Fix slab out-of-bounds on insufficient headroom for IPv6 packets
Subsystems (3)
cover Fix slab out-of-bounds on insufficient headroom for IPv6 packets
Patch 1/2 fixes a slab out-of-bounds occurring with short SCTP packets over IPv4 over L2TP over IPv6 on a configuration with relatively low HEADER_MAX.
Patch 2/2 makes sure we panic in neigh_hh_output() instead of silently writing before the allocated buffer in case the headroom is enough for the unaligned hardware header size, but not enough for the aligned one.
Stefano Brivio (2):
ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options
neighbour: BUG_ON() writing before skb->head in neigh_hh_output()
include/net/neighbour.h | 8 ++++++-- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
PATCH 1/2 ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options
Even if we send an IPv6 packet without options, MAX_HEADER might not be enough to account for the additional headroom required by alignment of hardware headers.
On a configuration without HYPERV_NET, WLAN, AX25, and with IPV6_TUNNEL, sending short SCTP packets over IPv4 over L2TP over IPv6, we start with 100 bytes of allocated headroom in sctp_packet_transmit(), end up with 54 bytes after l2tp_xmit_skb(), and 14 bytes in ip6_finish_output2().
Those would be enough to append our 14 bytes header, but we're going to align that to 16 bytes, and write 2 bytes out of the allocated slab in neigh_hh_output().
KASan says:
[ 264.967848] ================================================================== [ 264.967861] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_finish_output2+0x1aec/0x1c70 [ 264.967866] Write of size 16 at addr 000000006af1c7fe by task netperf/6201 [ 264.967870] [ 264.967876] CPU: 0 PID: 6201 Comm: netperf Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4+ #1 [ 264.967881] Hardware name: IBM 2827 H43 400 (z/VM 6.4.0) [ 264.967887] Call Trace: [ 264.967896] ([<00000000001347d6>] show_stack+0x56/0xa0) [ 264.967903] [<00000000017e379c>] dump_stack+0x23c/0x290 [ 264.967912] [<00000000007bc594>] print_address_description+0xf4/0x290 [ 264.967919] [<00000000007bc8fc>] kasan_report+0x13c/0x240 [ 264.967927] [<000000000162f5e4>] ip6_finish_output2+0x1aec/0x1c70 [ 264.967935] [<000000000163f890>] ip6_finish_output+0x430/0x7f0 [ 264.967943] [<000000000163fe44>] ip6_output+0x1f4/0x580 [ 264.967953] [<000000000163882a>] ip6_xmit+0xfea/0x1ce8 [ 264.967963] [<00000000017396e2>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x282/0x3f8 [ 264.968033] [<000003ff805fb0ba>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0xe02/0x13e0 [l2tp_core] [ 264.968037] [<000003ff80631192>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0xda/0x150 [l2tp_eth] [ 264.968041] [<0000000001220020>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x268/0x928 [ 264.968069] [<0000000001330e8e>] sch_direct_xmit+0x7ae/0x1350 [ 264.968071] [<000000000122359c>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2b7c/0x3478 [ 264.968075] [<00000000013d2862>] ip_finish_output2+0xce2/0x11a0 [ 264.968078] [<00000000013d9b14>] ip_finish_output+0x56c/0x8c8 [ 264.968081] [<00000000013ddd1e>] ip_output+0x226/0x4c0 [ 264.968083] [<00000000013dbd6c>] __ip_queue_xmit+0x894/0x1938 [ 264.968100] [<000003ff80bc3a5c>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x29d4/0x3648 [sctp] [ 264.968116] [<000003ff80b7bf68>] sctp_outq_flush_ctrl.constprop.5+0x8d0/0xe50 [sctp] [ 264.968131] [<000003ff80b7c716>] sctp_outq_flush+0x22e/0x7d8 [sctp] [ 264.968146] [<000003ff80b35c68>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.16+0x530/0x6800 [sctp] [ 264.968161] [<000003ff80b3410a>] sctp_do_sm+0x222/0x648 [sctp] [ 264.968177] [<000003ff80bbddac>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0xbc/0xf8 [sctp] [ 264.968192] [<000003ff80b93328>] __sctp_connect+0x830/0xc20 [sctp] [ 264.968208] [<000003ff80bb11ce>] sctp_inet_connect+0x2e6/0x378 [sctp] [ 264.968212] [<0000000001197942>] __sys_connect+0x21a/0x450 [ 264.968215] [<000000000119aff8>] sys_socketcall+0x3d0/0xb08 [ 264.968218] [<000000000184ea7a>] system_call+0x2a2/0x2c0
[...]
