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x86: address some violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

PATCH Superseded Federico Serafini 5 participants 17 messages Jul 29, 2024 – Sep 2, 2024

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#0 lore raw

v5 cover x86: address some violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

This patch series fixes a missing escape in a deviation and addresses some violations.

Federico Serafini (8):
automation/eclair: fix deviation of MISRA C Rule 16.3 x86/vpmu: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3 x86/traps: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3 x86/mce: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3 x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3 x86/hvm: add defensive statements in unreachable program points x86/mm: add defensive return
x86/mpparse: address a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3

 automation/eclair_analysis/ECLAIR/deviations.ecl |  5 ++---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c                |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c              |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c                          |  3 +++
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c                    |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c                       | 12 +++++++-----
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                           |  5 +++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c                     |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c                           |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c                       |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c                       |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c                        |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c                      |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c                       |  3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c                      |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpic.c                          |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c                           |  3 +--
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c                                |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c                           |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c                             |  3 +++
 20 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/8 automation/eclair: fix deviation of MISRA C Rule 16.3

Add missing escape for the final dot of the fallthrough comment, extend the search of a fallthrough comment up to 2 lines after the last statement and improve the text of the justification.

Fixes a128d8da91 ("automation/eclair: add deviations for MISRA C:2012 Rule 16.3")
---
 automation/eclair_analysis/ECLAIR/deviations.ecl | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
automation/eclair_analysis/ECLAIR/deviations.ecl +2 -3
index 0af1cb93d1..88b49c23d8 100644
@@ -482,9 +482,8 @@ safe."
 -config=MC3R1.R16.3,reports+={safe, "any_area(end_loc(any_exp(text(/BUG\\(\\);/))))"}
 -doc_end
 
--doc_begin="Switch clauses not ending with the break statement are safe if an
-explicit comment indicating the fallthrough intention is present."
--config=MC3R1.R16.3,reports+={safe, "any_area(end_loc(any_exp(text(^(?s).*/\\* [fF]all ?through.? \\*/.*$,0..1))))"}
+-doc_begin="Switch clauses ending with an explicit comment indicating the fallthrough intention are safe."
+-config=MC3R1.R16.3,reports+={safe, "any_area(end_loc(any_exp(text(^(?s).*/\\* [fF]all ?through\\.? \\*/.*$,0..2))))"}
 -doc_end
 
 -doc_begin="Switch statements having a controlling expression of enum type deliberately do not have a default case: gcc -Wall enables -Wswitch which warns (and breaks the build as we use -Werror) if one of the enum labels is missing from the switch."
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/8 x86/vpmu: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

In reply to Federico Serafini

Add missing break statements to address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

No functional change.

---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c       | 3 +++
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c +3 -0
index a7bc0cd1fc..b2ba999412 100644
@@ -663,6 +663,8 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(
 
         if ( pmu_params.version.maj != XENPMU_VER_MAJ )
             return -EINVAL;
+
+        break;
     }
 
     switch ( op )
@@ -776,6 +778,7 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(
 
     default:
         ret = -EINVAL;
+        break;
     }
 
     return ret;
xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c +2 -0
index cd414165df..26dd3a9358 100644
@@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ static int cf_check core2_vpmu_do_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
 
             xen_pmu_cntr_pair[tmp].control = msr_content;
         }
+        break;
     }
 
     if ( type != MSR_TYPE_GLOBAL )
@@ -713,6 +714,7 @@ static int cf_check core2_vpmu_do_rdmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
             break;
         default:
             rdmsrl(msr, *msr_content);
+            break;
         }
     }
     else if ( msr == MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/8 x86/traps: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

In reply to Federico Serafini

Add break or pseudo keyword fallthrough to address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

No functional change.

---
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
xen/arch/x86/traps.c +3 -0
index ee91fc56b1..7a9299ae6c 100644
@@ -1186,6 +1186,7 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        break;
     }
 }
 
@@ -1748,6 +1749,7 @@ static void io_check_error(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     {
     case 'd': /* 'dom0' */
         nmi_hwdom_report(_XEN_NMIREASON_io_error);
+        break;
     case 'i': /* 'ignore' */
         break;
     default:  /* 'fatal' */
@@ -1768,6 +1770,7 @@ static void unknown_nmi_error(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
     {
     case 'd': /* 'dom0' */
         nmi_hwdom_report(_XEN_NMIREASON_unknown);
+        break;
     case 'i': /* 'ignore' */
         break;
     default:  /* 'fatal' */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v5 4/8 x86/mce: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

In reply to Federico Serafini

Add missing break statements to address violations of
MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

No functional change.

