errors at all.
vfat_hashi()
safe - uses ->s_fs_info->nls_io, freeing and unloading
is rcu-delayed (in delayed_free(), from ->put_super()).
No errors at all.
ntfs_d_hash()
fucked in head - blocking allocations, UAF, etc.
Not touching that one, sorry.

d_compare:
adfs_compare()
safe - no fs objects accessed
affs_compare_dentry()
same as affs_hash_dentry(), fixed by the same patch
affs_intl_compare_dentry()
same as affs_hash_dentry(), fixed by the same patch
cifs_ci_compare()
safe; uses ->s_fs_info->local_nls.
->s_fs_info is freed from delayed_free(), via call_rcu() from cifs_umount() from ->kill_sb(). ->local_nls is dropped in the same place.
efivarfs_d_compare()
safe - no access to fs objects.
exfat_d_cmp()
UAF; similar to exfat_d_hash(), fixed by the same patch
exfat_utf8_d_cmp()
UAF; similar to exfat_utf8_d_hash(), fixed by the same patch
generic_ci_d_compare()
safe, even though it's a really scary one.
hfs_compare_dentry()
safe - no access to fs objects.
hfsplus_compare_dentry()
UAF; similar to hfsplus_hash_dentry(), fixed by the same patch
hpfs_compare_dentry()
safe - uses ->s_fs_info->sb_cp_table; freeing is rcu-delayed (in lazy_free_sbi(), from hpfs_put_super().
isofs_dentry_cmpi()
safe - no access to fs objects.
isofs_dentry_cmpi_ms()
safe - no access to fs objects.
isofs_dentry_cmp_ms()
safe - no access to fs objects.
jfs_ci_compare()
safe - no access to fs objects.
msdos_cmp()
safe - dereferences ->s_fs_info, freeing is rcu-delayed (in delayed_free(), from ->put_super()).
proc_sys_compare()
safe - access of ->sysctl of containing proc_inode, with barriers provided by rcu_dereference() and protection against the case it had already been zeroed. Freeing of the object it points to is rcu-delayed (kfree_rcu() from ->evict_inode()).
vfat_cmp()
safe - no access to fs objects.
vfat_cmpi()
safe - uses ->s_fs_info->nls_io, freeing and unloading is rcu-delayed (in delayed_free(), from ->put_super()).
ntfs_d_compare()
fucked in head - blocking allocations, UAF, etc. Not touching that one, sorry.

