kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64
Subsystems (17)
v11 cover kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64
This patchset adds a new hardware tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. The new mode is similar to the existing software tag-based KASAN, but relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging (instead of shadow memory and compiler instrumentation).
This patchset is co-developed and tested by
Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>.
This patchset is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-mte-v11
For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:
1. QEMU built from master [4] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run).
2. GCC version 10.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux for-next/mte
[4] https://github.com/qemu/qemu
====== Overview
The underlying ideas of the approach used by hardware tag-based KASAN are:
1. By relying on the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, pointer tags are stored in the top byte of each kernel pointer.
2. With the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) arm64 CPU feature, memory tags for kernel memory allocations are stored in a dedicated memory not accessible via normal instuctions.
3. On each memory allocation, a random tag is generated, embedded it into the returned pointer, and the corresponding memory is tagged with the same tag value.
4. With MTE the CPU performs a check on each memory access to make sure that the pointer tag matches the memory tag.
5. On a tag mismatch the CPU generates a tag fault, and a KASAN report is printed.
Same as other KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN is intended as a debugging feature at this point.
====== Rationale
There are two main reasons for this new hardware tag-based mode:
1. Previously implemented software tag-based KASAN is being successfully used on dogfood testing devices due to its low memory overhead (as initially planned). The new hardware mode keeps the same low memory overhead, and is expected to have significantly lower performance impact, due to the tag checks being performed by the hardware. Therefore the new mode can be used as a better alternative in dogfood testing for hardware that supports MTE.
2. The new mode lays the groundwork for the planned in-kernel MTE-based memory corruption mitigation to be used in production.
====== Technical details
From the implementation perspective, hardware tag-based KASAN is almost identical to the software mode. The key difference is using MTE for assigning and checking tags.
Compared to the software mode, the hardware mode uses 4 bits per tag, as dictated by MTE. Pointer tags are stored in bits [56:60), the top 4 bits have the normal value 0xF. Having less distict tags increases the probablity of false negatives (from ~1/256 to ~1/16) in certain cases.
Only synchronous exceptions are set up and used by hardware tag-based KASAN.
====== Benchmarks
Note: all measurements have been performed with software emulation of Memory Tagging Extension, performance numbers for hardware tag-based KASAN on the actual hardware are expected to be better.
Boot time [1]:
* 2.8 sec for clean kernel
* 5.7 sec for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 11.8 sec for software tag-based KASAN
* 11.6 sec for generic KASAN
Slab memory usage after boot [2]:
* 7.0 kb for clean kernel
* 9.7 kb for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 9.7 kb for software tag-based KASAN
* 41.3 kb for generic KASAN
Measurements have been performed with:
* defconfig-based configs
* Manually built QEMU master
* QEMU arguments: -machine virt,mte=on -cpu max
* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE disabled
* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
* clang-10 as the compiler and gcc-10 as the assembler
[1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized.
[2] Measured as cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab.
====== Notes
The cover letter for software tag-based KASAN patchset can be found here:
===== Tags
====== History
Change v10->v11:
(Andrey:)
- Rebase onto the latest mm.
Changes v9->v10:
(Andrey:)
- Rebase onto the mm tree.
- Drop "s390/kasan: include asm/page.h from asm/kasan.h" as linux-next already contains this fix queued up with other s390 KASAN changes.
- Add kfence checks in mm/kasan/hw_tags.c.
- Rename KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE to KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE.
- Clarify "slab memory" in documentation.
- Add a comment to CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS.
- Drop "kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes" as KASAN_INLINE already depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS.
- Mark kasan_init_hw_tags() as __init, as non-init parts have been moved to kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu().
- Rename kasan_(un)poison_memory() to (kasan_)(un)poison_range(). (Vincenzo:)
- Add smb_wmb() to copy_highpage().
- Rename mte_enable() to mte_enable_kernel().
- Address review comments on selftest code.
- Address concerns from checkpatch.pl (courtesy of Marco Elver).
- Integrate a fixup from Marco Elver for code alignment.
Changes v8->v9:
(Andrey:)
- Drop __init for kasan_init_hw_tags.
- Split out mte_enable() from mte_init_tags().
- Fix incorrect commit author.
- Revert addr_has_metadata() change done in a previous version, otherwise KASAN fails to print metadata for page_alloc allocations.
- Split kasan_init_hw_tags() into kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu() that is called for each CPU in cpu_enable_mte(), and kasan_init_hw_tags() that is called for boot CPU in smp_prepare_boot_cpu().
- Move kunit_kasan_expectation struct definition under CONFIG_KASAN. (Vincenzo:)
- Address Catalin's comments for "arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags".
- New patch "kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area".
Changes v7->v8:
(Andrey:)
- Rebased onto 5.10-rc2+.
- Enable in-kernel MTE via kasan_init_hw_tags() instead of doing it directly from cpu_enable_mte(). This changes mte_init_tags() to both init RRND and enable in-kernel MTE in sync mode.
- Put the patches back into a logical order.
- Rename KASAN_SHADOW_GRANULE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE in lib/test_kasan_module.c.
- Rename kasan_init_tags() to kasan_init_sw_tags() and mark as __init.
Changes v6->v7:
(Andrey:)
- Rebase onto 5.10-rc2.
- Fix pgd_t not defined build warning on s390.
- Mark kasan_init_depth() as static.
- Don't use mte_*() functions directly in report_hw_tags.c
- Add hw_ prefix to KASAN-level definitions of arch_*() tag helpers.
- Add missing <sched/task_stack.h> include to report_generic.h.
Changes v5->v6:
(Vincenzo:)
- Re-based on 5.10-rc1.
- Modified the flow of the mte fault handler in order to address an issue with word at a time routines that would affect Android init process.
- Dropped Reviewed-by from the involved patches.
(Andrey:)
- Properly use #if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE.
- Expand CONFIG_KASAN checks in arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c and arch/arm64/kernel/module.c.
- Don't select CONFIG_CONSTRUCTORS for HW_TAGS mode.
- Check PageSlab() in addr_has_metadata().
Changes v4->v5:
(Vincenzo:)
- Reset the tag associated by the kernel to a page when this is changed by the user.
- Add a kselftest to verify that GCR_EL1 is preserved during context switch.
