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Add support for multiple required keys

PATCH Superseded Thirupathaiah Annapureddy 2 participants 9 messages Jul 18, 2020 – Aug 22, 2020

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Add support for multiple required keys

This patch series adds the support for multiple required keys in U-Boot DTB with test support.

Changes in v2 (thanks for the feedback Simon and Rasmus):
- Introduce a policy variable in U-boot DTB to control whether any or all required keys must have signed configuration.
- Added tests to cover any or all required keys policy.
- Updated signature.txt to include required-mode policy information.

Thirupathaiah Annapureddy (3):
vboot: add DTB policy for supporting multiple required conf keys
test: vboot: add tests for multiple required keys
doc: verified-boot: add required-mode information

 common/image-fit-sig.c       | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 14 +++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_vboot.py  | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 vboot: add DTB policy for supporting multiple required conf keys

Currently FIT image must be signed by all required conf keys. This means Verified Boot fails if there is a signature verification failure using any required key in U-boot DTB.

This patch introduces a new policy in DTB that can be set to any required conf key. This means if verified boot passes with one of the required keys, u-boot will continue the OS hand off.

There were prior attempts to address this:
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-April/366047.html
The above patch was failing "make tests".
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2020-January/396629.html

---

Changes in v2:
- Modify fit_config_verify_required_sigs() to process required-mode policy variable in U-boot DTB.

 common/image-fit-sig.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
common/image-fit-sig.c +27 -3
index cc1967109e..d9b1c93a9b 100644
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
 {
 	int noffset;
 	int sig_node;
+	int verified = 0;
+	int reqd_sigs = 0;
+	bool reqd_policy_all = true;
+	const char *reqd_mode;
 
 	/* Work out what we need to verify */
 	sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
@@ -425,6 +429,14 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
+	reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, sig_node, "required-mode", NULL);
+	if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
+		reqd_policy_all = false;
+
+	debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
+	      reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
+
 	fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
 		const char *required;
 		int ret;
@@ -433,15 +445,27 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
 				       NULL);
 		if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
 			continue;
+
+		reqd_sigs++;
+
 		ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
 					    noffset);
 		if (ret) {
-			printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
-			       fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
-			return ret;
+			if (reqd_policy_all) {
+				printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
+				       fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
+				return ret;
+			}
+		} else {
+			verified++;
+			if (!reqd_policy_all)
+				break;
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (reqd_sigs && !verified)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.2
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 vboot: add DTB policy for supporting multiple required conf keys

Hi Thirupathaiah,

Quoted 8 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

Currently FIT image must be signed by all required conf keys. This means Verified Boot fails if there is a signature verification failure using any required key in U-boot DTB.

This patch introduces a new policy in DTB that can be set to any required conf key. This means if verified boot passes with one of the required keys, u-boot will continue the OS hand off.

U-Boot

Quoted 7 lines

There were prior attempts to address this:
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-April/366047.html
The above patch was failing "make tests".
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2020-January/396629.html

Quoted 8 lines

---

Changes in v2:
- Modify fit_config_verify_required_sigs() to process required-mode policy variable in U-boot DTB.

 common/image-fit-sig.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Please see below

Quoted 37 lines
common/image-fit-sig.c +14 -0
index cc1967109e..d9b1c93a9b 100644
@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
 {
        int noffset;
        int sig_node;
+       int verified = 0;
+       int reqd_sigs = 0;
+       bool reqd_policy_all = true;
+       const char *reqd_mode;
 
        /* Work out what we need to verify */
        sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
@@ -425,6 +429,14 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
                return 0;
        }
 
+       /* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
+       reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, sig_node, "required-mode", NULL);
+       if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
+               reqd_policy_all = false;
+
+       debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
+             reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
+
        fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
                const char *required;
                int ret;
@@ -433,15 +445,27 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
                                       NULL);
                if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
                        continue;
+
+               reqd_sigs++;

common/image-fit-sig.c int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, · line 456

Quoted 10 lines
common/image-fit-sig.c +4 -3
+
                ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
                                            noffset);
                if (ret) {
-                       printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
-                              fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
-                       return ret;
+                       if (reqd_policy_all) {
+                               printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
+                                      fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));

I think we should keep this message outside the if(). Otherwise there is no indication what is going on.

common/image-fit-sig.c int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, · line 466

Quoted 10 lines
common/image-fit-sig.c +7 -0
+                               return ret;
+                       }
+               } else {
+                       verified++;
+                       if (!reqd_policy_all)
+                               break;
                }
        }
 
+       if (reqd_sigs && !verified)

I think we need a message here, indicating that no signature was verified.

Quoted 8 lines
common/image-fit-sig.c +2 -1
+               return -EPERM;
+
        return 0;
 }
 
--

2.25.2

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 test: vboot: add tests for multiple required keys

In reply to Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

This patch adds vboot tests to verify the support for multiple required keys using new required-mode DTB policy.

This patch also fixes existing test where dev key is assumed to be marked as not required, although it is marked as required.

Note that this patch re-added sign_fit_norequire(). sign_fit_norequire() was removed as part of the commit:
b008677daf2a9dc0335260c7c4e24390487fe0ca (test: vboot: Fix pylint errors)
This patch leverages sign_fit_norequire() to fix the existing bug.