d_revalidate:
afs_d_revalidate()
race - we might end up doing __afs_break_callback() there, and it could race with afs_drop_open_mmap(), leading to stray queued work on object that might be about to be freed, with nothing to flush or cancel the sucker. Fixed by making sure that afs_drop_open_mmap()
will only do the final decrement while under ->cb_lock; since the entire __afs_break_callback() is done under the same, it will either see zero mmap count and do nothing, or it will finish queue_work() before afs_drop_open_mmap() gets to its flush_work() ("afs: fix __afs_break_callback() / afs_drop_open_mmap() race").
afs_dynroot_d_revalidate()
safe - no access to fs objects, no errors.
Probably no point keeping it...
cifs_d_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
coda_dentry_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ecryptfs_d_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
exfat_d_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
fscrypt_d_revalidate()
safe - accesses dentry, then either accesses no fs objects, or bails out in unsafe case
fuse_dentry_revalidate()
safe - fetches ->d_inode (safely), then accesses fields of dentry and of the structure inode is embedded into. In 32bit case we also dereference ->d_fsdata, but there its freeing is done by kfree_rcu() from ->d_release(), which means that it won't be freed until we drop rcu_read_lock(). Probably needs cleaning its control flow, but that's a separate story...
gfs2_drevalidate()
buggered. Used to bail out in unsafe case, now it will go and do blocking IO. Revert; proposed fixes still don't deal with everything - they treat "can't do it in RCU mode" as "invalid", not "unlazy and repeat". [Reverted in mainline now]
hfs_revalidate_dentry()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
jfs_ci_revalidate()
safe - accesses dentry, then no access to fs objects.
kernfs_dop_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
map_files_d_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
nfs4_lookup_revalidate()
oops - nfs_set_verifier() makes an assumption that having grabbed ->d_lock is enough to keep dentry's parent positive. That's only true if dentry is pinned down... Fixed by rechecking parent's ->d_inode in there ("nfs: make nfs_set_verifier() safe for use in RCU pathwalk"). Also a UAF - we dereference ->s_fs_info, and that's freed synchronously in ->kill_sb(). The same goes for ->s_fs_info->io_stats (ditto) and, worse yet, for ->s_fs_info->nfs_client->rpc_ops. nfs_client might get freed synchronously, if our superblock is holding the last reference, and this is not just a use-after-free - it's chasing pointers through the freed structure, so we might end up dereferencing an address that had never been mapped/is in iomem/whatnot. What's more, after we get to rpc_ops, we fetch a function pointer from there and call it... Fixed by RCU-delaying the actual freeing of objects in question (" nfs: fix UAF on pathwalk running into umount").
nfs_lookup_revalidate()
same story as with nfs4_lookup_revalidate().
ocfs2_dentry_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
orangefs_d_revalidate()
safe - accesses dentry, then either accesses no fs objects, or bails out in unsafe case
ovl_dentry_revalidate()
Safe. Access to dentry, verifying that it's positive, then walking through the ovl_entry for associated inode (freeing of which is RCU-delayed) and calling ->d_revalidate() on all components (dput() is _not_ RCU-delayed, but it isn't initiated until the inode refcount reaches zero, so we are essentially in the same conditions as with RCU calls of >d_revalidate() - refcounts of dentries in question are not reached until after our rcu_read_lock() done by path_init(). _WAY_ too subtle, IMO - it relies upon DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE being turned off for negative dentries, so it can run into a negative only in RCU mode (in non-RCU we are holding a reference, so positive would've stayed positive). In that case we must've had successful unlink or rmdir and both would've unhashed the sucker, so legitimization would fail. _Ouch_.
pid_revalidate()
UAF; uses proc_pid(); not safe, since it's dropped in ->evict_inode(). Fixed by dropping it in ->free_inode() instead ("procfs: move dropping pde and pid from ->evict_inode() to ->free_inode()". It also might access LSM shite associated with inode; safe, AFAICS, in both LSM flavours that care about ->task_to_inode() hook.
proc_misc_d_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case.
Incidentally, it wouldn't take much to make it work unsafe case - by the end of the series we would have everything we need for that...
proc_net_d_revalidate()
safe - no access to fs objects
proc_sys_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
tid_fd_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
v9fs_lookup_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
vboxsf_dentry_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case.
vfat_revalidate()
safe - bails out in unsafe case.
vfat_revalidate_ci()
safe - bails out in unsafe case.
xattr_hide_revalidate
safe - no access to fs objects
ceph_d_revalidate()
broken - races on fs shutdown, AFAICS, and with that one I'm not familiar enough with the codebase, so
I'd rather leave that to ceph maintainers...
Lifetime of ceph_mds_client, etc.

d_manage:
autofs_d_manage()
safe; accesses fs-private objects associated with dentry and with superblock (freeing either is rcu-delayed). The only non-obvious part is the call of autofs_oz_mode(), which looks like it might try to compare task_pgrp(current) with potentially dangling pointer; however, it only becomes dangling after ->kill_sb() had called autofs_catatonic_mode(), at which point we want autofs_oz_mode() to return true, same PGRP or not. IOW, potential false positives on struct pid reuse are not false at all.

permission: [reordered with the default instance put in front]
generic_permission()
safe; accesses fields of struct inode, relies upon the rcu-delayed freeing of cached acls. Bails out if an unsafe call would have to extract acls from filesystem (with narrow exception used by fuse and overlayfs).
afs_permission()
same race as in afs_d_revalidate(), same fix
autofs_dir_permission()
safe - boils down to generic_permission() if no MAY_WRITE is given. Even with MAY_WRITE it would be safe - it accesses ->s_fs_data in that case, but that gets freed with kfree_rcu()...
bad_inode_permission()
safe - no access to filesystem objects
btrfs_permission()
safe - boils down to generic_permission() if no MAY_WRITE is given. With MAY_WRITE it would boil down to access to btrfs_root; no idea where does that get freed.
ceph_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
cifs_permission()
safe - derefences ->s_fs_info, then possibly does generic_permission(). see above (cifs_ci_hash() entry) for the reasons that's safe.
coda_ioctl_permission()
safe - no access to filesystem objects
coda_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ecryptfs_permission()
safe - it fetches ->wii_inode of containing ecryptfs_inode_info, then passes it to inode_permission(). Note that this call of inode_permission() is itself unsafe; the inode passed to it might be getting torn down. However, the reference held in ecryptfs_inode_info does contribute to inode refcount and it is not dropped until
ecryptfs_evict_inode(). IOW, that inode must have had
a positive refcount at some point after the caller had grabbed rcu_read_lock().
fuse_permission()
UAF; accesses ->s_fs_info->fc, and ->s_fs_info
points to struct fuse_mount which gets freed synchronously by fuse_mount_destroy(), from
the end of ->kill_sb(). It proceeds to accessing
->fc, but that part is safe - ->fc freeing is
done via kfree_rcu() (called via ->fc->release())
after the refcount of ->fc drops to zero.
That can't happen until the call of fuse_conn_put()
(from fuse_mount_destroy() from ->kill_sb()), so anything rcu-delayed from there won't get freed until the end of rcu pathwalk.