---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c   | 1 +
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c +1 -0
index 3318b8204f..4f06a3153b 100644
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static void mcequirk_amd_apply(enum mcequirk_amd_flags flags)
 
     default:
         ASSERT(flags == MCEQUIRK_NONE);
+        break;
     }
 }
 
xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c +2 -0
index dd812f4b8a..9574dedbfd 100644
@@ -896,6 +896,8 @@ static void intel_init_ppin(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
             ppin_msr = 0;
         else if ( c == &boot_cpu_data )
             ppin_msr = MSR_PPIN;
+
+        break;
     }
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v5 5/8 x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

In reply to Federico Serafini

MISRA C Rule 16.3 states that "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Add pseudo keyword fallthrough or missing break statement to address violations of the rule.

---
Changes in v5:
- separate mechanical changes from the ones that report an error to the caller (see patch 6 of this series).
Changes in v4:
- do not separate different parts of HVM in different patches;
- re-arrange fallthrough positioning to comply with Coverity. Changes in v3:
- squashed here modifications of pmtimer.c;
- no blank line after fallthrough;
- better indentation of fallthrough.

---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c   | 11 ++++++-----
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c       |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c       |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c   |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c   |  2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c    |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c   |  3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c  |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpic.c      |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c       |  3 +--
 11 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +6 -5
index 02e378365b..135aa6fc22 100644
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
     }
     case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-        /* Fall-through */
+        fallthrough;
     default:
         BUG();
     }
@@ -396,8 +396,7 @@ static int hvmemul_acquire_page(unsigned long gmfn, struct page_info **page)
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-        /* Fallthrough */
-
+        fallthrough;
     case -EINVAL:
         return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
     }
@@ -2764,6 +2763,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long gla)
         /* fallthrough */
     default:
         hvm_emulate_writeback(&ctxt);
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
@@ -2799,10 +2799,11 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, unsigned int trapnr,
         memcpy(hvio->mmio_insn, curr->arch.vm_event->emul.insn.data,
                hvio->mmio_insn_bytes);
     }
-    /* Fall-through */
+        fallthrough;
     default:
         ctx.set_context = (kind == EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT_DATA);
         rc = hvm_emulate_one(&ctx, VIO_no_completion);
+        break;
     }
 
     switch ( rc )
@@ -2818,7 +2819,7 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, unsigned int trapnr,
     case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
         if ( hvm_monitor_emul_unimplemented() )
             return;
-        /* fall-through */
+        fallthrough;
     case X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE:
         hvm_dump_emulation_state(XENLOG_G_DEBUG, "Mem event", &ctx, rc);
         hvm_inject_hw_exception(trapnr, errcode);
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +1 -0
index 7f4b627b1f..1d32f473a4 100644
@@ -5283,6 +5283,7 @@ void hvm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
          * %cs and %tr are unconditionally present.  SVM ignores these present
          * bits and will happily run without them set.
          */
+        fallthrough;
     case x86_seg_cs:
         reg->p = 1;
         break;
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c +1 -1
index 7fb3136f0c..c1bd17571e 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int hvm_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     {
     case 8:
         eax = regs->rax;
-        /* Fallthrough to permission check. */
+        fallthrough;
     case 4:
     case 2:
         if ( currd->arch.monitor.guest_request_userspace_enabled &&
xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c +1 -0
index 210cebb0e6..1eab44defc 100644
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static void hvm_set_callback_irq_level(struct vcpu *v)
             __hvm_pci_intx_assert(d, pdev, pintx);
         else
             __hvm_pci_intx_deassert(d, pdev, pintx);
+        break;
     default:
         break;
     }
xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c +1 -0
index 97099ac305..87a7a01c9f 100644
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static int cf_check handle_evt_io(
                 gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, 
                          "Bad ACPI PM register write: %x bytes (%x) at %x\n", 
                          bytes, *val, port);
+                break;
             }
         }
         /* Fix up the SCI state to match the new register state */
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +2 -0
index 988250dbc1..92bb10c504 100644
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ static void cf_check svm_get_segment_register(
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
         domain_crash(v->domain);
         *reg = (struct segment_register){};
+        break;
     }
 }
 
