evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()
Subsystems (5)
Hello Roberto Sassu,
The patch 53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119 init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
89
90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
92 }
93
94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
95 mutex_lock(&mutex);
96 if (*tfm)
97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
100 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
102 *tfm = NULL;
103 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
104 return ERR_PTR(rc);
105 }
106 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
108 if (rc) {
109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
110 *tfm = NULL;
111 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
112 return ERR_PTR(rc);
113 }
114 }
115 out:
116 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
117 }
118
119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
^^^^I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
120 GFP_KERNEL); 121 if (!desc) 122 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 123
regards,
dan carpenter
Roberto Sassu
maintainerQuoted 22 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PMHello Roberto Sassu,
The patch
53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer ininit_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possibleERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c89 90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; 91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; 92 } 93 94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
Quoted 7 lines
95 mutex_lock(&mutex); 96 if (*tfm) 97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
Hello Dan
you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
goto out;
Quoted 23 lines
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
100 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
102 *tfm = NULL;
103 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
104 return ERR_PTR(rc);
105 }
106 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
108 if (rc) {
109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
110 *tfm = NULL;
111 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
112 return ERR_PTR(rc);
113 }
114 }
115 out:
116 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
117 }
118
119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
^^^^Quoted 2 lines
I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
I think the purpose of the mutex is just to prevent two concurrent allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
Thanks
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
Quoted 7 lines
120 GFP_KERNEL); 121 if (!desc) 122 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 123regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 30 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 22 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PMHello Roberto Sassu,
The patch
53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer ininit_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possibleERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c89 90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; 91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; 92 } 93 94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
Quoted 7 lines
95 mutex_lock(&mutex); 96 if (*tfm) 97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
Quoted 6 lines
Hello Dan
you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
goto out;
No. I was wrong.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 24 lines
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); 99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { 100 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); 101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); 102 *tfm = NULL; 103 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 104 return ERR_PTR(rc); 105 } 106 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { 107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); 108 if (rc) { 109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm); 110 *tfm = NULL; 111 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 112 return ERR_PTR(rc); 113 } 114 } 115 out: 116 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 117 } 118 119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^Quoted 2 lines
I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
Quoted 3 lines
I think the purpose of the mutex is just to prevent two concurrent allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
Actually by the time we take the lock then *tfm is either valid or NULL so this code works. It's confusing though.
regards,
dan carpenter
Roberto Sassu
maintainerQuoted 71 lines
From: [email protected] [mailto:owner-linux- [email protected]] On Behalf Of Dan Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 2:34 PMQuoted 30 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 22 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PMHello Roberto Sassu,
The patch
53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer ininit_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possibleERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c89 90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; 91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; 92 } 93 94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
Quoted 7 lines
95 mutex_lock(&mutex); 96 if (*tfm) 97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
Quoted 6 lines
Hello Dan
you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
goto out;No. I was wrong.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); 99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { 100 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); 101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); 102 *tfm = NULL; 103 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 104 return ERR_PTR(rc);105 }
106 if (type ==EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey,
evmkey_len);Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 15 lines
108 if (rc) { 109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm); 110 *tfm = NULL; 111 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 112 return ERR_PTR(rc); 113 } 114 } 115 out: 116 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 117 } 118 119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think the purpose of the mutex is just to prevent two concurrent allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
Actually by the time we take the lock then *tfm is either valid or NULL so this code works. It's confusing though.
static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr)
{
return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
}CPU#1 CPU#2
*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); unlikely(!ptr) *tfm = NULL;
IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
Could this happen?
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
Quoted 84 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 71 lines
From: [email protected] [mailto:owner-linux- [email protected]] On Behalf Of Dan Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 2:34 PMQuoted 30 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 22 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PMHello Roberto Sassu,
The patch
53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer ininit_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possibleERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c89 90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; 91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; 92 } 93 94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
Quoted 7 lines
95 mutex_lock(&mutex); 96 if (*tfm) 97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on the next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
Quoted 6 lines
Hello Dan
you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
goto out;No. I was wrong.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); 99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { 100 rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); 101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); 102 *tfm = NULL; 103 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 104 return ERR_PTR(rc);105 }
106 if (type ==EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey,
evmkey_len);Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 15 lines
108 if (rc) { 109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm); 110 *tfm = NULL; 111 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 112 return ERR_PTR(rc); 113 } 114 } 115 out: 116 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 117 } 118 119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think the purpose of the mutex is just to prevent two concurrent allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
Actually by the time we take the lock then *tfm is either valid or NULL so this code works. It's confusing though.
static inline bool
__must_checkIS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr){ return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr); }CPU#1 CPU#2
Quoted 8 lines
*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); unlikely(!ptr) *tfm = NULL;
IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),Could this happen?
