x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation
spectre_v2_select_retpoline() unconditionally emits
"Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"
when the kernel lacks retpoline support, before returning SPECTRE_V2_NONE to its callers. SPECTRE_V2_NONE is not the final answer, though:spectre_v2_update_mitigation() runs afterwards and can still upgrade the mitigation.
On an Intel CPU affected by RETBleed, built with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY=y and CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n, and booted with spectre_v2=auto, retbleed_select_mitigation() picks RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, and spectre_v2_update_mitigation() then promotes SPECTRE_V2_NONE to SPECTRE_V2_IBRS. The boot log claims no mitigation is available immediately before reporting "Spectre V2 : Mitigation: IBRS", and sysfs reports the machine as mitigated. The message is alarming and simply wrong.
Drop the pr_err from the helper and emit it once from spectre_v2_update_mitigation(), after the final mitigation is known, so it only fires when the system really is left unmitigated. Guard it on !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) so it fires only when retpoline truly cannot be built in, and restrict it to the cases where retpoline was the implied choice: SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, or SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO when should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) indicates a mitigation was actually intended.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8 -3
@@ -1956,10 +1956,8 @@ early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline);static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline (void ) { -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE )) { -pr_err ("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!" ); +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE ))return SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; - }return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ; }
@@ -2247,6 +2245,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void) } } +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE ) && + spectre_v2_enabled ==SPECTRE_V2_NONE && + (spectre_v2_cmd ==SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE || + (spectre_v2_cmd ==SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO && +should_mitigate_vuln (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 )))) +pr_err ("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!" ); +if (boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 ))pr_info ("%s\n" , spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); }
base-commit: 8d3ae59288f1e7d58d76558a6ee96d533bc5019f
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Pawan Gupta
reviewerQuoted 40 lines · Kim Phillips
spectre_v2_select_retpoline()unconditionally emits"Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"
when the kernel lacks retpoline support, before returning
SPECTRE_V2_NONEto its callers.SPECTRE_V2_NONEis not the final answer, though:spectre_v2_update_mitigation()runs afterwards and can still upgrade the mitigation.On an Intel CPU affected by RETBleed, built with
CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY=yandCONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n, and booted with spectre_v2=auto,retbleed_select_mitigation()picksRETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, andspectre_v2_update_mitigation()then promotesSPECTRE_V2_NONEtoSPECTRE_V2_IBRS. The boot log claims no mitigation is available immediately before reporting "Spectre V2 : Mitigation: IBRS", and sysfs reports the machine as mitigated. The message is alarming and simply wrong.Drop the
pr_errfrom the helper and emit it once fromspectre_v2_update_mitigation(), after the final mitigation is known, so it only fires when the system really is left unmitigated. Guard it on !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) so it fires only when retpoline truly cannot be built in, and restrict it to the cases where retpoline was the implied choice:SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, orSPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTOwhenshould_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)indicates a mitigation was actually intended.Fixes 480e803dacf8 ("x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation")Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>Assisted-by ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline); · line 1960
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-2@@ -1956,10 +1956,8 @@ early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline);static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline (void ) { -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE )) { -pr_err ("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!" );
The claim "No mitigation available" is really the problem. And, it is redundant here because the final mitigation state is anyways printed in spectre_v2_update_mitigation().
How about just change the message to:
pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline");It stays accurate here, telling retpoline mitigation was attempted.
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1
-1+if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE ))return SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; - }return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ; }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void) · line 2254
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +7
-0@@ -2247,6 +2245,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void) } } +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE ) && + spectre_v2_enabled ==SPECTRE_V2_NONE && + (spectre_v2_cmd ==SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE || + (spectre_v2_cmd ==SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO && +should_mitigate_vuln (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 )))) +pr_err ("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!" ); +
With the above message tweak, this check can be dropped.
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-0if (boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 ))pr_info ("%s\n" , spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); }
Quoted 13 lines · Pawan Gupta
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline); · line 1960
Quoted 7 lines · Kim Phillips
+++
b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.carch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-2@@ -1956,10 +1956,8 @@ early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline);static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline (void ) { -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE )) { -pr_err ("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!" );The claim "No mitigation available" is really the problem. And, it is redundant here because the final mitigation state is anyways printed in
spectre_v2_update_mitigation().
Quoted 5 lines
How about just change the message to:
pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline");It stays accurate here, telling retpoline mitigation was attempted.
Thanks for your review. I've made these changes and reworded the commit text and submitted a v2 here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Kim