@@ -2416,6 +2417,7 @@ static void cf_check svm_set_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, uint64_t val)
         printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%s(%pv, 0x%08x, 0x%016"PRIx64") Bad register\n",
                __func__, v, reg, val);
         domain_crash(d);
+        break;
     }
 }
 
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +1 -0
index 9cfc82666a..2ec9594271 100644
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ static void vlapic_accept_irq(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t icr_low)
         gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "TODO: unsupported delivery mode in ICR %x\n",
                  icr_low);
         domain_crash(v->domain);
+        break;
     }
 }
 
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +2 -1
index f16faa6a61..46911c3e1c 100644
@@ -2745,6 +2745,7 @@ static void cf_check vmx_set_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, uint64_t val)
         printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%s(%pv, 0x%08x, 0x%016"PRIx64") Bad register\n",
                __func__, v, reg, val);
         domain_crash(d);
+        break;
     }
     vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
 }
@@ -3393,7 +3394,7 @@ static int cf_check vmx_msr_read_intercept(
         *msr_content |= MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL |
                        MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL;
         /* Perhaps vpmu will change some bits. */
-        /* FALLTHROUGH */
+        fallthrough;
     case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0)...MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
     case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(0)...MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(3):
     case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0...MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2:
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +1 -0
index 39290c9861..c05e0e9326 100644
@@ -2768,6 +2768,7 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
         gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unhandled nested vmexit: reason %u\n",
                 exit_reason);
         domain_crash(v->domain);
+        break;
     }
 
     return ( nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending == 1 );
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpic.c +1 -0
index 7c3b5c7254..6427b08086 100644
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ static void vpic_ioport_write(
             if ( !(vpic->init_state & 8) )
                 break; /* CASCADE mode: wait for write to ICW3. */
             /* SNGL mode: fall through (no ICW3). */
+            fallthrough;
         case 2:
             /* ICW3 */
             vpic->init_state++;
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c +1 -2
index e1d6845a28..5e7b9a9f66 100644
@@ -119,8 +119,7 @@ static int pt_irq_masked(struct periodic_time *pt)
 
         gsi = hvm_isa_irq_to_gsi(pt->irq);
     }
-
-    /* Fallthrough to check if the interrupt is masked on the IO APIC. */
+        fallthrough;
     case PTSRC_ioapic:
     {
         int mask = vioapic_get_mask(v->domain, gsi);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Acked-by on v5 5/8
#6 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 5/8] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

Quoted 7 lines · Federico Serafini

MISRA C Rule 16.3 states that "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Add pseudo keyword fallthrough or missing break statement to address violations of the rule.

#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 6/8 x86/hvm: add defensive statements in unreachable program points

In reply to Federico Serafini

As a defensive measure, make sure to signal an error to the caller if an unreachable program point is reached.

---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c  | 1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c      | 4 ++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +1 -0
index 135aa6fc22..b6ca5cb9d1 100644
@@ -2673,6 +2673,7 @@ static int _hvm_emulate_one(struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt,
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
     }
 
     if ( hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.retire.singlestep )
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +4 -0
index 1d32f473a4..d7f195ba9a 100644
@@ -4919,6 +4919,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
  out:
@@ -5020,6 +5022,8 @@ static int compat_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +2 -0
index 9b6dc51f36..5787110a56 100644
@@ -1446,6 +1446,7 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        break;
     }
 
     if ( !start )
@@ -1598,6 +1599,7 @@ int vmx_del_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        return -EINVAL;
     }
 
     if ( !start )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH v5 7/8 x86/mm: add defensive return

In reply to Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +1 -0
index 95795567f2..8973e76dff 100644
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
                 return 0;
             default:
                 ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+                return -EPERM;
             }
         }
         else if ( l1f & _PAGE_RW )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Reviewed-by on v5 7/8
#10 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 23 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +1 -0
index 95795567f2..8973e76dff 100644
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
                 return 0;
             default:
                 ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+                return -EPERM;
             }
         }
         else if ( l1f & _PAGE_RW )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#11 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 13 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 3 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

Looking at the older threads, I looks like Jan suggested EACCES, I also think it is marginally better. My R-b stands also for EACCES. Jan, I think you should go ahead and fix on commit

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 20 lines
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
xen/arch/x86/mm.c +1 -0
index 95795567f2..8973e76dff 100644
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
                 return 0;
             default:
                 ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+                return -EPERM;
             }
         }
         else if ( l1f & _PAGE_RW )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#12 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 11 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 10 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

Looking at the older threads, I looks like Jan suggested EACCES, I also think it is marginally better. My R-b stands also for EACCES. Jan, I think you should go ahead and fix on commit

No, I very definitely want a 2nd x86 maintainer opinion here. Or a better suggestion for the error code to use by anyone. After all, as you confirm, EACCES is only marginally better.