Yeah. Huh. That's true. Good eyes.
I feel like this would be more clear as well if we used a temporary variable instead of working directly on "*tfm".
regards,
dan carpenter
Roberto Sassu
maintainerQuoted 98 lines
From: [email protected] [mailto:owner-linux- [email protected]] On Behalf Of Dan Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 3:04 PMQuoted 1 line · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 1 line
From: [email protected] [mailto:owner-
linux-
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
[email protected]] On Behalf Of Dan Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 2:34 PMQuoted 20 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 20 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:48 PMHello Roberto Sassu,
The patch
53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer ininit_desc()" from Apr 27, 2020, leads to the following static checker warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:119init_desc()
error: '*tfm' dereferencing possibleERR_PTR()
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c89 90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; 91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; 92 } 93 94 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm)) {Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
This used to be a "if (!*tfm)" check.
95 mutex_lock(&mutex); 96 if (*tfm) 97 goto out;Then we test again with the lock held. But in the new code if "*tfm" is an error pointer then we jump directly to the unlock and crash on
the
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
next line. I can't see how the commit would fix anything.
Hello Dan
you are right. The fix should be applied in both places.
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*tfm))
goto out;Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
No. I was wrong.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
98 *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); 99 if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {100 rc =
PTR_ERR(*tfm);
101 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,rc);
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
102 *tfm = NULL; 103 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 104 return ERR_PTR(rc);105 }
106 if (type ==EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
107 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey,
evmkey_len);Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
108 if (rc) { 109 crypto_free_shash(*tfm); 110 *tfm = NULL; 111 mutex_unlock(&mutex);Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
112 return ERR_PTR(rc); 113 } 114 } 115 out: 116 mutex_unlock(&mutex); 117 } 118 119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
^^^^I don't understand how using *tfm outside of a lock is safe at all anyway.
I think the purpose of the mutex is just to prevent two concurrent allocations. Later, it should not be a problem, as *tfm is never freed.
Actually by the time we take the lock then *tfm is either valid or NULL so this code works. It's confusing though.
Quoted 7 lines
static inline bool
__must_checkIS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr){ return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr); }CPU#1 CPU#2
*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0,
CRYPTO_NOLOAD);Quoted 4 lines
unlikely(!ptr)
*tfm = NULL;
IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),Could this happen?
Yeah. Huh. That's true. Good eyes.
I feel like this would be more clear as well if we used a temporary variable instead of working directly on "*tfm".
Yes, seems better. I will send a new version of the patch.
Thanks
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
PATCH 1/1 evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
In reply to Dan CarpenterThe IS_ERR_OR_NULL() function has two conditions and if we got really unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and then was set to NULL. Both conditions would be false even though the pointer at the end was NULL.
This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL or valid. I have introduced a "tmp_tfm" variable to make that work. I also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.
---
I just had a go at the fix. I'm not super wedded to this solution, but I hoped it was nice.
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +22 -22
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) {long rc;const char *algo; -struct crypto_shash **tfm; +struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;struct shash_desc *desc;if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) {
@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } -if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (*tfm)) { -mutex_lock (&mutex); -if (*tfm) - goto out; - *tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); -if (IS_ERR (*tfm)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (*tfm); -pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, rc); - *tfm =NULL ; +if (*tfm) + goto alloc; +mutex_lock (&mutex); +if (*tfm) + goto unlock; + + tmp_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); +if (IS_ERR (tmp_tfm)) { +pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, +PTR_ERR (tmp_tfm)); +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +return ERR_CAST (tmp_tfm); + } +if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { + rc =crypto_shash_setkey (tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); +if (rc) { +crypto_free_shash (tmp_tfm);mutex_unlock (&mutex);return ERR_PTR (rc); } -if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { - rc =crypto_shash_setkey (*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); -if (rc) { -crypto_free_shash (*tfm); - *tfm =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&mutex); -return ERR_PTR (rc); - } - } -out: -mutex_unlock (&mutex); } - + *tfm = tmp_tfm; +unlock: +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +alloc: desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (*tfm),GFP_KERNEL );if (!desc)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Roberto Sassu
maintainerRE: [PATCH] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
Quoted 14 lines
From: [email protected] [mailto:linux-integrity- [email protected]] On Behalf Of Dan Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 3:19 PM
Subject: [PATCH] evm: Fix a small race ininit_desc()The
IS_ERR_OR_NULL()function has two conditions and if we got really unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and then was set to NULL. Both conditions would be false even though the pointer at the end was NULL.This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL or valid. I have introduced a "
tmp_tfm" variable to make that work. I also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.