- Squashed the TBI patch.
- Addressed some review comments.
- Verified the series with LTP.
(Andrey:)
- Put core arm64 patches first as requested by Catalin.
Changes v3->v4:
(Vincenzo:)
- Introduced mte-def.h that contains MTE definitions.
- Moved __MTE_PREAMBLE in mte.h.
- Clarified which API is part of mte-kasan.h.
- Removed tsk argument from mte_set_kernel_gcr().
- Addressed several nitpicks pointed out during review. (Andrey:)
- Move include <asm/kasan.h> in include/linux/kasan.h to avoid build failures.
- Don't move "select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB" back and forth between patches in KASAN Kconfig.
- Add arm64 prefix to "kasan: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE" commit.
- Don't add braces when defining KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
- Make KASAN_HW_TAGS compatible with init_on_alloc/free.
Changes v2->v3:
(Vincenzo:)
- Use ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE for asm macros.
- Rename mte-helper.h to mte-kasan.h. The new header is meant to contain only macros and prototypes directly used in KASAN. The rest is defined in mte.h.
- Update mte_get_mem_tag()/mte_get_random_tag() to used directly asm volatile() macros instead of calling library functions.
- Harden mte_assign_mem_tag_range() to prevent an infinite loop in case of unaligned size.
- Made sure that report_tag_fault() is executed only once.
- Simplify the mte code in __cpu_setup.
- Remove kprobes.h from mte.c includes.
- General cleanup of the code.
(Andrey:)
- Use READ/WRITE_ONCE when accessing reported in do_tag_recovery().
- Move .unreq mte_tcr under CONFIG_ARM64_MTE to avoid build errors when MTE is not enabled.
- Improve mm/kasan/shadow.c comment header.
- Clarify what is a memory granule in "kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_" commit description.
- Rename (report_)tags_sw/hw.c to to (report_)sw/hw_tags.c and drop unnecessary rename commit.
- Adopt 100 lines limit for some mm/kasan/ changes.
- Align arguments for stack_trace_save() call in mm/slub.c.
- Restore comment before kasan_init_tags().
- Remove GNU headers from all mm/kasan/ files.
- Simplify check_invalid_free() implementation tag-based modes.
- Drop subsequently removed report_tag_fault() implementation.
- Add KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE and use instead of PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
- Move kasan_enable/disable_current() declarations to simplify include/linux/kasan.h.
- Drop dependency on CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG.
- Clarify the purpose of CONFIG_STACKTRACE in KASAN Kconfig.
Changes v1->v2:
- Rebase onto v10 of the user MTE patchset.
- Only enable in-kernel MTE when KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled.
- Add a layer of arch-level indirection, so KASAN doesn't call MTE helpers directly (this will be useful in case more architectures will add support for HW_TAGS).
- Don't do arm64_skip_faulting_instruction() on MTE fault, disable MTE instead.
- Don't allow software tags with MTE via arch/arm64/Kconfig instead of lib/Kconfig.kasan.
- Rename mm/kasan/tags.c to tags_sw.c and mte.c to tags_hw.c, and do the same for report_*.c files.
- Reword HW_TAGS Kconfig help text to make it less MTE specific.
- Reword and clarify Documentation.
- Drop unnecessary is_el1_mte_sync_tag_check_fault().
- Change report_tag_fault() to only call kasan_report() once HW_TAGS is introduced.
- Rename arch/arm64/include/asm/mte_asm.h to mte-helpers.h and move all MTE-related defines and some helper functions there.
- Change mm/kasan/kasan.h to include mte-def.h instead of mte.h.
- Add WARN_ON() on unaligned size to mte_set_mem_tag_range().
- Implement ldg/irg MTE routines as inline assembly.
- Remove smp_wmb() from mte_set_mem_tag_range().
- Drop __must_check from mte_set_mem_tag_range() as KASAN has no use for the return value.
- Drop zero size check from mte_assign_mem_tag_range().
- Drop unnecessary include <asm/kasan.h> from low-level arm64 code.
- Move enabling TBI1 into __cpu_setup().
- Drop stale comment about callee-saved register from arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S.
- Mark gcr_kernel_excl as __ro_after_init.
- Use GENMASK() in mte_init_tags().
Andrey Konovalov (33):
kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers
kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC
kasan: group vmalloc code
kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes
kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range
kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
kasan: only build init.c for software modes
kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c
kasan: define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE
kasan: rename report and tags files
kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies
kasan: hide invalid free check implementation
kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth for software modes kasan, arm64: move initialization message
kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init
kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata
kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata
kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META
kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode kasan, arm64: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE
kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS
arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers
kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS
kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN
kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks
kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime
kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata
kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode
Vincenzo Frascino (9):
arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option
arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers
arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags
arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler
arm64: kasan: Allow enabling in-kernel MTE
arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask
arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area kselftest/arm64: Check GCR_EL1 after context switch
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 82 ++-
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 +-
arch/arm64/Makefile | 7 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h | 3 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h | 5 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 15 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h | 14 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 67 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h | 22 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h | 5 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 23 +
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 41 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 5 +
arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 6 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 118 +++-
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/lib/mte.S | 16 +
arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c | 9 +
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 59 ++
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 19 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c | 9 +
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 23 +-
arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 6 +-
arch/s390/boot/string.c | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 +
include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 2 +-
include/linux/kasan.h | 125 ++--
include/linux/mm.h | 2 +-
include/linux/moduleloader.h | 3 +-
include/linux/page-flags-layout.h | 2 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 2 +-
include/linux/string.h | 2 +-
init/init_task.c | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c | 4 +-
lib/Kconfig.kasan | 65 +-
lib/test_kasan.c | 2 +-
lib/test_kasan_module.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/Makefile | 25 +-
mm/kasan/common.c | 577 ++----------------
mm/kasan/generic.c | 51 +-
mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 165 -----
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 89 +++
mm/kasan/init.c | 17 +-
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 74 ++-
mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 10 -
mm/kasan/report.c | 256 ++------
mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 327 ++++++++++
mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c | 42 ++
mm/kasan/{tags_report.c => report_sw_tags.c} | 14 +-
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 516 ++++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/{tags.c => sw_tags.c} | 24 +-
mm/page_alloc.c | 9 +-
mm/page_poison.c | 2 +-
mm/ptdump.c | 13 +-
mm/slab_common.c | 2 +-
mm/slub.c | 29 +-
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/Makefile | 2 +-
.../arm64/mte/check_gcr_el1_cswitch.c | 155 +++++
68 files changed, 2036 insertions(+), 1165 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h
delete mode 100644 mm/kasan/generic_report.c
create mode 100644 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
create mode 100644 mm/kasan/report_generic.c
create mode 100644 mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
rename mm/kasan/{tags_report.c => report_sw_tags.c} (87%)
create mode 100644 mm/kasan/shadow.c
rename mm/kasan/{tags.c => sw_tags.c} (92%)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/check_gcr_el1_cswitch.cSignature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 1/42 kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers
Don't mention "GNU General Public License version 2" text explicitly, as it's already covered by the SPDX-License-Identifier.
