x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers
v2 cover x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers
Address Andrew's comments and rebased on top of staging.
Wei Liu (2):
x86/mm: don't wrap x86_emulate_ctxt in ptwr_emulate_ctxt x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 20 ++-- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 5 +- 3 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 182 deletions(-)
Signature · 7 lines
2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
PATCH v2 1/2 x86/mm: don't wrap x86_emulate_ctxt in ptwr_emulate_ctxt
Rewrite the code so that it has the same structure as mmio_ro_emualte_ctxt. x86_emulate_ctxt now points to ptwr_emulate_ctxt via its data pointer.
This patch will help unify mmio_ro and ptwr code paths later.
---
v2: do away with pointer in ptwr_emulate_ctxt
--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +23 -25
@@ -4964,7 +4964,6 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)*/ struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt { -struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt;unsigned long cr2;l1_pgentry_t pte; };
@@ -4995,7 +4994,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(paddr_t val, unsigned int bytes, unsigned int do_cmpxchg, - struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt *ptwr_ctxt) + struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { unsigned long mfn;unsigned long unaligned_addr = addr;
@@ -5003,6 +5002,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(l1_pgentry_t pte, ol1e, nl1e, *pl1e;struct vcpu *v = current;struct domain *d = v->domain; +struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt *ptwr_ctxt = ctxt->data;int ret;/* Only allow naturally-aligned stores within the original %cr2 page. */
@@ -5026,7 +5026,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update( {x86_emul_pagefault (0 ,/* Read fault. */ addr +sizeof (paddr_t) - rc, - &ptwr_ctxt->ctxt); + ctxt);return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION ; }/* Mask out bits provided by caller. */
@@ -5141,9 +5141,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_write(memcpy (&val, p_data, bytes); -return ptwr_emulated_update ( - offset,0 , val, bytes,0 , - container_of(ctxt, struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt, ctxt)); +return ptwr_emulated_update (offset,0 , val, bytes,0 , ctxt); } static int ptwr_emulated_cmpxchg(
@@ -5166,9 +5164,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_cmpxchg(memcpy (&old, p_old, bytes);memcpy (&new, p_new, bytes); -return ptwr_emulated_update ( - offset, old, new, bytes,1 , - container_of(ctxt, struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt, ctxt)); +return ptwr_emulated_update (offset, old, new, bytes,1 , ctxt); }static const struct x86_emulate_ops ptwr_emulate_ops = {
@@ -5187,14 +5183,14 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,struct domain *d = v->domain;struct page_info *page;l1_pgentry_t pte; -struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt = { - .ctxt = { - .regs = regs, - .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, - .addr_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .sp_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .lma = !is_pv_32bit_domain (d), - }, +struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , + .sp_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_domain (d), + .data = &ptwr_ctxt, };int rc;
@@ -5221,10 +5217,12 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, goto bail; } - ptwr_ctxt.cr2 = addr; - ptwr_ctxt.pte = pte; + ptwr_ctxt = (struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ) { + .cr2 = addr, + .pte = pte, + }; - rc =x86_emulate (&ptwr_ctxt.ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops); + rc =x86_emulate (&ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops);page_unlock (page);put_page (page);
@@ -5239,18 +5237,18 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,* emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction stream under * Xen's feet. */ -if ( ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && - ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) -pv_inject_event (&ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event); +if ( ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && + ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) +pv_inject_event (&ctxt.event);else gdprintk (XENLOG_WARNING ,"Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n" , - ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.type, ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector); + ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector);/* Fallthrough */ case X86EMUL_OKAY : -if ( ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.retire.singlestep ) +if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep )pv_inject_hw_exception (TRAP_debug,X86_EVENT_NO_EC );/* Fallthrough */
Signature · 7 lines
2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/mm: don't wrap x86_emulate_ctxt in ptwr_emulate_ctxt
Quoted 7 lines · Wei Liu
Rewrite the code so that it has the same structure as
mmio_ro_emualte_ctxt.x86_emulate_ctxtnow points toptwr_emulate_ctxtvia its data pointer.This patch will help unify
mmio_roand ptwr code paths later.Signed-off-by Wei Liu <[email protected]>
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/mm: don't wrap x86_emulate_ctxt in ptwr_emulate_ctxt
In reply to Wei Liuxen/arch/x86/mm.c int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, · line 5223
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 31.08.17 at 13:22, <[email protected]> wrote:
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +4
-2@@ -5221,10 +5217,12 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, goto bail; } - ptwr_ctxt.cr2 = addr; - ptwr_ctxt.pte = pte; + ptwr_ctxt = (struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ) { + .cr2 = addr, + .pte = pte, + };
I don't see the need for this re-write.