Unfortunately, we also dereference fc->user_ns (pass it to current_in_userns). That gets dropped via put_user_ns() (non-rcu-delayed) from the final fuse_conn_put() and it needs to be delayed.

Solution: make freeing in ->release() synchronous and do call_rcu(delayed_release, &fc->rcu), with delayed_release() doing put_user_ns() and calling ->release() ("fuse: fix UAF in rcu pathwalks").

In case of MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR it would blow up in rcu mode; thankfully, we are not calling it that way.
gfs2_permission()
currently safe, with breakage reverted.
carefully dereferences ->ip_gl of containing gfs2_inode, bails out if NULL. Freeing of the object being accessed is rcu-delayed, and past that point it either bails
out or does generic_permission().
hostfs_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
kernfs_iop_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
nfs_permission()
same UAF as for nfs4_lookup_revalidate(), same fix
NB: might make sense to tell nfs_revalidate_inode() that we are in non-blocking mode and have it bail out with -ECHILD if it's about to talk to server; then bailout at
out_notsup: would go away.
nilfs_permission()
safe - boils down to generic_permission() if no MAY_WRITE is given. IF we want to support MAY_WRITE|MAY_NOT_BLOCK, it becomes more interesting. We dereference a pointer (->i_root) in nilfs object inode is embedded into. Probably would be enough to rcu-delay freeing nilfs_root - just the kfree() -> kfree_rcu() in nilfs_put_root().
ocfs2_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
orangefs_permission()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ovl_permission()
safe. Accesses the object inode is embedded into, dereferences a pointer to ovl_entry (->oe) in that object, accesses inodes and dentries found in ovl_entry. Freeing of ->oe is done from ->free_inode(), i.e. past an RCU delay; dropping dentry references in it happens from ->destroy_inode(), which couldn't have happened before we'd grabbed rcu_read_lock(), so wrt the dentries we are in the same situation as for anything found during the pathwalk - they might be going down, but they couldn't have started to do so until after our rcu_read_lock(). We dereference ->layer pointer picked from oe and pick struct mount reference from there; safe, since the object it points to is taken apart in ovl_free_fs(), after ovl_free_fs() has called kern_unmount_array(), with its RCU delay. Probably worth a comment - it's fairly subtle.
Call of generic_permission() is safe, as usual.
We also access ->creator_cred in fs-private part of superblock; that gets dropped from ovl_free_fs(),
again, after the call of kern_unmount_array().
proc_fd_permission()
UAF; same story as with pid_revalidate(), same fix
proc_pid_permission()
UAF; same as with pid_revalidate() + use of
->s_fs_info, which is freed synchronously from ->kill_sb(); to fix that part, make freeing ->s_fs_info
rcu-delayed. Dropping pidns doesn't need
to be rcu-delayed - it's already careful enough.
Fixed in "procfs: make freeing proc_fs_info rcu-delayed"
proc_tid_comm_permission()
safe, because it's a non-directory and will see no unsafe calls. IF we allow MAY_NOT_BLOCK in other callers, same UAF as in pid_revalidate() (with the same fix).
proc_sys_permission()
race; we start with fetching ->sysctl of the proc_inode our inode is embedded into. That gets cleared from ->evict_inode(), without an RCU delay. Freeing of that thing *is* RCU-delayed, so dereference is safe. However, running into a directory that is getting evicted is indistinguishable from running into /proc/sys itself, since there ->sysctl is NULL all along; that's an artefact of the way we represent the root sysctl inode. Race is harmless, not quite by an accident - /proc/sys permissions are the least restrictive in the entire subtree, so we do not get bogus hard errors and if rcu pathwalk observes such inode getting evicted, we are going to get ->d_seq mismatch anyway. Fixing the race would still be nice (and getting rid of that artefact would simplify things there), but that's out of scope for this series.
reiserfs_permission()
safe - accesses fields of inode, then proceeds to generic_permission()
reject_all()
safe - no access to filesystem objects