---
Change-Id: If0a2690042a2aa0fca70cea601ae9aabe72fa233
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/init.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 10 ---------- mm/kasan/report.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/tags.c | 5 ----- mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 5 ----- 8 files changed, 45 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +0 -5
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@* * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by * Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #include <linux/export.h>
mm/kasan/generic.c +0 -5
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@* * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by * Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
mm/kasan/generic_report.c +0 -5
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@* * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by * Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #include <linux/bitops.h>
mm/kasan/init.c +0 -5
@@ -4,11 +4,6 @@* * Copyright (c) 2015 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #include <linux/memblock.h>
mm/kasan/quarantine.c +0 -10
@@ -6,16 +6,6 @@* Copyright (C) 2016 Google, Inc. * * Based on code by Dmitry Chernenkov. -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License -* version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. -* -* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but -* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU -* General Public License for more details. -* */ #include <linux/gfp.h>
mm/kasan/report.c +0 -5
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@* * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by * Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #include <linux/bitops.h>
mm/kasan/tags.c +0 -5
@@ -4,11 +4,6 @@* * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc. * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
mm/kasan/tags_report.c +0 -5
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@* * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by * Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> -* -* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as -* published by the Free Software Foundation. -* */ #include <linux/bitops.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 2/42 kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC
In reply to Andrey KonovalovCurrently only generic KASAN mode supports vmalloc, reflect that in the config.
---
Change-Id: I1889e5b3bed28cc5d607802fb6ae43ba461c0dc1
--- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY config KASAN_VMALLOC bool "Back mappings in vmalloc space with real shadow memory" - depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC + depends on KASAN_GENERIC && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC help By default, the shadow region for vmalloc space is the read-only zero page. This means that KASAN cannot detect errors involving
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 3/42 kasan: group vmalloc code
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Group all vmalloc-related function declarations in include/linux/kasan.h, and their implementations in mm/kasan/common.c.
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: Ie20b6c689203cd6de4fd7f2c465ec081c00c5f15
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 41 +++++++++++++---------- mm/kasan/common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +23 -18
@@ -75,19 +75,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {int free_meta_offset; }; -/* -* These functions provide a special case to support backing module -* allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special -* case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case. -*/ -#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC -int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size); -void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm); -#else -static inline int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size) {return 0 ; } -static inline void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {} -#endif -int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size);void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size);
@@ -156,9 +143,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,return false; } -static inline int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size) {return 0 ; } -static inline void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {} -static inline int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size) {return 0 ;
@@ -211,13 +195,16 @@ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC +int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long addr,unsigned long size);void kasan_poison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size);void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc (const void *start,unsigned long size);void kasan_release_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long end,unsigned long free_region_start,unsigned long free_region_end); -#else + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ +static inline int kasan_populate_vmalloc (unsigned long start,unsigned long size) {
@@ -232,7 +219,25 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long free_region_start, unsigned long free_region_end) {} -#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) && !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ) + +/* +* These functions provide a special case to support backing module +* allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special +* case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case. +*/ +int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size); +void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm); + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ + +static inline int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size) {return 0 ; } +static inline void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr);
mm/kasan/common.c +40 -38
94 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 4/42 kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Group shadow-related KASAN function declarations and only define them for the two existing software modes.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I864be75a88b91b443c55e9c2042865e15703e164
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +31 -16
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ struct task_struct;#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -#include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <asm/kasan.h> /* kasan_data struct is used in KUnit tests for KASAN expected failures */
@@ -20,6 +19,20 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation { bool report_found; }; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) + +#include <linux/pgtable.h> + +/* Software KASAN implementations use shadow memory. */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +#define KASAN_SHADOW_INIT 0xFF +#else +#define KASAN_SHADOW_INIT 0 +#endif +extern unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE ];extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE ];extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD ];
@@ -35,6 +48,23 @@ static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } +int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); +void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +static inline int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start, +unsigned long size) +{} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +/* Enable reporting bugs after kasan_disable_current() */ extern void kasan_enable_current (void );
@@ -75,9 +105,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {int free_meta_offset; }; -int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); -void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); -size_t __ksize (const void *);static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) {
@@ -143,14 +170,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,return false; } -static inline int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size) -{ -return 0 ; -} -static inline void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start, -unsigned long size) -{} -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { }static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache) {return 0 ; }
@@ -158,8 +177,6 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC -#define KASAN_SHADOW_INIT 0 -void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache);void kasan_cache_shutdown (struct kmem_cache *cache);void kasan_record_aux_stack (void *ptr);
@@ -174,8 +191,6 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS -#define KASAN_SHADOW_INIT 0xFF -void kasan_init_tags (void );void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 5/42 kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Rename external annotation kasan_unpoison_shadow() to kasan_unpoison_range(), and introduce internal functions (un)poison_range() (without kasan_ prefix).