Jan
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
PATCH v2 2/2 x86/mm: merge ptwr and mmio_ro page fault handlers
In reply to Wei LiuProvide a unified entry to avoid going through pte look-up, decode and emulation cycle more than necessary. The path taken is determined by the faulting address.
Note that the order of checks is changed in the new function, but the order of the checks is performed shouldn't matter.
The sole caller is changed to use the new function.
No functional change.
---
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
v2: rebase and (sorta) merge Andrew's changes
Dom0 boots fine. XTF is happy with this change. Let me know if more tests can be done.
--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 290 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 20 ++-- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 5 +- 3 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +128 -162
@@ -5176,91 +5176,6 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops ptwr_emulate_ops = { .cpuid = pv_emul_cpuid, }; -/* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */ -int ptwr_do_page_fault (struct vcpu *v,unsigned long addr, -struct cpu_user_regs *regs) -{ -struct domain *d = v->domain; -struct page_info *page; -l1_pgentry_t pte; -struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt; -struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { - .regs = regs, - .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, - .addr_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .sp_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .lma = !is_pv_32bit_domain (d), - .data = &ptwr_ctxt, - }; -int rc; - -/* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */ - pte =guest_get_eff_l1e (addr); - -/* We are looking only for read-only mappings of p.t. pages. */ -if ( ((l1e_get_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) || -rangeset_contains_singleton (mmio_ro_ranges,l1e_get_pfn (pte)) || - !get_page_from_mfn (l1e_get_mfn (pte), d) ) - goto bail; - - page =l1e_get_page (pte); -if ( !page_lock (page) ) - { -put_page (page); - goto bail; - } - -if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table ) - { -page_unlock (page); -put_page (page); - goto bail; - } - - ptwr_ctxt = (struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ) { - .cr2 = addr, - .pte = pte, - }; - - rc =x86_emulate (&ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops); - -page_unlock (page); -put_page (page); - -switch ( rc ) - { -case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION : -/* -* This emulation only covers writes to pagetables which are marked -* read-only by Xen. We tolerate #PF (in case a concurrent pagetable -* update has succeeded on a different vcpu). Anything else is an -* emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction stream under -* Xen's feet. -*/ -if ( ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && - ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) -pv_inject_event (&ctxt.event); -else -gdprintk (XENLOG_WARNING , -"Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n" , - ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_OKAY : - -if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep ) -pv_inject_hw_exception (TRAP_debug,X86_EVENT_NO_EC ); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_RETRY : -perfc_incr (ptwr_emulations); -return EXCRET_fault_fixed; - } - - bail: -return 0 ; -} -/************************* * fault handling for read-only MMIO pages */
@@ -5333,83 +5248,6 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops mmcfg_intercept_ops = { .cpuid = pv_emul_cpuid, }; -/* Check if guest is trying to modify a r/o MMIO page. */ -int mmio_ro_do_page_fault (struct vcpu *v,unsigned long addr, -struct cpu_user_regs *regs) -{ -l1_pgentry_t pte; -unsigned long mfn; -unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; -struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = addr }; -struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { - .regs = regs, - .vendor = v->domain->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, - .addr_size = addr_size, - .sp_size = addr_size, - .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v), - .data = &mmio_ro_ctxt, - }; -int rc; - -/* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */ - pte =guest_get_eff_l1e (addr); - -/* We are looking only for read-only mappings of MMIO pages. */ -if ( ((l1e_get_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) ) -return 0 ; - - mfn =l1e_get_pfn (pte); -if (mfn_valid (_mfn (mfn)) ) - { -struct page_info *page =mfn_to_page (_mfn (mfn)); -struct domain *owner =page_get_owner_and_reference (page); - -if ( owner ) -put_page (page); -if ( owner != dom_io ) -return 0 ; - } - -if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton (mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) ) -return 0 ; - -if (pci_ro_mmcfg_decode (mfn, &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) ) - rc =x86_emulate (&ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops); -else - rc =x86_emulate (&ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); - -switch ( rc ) - { -case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION : -/* -* This emulation only covers writes to MMCFG space or read-only MFNs. -* We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page or a successful -* concurrent pagetable update). Anything else is an emulation bug, -* or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet. -*/ -if ( ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && - ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) -pv_inject_event (&ctxt.event); -else -gdprintk (XENLOG_WARNING , -"Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n" , - ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_OKAY : - -if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep ) -pv_inject_hw_exception (TRAP_debug,X86_EVENT_NO_EC ); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_RETRY : -perfc_incr (mmio_ro_emulations); -return EXCRET_fault_fixed; - } - -return 0 ; -} -void *alloc_xen_pagetable (void ) {if ( system_state != SYS_STATE_early_boot )
@@ -6441,6 +6279,134 @@ void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE); } +/* Check if guest is trying to modify a r/o MMIO page. */ +static int mmio_ro_do_page_fault (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, +unsigned long addr,l1_pgentry_t pte) +{ +struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = addr }; +mfn_t mfn =l1e_get_mfn (pte); + +if (mfn_valid (mfn) ) + { +struct page_info *page =mfn_to_page (mfn); +struct domain *owner =page_get_owner_and_reference (page); + +if ( owner ) +put_page (page); +if ( owner != dom_io ) +return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ; + } + + ctxt->data = &mmio_ro_ctxt; +if (pci_ro_mmcfg_decode (mfn_x (mfn), &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) ) +return x86_emulate (ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops); +else +return x86_emulate (ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); +} + +/* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */ +static int ptwr_do_page_fault (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct domain *d, +unsigned long addr,l1_pgentry_t pte) +{ +struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt = { + .cr2 = addr, + .pte = pte, + }; +struct page_info *page; +int rc =X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ; + +if ( !get_page_from_mfn (l1e_get_mfn (pte), d) ) + goto out; + + page =l1e_get_page (pte); +if ( !page_lock (page) ) + { +put_page (page); + goto out; + } + +if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table ) + { +page_unlock (page); +put_page (page); + goto out; + } + + ctxt->data = &ptwr_ctxt; + rc =x86_emulate (ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops); + +page_unlock (page); +put_page (page); + + out: +return rc; +} + +int pv_ro_page_fault (struct vcpu *v,unsigned long addr, +struct cpu_user_regs *regs) +{ +l1_pgentry_t pte; +struct domain *d = v->domain; +unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size = addr_size, + .sp_size = addr_size, + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v), + }; +int rc; +bool mmio_ro; + +/* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */ + pte =guest_get_eff_l1e (addr); + +/* We are only looking for read-only mappings */ +if ( ((l1e_get_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) ) +return 0 ; + + mmio_ro =rangeset_contains_singleton (mmio_ro_ranges,l1e_get_pfn (pte)); +if ( mmio_ro ) + rc =mmio_ro_do_page_fault (&ctxt, addr, pte); +else + rc =ptwr_do_page_fault (&ctxt, d, addr, pte); + +switch ( rc ) + { +case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION : +/* +* This emulation covers writes to: +* - L1 pagetables. +* - MMCFG space or read-only MFNs. +* We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page or a successful +* concurrent pagetable update). Anything else is an emulation bug, +* or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet. +*/ +if ( ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && + ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) +pv_inject_event (&ctxt.event); +else +gdprintk (XENLOG_WARNING , +"Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n" , + ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector); + +/* Fallthrough */ +case X86EMUL_OKAY : +if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep ) +pv_inject_hw_exception (TRAP_debug,X86_EVENT_NO_EC ); + +/* Fallthrough */ +case X86EMUL_RETRY : +if ( mmio_ro ) +perfc_incr (mmio_ro_emulations); +else +perfc_incr (ptwr_emulations); +return EXCRET_fault_fixed; + } + +return 0 ; +} +/* * Local variables: * mode: C
xen/arch/x86/traps.c +11 -9