Quoted 7 lines
Reported-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Fixes 53de3b080d5e: "evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in
init_desc()"Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>---
I just had a go at the fix. I'm not super wedded to this solution, but I hoped it was nice.
Thanks. I think you can merge both patches in one, as the first one is not yet pulled.
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
Quoted 76 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +1
-1@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) {long rc;const char *algo; -struct crypto_shash **tfm; +struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;struct shash_desc *desc;security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +21
-21if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) {@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } -if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (*tfm)) { -mutex_lock (&mutex); -if (*tfm) - goto out; - *tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); -if (IS_ERR (*tfm)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (*tfm); -pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, rc); - *tfm =NULL ; +if (*tfm) + goto alloc; +mutex_lock (&mutex); +if (*tfm) + goto unlock; + + tmp_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); +if (IS_ERR (tmp_tfm)) { +pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, +PTR_ERR (tmp_tfm)); +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +return ERR_CAST (tmp_tfm); + } +if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { + rc =crypto_shash_setkey (tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); +if (rc) { +crypto_free_shash (tmp_tfm);mutex_unlock (&mutex);return ERR_PTR (rc); } -if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { - rc =crypto_shash_setkey (*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); -if (rc) { -crypto_free_shash (*tfm); - *tfm =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&mutex); -return ERR_PTR (rc); - } - } -out: -mutex_unlock (&mutex); } - + *tfm = tmp_tfm; +unlock: +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +alloc:security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +0
-1desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (*tfm),GFP_KERNEL );if (!desc) --2.26.2
PATCH v2 1/1 evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition.
Imagine we have two threads and in the first thread crypto_alloc_shash() fails and returns an error pointer.
*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); <--- FIRST THREAD HERE!
pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
*tfm = NULL;And the second thread is here:
if (*tfm = NULL) { <--- SECOND THREAD HERE!
mutex_lock(&mutex);
if (*tfm)
goto out;Since "*tfm" is non-NULL, we assume that it is valid and that leads to a crash when it dereferences "*tfm".
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
^^^^This patch fixes the problem by introducing a temporary "tmp_tfm" and only setting "*tfm" at the very end after everything has succeeded. The other change is that I reversed the initial "if (!*tfm) {" condition and pull the code in one indent level.
---
v2: I folded mine patch together with Roberto's
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +22 -22
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) {long rc;const char *algo; -struct crypto_shash **tfm; +struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;struct shash_desc *desc;if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) {
@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } -if (*tfm =NULL ) { -mutex_lock (&mutex); -if (*tfm) - goto out; - *tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); -if (IS_ERR (*tfm)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (*tfm); -pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, rc); - *tfm =NULL ; +if (*tfm) + goto alloc; +mutex_lock (&mutex); +if (*tfm) + goto unlock; + + tmp_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); +if (IS_ERR (tmp_tfm)) { +pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, +PTR_ERR (tmp_tfm)); +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +return ERR_CAST (tmp_tfm); + } +if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { + rc =crypto_shash_setkey (tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); +if (rc) { +crypto_free_shash (tmp_tfm);mutex_unlock (&mutex);return ERR_PTR (rc); } -if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { - rc =crypto_shash_setkey (*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); -if (rc) { -crypto_free_shash (*tfm); - *tfm =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&mutex); -return ERR_PTR (rc); - } - } -out: -mutex_unlock (&mutex); } - + *tfm = tmp_tfm; +unlock: +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +alloc: desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (*tfm),GFP_KERNEL );if (!desc)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RE: [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
Quoted 35 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:47 PM
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set bycrypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition.Imagine we have two threads and in the first thread
crypto_alloc_shash()fails and returns an error pointer.*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); <--- FIRST THREAD HERE! pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); *tfm = NULL;And the second thread is here:
if (*tfm = NULL) { <--- SECOND THREAD HERE! mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out;Since "*tfm" is non-NULL, we assume that it is valid and that leads to a crash when it dereferences "*tfm".
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^This patch fixes the problem by introducing a temporary "
tmp_tfm" and only setting "*tfm" at the very end after everything has succeeded. The other change is that I reversed the initial "if (!*tfm) {" condition and pull the code in one indent level.