Just like ip_finish_output2() does for IPv4, check that we have enough headroom in ip6_xmit(), and reallocate it if we don't.
This issue is older than git history.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +21 -21
@@ -195,37 +195,37 @@ int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6,const struct ipv6_pinfo *np =inet6_sk (sk);struct in6_addr *first_hop = &fl6->daddr;struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb); +unsigned int head_room;struct ipv6hdr *hdr;u8 proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;int seg_len = skb->len;int hlimit =-1 ;u32 mtu; -if (opt) { -unsigned int head_room; + head_room =sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) +LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev); +if (opt) + head_room += opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen; -/* First: exthdrs may take lots of space (~8K for now) -MAX_HEADER is not enough. -*/ - head_room = opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen; - seg_len += head_room; - head_room +=sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) +LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev); - -if (skb_headroom (skb) < head_room) { -struct sk_buff *skb2 =skb_realloc_headroom (skb, head_room); -if (!skb2) { -IP6_INC_STATS (net,ip6_dst_idev (skb_dst (skb)), -IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS ); -kfree_skb (skb); -return -ENOBUFS ; - } -if (skb->sk) -skb_set_owner_w (skb2, skb->sk); -consume_skb (skb); - skb = skb2; +if (unlikely (skb_headroom (skb) < head_room)) { +struct sk_buff *skb2 =skb_realloc_headroom (skb, head_room); +if (!skb2) { +IP6_INC_STATS (net,ip6_dst_idev (skb_dst (skb)), +IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS ); +kfree_skb (skb); +return -ENOBUFS ; } +if (skb->sk) +skb_set_owner_w (skb2, skb->sk); +consume_skb (skb); + skb = skb2; + } + +if (opt) { + seg_len += opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen; +if (opt->opt_flen)ipv6_push_frag_opts (skb, opt, &proto); +if (opt->opt_nflen)ipv6_push_nfrag_opts (skb, opt, &proto, &first_hop, &fl6->saddr);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
PATCH 2/2 neighbour: BUG_ON() writing before skb->head in neigh_hh_output()
In reply to Stefano BrivioWhile skb_push() makes the kernel panic if the skb headroom is less than the unaligned hardware header size in neigh_hh_output(), it will proceed silently in case we copy more than that because of alignment.
In the case fixed by the previous patch,
"ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options", we end up in neigh_hh_output() with 14 bytes headroom, 14 bytes hardware header and write 16 bytes, starting 2 bytes before the allocated buffer.
Panic, instead of silently corrupting adjacent slabs.
--- include/net/neighbour.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/neighbour.h +6 -2
@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ static inline int neigh_hh_bridge(struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb)static inline int neigh_hh_output (const struct hh_cache *hh,struct sk_buff *skb) { +unsigned int hh_alen =0 ;unsigned int seq;unsigned int hh_len;
@@ -461,15 +462,18 @@ static inline int neigh_hh_output(const struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb seq =read_seqbegin (&hh->hh_lock); hh_len = hh->hh_len;if (likely (hh_len <=HH_DATA_MOD )) { + hh_alen =HH_DATA_MOD ;/* this is inlined by gcc */ memcpy (skb->data -HH_DATA_MOD , hh->hh_data,HH_DATA_MOD ); }else { -unsigned int hh_alen =HH_DATA_ALIGN (hh_len); - + hh_alen =HH_DATA_ALIGN (hh_len);memcpy (skb->data - hh_alen, hh->hh_data, hh_alen); } }while (read_seqretry (&hh->hh_lock, seq)); +/* skb_push() won't panic if we have room for the unaligned size only */ +BUG_ON (skb_headroom (skb) < hh_alen); +skb_push (skb, hh_len);return dev_queue_xmit (skb); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CANn89i+VoX7LNq4uGztJvH3EVzbE=Rhab=erkCOzHo3xyWBExg@mail.gmail.com
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] neighbour: BUG_ON() writing before skb->head in neigh_hh_output()
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:26:05 -0800 Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines
+ /*
skb_push()won't panic if we have room for the unaligned size
only */
+BUG_ON(skb_headroom(skb) < hh_alen);What about avoiding the panic and instead call
kfree_skb()?if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_headroom(skb) < hh_alen)) { kfree_skb(skb); return NET_XMIT_DROP; }
Okay, I guess it won't go unnoticed anyway, and it's probably better than the alternative.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
+
skb_push(skb, hh_len);Maybe we can use
__skb_push()here, since prior safety check should be enough ?
Indeed, I'll change that in v2. Thanks!
Signature · 1 line
Stefano