@@ -1308,16 +1308,18 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) !(regs->error_code & (PFEC_reserved_bit | PFEC_insn_fetch)) && (regs->error_code & PFEC_write_access) ) { -if (VM_ASSIST (d, writable_pagetables) && -/* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may -legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */ - (paging_mode_enabled (d) || - (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present)) && -ptwr_do_page_fault (v, addr, regs) ) -return EXCRET_fault_fixed; +bool ptwr, mmio_ro; + + ptwr =VM_ASSIST (d, writable_pagetables) && +/* Do not check if access-protection fault since the page may +legitimately be not present in shadow page tables */ + (paging_mode_enabled (d) || + (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present)); + + mmio_ro =is_hardware_domain (d) && + (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present); -if (is_hardware_domain (d) && (regs->error_code & PFEC_page_present) && -mmio_ro_do_page_fault (v, addr, regs) ) +if ( (ptwr || mmio_ro) &&pv_ro_page_fault (v, addr, regs) )return EXCRET_fault_fixed; }
xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +1 -4
@@ -511,10 +511,7 @@ extern int mmcfg_intercept_write(enum x86_segment seg,int pv_emul_cpuid (uint32_t leaf,uint32_t subleaf,struct cpuid_leaf *res,struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt); -int ptwr_do_page_fault (struct vcpu *,unsigned long , -struct cpu_user_regs *); -int mmio_ro_do_page_fault (struct vcpu *,unsigned long , -struct cpu_user_regs *); +int pv_ro_page_fault (struct vcpu *,unsigned long ,struct cpu_user_regs *);int audit_adjust_pgtables (struct domain *d,int dir,int noisy);
Signature · 7 lines
2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 95 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 31.08.17 at 13:22, <[email protected]> wrote:
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +0
-85@@ -5176,91 +5176,6 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops ptwr_emulate_ops = { .cpuid = pv_emul_cpuid, }; -/* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */ -int ptwr_do_page_fault (struct vcpu *v,unsigned long addr, -struct cpu_user_regs *regs) -{ -struct domain *d = v->domain; -struct page_info *page; -l1_pgentry_t pte; -struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt; -struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { - .regs = regs, - .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, - .addr_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .sp_size =is_pv_32bit_domain (d) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG , - .lma = !is_pv_32bit_domain (d), - .data = &ptwr_ctxt, - }; -int rc; - -/* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */ - pte =guest_get_eff_l1e (addr); - -/* We are looking only for read-only mappings of p.t. pages. */ -if ( ((l1e_get_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) || -rangeset_contains_singleton (mmio_ro_ranges,l1e_get_pfn (pte)) || - !get_page_from_mfn (l1e_get_mfn (pte), d) ) - goto bail; - - page =l1e_get_page (pte); -if ( !page_lock (page) ) - { -put_page (page); - goto bail; - } - -if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table ) - { -page_unlock (page); -put_page (page); - goto bail; - } - - ptwr_ctxt = (struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ) { - .cr2 = addr, - .pte = pte, - }; - - rc =x86_emulate (&ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops); - -page_unlock (page); -put_page (page); - -switch ( rc ) - { -case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION : -/* -* This emulation only covers writes to pagetables which are marked -* read-only by Xen. We tolerate #PF (in case a concurrent pagetable -* update has succeeded on a different vcpu). Anything else is an -* emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction stream under -* Xen's feet. -*/ -if ( ctxt.event.type ==X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION && - ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault ) -pv_inject_event (&ctxt.event); -else -gdprintk (XENLOG_WARNING , -"Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n" , - ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_OKAY : - -if ( ctxt.retire.singlestep ) -pv_inject_hw_exception (TRAP_debug,X86_EVENT_NO_EC ); - -/* Fallthrough */ -case X86EMUL_RETRY : -perfc_incr (ptwr_emulations); -return EXCRET_fault_fixed; - } - - bail: -return 0 ; -} -/************************* * fault handling for read-only MMIO pages
Quoted 1 line
*/
Note how you move the remains of the function above below this comment, which isn't really correct.
Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +1
-0@@ -6441,6 +6279,134 @@ void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE); } +/* Check if guest is trying to modify a r/o MMIO page. */
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6292
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +10
-0+static int mmio_ro_do_page_fault (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, +unsigned long addr,l1_pgentry_t pte) +{ +struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = addr }; +mfn_t mfn =l1e_get_mfn (pte); + +if (mfn_valid (mfn) ) + { +struct page_info *page =mfn_to_page (mfn); +struct domain *owner =page_get_owner_and_reference (page);
Please add const as you move this.
