Fix BPF probe memory helpers

index d4ee6e942562..38555435a64a 100644
@@ -337,6 +337,18 @@ extern long __probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size);
 extern long notrace probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
 extern long notrace __probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
 
+/*
+ * probe_user_write(): safely attempt to write to a location in user space
+ * @dst: address to write to
+ * @src: pointer to the data that shall be written
+ * @size: size of the data chunk
+ *
+ * Safely write to address @dst from the buffer at @src.  If a kernel fault
+ * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
+ */
+extern long notrace probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
+extern long notrace __probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
+
 extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count);
 extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr,
 				     long count);

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new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fcc55a7cbde2
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+static __always_inline u64 canonical_address(u64 vaddr, u8 vaddr_bits)
+{
+	return ((s64)vaddr << (64 - vaddr_bits)) >> (64 - vaddr_bits);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool non_canonical_address(u64 vaddr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	return canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits) != vaddr;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+{
+	u64 addr = (unsigned long)src;
+
+	if (unlikely(addr < TASK_SIZE_MAX || non_canonical_address(addr)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size);
+}
+
+long strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
+{
+	u64 addr = (unsigned long)unsafe_addr;
+
+	if (unlikely(addr < TASK_SIZE_MAX || non_canonical_address(addr)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return __strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_addr, count);
+}

index 38555435a64a..67f016010aad 100644
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, const void __user *src,
  * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
  */
 extern long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
+extern long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
 extern long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
 
 /*

@@ -350,6 +351,9 @@ extern long notrace probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t s
 extern long notrace __probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
 
 extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count);
+extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
+				       long count);
+extern long __strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count);
 extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr,
 				     long count);
 extern long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count);

index 2d3c3d01064c..3ca8d97e5010 100644
@@ -43,11 +43,20 @@ probe_write_common(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
  * do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem.  This makes
  * probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
  * already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem.
+ *
+ * probe_kernel_read_strict() is the same as probe_kernel_read() except for
+ * the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
+ * ranges: probe_kernel_read_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
+ * probing memory on a user address range where probe_user_read() is supposed
+ * to be used instead.
  */
 
 long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
     __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
 
+long __weak probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+    __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
+
 long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
 {
 	long ret;

@@ -157,8 +166,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_write);
  *
  * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
  * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
+ *
+ * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() is the same as strncpy_from_unsafe() except
+ * for the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
+ * ranges: strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
+ * probing memory on a user address range where strncpy_from_unsafe_user() is
+ * supposed to be used instead.
  */
-long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
+
+long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
+    __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
+
+long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
+				       long count)
+    __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
+
+long __strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
 {
 	mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
 	const void *src = unsafe_addr;

index 571c25d60710..91eb17ac4bb6 100644
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = {
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
+BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void __user *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
 	   u32, size)
 {
 	/*

@@ -186,10 +186,8 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (unlikely(!nmi_uaccess_okay()))
 		return -EPERM;
-	if (!access_ok(unsafe_ptr, size))
-		return -EPERM;
 
-	return probe_kernel_write(unsafe_ptr, src, size);
+	return probe_user_write(unsafe_ptr, src, size);
 }
 
 static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_write_user_proto = {

index 4af8b0819a32..41855b53e8ff 100644
@@ -561,10 +561,13 @@ union bpf_attr {
  * 	Return
  * 		0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure.
  *
- * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *src)
+ * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
  * 	Description
  * 		For tracing programs, safely attempt to read *size* bytes from
- * 		address *src* and store the data in *dst*.
+ * 		kernel space address *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*.
+ *
+ * 		Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user() or bpf_probe_read_kernel()
+ * 		instead.
  * 	Return
  * 		0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure.
  *

@@ -1428,43 +1431,12 @@ union bpf_attr {
  *
  * int bpf_probe_read_str(void *dst, int size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
  * 	Description
- * 		Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe address
- * 		*unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the
- * 		terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than
- * 		*size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the
- * 		string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are
- * 		copied and the last byte is set to NUL.
- *
- * 		On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This
- * 		makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading
- * 		strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See
- * 		the following snippet:
- *
- * 		::
- *
- * 			SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
- * 			void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
- * 			{
- * 			        char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256
- * 			        int res = bpf_probe_read_str(buf, sizeof(buf),
- * 				                             ctx->di);
- *
- * 				// Consume buf, for example push it to
- * 				// userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we
- * 				// can use res (the string length) as event
- * 				// size, after checking its boundaries.
- * 			}
- *
- * 		In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read()** helper here instead
- * 		to read the string would require to estimate the length at
- * 		compile time, and would often result in copying more memory
- * 		than necessary.
+ * 		Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address
+ * 		*unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. See bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() for
+ * 		more details.
  *
- * 		Another useful use case is when parsing individual process
- * 		arguments or individual environment variables navigating
- * 		*current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\
- * 		**->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value,
- * 		one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area.
+ * 		Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user_str() or bpf_probe_read_kernel_str()
+ * 		instead.
  * 	Return
  * 		On success, the strictly positive length of the string,
  * 		including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative

@@ -2775,6 +2747,72 @@ union bpf_attr {
  * 		restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs.
  * 	Return
  * 		0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure.
+ *
+ * int bpf_probe_read_user(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
+ * 	Description
+ * 		Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from user space address
+ * 		*unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*.
+ * 	Return
+ * 		0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure.
+ *
+ * int bpf_probe_read_kernel(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
+ * 	Description
+ * 		Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from kernel space address
+ * 		*unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*.
+ * 	Return
+ * 		0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure.
+ *
+ * int bpf_probe_read_user_str(void *dst, int size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
+ * 	Description
+ * 		Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe user address
+ * 		*unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the
+ * 		terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than
+ * 		*size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the
+ * 		string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are
+ * 		copied and the last byte is set to NUL.
+ *
+ * 		On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This
+ * 		makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading
+ * 		strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See
+ * 		the following snippet:
+ *
+ * 		::
+ *
+ * 			SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
+ * 			void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
+ * 			{
+ * 			        char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256
+ * 			        int res = bpf_probe_read_user_str(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ * 				                                  ctx->di);
+ *
+ * 				// Consume buf, for example push it to
+ * 				// userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we
+ * 				// can use res (the string length) as event
+ * 				// size, after checking its boundaries.
+ * 			}
+ *
+ * 		In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read_user()** helper here
+ * 		instead to read the string would require to estimate the length
+ * 		at compile time, and would often result in copying more memory
+ * 		than necessary.
+ *
+ * 		Another useful use case is when parsing individual process
+ * 		arguments or individual environment variables navigating
+ * 		*current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\
+ * 		**->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value,
+ * 		one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area.
+ * 	Return
+ * 		On success, the strictly positive length of the string,
+ * 		including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative
+ * 		value.
+ *
+ * int bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(void *dst, int size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
+ * 	Description
+ * 		Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address *unsafe_ptr*
+ * 		to *dst*. Same semantics as with bpf_probe_read_user_str() apply.
+ * 	Return
+ * 		On success, the strictly positive length of the string,	including
+ * 		the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative value.
  */
 #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN)		\
 	FN(unspec),			\

@@ -2888,7 +2926,11 @@ union bpf_attr {
 	FN(sk_storage_delete),		\
 	FN(send_signal),		\
 	FN(tcp_gen_syncookie),		\
-	FN(skb_output),
+	FN(skb_output),			\
+	FN(probe_read_user),		\
+	FN(probe_read_kernel),		\
+	FN(probe_read_user_str),	\
+	FN(probe_read_kernel_str),
 
 /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper
  * function eBPF program intends to call

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index 673f5d40a93e..76452326fd8e 100644
@@ -1309,11 +1309,12 @@ bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code)
 }
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
-u64 __weak bpf_probe_read(void * dst, u32 size, const void * unsafe_ptr)
+u64 __weak bpf_probe_read_kernel(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
 {
 	memset(dst, 0, size);
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
+
 /**
  *	__bpf_prog_run - run eBPF program on a given context
  *	@regs: is the array of MAX_BPF_EXT_REG eBPF pseudo-registers

@@ -1569,9 +1570,9 @@ static u64 __no_fgcse ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u6
 	LDST(W,  u32)
 	LDST(DW, u64)
 #undef LDST
-#define LDX_PROBE(SIZEOP, SIZE)						\
-	LDX_PROBE_MEM_##SIZEOP:						\
-		bpf_probe_read(&DST, SIZE, (const void *)(long) SRC);	\
+#define LDX_PROBE(SIZEOP, SIZE)							\
+	LDX_PROBE_MEM_##SIZEOP:							\
+		bpf_probe_read_kernel(&DST, SIZE, (const void *)(long) SRC);	\
 		CONT;
 	LDX_PROBE(B,  1)
 	LDX_PROBE(H,  2)

index 5c11aefbc489..281bcdaee58e 100644
@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ int stress_lru_hmap_alloc(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 	if (addrlen != sizeof(*in6))
 		return 0;
 
-	ret = bpf_probe_read(test_params.dst6, sizeof(test_params.dst6),
-			     &in6->sin6_addr);
+	ret = bpf_probe_read_user(test_params.dst6, sizeof(test_params.dst6),
+				  &in6->sin6_addr);
 	if (ret)
 		goto done;
 

index 4f80cbe74c72..32ee752f19df 100644
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int trace_sys_connect(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 	if (addrlen != sizeof(*in6))
 		return 0;
 