---

Changes in v2:
- Added tests to cover any or all required keys policy.

 test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +44 -2
index 6b998cfd70..e45800d94c 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,23 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, sign_options, required):
         cons.log.action('%s: Sign images' % sha_algo)
         util.run_and_log(cons, args)
 
+    def sign_fit_norequire(sha_algo, options):
+        """Sign the FIT
+
+        Signs the FIT and writes the signature into it. It also writes the
+        public key into the dtb. It does not mark key as 'required' in dtb.
+
+        Args:
+            sha_algo: Either 'sha1' or 'sha256', to select the algorithm to
+                    use.
+            options: Options to provide to mkimage.
+        """
+        args = [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb, fit]
+        if options:
+            args += options.split(' ')
+        cons.log.action('%s: Sign images' % sha_algo)
+        util.run_and_log(cons, args)
+
     def replace_fit_totalsize(size):
         """Replace FIT header's totalsize with something greater.
 
@@ -279,15 +296,40 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, sign_options, required):
         # Build the FIT with dev key (keys NOT required). This adds the
         # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, NOT marked 'required'.
         make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding))
-        sign_fit(sha_algo, sign_options)
+        sign_fit_norequire(sha_algo, sign_options)
 
         # So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
         # Only the prod key is set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
-        # a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
+        # a dev signature only (sign_fit_norequire() overwrites the FIT).
         # Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should not be accepted by
         # U-Boot because the prod key is required.
         run_bootm(sha_algo, 'required key', '', False)
 
+        # Build the FIT with dev key (keys required) and sign it. This puts the
+        # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, marked 'required'.
+        make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding))
+        sign_fit(sha_algo, sign_options)
+
+        # Set the required-mode policy to "any".
+        # So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
+        # Both the dev and prod key are set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
+        # a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
+        # Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should be accepted by
+        # U-Boot because the dev key is required and policy is "any" required key.
+        util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtput -t s %s /signature required-mode any' %
+                         (dtb))
+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'multi required key', 'dev+', True)
+
+        # Set the required-mode policy to "all".
+        # So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
+        # Both the dev and prod key are set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
+        # a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
+        # Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should not be accepted by
+        # U-Boot because the prod key is required and policy is "all" required key
+        util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtput -t s %s /signature required-mode all' %
+                         (dtb))
+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'multi required key', '', False)
+
     cons = u_boot_console
     tmpdir = cons.config.result_dir + '/'
     datadir = cons.config.source_dir + '/test/py/tests/vboot/'
Signature · 1 line
2.25.2
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 test: vboot: add tests for multiple required keys

Quoted 15 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

This patch adds vboot tests to verify the support for multiple required keys using new required-mode DTB policy.

This patch also fixes existing test where dev key is assumed to be marked as not required, although it is marked as required.

Note that this patch re-added sign_fit_norequire(). sign_fit_norequire() was removed as part of the commit:
b008677daf2a9dc0335260c7c4e24390487fe0ca (test: vboot: Fix pylint errors)
This patch leverages sign_fit_norequire() to fix the existing bug.

Quoted 8 lines

---

Changes in v2:
- Added tests to cover any or all required keys policy.

 test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 doc: verified-boot: add required-mode information

In reply to Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

---

Changes in v2:
- New

 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt +14 -0
index d4afd755e9..a3455889ed 100644
@@ -386,6 +386,20 @@ that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
 
 This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
 
+For Signed Configurations, the default verification behavior can be changed by
+the following optional property in /signature node in U-Boot's control FDT.
+
+- required-mode: Valid values are "any" to allow verified boot to succeed if
+the selected configuration is signed by any of the 'required' keys, and "all"
+to allow verified boot to succeed if the selected configuration is signed by
+all of the 'required' keys.
+
+This property can be added to a binary device tree using fdtput as shown in
+below examples::
+
+	fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode any
+	fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode all
+
 
 Enabling FIT Verification
 -------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.25.2
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 doc: verified-boot: add required-mode information

Hi Thirupathaiah,

Quoted 10 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

---

Changes in v2:
- New

 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

But I think we need a new mkimage option to set the required-mode

Quoted 28 lines
doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt +14 -1
index d4afd755e9..a3455889ed 100644
@@ -386,6 +386,20 @@ that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
 
 This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
 
+For Signed Configurations, the default verification behavior can be changed by
+the following optional property in /signature node in U-Boot's control FDT.
+
+- required-mode: Valid values are "any" to allow verified boot to succeed if
+the selected configuration is signed by any of the 'required' keys, and "all"
+to allow verified boot to succeed if the selected configuration is signed by
+all of the 'required' keys.
+
+This property can be added to a binary device tree using fdtput as shown in
+below examples::
+
+       fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode any
+       fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode all
+
 
 Enabling FIT Verification
 -------------------------
--

2.25.2

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 doc: verified-boot: add required-mode information

Quoted 11 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Thirupathaiah,

Quoted 7 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

---

Changes in v2:
- New

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

But I think we need a new mkimage option to set the required-mode

Is it okay if I do mkimage option change as part of a different patch/ patch series?

Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt +14 -1
index d4afd755e9..a3455889ed 100644
@@ -386,6 +386,20 @@ that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
 
 This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
 
+For Signed Configurations, the default verification behavior can be changed by
+the following optional property in /signature node in U-Boot's control FDT.
+
+- required-mode: Valid values are "any" to allow verified boot to succeed if
+the selected configuration is signed by any of the 'required' keys, and "all"
+to allow verified boot to succeed if the selected configuration is signed by
+all of the 'required' keys.
+
+This property can be added to a binary device tree using fdtput as shown in
+below examples::
+
+       fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode any
+       fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode all
+
 
 Enabling FIT Verification
 -------------------------
--

2.25.2

#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 doc: verified-boot: add required-mode information

Hi Thirupathaiah,

Quoted 19 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy
Quoted 15 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Thirupathaiah,

Quoted 10 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy

---

Changes in v2:
- New

 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

But I think we need a new mkimage option to set the required-mode

Is it okay if I do mkimage option change as part of a different patch/ patch series?

That's fine with me.

Regards,
SImon