Jan

#13 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 16 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 15 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 13 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 3 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Looking at the older threads, I looks like Jan suggested EACCES, I also think it is marginally better. My R-b stands also for EACCES. Jan, I think you should go ahead and fix on commit

No, I very definitely want a 2nd x86 maintainer opinion here. Or a better suggestion for the error code to use by anyone. After all, as you confirm, EACCES is only marginally better.

Hm, the only alternative I could suggest is using ERANGE, to signal the value of opt_mmio_relax is out of the expected range, however that could be confusing for the callers?

One benefit of using ERANGE is that there's currently no return path in get_page_from_l1e() with that error code, so it would be very easy to spot when an unexpected value of opt_mmio_relax is found. However there are no guarantees that further error paths might use that error code.

Thanks, Roger.

#14 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 25 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 13 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 12 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 3 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Looking at the older threads, I looks like Jan suggested EACCES, I also think it is marginally better. My R-b stands also for EACCES. Jan, I think you should go ahead and fix on commit

No, I very definitely want a 2nd x86 maintainer opinion here. Or a better suggestion for the error code to use by anyone. After all, as you confirm, EACCES is only marginally better.

Hm, the only alternative I could suggest is using ERANGE, to signal the value of opt_mmio_relax is out of the expected range, however that could be confusing for the callers?

Quoted 5 lines

One benefit of using ERANGE is that there's currently no return path in get_page_from_l1e() with that error code, so it would be very easy to spot when an unexpected value of opt_mmio_relax is found. However there are no guarantees that further error paths might use that error code.

EPERM and EACCES are both very wrong here.  They imply something that is simply not appropriate in this context.

We use EILSEQ elsewhere for believed-impossible conditions where we need an errno of some kind.  I suggest we use it here too.

~Andrew

Reviewed-by
#15 lore raw

Re: [XEN PATCH v5 7/8] x86/mm: add defensive return

Quoted 32 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 25 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 13 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 12 lines · Stefano Stabellini
Quoted 6 lines · Federico Serafini

Add defensive return statement at the end of an unreachable default case. Other than improve safety, this meets the requirements to deviate a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

Quoted 3 lines

---
No changes from v3 and v4, further feedback on this thread would be appreciated:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-07/msg00474.html

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Looking at the older threads, I looks like Jan suggested EACCES, I also think it is marginally better. My R-b stands also for EACCES. Jan, I think you should go ahead and fix on commit

No, I very definitely want a 2nd x86 maintainer opinion here. Or a better suggestion for the error code to use by anyone. After all, as you confirm, EACCES is only marginally better.

Hm, the only alternative I could suggest is using ERANGE, to signal the value of opt_mmio_relax is out of the expected range, however that could be confusing for the callers?

Quoted 5 lines

One benefit of using ERANGE is that there's currently no return path in get_page_from_l1e() with that error code, so it would be very easy to spot when an unexpected value of opt_mmio_relax is found. However there are no guarantees that further error paths might use that error code.

Quoted 5 lines

EPERM and EACCES are both very wrong here.  They imply something that is simply not appropriate in this context.

We use EILSEQ elsewhere for believed-impossible conditions where we need an errno of some kind.  I suggest we use it here too.

Fine with me. With that:

Thanks.

#16 lore raw

PATCH v5 8/8 x86/mpparse: address a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3

In reply to Federico Serafini

Add a missing break statement to address a violation of MISRA C Rule 16.3: "An unconditional `break' statement shall terminate every switch-clause".

No functional change.

---
 xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c +1 -0
index d8ccab2449..306d8ed97a 100644
@@ -544,6 +544,7 @@ static inline void __init construct_default_ISA_mptable(int mpc_default_type)
 		case 4:
 		case 7:
 			memcpy(bus.mpc_bustype, "MCA   ", 6);
+			break;
 	}
 	MP_bus_info(&bus);
 	if (mpc_default_type > 4) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1