-	ret = bpf_probe_read(dst6, sizeof(dst6), &in6->sin6_addr);
+	ret = bpf_probe_read_user(dst6, sizeof(dst6), &in6->sin6_addr);
 	if (ret) {
 		inline_ret = ret;
 		goto done;

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int trace_sys_connect(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 
 	test_case = dst6[7];
 
-	ret = bpf_probe_read(&port, sizeof(port), &in6->sin6_port);
+	ret = bpf_probe_read_user(&port, sizeof(port), &in6->sin6_port);
 	if (ret) {
 		inline_ret = ret;
 		goto done;

index a543358218e6..b7c48f37132c 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int bpf_prog1(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 	if (sockaddr_len > sizeof(orig_addr))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (bpf_probe_read(&orig_addr, sizeof(orig_addr), sockaddr_arg) != 0)
+	if (bpf_probe_read_user(&orig_addr, sizeof(orig_addr), sockaddr_arg) != 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	mapped_addr = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&dnat_map, &orig_addr);

index 89af8a921ee4..489319ea1d6a 100644
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ int trace_kfree_skb(struct trace_kfree_skb *ctx)
 		func = ptr->func;
 	}));
 
-	bpf_probe_read(&pkt_type, sizeof(pkt_type), _(&skb->__pkt_type_offset));
+	bpf_probe_read_kernel(&pkt_type, sizeof(pkt_type), _(&skb->__pkt_type_offset));
 	pkt_type &= 7;
 
 	/* read eth proto */
-	bpf_probe_read(&pkt_data, sizeof(pkt_data), data + 12);
+	bpf_probe_read_kernel(&pkt_data, sizeof(pkt_data), data + 12);
 
 	bpf_printk("rcuhead.next %llx func %llx\n", ptr, func);
 	bpf_printk("skb->len %d users %d pkt_type %x\n",

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index 067eb625d01c..4bf16e0a1b0e 100644
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct strobe_map_raw {
 	/*
 	 * having volatile doesn't change anything on BPF side, but clang
 	 * emits warnings for passing `volatile const char *` into
-	 * bpf_probe_read_str that expects just `const char *`
+	 * bpf_probe_read_user_str that expects just `const char *`
 	 */
 	const char* tag;
 	/*

@@ -309,18 +309,18 @@ static __always_inline void *calc_location(struct strobe_value_loc *loc,
 	dtv_t *dtv;
 	void *tls_ptr;
 
-	bpf_probe_read(&tls_index, sizeof(struct tls_index),
-		       (void *)loc->offset);
+	bpf_probe_read_user(&tls_index, sizeof(struct tls_index),
+			    (void *)loc->offset);
 	/* valid module index is always positive */
 	if (tls_index.module > 0) {
 		/* dtv = ((struct tcbhead *)tls_base)->dtv[tls_index.module] */
-		bpf_probe_read(&dtv, sizeof(dtv),
-			       &((struct tcbhead *)tls_base)->dtv);
+		bpf_probe_read_user(&dtv, sizeof(dtv),
+				    &((struct tcbhead *)tls_base)->dtv);
 		dtv += tls_index.module;
 	} else {
 		dtv = NULL;
 	}
-	bpf_probe_read(&tls_ptr, sizeof(void *), dtv);
+	bpf_probe_read_user(&tls_ptr, sizeof(void *), dtv);
 	/* if pointer has (void *)-1 value, then TLS wasn't initialized yet */
 	return tls_ptr && tls_ptr != (void *)-1
 		? tls_ptr + tls_index.offset

@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static __always_inline void read_int_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg,
 	if (!location)
 		return;
 
-	bpf_probe_read(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
+	bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
 	data->int_vals[idx] = value->val;
 	if (value->header.len)
 		data->int_vals_set_mask |= (1 << idx);

@@ -356,13 +356,13 @@ static __always_inline uint64_t read_str_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg,
 	if (!location)
 		return 0;
 
-	bpf_probe_read(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
-	len = bpf_probe_read_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, value->ptr);
+	bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
+	len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, value->ptr);
 	/*
-	 * if bpf_probe_read_str returns error (<0), due to casting to
+	 * if bpf_probe_read_user_str returns error (<0), due to casting to
 	 * unsinged int, it will become big number, so next check is
 	 * sufficient to check for errors AND prove to BPF verifier, that
-	 * bpf_probe_read_str won't return anything bigger than
+	 * bpf_probe_read_user_str won't return anything bigger than
 	 * STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN
 	 */
 	if (len > STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN)

@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg,
 	if (!location)
 		return payload;
 
-	bpf_probe_read(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
-	if (bpf_probe_read(&map, sizeof(struct strobe_map_raw), value->ptr))
+	bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location);
+	if (bpf_probe_read_user(&map, sizeof(struct strobe_map_raw), value->ptr))
 		return payload;
 
 	descr->id = map.id;