---
Change-Id: Ia359f32815242c4704e49a5f1639ca2d2f8cba69
--- include/linux/kasan.h | 6 +++--- kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/common.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 23 ++++++++++---------- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 3 ++- mm/kasan/tags.c | 2 +- mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/kasan.h +3 -3
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void);/* Disable reporting bugs for current task */ extern void kasan_disable_current (void ); -void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size); +void kasan_unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size);void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct kasan_cache {size_t __ksize (const void *);static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab (const void *ptr) { -kasan_unpoison_shadow (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); +kasan_unpoison_range (ptr,__ksize (ptr)); }size_t kasan_metadata_size (struct kmem_cache *cache);
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ -static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {}
kernel/fork.c +2 -2
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)if (!s)continue ; -/* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */ -kasan_unpoison_shadow (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE ); +/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */ +kasan_unpoison_range (s->addr,THREAD_SIZE );/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */ memset (s->addr,0 ,THREAD_SIZE );
mm/kasan/common.c +27 -22
151 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/generic.c +11 -12
@@ -203,11 +203,11 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global) {size_t aligned_size =round_up (global->size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); -kasan_unpoison_shadow (global->beg, global->size); +unpoison_range (global->beg, global->size); -kasan_poison_shadow (global->beg + aligned_size, - global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size, -KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE ); +poison_range (global->beg + aligned_size, + global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size, +KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE ); }void __asan_register_globals (struct kasan_global *globals,size_t size)
@@ -286,13 +286,12 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)WARN_ON (!IS_ALIGNED (addr,KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE )); -kasan_unpoison_shadow ((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size), - size - rounded_down_size); -kasan_poison_shadow (left_redzone,KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE , -KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT ); -kasan_poison_shadow (right_redzone, - padding_size +KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE , -KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT ); +unpoison_range ((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size), + size - rounded_down_size); +poison_range (left_redzone,KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE , +KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT ); +poison_range (right_redzone, padding_size +KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE , +KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__asan_alloca_poison);
@@ -302,7 +301,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom)if (unlikely (!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))return ; -kasan_unpoison_shadow (stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top); +unpoison_range (stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__asan_allocas_unpoison);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)return (addr >=kasan_shadow_to_mem ((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START )); } -void kasan_poison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +void poison_range (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +void unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size);/** * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
mm/kasan/tags.c +1 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);void __hwasan_tag_memory (unsigned long addr,u8 tag,unsigned long size) { -kasan_poison_shadow ((void *)addr, size, tag); +poison_range ((void *)addr, size, tag); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__hwasan_tag_memory);
mm/slab_common.c +1 -1
@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, * so we need to unpoison this area. */ -kasan_unpoison_shadow (objp, size); +kasan_unpoison_range (objp, size);return size; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ksize);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 6/42 kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for hardware tag-based mode.
Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: Iac733e2248aa9d29f6fc425d8946ba07cca73ecf
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 2 +- lib/test_kasan.c | 2 +- lib/test_kasan_module.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++--------------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 14 +++++------ mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 8 +++---- mm/kasan/init.c | 8 +++---- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/report.c | 10 ++++---- mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 2 +- 10 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +1 -1
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to -``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``. +``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``. Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
lib/test_kasan.c +1 -1
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@#include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h" -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)/* * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
lib/test_kasan_module.c +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@#include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h" -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) static noinline void __init copy_user_test(void) {
mm/kasan/common.c +20 -19
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)/* * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'. -* Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE. +* Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. */ void poison_range (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value) {
@@ -151,13 +151,13 @@ void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)poison_range (address, size, tag); -if (size &KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ) { +if (size &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ) {u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (address + size);if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) *shadow = tag;else - *shadow = size &KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ; + *shadow = size &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ; } }
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)void kasan_poison_object_data (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object) {poison_range (object, -round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ), +round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ),KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE ); }
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ))return shadow_byte <0 || - shadow_byte >=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + shadow_byte >=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ;/* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */ if ((u8 )shadow_byte ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID )
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,return true; } - rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); + rounded_up_size =round_up (cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );poison_range (object, rounded_up_size,KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE ); if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
@@ -464,9 +464,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,return (void *)object; redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(object + size), -KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); redzone_end =round_up ((unsigned long )object + cache->object_size, -KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag);
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, page =virt_to_page (ptr); redzone_start =round_up ((unsigned long )(ptr + size), -KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); redzone_end = (unsigned long )ptr +page_size (page);unpoison_range (ptr, size);
@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages <<PAGE_SHIFT ; shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size; -if (WARN_ON (mem_data->nr_pages %KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ) || -WARN_ON (start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE <<PAGE_SHIFT ))) +if (WARN_ON (mem_data->nr_pages %KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ) || +WARN_ON (start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE <<PAGE_SHIFT )))return NOTIFY_BAD ;switch (action) {
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr (start))return ; - size =round_up (size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); + size =round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );poison_range (start, size,KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID ); }
@@ -880,22 +880,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,unsigned long region_start, region_end;unsigned long size; - region_start =ALIGN (start,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); - region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (end,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); + region_start =ALIGN (start,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (end,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); free_region_start =ALIGN (free_region_start, -PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );if (start != region_start && free_region_start < region_start) - region_start -=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + region_start -=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; free_region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (free_region_end, -PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );if (end != region_end && free_region_end > region_end) - region_end +=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + region_end +=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; shadow_start =kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)region_start); shadow_end =kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)region_end);
@@ -921,7 +921,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)unsigned long shadow_start; shadow_start = (unsigned long )kasan_mem_to_shadow (addr); - scaled_size = (size +KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ) >>KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ; + scaled_size = (size +KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE -1 ) >> +KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ; shadow_size =round_up (scaled_size,PAGE_SIZE );if (WARN_ON (!PAGE_ALIGNED (shadow_start)))
mm/kasan/generic.c +7 -7
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr)s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)addr);if (unlikely (shadow_value)) { -s8 last_accessible_byte = addr &KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ; +s8 last_accessible_byte = addr &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ;return unlikely (last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value); }
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr,* Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both. */ -if (unlikely (((addr + size -1 ) &KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ) < size -1 )) +if (unlikely (((addr + size -1 ) &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ) < size -1 ))return *shadow_addr ||memory_is_poisoned_1 (addr + size -1 );return memory_is_poisoned_1 (addr + size -1 );
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)addr);/* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */ -if (unlikely (!IS_ALIGNED (addr,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ))) +if (unlikely (!IS_ALIGNED (addr,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE )))return *shadow_addr ||memory_is_poisoned_1 (addr +15 );return *shadow_addr;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)last_byte);if (unlikely (ret != (unsigned long )last_shadow || - ((long )(last_byte &KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ) >= *last_shadow))) + ((long )(last_byte &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ) >= *last_shadow)))return true; }return false;
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)static void register_global (struct kasan_global *global) { -size_t aligned_size =round_up (global->size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +size_t aligned_size =round_up (global->size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );unpoison_range (global->beg, global->size);
@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);/* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */ void __asan_alloca_poison (unsigned long addr,size_t size) { -size_t rounded_up_size =round_up (size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +size_t rounded_up_size =round_up (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );size_t padding_size =round_up (size,KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE ) - rounded_up_size; -size_t rounded_down_size =round_down (size,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); +size_t rounded_down_size =round_down (size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE );
mm/kasan/generic_report.c +4 -4
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)void *p = addr;while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (p))) - p +=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + p +=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ;return p; }
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (info->first_bad_addr);/* -* If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look +* If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access. */ -if (*shadow_addr >0 && *shadow_addr <=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE -1 ) +if (*shadow_addr >0 && *shadow_addr <=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE -1 ) shadow_addr++;switch (*shadow_addr) { - case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1: + case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:/* * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values * due to a data race in the kernel code.