get_link: [reordered with two common instances put in front]
simple_get_link()
safe; returns ->i_link, which should be pointing to something that will live at least until inode freeing. Separate code audit, but AFAICS everything's currently fine with that one.
page_get_link()
safe; that's "grab page in inode->i_mapping, bail out if not there or not uptodate" and inode->i_mapping points to &inode->i_data for all symlinks.
NOTE: hitting busy symlink inodes in generic_shutdown_super() will poison ->i_mapping; that's really a data corruption scenario, though - the possibility of race hitting UAF here is the least of concerns. Might insert synchronize_rcu() before the poisoning loop for shits and giggles, but... no point, really.
autofs_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
bad_inode_get_link()
safe - no fs objects accessed
ceph_encrypted_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
cifs_get_link()
buggered - unconditional GFP_KERNEL allocation looks like they'd assumed that ->d_revalidate() bailing out would suffice; it isn't. Obvious fix: bail out in unsafe case and be done with that ("cifs_get_link(): bail out in unsafe case"). It might be tempting
to try and return ->symlink_target and to hell with any allocations, but... the damn thing can get freed and
replaced at any point. Might be possible to work around
(add a refcount, store new value with rcu_assign_pointer, add rcu delay between refcount hitting zero and freeing the sucker), but that's way out of scope for this.
ecryptfs_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ext4_encrypted_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ext4_get_link()
leak - checks a bit in containing ext4_inode_info, then either bails out in unsafe case, or does buffer_head analogue of what page_get_link() would do for pages. Unfortunately, it has two problems - potentially bogus hard errors from ext4_getblk() and leak in case when we get a bh that is not uptodate. Fixed in "ext4_get_link(): fix breakage in RCU mode".
f2fs_encrypted_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
f2fs_get_link()
safe - page_get_link(), followed by no access of fs objects
fuse_get_link()
UAF, similar to one in fuse_permission(),
but without the ->user_ns part - we only check
->s_fs_info->fc->cached_symlinks flag. After that it
either uses page_get_link() or buggers off in unsafe case. So fix for fuse_permission() is sufficient here.
gfs2_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
hostfs_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
kernfs_iop_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
nfs_get_link()
same UAF as for nfs4_lookup_revalidate(), same fix
ntfs_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
ovl_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
policy_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
proc_get_link()
UAF (and oops) - dereferences ->pde of containing proc_inode, which is dropped (and field zeroed) from ->evict_inode(). Fixed in "procfs: move dropping pde and pid from ->evict_inode() to ->free_inode()"
proc_map_files_get_link()
safe - possible hard error, without any fs objects being accessed, then bails out in unsafe case
proc_ns_get_link()
safe - fetches a field of procfs container of inode, then bails out in unsafe case
proc_pid_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
proc_self_get_link()
UAF - accesses the result of proc_pid_ns(), i.e. ->s_fs_info->pid_ns. ->s_fs_info is freed synchronously from ->kill_sb(), immediately after (also synchronous) put_pid_ns() in there. Fixed by having that taken to rcu-delayed helper in "procfs: make freeing proc_fs_info rcu-delayed".
proc_thread_self_get_link()
same UAF as in proc_self_get_link(), same fix
rawdata_get_link_abi()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
rawdata_get_link_data()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
rawdata_get_link_sha1()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
shmem_get_link()
safe; essentially the same thing page_get_link() does.
ubifs_get_link()
safe; checks inode field, then either returns a pointer into containing ubifs_inode or bails out in unsafe case
v9fs_vfs_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
v9fs_vfs_get_link_dotl()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
vboxsf_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
xfs_vn_get_link()
safe - bails out in unsafe case
NOTE: really ancient comment about recursion(!) next to that one. Comment ought to go... No idea why bother recalculating the symlink every time, BTW - might as well cache the sucker in ->i_link on the first access and leave freeing to the time we free the inode... Oh, wait - XFS doesn't free them at all, they are playing games with reuse... Alternatively, they could shove the symlink contents in page cache, a-la e.g. NFS does. Anyway, well out of scope for this...

get_inode_acl:
fuse_get_inode_acl()
same UAF as in fuse_get_link(), except that we are fetching a different flag from ->s_fs_info->fc. Same fix...
ovl_get_inode_acl()
safe; pretty much parallel to ovl_permission(), except that it calls get_cached_acl_rcu() rather than inode_permission()