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io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

PATCH Applied Paul Moore 2 participants 7 messages Jan 23, 2024

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Paul Moore

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

The second change is to disable the io_uring credential override functionality, also known as io_uring "personalities", in the FD_INSTALL command. The credential override in FD_INSTALL is particularly problematic as it affects the credentials used in the security_file_receive() LSM hook. If a task were to request a credential override via REQ_F_CREDS on a FD_INSTALL operation, the LSM would incorrectly check to see if the overridden credentials of the io_uring were able to "receive" the file as opposed to the task's credentials. After discussions upstream, it's difficult to imagine a use case where we would want to allow a credential override on a FD_INSTALL operation so we are simply going to block REQ_F_CREDS on IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operations.

Fixes dc18b89ab113 ("io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL")
---
 io_uring/opdef.c     | 1 -
 io_uring/openclose.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/opdef.c +0 -1
index 6705634e5f52..b1ee3a9c3807 100644
@@ -471,7 +471,6 @@ const struct io_issue_def io_issue_defs[] = {
 	},
 	[IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL] = {
 		.needs_file		= 1,
-		.audit_skip		= 1,
 		.prep			= io_install_fixed_fd_prep,
 		.issue			= io_install_fixed_fd,
 	},
io_uring/openclose.c +4 -0
index 0fe0dd305546..e3357dfa14ca 100644
@@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sq
 	if (flags & ~IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* ensure the task's creds are used when installing/receiving fds */
+	if (req->flags & REQ_F_CREDS)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* default to O_CLOEXEC, disable if IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC is set */
 	ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
 	ifi->o_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · Paul Moore

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

The second change is to disable the io_uring credential override functionality, also known as io_uring "personalities", in the FD_INSTALL command. The credential override in FD_INSTALL is particularly problematic as it affects the credentials used in the security_file_receive() LSM hook. If a task were to request a credential override via REQ_F_CREDS on a FD_INSTALL operation, the LSM would incorrectly check to see if the overridden credentials of the io_uring were able to "receive" the file as opposed to the task's credentials. After discussions upstream, it's difficult to imagine a use case where we would want to allow a credential override on a FD_INSTALL operation so we are simply going to block REQ_F_CREDS on IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operations.

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes dc18b89ab113 ("io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL")
---
 io_uring/opdef.c     | 1 -
 io_uring/openclose.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Not having an IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL test handy I only did some basic sanity tests before posting, I would appreciate it if the io_uring folks could run this through whatever FD_INSTALL tests you have.

Quoted 29 lines
io_uring/opdef.c +0 -1
index 6705634e5f52..b1ee3a9c3807 100644
@@ -471,7 +471,6 @@ const struct io_issue_def io_issue_defs[] = {
        },
        [IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL] = {
                .needs_file             = 1,
-               .audit_skip             = 1,
                .prep                   = io_install_fixed_fd_prep,
                .issue                  = io_install_fixed_fd,
        },
io_uring/openclose.c +4 -1
index 0fe0dd305546..e3357dfa14ca 100644
@@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sq
        if (flags & ~IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC)
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       /* ensure the task's creds are used when installing/receiving fds */
+       if (req->flags & REQ_F_CREDS)
+               return -EPERM;
+
        /* default to O_CLOEXEC, disable if IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC is set */
        ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
        ifi->o_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
--

2.43.0

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 24 lines · On Tue, Jan 23, 2024 at 4:55?PM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

The second change is to disable the io_uring credential override functionality, also known as io_uring "personalities", in the FD_INSTALL command. The credential override in FD_INSTALL is particularly problematic as it affects the credentials used in the security_file_receive() LSM hook. If a task were to request a credential override via REQ_F_CREDS on a FD_INSTALL operation, the LSM would incorrectly check to see if the overridden credentials of the io_uring were able to "receive" the file as opposed to the task's credentials. After discussions upstream, it's difficult to imagine a use case where we would want to allow a credential override on a FD_INSTALL operation so we are simply going to block REQ_F_CREDS on IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operations.

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes dc18b89ab113 ("io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL")
---
 io_uring/opdef.c     | 1 -
 io_uring/openclose.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 4 lines

Not having an IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL test handy I only did some basic sanity tests before posting, I would appreciate it if the io_uring folks could run this through whatever FD_INSTALL tests you have.

You bet, I'm going to augment the existing test case with one that passes in creds as well just to verify that part fails as it should as well.

But looking at the patch, this will surely work.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Paul Moore
Quoted 11 lines · Paul Moore

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

      commit: 16bae3e1377846734ec6b87eee459c0f3551692c

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

      commit: 16bae3e1377846734ec6b87eee459c0f3551692c

So after doing that and writing the test case and testing it, it dawned on me that we should potentially allow the current task creds. And to make matters worse, this is indeed what happens if eg the application would submit this with IOSQE_ASYNC or if it was part of a linked series and we marked it async.

While I originally reasoned for why this is fine as it'd be silly to register your current creds and then proceed to pass in that personality, I do think that we should probably handle that case and clearly separate the case of "we assigned creds from the submitting task because we're handing it to a thread" vs "the submitting task asked for other creds that were previously registered".

I'll take a look and see what works the best here.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 12 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

      commit: 16bae3e1377846734ec6b87eee459c0f3551692c

So after doing that and writing the test case and testing it, it dawned on me that we should potentially allow the current task creds. And to make matters worse, this is indeed what happens if eg the application would submit this with IOSQE_ASYNC or if it was part of a linked series and we marked it async.

Quoted 8 lines

While I originally reasoned for why this is fine as it'd be silly to register your current creds and then proceed to pass in that personality, I do think that we should probably handle that case and clearly separate the case of "we assigned creds from the submitting task because we're handing it to a thread" vs "the submitting task asked for other creds that were previously registered".

I'll take a look and see what works the best here.

Actually, a quick look and it's fine, the usual async offload will do the right thing. So let's just keep it as-is, I don't think there's any point to complicating this for some theoretically-valid-but-obscure use case!

FWIW, the test case is here, and I'll augment it now to add IOSQE_ASYNC as well just to cover all the bases.

https://git.kernel.dk/cgit/liburing/commit/?id=bc576ca398661b266d3e4a4f5db3a9cf7f33fe62

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
author maintainer
#6 lore raw
Quoted 34 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 33 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 12 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL command to take into account the security implications of making an io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users may want to audit.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL

      commit: 16bae3e1377846734ec6b87eee459c0f3551692c

So after doing that and writing the test case and testing it, it dawned on me that we should potentially allow the current task creds. And to make matters worse, this is indeed what happens if eg the application would submit this with IOSQE_ASYNC or if it was part of a linked series and we marked it async.

While I originally reasoned for why this is fine as it'd be silly to register your current creds and then proceed to pass in that personality, I do think that we should probably handle that case and clearly separate the case of "we assigned creds from the submitting task because we're handing it to a thread" vs "the submitting task asked for other creds that were previously registered".

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

I'll take a look and see what works the best here.

Actually, a quick look and it's fine, the usual async offload will do the right thing. So let's just keep it as-is, I don't think there's any point to complicating this for some theoretically-valid-but-obscure use case!

Perhaps the one case where REQ_F_CREDS is our friend for FD_INSTALL ;)

Quoted 4 lines

FWIW, the test case is here, and I'll augment it now to add IOSQE_ASYNC as well just to cover all the bases.

https://git.kernel.dk/cgit/liburing/commit/?id=bc576ca398661b266d3e4a4f5db3a9cf7f33fe62

Great, thanks!

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com