Quoted 40 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +40
-0+if ( owner ) +put_page (page); +if ( owner != dom_io ) +return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ; + } + + ctxt->data = &mmio_ro_ctxt; +if (pci_ro_mmcfg_decode (mfn_x (mfn), &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) ) +return x86_emulate (ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops); +else +return x86_emulate (ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); +} + +/* Write page fault handler: check if guest is trying to modify a PTE. */ +static int ptwr_do_page_fault (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct domain *d, +unsigned long addr,l1_pgentry_t pte) +{ +struct ptwr_emulate_ctxt ptwr_ctxt = { + .cr2 = addr, + .pte = pte, + }; +struct page_info *page; +int rc =X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE ; + +if ( !get_page_from_mfn (l1e_get_mfn (pte), d) ) + goto out; + + page =l1e_get_page (pte); +if ( !page_lock (page) ) + { +put_page (page); + goto out; + } + +if ( (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table ) + { +page_unlock (page); +put_page (page); + goto out; + }
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6343
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +10
-0+ + ctxt->data = &ptwr_ctxt; + rc =x86_emulate (ctxt, &ptwr_emulate_ops); + +page_unlock (page); +put_page (page); + + out: +return rc; +}
Could you please avoid goto when the exit path is trivial?
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6345
Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +1
-0+int pv_ro_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
Since you alter this and the caller anyway, the first parameter could as well become const struct domain *, simplifying ...
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6356
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +11
-0+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs) +{ +l1_pgentry_t pte; +struct domain *d = v->domain; +unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size = addr_size, + .sp_size = addr_size, + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v),
... both is_pv_32bit_vcpu() accesses here (which internally use v->domain). In fact I wonder whether it wouldn't yield more consistent code if you didn't pass in the domain at all, as this must strictly be current->domain, or invoking x86_emulate() and various other functions is bogus. You'd then latch this into currd here.
Furthermore I think this second use could become "addr_size > 32".
Jan
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 3 lines
/*************************
* fault handling for read-only MMIO pages
*/Note how you move the remains of the function above below this comment, which isn't really correct.
I can place the new function where the old was.
Quoted 1 line
[..]
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 1 line
+int pv_ro_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
Since you alter this and the caller anyway, the first parameter could as well become const struct domain *, simplifying ...
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6356
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +11
-0+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs) +{ +l1_pgentry_t pte; +struct domain *d = v->domain; +unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size = addr_size, + .sp_size = addr_size, + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v),
Quoted 9 lines
... both
is_pv_32bit_vcpu()accesses here (which internally usev->domain). In fact I wonder whether it wouldn't yield more consistent code if you didn't pass in the domain at all, as this must strictly becurrent->domain, or invokingx86_emulate()and various other functions is bogus. You'd then latch this into currd here.Furthermore I think this second use could become "
addr_size> 32".
Sorry, second use of what?
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 35 lines · Wei Liu
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 3 lines
/*************************
* fault handling for read-only MMIO pages
*/Note how you move the remains of the function above below this comment, which isn't really correct.
I can place the new function where the old was.
Quoted 1 line
[..]
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 1 line
+int pv_ro_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
Since you alter this and the caller anyway, the first parameter could as well become const struct domain *, simplifying ...
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6356
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +11
-0+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs) +{ +l1_pgentry_t pte; +struct domain *d = v->domain; +unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size = addr_size, + .sp_size = addr_size, + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v),... both
is_pv_32bit_vcpu()accesses here (which internally usev->domain). In fact I wonder whether it wouldn't yield more consistent code if you didn't pass in the domain at all, as this must strictly becurrent->domain, or invokingx86_emulate()and various other functions is bogus. You'd then latch this into currd here.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Furthermore I think this second use could become "
addr_size> 32".Sorry, second use of what?
Oh, you mean
.lma = addr_size > 32
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 01.09.17 at 15:50, <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 20 lines · Wei Liu
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Beulich
xen/arch/x86/mm.c void write_32bit_pse_identmap(uint32_t *l2) · line 6356
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +11
-0+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs) +{ +l1_pgentry_t pte; +struct domain *d = v->domain; +unsigned int addr_size =is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v) ?32 :BITS_PER_LONG ; +struct x86_emulate_ctxt ctxt = { + .regs = regs, + .vendor = d->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor, + .addr_size = addr_size, + .sp_size = addr_size, + .lma = !is_pv_32bit_vcpu (v),... both
is_pv_32bit_vcpu()accesses here (which internally usev->domain). In fact I wonder whether it wouldn't yield more consistent code if you didn't pass in the domain at all, as this must strictly becurrent->domain, or invokingx86_emulate()and various other functions is bogus. You'd then latch this into currd here.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Furthermore I think this second use could become "
addr_size> 32".Sorry, second use of what?
Oh, you mean
.lma = addr_size > 32
Yes.
Jan
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel