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PATCH In review mark gross 3 participants 8 messages Apr 27, 2020 – Jun 7, 2020 1 message not in the archive

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From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 0/4] Slow Ranomizing Boosts DoS linux-4.9.y backport

This is a backport of the backports done by Thomas for linux-4.14.y to linux-4.9.y.

The backport was pretty simple with no new dependencies needed.

this was tested by the test engineer who tested the other SRBDS implementations and it seems to work.

Mark Gross (4):
x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
mitigation
x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst               |   1 +
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt           |  20 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h          |  27 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |  30 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 106 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  54 +++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 +
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h               |   6 +
 13 files changed, 388 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/4 more sampling fun 1

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

[ bp: Massage.
tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c          |  7 ++++++-
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h      |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +27 -0
index ff501e511d91..b9473858c6b6 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
 
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings:	Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
+ * required for this.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
+	.vendor		= X86_VENDOR_##_vendor,				\
+	.family		= _family,					\
+	.model		= _model,					\
+	.steppings	= _steppings,					\
+	.feature	= _feature,					\
+	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
+}
+
 extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
 
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +6 -1
index e42117d5f4d7..f46ffb3b295f 100644
@@ -33,13 +33,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 
-	for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+	for (m = match;
+	     m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+	     m++) {
 		if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
 			continue;
 		if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
 			continue;
 		if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
 			continue;
+		if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+		    !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+			continue;
 		if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
 			continue;
 		return m;
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +6 -0
index 1abfe37314a0..df841a72b804 100644
@@ -572,6 +572,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id {
 /*
  * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id.
  * Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define.
+ *
+ * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the
+ * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream
+ * has been converted to proper C99 initializers.
  */
 #define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id
 struct x86_cpu_id {
@@ -580,6 +584,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 model;
 	__u16 feature;	/* bit index */
 	kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
+	__u16 steppings;
 };
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
@@ -588,6 +593,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0	/* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 more sampling fun 2

In reply to mark gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +13 -10
index f490a4fab2f7..078ad5da2e1f 100644
@@ -956,9 +956,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -978,29 +978,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1018,7 +1021,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1027,7 +1030,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 more sampling fun 3

In reply to mark gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data
Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]

---
 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt           |  20 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |  30 ++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 106 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  31 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   1 +
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 ++
 8 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +1 -0
index b41046b5713b..a5225df4a070 100644
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +20 -0
index e05d65d6fcb6..40602517ca52 100644
@@ -4262,6 +4262,26 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	ssbd=		[ARM64,HW]
 			Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
 
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +16 -14
index fb457ba8ccc6..2cd5d12a842c 100644
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -346,19 +347,20 @@
  */
 #define X86_BUG_ESPFIX		X86_BUG(9) /* "" IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */
 #endif
-#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG	X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE	X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
-#define X86_BUG_MONITOR		X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
-#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400	X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN	X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1	X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2	X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
-#define X86_BUG_L1TF		X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
-#define X86_BUG_MDS		X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
-#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY	X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS		X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
-#define X86_BUG_TAA		X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
-#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT	X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG		X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE		X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
+#define X86_BUG_MONITOR			X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
+#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400		X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +4 -0
index 8d162e0f2881..b12b0a50ad1f 100644
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@
 #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
 #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
 
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL		0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +106 -0

140 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +31 -0
index 078ad5da2e1f..b16b6176738b 100644
@@ -956,6 +956,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
+					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS		BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC),	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD),	SRBDS),
+	{}
+};
+
 static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
@@ -1021,6 +1042,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
+	/*
+	 * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+	 * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+	 */
+	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+	    cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+		    setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1453,6 +1483,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	mtrr_ap_init();
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
 	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+	update_srbds_msr();
 }
 
 struct msr_range {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +1 -0
index 4350f50b5deb..fdeeab6b158c 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
 
 extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
 
drivers/base/cpu.c +8 -0
index 677c5f36674b..100850398dd3 100644
@@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -558,6 +564,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -568,6 +575,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 more sampling fun 4

In reply to mark gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation
documentation

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

---
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file +148 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a473da80b62
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <=0xC
+
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <=0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
index 24f53c501366..42247f412e63 100644
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): a49dc9722824aa7630d3cbe95d43b792b61130aa.158800=?utf-8?q?1122?= [email protected]

#6 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] more sampling fun 4

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

Quoted 26 lines · speck for Mark Gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation
documentation

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

---
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a473da80b62

[...]

This should go under Documentation/hw-vuln as there is no admin-guide directory on 4.9...

Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst are configurable at compile, boot or run time. · line 16

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

...and this index will be broken.

Ben.

Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings
It's easier to fight for one's principles than to live up to them.
author
#7 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] more sampling fun 4

Quoted 42 lines · speck for Ben Hutchings

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

Quoted 26 lines · speck for Mark Gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation
documentation

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

---
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a473da80b62

[...]

This should go under Documentation/hw-vuln as there is no admin-guide directory on 4.9...

Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst are configurable at compile, boot or run time. · line 16

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

...and this index will be broken.

Quoted 7 lines

Ben.

Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings
It's easier to fight for one's principles than to live up to them.

You are correct. How's the following look?

From 67a45bf700e6ec55acaf7fabea50f2cda6c629c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 14:20:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] backport put the documentation in the wrong directory WRT
4.9.

Move special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst to Documentation/hw-vuln

Also clean up title underlining to correct a few warnings in make htlmdoc buy making them line up exactly with the text they are under.

---
 .../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst       | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 rename Documentation/{admin-guide => }/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst (99%)
Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst renamed from Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst +3 -3
similarity index 99%
rename from Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
rename to Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
index 47b1b3afac99..3b1ce68d2456 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
 to MDS attacks.
 
 Affected processors
---------------------
+-------------------
 Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
 be affected.
 
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
 
 
 Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
+--------------------
 Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
 EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
 staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
   ============= =============================================================
 
 SRBDS System Information
------------------------
+------------------------
 The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
 SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#8 lore raw

[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/4] more sampling fun 4

In reply to Ben Hutchings

hi,

Quoted 32 lines · speck for Ben Hutchings

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

Quoted 26 lines · speck for Mark Gross

From: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation
documentation

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

---
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a473da80b62

[...]

This should go under Documentation/hw-vuln as there is no admin-guide directory on 4.9...

Quoted 9 lines

Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst are configurable at compile, boot or run time. · line 16

Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

...and this index will be broken.

This comment from Ben seems to have got lost. Do you have it on the radar for the 4.9.x backports?

Regards,
Salvatore