mm/kasan/init.c +4 -4
@@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) end = addr + (size >>KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT );if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start % - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || -WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE ))) + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || +WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )))return ;for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >>KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT );if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start % - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || -WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE ))) + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || +WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )))return -EINVAL ; ret =kasan_populate_early_shadow (shadow_start, shadow_end);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -2
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) -#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1) +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)#define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF/* native kernel pointers tag */ #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE/* inaccessible memory tag */
mm/kasan/report.c +5 -5
@@ -314,24 +314,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,return false; aligned_addr =round_down ((unsigned long )addr,sizeof (long )); - mem_ptr =round_down (aligned_addr,KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); + mem_ptr =round_down (aligned_addr,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); shadow_ptr =kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)aligned_addr); shadow_bottom =kasan_mem_to_shadow (end_of_stack (current));while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr !=KASAN_STACK_LEFT ) { shadow_ptr--; - mem_ptr -=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + mem_ptr -=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; }while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr ==KASAN_STACK_LEFT ) { shadow_ptr--; - mem_ptr -=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + mem_ptr -=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; }if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)return false; - frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr +KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ); + frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr +KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE );if (frame[0 ] !=KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC ) {pr_err ("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n" , frame[0 ]);
@@ -599,6 +599,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) else bug_type ="maybe wild-memory-access" ;pr_alert ("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n" , bug_type, - orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK); + orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); }#endif
mm/kasan/tags_report.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)void *end = p + size;while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (p)) - p +=KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE ; + p +=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ;return p; }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 7/42 kasan: only build init.c for software modes
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
The new mode won't be using shadow memory, so only build init.c that contains shadow initialization code for software modes.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I8d68c47345afc1dbedadde738f34a874dcae5080
--- mm/kasan/Makefile | 6 +++--- mm/kasan/init.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/Makefile +3 -3
@@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ CFLAGS_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_tags_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) := common.o init.o report.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += generic.o generic_report.o quarantine.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += tags.o tags_report.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) := common.o report.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o generic_report.o quarantine.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o tags.o tags_report.o
mm/kasan/init.c +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* -* This file contains some kasan initialization code. +* This file contains KASAN shadow initialization code. * * Copyright (c) 2015 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 8/42 kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Move all shadow-related code to shadow.c, which is only enabled for software KASAN modes that use shadow memory.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: Ic1c32ce72d4649848e9e6a1f2c8dd269c77673f2
--- mm/kasan/Makefile | 6 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 498 +------------------------------------------- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 518 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 499 deletions(-) create mode 100644 mm/kasan/shadow.c
mm/kasan/Makefile +4 -2
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_generic_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_init.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_quarantine.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_shadow.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_tags_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
@@ -26,9 +27,10 @@ CFLAGS_generic_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_init.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_quarantine.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_shadow.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_tags_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) := common.o report.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o generic_report.o quarantine.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o tags.o tags_report.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o generic_report.o shadow.o quarantine.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o shadow.o tags.o tags_report.o
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -497
526 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/shadow.c new file +518 -0
518 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 9/42 kasan: define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE
In reply to Andrey KonovalovDefine KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE as (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT), which is the same as (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE) for software modes that use shadow memory, and use it across KASAN code to simplify it.
---
Change-Id: I0b627b24187d06c8b9bb2f1d04d94b3d06945e73
--- mm/kasan/init.c | 10 ++++------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 ++ mm/kasan/shadow.c | 16 +++++++--------- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/init.c +4 -6
@@ -441,9 +441,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) addr = (unsigned long )kasan_mem_to_shadow (start); end = addr + (size >>KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ); -if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start % - (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || -WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE ))) +if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start %KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ) || +WARN_ON (size %KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ))return ;for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
@@ -476,9 +475,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) shadow_start =kasan_mem_to_shadow (start); shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >>KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ); -if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start % - (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE )) || -WARN_ON (size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE *PAGE_SIZE ))) +if (WARN_ON ((unsigned long )start %KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ) || +WARN_ON (size %KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ))return -EINVAL ; ret =kasan_populate_early_shadow (shadow_start, shadow_end);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) +#define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT) +#define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF/* native kernel pointers tag */ #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE/* inaccessible memory tag */ #define KASAN_TAG_MAX 0xFD/* maximum value for random tags */
mm/kasan/shadow.c +7 -9
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;if (WARN_ON (mem_data->nr_pages %KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ) || -WARN_ON (start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE <<PAGE_SHIFT ))) +WARN_ON (start_kaddr %KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ))return NOTIFY_BAD ;switch (action) {
@@ -445,22 +445,20 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,unsigned long region_start, region_end;unsigned long size; - region_start =ALIGN (start,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); - region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (end,PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + region_start =ALIGN (start,KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ); + region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (end,KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ); - free_region_start =ALIGN (free_region_start, -PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + free_region_start =ALIGN (free_region_start,KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE );if (start != region_start && free_region_start < region_start) - region_start -=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; + region_start -=KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ; - free_region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (free_region_end, -PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); + free_region_end =ALIGN_DOWN (free_region_end,KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE );if (end != region_end && free_region_end > region_end) - region_end +=PAGE_SIZE *KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; + region_end +=KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE ; shadow_start =kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)region_start); shadow_end =kasan_mem_to_shadow ((void *)region_end);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 10/42 kasan: rename report and tags files
In reply to Andrey KonovalovRename generic_report.c to report_generic.c and tags_report.c to report_sw_tags.c, as their content is more relevant to report.c file. Also rename tags.c to sw_tags.c to better reflect that this file contains code for software tag-based mode.