@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg,
 		data->req_meta_valid = 1;
 	}
 
-	len = bpf_probe_read_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.tag);
+	len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.tag);
 	if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) {
 		descr->tag_len = len;
 		payload += len;

@@ -418,15 +418,15 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg,
 			break;
 
 		descr->key_lens[i] = 0;
-		len = bpf_probe_read_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN,
-					 map.entries[i].key);
+		len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN,
+					      map.entries[i].key);
 		if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) {
 			descr->key_lens[i] = len;
 			payload += len;
 		}
 		descr->val_lens[i] = 0;
-		len = bpf_probe_read_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN,
-					 map.entries[i].val);
+		len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN,
+					      map.entries[i].val);
 		if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) {
 			descr->val_lens[i] = len;
 			payload += len;

index c8c595da38d4..87b7d934ce73 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include "bpf_helpers.h"
 
-#define _(P) ({typeof(P) val = 0; bpf_probe_read(&val, sizeof(val), &P); val;})
+#define _(P) ({typeof(P) val = 0; bpf_probe_read_kernel(&val, sizeof(val), &P); val;})
 #define TCP_ESTATS_MAGIC 0xBAADBEEF
 
 /* This test case needs "sock" and "pt_regs" data structure.

new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6cc36c87bdbc
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <test_progs.h>
+
+void test_probe_user(void)
+{
+#define kprobe_name "__sys_connect"
+	const char *prog_name = "kprobe/" kprobe_name;
+	const char *obj_file = "./test_probe_user.o";
+	DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_object_open_opts, opts, );
+	int err, results_map_fd, sock_fd, duration;
+	struct sockaddr curr, orig, tmp;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&curr;
+	struct bpf_link *kprobe_link = NULL;
+	struct bpf_program *kprobe_prog;
+	struct bpf_object *obj;
+	static const int zero = 0;
+
+	obj = bpf_object__open_file(obj_file, &opts);
+	if (CHECK(IS_ERR(obj), "obj_open_file", "err %ld\n", PTR_ERR(obj)))
+		return;
+
+	kprobe_prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_title(obj, prog_name);
+	if (CHECK(!kprobe_prog, "find_probe",
+		  "prog '%s' not found\n", prog_name))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	err = bpf_object__load(obj);
+	if (CHECK(err, "obj_load", "err %d\n", err))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	results_map_fd = bpf_find_map(__func__, obj, "test_pro.bss");
+	if (CHECK(results_map_fd < 0, "find_bss_map",
+		  "err %d\n", results_map_fd))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	kprobe_link = bpf_program__attach_kprobe(kprobe_prog, false,
+						 kprobe_name);
+	if (CHECK(IS_ERR(kprobe_link), "attach_kprobe",
+		  "err %ld\n", PTR_ERR(kprobe_link))) {
+		kprobe_link = NULL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	memset(&curr, 0, sizeof(curr));
+	in->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	in->sin_port = htons(5555);
+	in->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("255.255.255.255");
+	memcpy(&orig, &curr, sizeof(curr));
+
+	sock_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (CHECK(sock_fd < 0, "create_sock_fd", "err %d\n", sock_fd))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	connect(sock_fd, &curr, sizeof(curr));
+	close(sock_fd);
+
+	err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(results_map_fd, &zero, &tmp);
+	if (CHECK(err, "get_kprobe_res",
+		  "failed to get kprobe res: %d\n", err))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&tmp;
+	if (CHECK(memcmp(&tmp, &orig, sizeof(orig)), "check_kprobe_res",
+		  "wrong kprobe res from probe read: %s:%u\n",
+		  inet_ntoa(in->sin_addr), ntohs(in->sin_port)))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	memset(&tmp, 0xab, sizeof(tmp));
+
+	in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&curr;
+	if (CHECK(memcmp(&curr, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)), "check_kprobe_res",
+		  "wrong kprobe res from probe write: %s:%u\n",
+		  inet_ntoa(in->sin_addr), ntohs(in->sin_port)))
+		goto cleanup;
+cleanup:
+	bpf_link__destroy(kprobe_link);
+	bpf_object__close(obj);
+}

new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1871e2ece0c4
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include "bpf_helpers.h"
+#include "bpf_tracing.h"
+
+static struct sockaddr_in old;
+
+SEC("kprobe/__sys_connect")
+int handle_sys_connect(struct pt_regs *ctx)
+{
+	void *ptr = (void *)PT_REGS_PARM2(ctx);
+	struct sockaddr_in new;
+
+	bpf_probe_read_user(&old, sizeof(old), ptr);
+	__builtin_memset(&new, 0xab, sizeof(new));
+	bpf_probe_write_user(ptr, &new, sizeof(new));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";