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")Reported-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Reported-by Krzysztof Struczynski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
Quoted 79 lines
---
v2: I folded mine patch together with Roberto'ssecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +1
-1@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) {long rc;const char *algo; -struct crypto_shash **tfm; +struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;struct shash_desc *desc;security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +21
-21if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) {@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } -if (*tfm =NULL ) { -mutex_lock (&mutex); -if (*tfm) - goto out; - *tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); -if (IS_ERR (*tfm)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (*tfm); -pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, rc); - *tfm =NULL ; +if (*tfm) + goto alloc; +mutex_lock (&mutex); +if (*tfm) + goto unlock; + + tmp_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); +if (IS_ERR (tmp_tfm)) { +pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, +PTR_ERR (tmp_tfm)); +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +return ERR_CAST (tmp_tfm); + } +if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { + rc =crypto_shash_setkey (tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); +if (rc) { +crypto_free_shash (tmp_tfm);mutex_unlock (&mutex);return ERR_PTR (rc); } -if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { - rc =crypto_shash_setkey (*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); -if (rc) { -crypto_free_shash (*tfm); - *tfm =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&mutex); -return ERR_PTR (rc); - } - } -out: -mutex_unlock (&mutex); } - + *tfm = tmp_tfm; +unlock: +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +alloc:security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +0
-1desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (*tfm),GFP_KERNEL );if (!desc) --2.26.2
Krzysztof Struczynski
Acked-byRE: [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
Quoted 47 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Roberto Sassu
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 8:47 AM
To: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>; Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>; Krzysztof Struczynski <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>; Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>; Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]>; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; kernel- [email protected]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race ininit_desc()Quoted 34 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:47 PM
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set bycrypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition.Imagine we have two threads and in the first thread
crypto_alloc_shash()fails and returns an error pointer.*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); <--- FIRST THREAD HERE! pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); *tfm = NULL;And the second thread is here:
if (*tfm = NULL) { <--- SECOND THREAD HERE! mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out;Since "*tfm" is non-NULL, we assume that it is valid and that leads to a crash when it dereferences "*tfm".
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^This patch fixes the problem by introducing a temporary "
tmp_tfm" and only setting "*tfm" at the very end after everything has succeeded. The other change is that I reversed the initial "if (!*tfm) {" condition and pull the code in one indent level.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")Reported-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Reported-by Krzysztof Struczynski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>Acked-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Krzysztof
Quoted 89 lines
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063 Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
Quoted 82 lines
---
v2: I folded mine patch together with Roberto'ssecurity/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +0
-0@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type,
uint8_thash_algo)
{security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +1
-1long rc;const char *algo; -struct crypto_shash **tfm; +struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;struct shash_desc *desc;if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) {@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type,
uint8_thash_algo)security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +0
-8algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } -if (*tfm =NULL ) { -mutex_lock (&mutex); -if (*tfm) - goto out; - *tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); -if (IS_ERR (*tfm)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (*tfm); - pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,rc);
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +17
-3- *tfm =NULL ; +if (*tfm) + goto alloc; +mutex_lock (&mutex); +if (*tfm) + goto unlock; + + tmp_tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (algo,0 ,CRYPTO_NOLOAD ); +if (IS_ERR (tmp_tfm)) { +pr_err ("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n" , algo, +PTR_ERR (tmp_tfm)); +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +return ERR_CAST (tmp_tfm); + } +if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { + rc =crypto_shash_setkey (tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len); +if (rc) { +crypto_free_shash (tmp_tfm);mutex_unlock (&mutex);return ERR_PTR (rc); } -if (type =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ) { - rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey,
evmkey_len);security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +4
-11-if (rc) { -crypto_free_shash (*tfm); - *tfm =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&mutex); -return ERR_PTR (rc); - } - } -out: -mutex_unlock (&mutex); } - + *tfm = tmp_tfm; +unlock: +mutex_unlock (&mutex); +alloc: desc =kmalloc (sizeof (*desc) +crypto_shash_descsize (*tfm),GFP_KERNEL );if (!desc) --2.26.2
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
Quoted 39 lines · Krzysztof Struczynski
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 38 lines
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set bycrypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition.Imagine we have two threads and in the first thread
crypto_alloc_shash()fails and returns an error pointer.*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); <--- FIRST THREAD HERE! pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); *tfm = NULL;And the second thread is here:
if (*tfm = NULL) { <--- SECOND THREAD HERE! mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out;Since "*tfm" is non-NULL, we assume that it is valid and that leads to a crash when it dereferences "*tfm".
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm), ^^^^This patch fixes the problem by introducing a temporary "
tmp_tfm" and only setting "*tfm" at the very end after everything has succeeded. The other change is that I reversed the initial "if (!*tfm) {" condition and pull the code in one indent level.Fixes d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")Reported-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>Reported-by Krzysztof Struczynski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Acked-by Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Thanks, Roberto and Krzysztof.
This patch is now queued in the "fixes" branch.
Mimi