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: If77d21f655d52ef3e58c4c37fd6621a07f505f18
---
mm/kasan/Makefile | 16 ++++++++--------
mm/kasan/report.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/{generic_report.c => report_generic.c} | 0
mm/kasan/{tags_report.c => report_sw_tags.c} | 0
mm/kasan/{tags.c => sw_tags.c} | 0
5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
rename mm/kasan/{generic_report.c => report_generic.c} (100%)
rename mm/kasan/{tags_report.c => report_sw_tags.c} (100%)
rename mm/kasan/{tags.c => sw_tags.c} (100%)mm/kasan/Makefile +8 -8
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n # Disable ftrace to avoid recursion. CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -CFLAGS_REMOVE_generic_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_init.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_quarantine.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_shadow.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -CFLAGS_REMOVE_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -CFLAGS_REMOVE_tags_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) # Function splitter causes unnecessary splits in __asan_load1/__asan_store1 # see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=63533
@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING CFLAGS_common.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) -CFLAGS_generic_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_init.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_quarantine.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_report_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_report_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_shadow.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) -CFLAGS_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) -CFLAGS_tags_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) := common.o report.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o generic_report.o shadow.o quarantine.o -obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o shadow.o tags.o tags_report.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o report_generic.o shadow.o quarantine.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o report_sw_tags.o shadow.o sw_tags.o
mm/kasan/report.c +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* -* This file contains common generic and tag-based KASAN error reporting code. +* This file contains common KASAN error reporting code. * * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
mm/kasan/report_generic.c renamed from mm/kasan/generic_report.c +0 -0
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c renamed from mm/kasan/tags_report.c +0 -0
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c renamed from mm/kasan/tags.c +0 -0
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 11/42 kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies
In reply to Andrey KonovalovBoth KASAN_GENERIC and KASAN_SW_TAGS have common dependencies, move those to KASAN.
---
Change-Id: I77e475802e8f1750b9154fe4a6e6da4456054fcd
--- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +2 -6
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ menuconfig KASAN (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS) depends on (SLUB && SYSFS) || (SLAB && !DEBUG_SLAB) depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS + select CONSTRUCTORS + select STACKDEPOT help Enables KASAN (KernelAddressSANitizer) - runtime memory debugger, designed to find out-of-bounds accesses and use-after-free bugs.
@@ -46,10 +48,7 @@ choice config KASAN_GENERIC bool "Generic mode" depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC - depends on (SLUB && SYSFS) || (SLAB && !DEBUG_SLAB) select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB - select CONSTRUCTORS - select STACKDEPOT help Enables generic KASAN mode.
@@ -70,10 +69,7 @@ config KASAN_GENERIC config KASAN_SW_TAGS bool "Software tag-based mode" depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS - depends on (SLUB && SYSFS) || (SLAB && !DEBUG_SLAB) select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB - select CONSTRUCTORS - select STACKDEPOT help Enables software tag-based KASAN mode.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 12/42 kasan: hide invalid free check implementation
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
For software KASAN modes the check is based on the value in the shadow memory. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow, so hide the implementation of the check in check_invalid_free().
Also simplify the code for software tag-based mode.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I5fae9531c9fc948eb4d4e0c589744032fc5a0789
--- mm/kasan/common.c | 19 +------------------ mm/kasan/generic.c | 7 +++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 ++ mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/common.c +1 -18
@@ -278,25 +278,9 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,return (void *)object; } -static inline bool shadow_invalid (u8 tag,s8 shadow_byte) -{ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC )) -return shadow_byte <0 || - shadow_byte >=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; - -/* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */ -if ((u8 )shadow_byte ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) -return true; -if ((tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL ) && (tag != (u8 )shadow_byte)) -return true; - -return false; -} -static bool __kasan_slab_free (struct kmem_cache *cache,void *object,unsigned long ip,bool quarantine) { -s8 shadow_byte;u8 tag;void *tagged_object;unsigned long rounded_up_size;
@@ -318,8 +302,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,if (unlikely (cache->flags &SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU ))return false; - shadow_byte =READ_ONCE (*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (object)); -if (shadow_invalid (tag, shadow_byte)) { +if (check_invalid_free (tagged_object)) {kasan_report_invalid_free (tagged_object, ip);return true; }
mm/kasan/generic.c +7 -0
@@ -188,6 +188,13 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,return check_memory_region_inline (addr, size, write, ret_ip); } +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) +{ +s8 shadow_byte =READ_ONCE (*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (addr)); + +return shadow_byte <0 || shadow_byte >=KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ; +} +void kasan_cache_shrink (struct kmem_cache *cache) {quarantine_remove_cache (cache);
mm/kasan/kasan.h +2 -0
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);bool check_memory_region (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool write,unsigned long ret_ip); +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr); +void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);const char *get_bug_type (struct kasan_access_info *info);
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +9 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,return true; } +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr) +{ +u8 tag =get_tag (addr); +u8 shadow_byte =READ_ONCE (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (reset_tag (addr))); + +return (shadow_byte ==KASAN_TAG_INVALID ) || + (tag !=KASAN_TAG_KERNEL && tag != shadow_byte); +} +#define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE (size) \ void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(unsigned long addr) \ { \
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 13/42 kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
In reply to Andrey KonovalovDecoding routines aren't needed when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE is not enabled. Currently only generic KASAN mode implements stack error reporting.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I084e3214f2b40dc0bef7c5a9fafdc6f5c42b06a2
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++ mm/kasan/report.c | 162 -------------------------------------- mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -171,6 +171,12 @@ bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);const char *get_bug_type (struct kasan_access_info *info); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK +void print_address_stack_frame (const void *addr); +#else +static inline void print_address_stack_frame (const void *addr) { } +#endif +bool kasan_report (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool is_write,unsigned long ip);void kasan_report_invalid_free (void *object,unsigned long ip);
mm/kasan/report.c +0 -162
168 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/report_generic.c +162 -0
174 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 14/42 kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow memory. Only initialize it when one of the software KASAN modes are enabled.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I055e0651369b14d3e54cdaa8c48e6329b2e8952d
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h +6 -2
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@#define arch_kasan_get_tag (addr) __tag_get(addr)#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +void kasan_init (void ); +#else +static inline void kasan_init (void ) { } +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )/* * KASAN_SHADOW_START: beginning of the kernel virtual addresses.
@@ -33,12 +39,10 @@#define _KASAN_SHADOW_START (va) (KASAN_SHADOW_END - (1UL << ((va) - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)))#define KASAN_SHADOW_START _KASAN_SHADOW_START(vabits_actual) -void kasan_init (void );void kasan_copy_shadow (pgd_t *pgdir); asmlinkage void kasan_early_init(void);#else -static inline void kasan_init (void ) { }static inline void kasan_copy_shadow (pgd_t *pgdir) { }#endif
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +14 -1
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@#include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) +static pgd_t tmp_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD ]__initdata __aligned(PGD_SIZE) ;/*
@@ -208,7 +210,7 @@ static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start,set_pgd (pgd_offset_k (start),__pgd (0 )); } -void __init kasan_init (void ) +static void __init kasan_init_shadow (void ) {u64 kimg_shadow_start, kimg_shadow_end;u64 mod_shadow_start, mod_shadow_end;
@@ -269,6 +271,17 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)memset (kasan_early_shadow_page,KASAN_SHADOW_INIT ,PAGE_SIZE ); cpu_replace_ttbr1(lm_alias(swapper_pg_dir)); +} + +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) */ + +static inline void __init kasan_init_shadow (void ) { } + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +void __init kasan_init (void ) +{ +kasan_init_shadow ();/* At this point kasan is fully initialized. Enable error messages */ init_task.kasan_depth =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 15/42 kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth for software modes
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Hardware tag-based KASAN won't use kasan_depth. Only define and use it when one of the software KASAN modes are enabled.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I6109ea96c8df41ef6d75ad71bf22c1c8fa234a9a
--- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 11 ++++++++--- include/linux/kasan.h | 18 +++++++++--------- include/linux/sched.h | 2 +- init/init_task.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++ mm/kasan/report.c | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +8 -3
@@ -273,17 +273,22 @@ static void __init kasan_init_shadow(void) cpu_replace_ttbr1(lm_alias(swapper_pg_dir)); } +static void __init kasan_init_depth (void ) +{ + init_task.kasan_depth =0 ; +} +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) */ static inline void __init kasan_init_shadow (void ) { } +static inline void __init kasan_init_depth (void ) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ void __init kasan_init (void ) {kasan_init_shadow (); - -/* At this point kasan is fully initialized. Enable error messages */ - init_task.kasan_depth =0 ; +kasan_init_depth ();pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }
include/linux/kasan.h +9 -9
@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size);void kasan_remove_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size); +/* Enable reporting bugs after kasan_disable_current() */ +extern void kasan_enable_current (void ); + +/* Disable reporting bugs for current task */ +extern void kasan_disable_current (void ); +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ static inline int kasan_add_zero_shadow (void *start,unsigned long size)
@@ -61,16 +67,13 @@ static inline void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size) {} +static inline void kasan_enable_current (void ) {} +static inline void kasan_disable_current (void ) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -/* Enable reporting bugs after kasan_disable_current() */ -extern void kasan_enable_current (void ); - -/* Disable reporting bugs for current task */ -extern void kasan_disable_current (void ); -void kasan_unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size);void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task);
@@ -121,9 +124,6 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} -static inline void kasan_enable_current (void ) {} -static inline void kasan_disable_current (void ) {} -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}static inline void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order) {}
include/linux/sched.h +1 -1
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ struct task_struct {u64 timer_slack_ns;u64 default_timer_slack_ns; -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )unsigned int kasan_depth;#endif
init/init_task.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct task_struct init_task .numa_group = NULL, .numa_faults = NULL,#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) .kasan_depth = 1,#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
mm/kasan/common.c +2 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags) track->stack =kasan_save_stack (flags); } +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )void kasan_enable_current (void ) { current->kasan_depth++;
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) { current->kasan_depth--; } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ void kasan_unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size) {
mm/kasan/report.c +2 -0
@@ -292,8 +292,10 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)static bool report_enabled (void ) { +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )if (current->kasan_depth)return false; +#endif if (test_bit (KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT , &kasan_flags))return true;return !test_and_set_bit (KASAN_BIT_REPORTED , &kasan_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 16/42 kasan, arm64: move initialization message
In reply to Andrey KonovalovSoftware tag-based KASAN mode is fully initialized with kasan_init_tags(), while the generic mode only requires kasan_init(). Move the initialization message for tag-based mode into kasan_init_tags().
Also fix pr_fmt() usage for KASAN code: generic.c doesn't need it as it doesn't use any printing functions; tag-based mode should use "kasan:" instead of KBUILD_MODNAME (which stands for file name).
---
Change-Id: Iddca9764b30ff0fab1922f26ca9d4f39b6f22673
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h | 9 +++------ arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 13 +++++-------- mm/kasan/generic.c | 2 -- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h +3 -6
@@ -12,14 +12,10 @@#define arch_kasan_reset_tag (addr) __tag_reset(addr)#define arch_kasan_get_tag (addr) __tag_get(addr) -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_init (void ); -#else -static inline void kasan_init (void ) { } -#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) +void kasan_init (void ); +/* * KASAN_SHADOW_START: beginning of the kernel virtual addresses. * KASAN_SHADOW_END: KASAN_SHADOW_START + 1/N of kernel virtual addresses,
@@ -43,6 +39,7 @@ void kasan_copy_shadow(pgd_t *pgdir); asmlinkage void kasan_early_init(void);#else +static inline void kasan_init (void ) { }static inline void kasan_copy_shadow (pgd_t *pgdir) { }#endif
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +5 -8
@@ -278,17 +278,14 @@ static void __init kasan_init_depth(void) init_task.kasan_depth = 0; } -#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) */ - -static inline void __init kasan_init_shadow (void ) { } - -static inline void __init kasan_init_depth (void ) { } - -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ -void __init kasan_init (void ) {kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth (); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */ pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); +#endif } + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
mm/kasan/generic.c +0 -2
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@* Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt -#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/init.h>
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +3 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> */ -#define pr_fmt (fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h>
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ void kasan_init_tags(void)for_each_possible_cpu (cpu)per_cpu (prng_state, cpu) = (u32 )get_cycles (); + +pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 17/42 kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init
In reply to Andrey KonovalovRename kasan_init_tags() to kasan_init_sw_tags() as the upcoming hardware tag-based KASAN mode will have its own initialization routine. Also similarly to kasan_init() mark kasan_init_tags() as __init.
---
Change-Id: I99aa2f7115d38a34ed85b329dadab6c7d6952416
--- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 4 ++-- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +1 -1
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)smp_build_mpidr_hash ();/* Init percpu seeds for random tags after cpus are set up. */ -kasan_init_tags (); +kasan_init_sw_tags ();#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN /*
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c +1 -1
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)kasan_init_shadow ();kasan_init_depth ();#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) -/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_tags(). */ +/* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS also requires kasan_init_sw_tags(). */ pr_info ("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n" );#endif }
include/linux/kasan.h +2 -2
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS -void kasan_init_tags (void ); +void __init kasan_init_sw_tags (void );void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ -static inline void kasan_init_tags (void ) { } +static inline void kasan_init_sw_tags (void ) { }static inline void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) {
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state); -void kasan_init_tags (void ) +void __init kasan_init_sw_tags (void ) {int cpu;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 18/42 kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse this function. Rename "shadow" to implementation-neutral "metadata".
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: I03706fe34b38da7860c39aa0968e00001a7d1873
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +- mm/kasan/report.c | 6 +++--- mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +1 -1
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT); } -static inline bool addr_has_shadow (const void *addr) +static inline bool addr_has_metadata (const void *addr) {return (addr >=kasan_shadow_to_mem ((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START )); }
mm/kasan/report.c +3 -3
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, untagged_addr =reset_tag (tagged_addr); info.access_addr = tagged_addr; -if (addr_has_shadow (untagged_addr)) +if (addr_has_metadata (untagged_addr)) info.first_bad_addr =find_first_bad_addr (tagged_addr, size);else info.first_bad_addr = untagged_addr;
@@ -372,11 +372,11 @@ static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,start_report (&flags);print_error_description (&info); -if (addr_has_shadow (untagged_addr)) +if (addr_has_metadata (untagged_addr))print_tags (get_tag (tagged_addr), info.first_bad_addr);pr_err ("\n" ); -if (addr_has_shadow (untagged_addr)) { +if (addr_has_metadata (untagged_addr)) {print_address_description (untagged_addr,get_tag (tagged_addr));pr_err ("\n" );print_shadow_for_address (info.first_bad_addr);
mm/kasan/report_generic.c +1 -1
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)return "out-of-bounds" ; -if (addr_has_shadow (info->access_addr)) +if (addr_has_metadata (info->access_addr))return get_shadow_bug_type (info);return get_wild_bug_type (info); }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 19/42 kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse this function. Rename "shadow" to implementation-neutral "metadata".
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: I18397dddbed6bc6d365ddcaf063a83948e1150a5
--- mm/kasan/report.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/report.c +3 -3
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static int shadow_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *shadow) (shadow - row) /SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK +1 ; } -static void print_shadow_for_address (const void *addr) +static void print_memory_metadata (const void *addr) {int i;const void *shadow =kasan_mem_to_shadow (addr);
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)pr_err ("\n" );print_address_description (object, tag);pr_err ("\n" ); -print_shadow_for_address (object); +print_memory_metadata (object);end_report (&flags); }
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,if (addr_has_metadata (untagged_addr)) {print_address_description (untagged_addr,get_tag (tagged_addr));pr_err ("\n" ); -print_shadow_for_address (info.first_bad_addr); +print_memory_metadata (info.first_bad_addr); }else {dump_stack (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 20/42 kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse these macros. Rename "SHADOW" to implementation-neutral "META".
No functional changes.
---
Change-Id: Id2d836bf43b401bce1221cc06e745185f17b1cc
--- mm/kasan/report.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/report.c +15 -15
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@#include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" -/* Shadow layout customization. */ -#define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1 -#define SHADOW_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16 -#define SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW (SHADOW_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK) -#define SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2 +/* Metadata layout customization. */ +#define META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1 +#define META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16 +#define META_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK) +#define META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2static unsigned long kasan_flags;
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void print_address_description(void *addr, u8 tag)static bool row_is_guilty (const void *row,const void *guilty) { -return (row <= guilty) && (guilty < row +SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ); +return (row <= guilty) && (guilty < row +META_BYTES_PER_ROW ); }static int shadow_pointer_offset (const void *row,const void *shadow)
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static int shadow_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *shadow)* 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG/8)*2 chars. */ return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG /8 )*2 + (shadow - row)*2 + - (shadow - row) /SHADOW_BYTES_PER_BLOCK +1 ; + (shadow - row) /META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK +1 ; }static void print_memory_metadata (const void *addr)
@@ -259,15 +259,15 @@ static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr)const void *shadow_row; shadow_row = (void *)round_down ((unsigned long )shadow, -SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ) - -SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR *SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ; +META_BYTES_PER_ROW ) + -META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR *META_BYTES_PER_ROW ;pr_err ("Memory state around the buggy address:\n" ); -for (i = -SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR ; i <=SHADOW_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR ; i++) { +for (i = -META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR ; i <=META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR ; i++) {const void *kaddr =kasan_shadow_to_mem (shadow_row);char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG /8 )*2 ]; -char shadow_buf[SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ]; +char shadow_buf[META_BYTES_PER_ROW ];snprintf (buffer,sizeof (buffer), (i ==0 ) ?">%px: " :" %px: " , kaddr);
@@ -276,17 +276,17 @@ static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr)* function, because generic functions may try to * access kasan mapping for the passed address. */ -memcpy (shadow_buf, shadow_row,SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ); +memcpy (shadow_buf, shadow_row,META_BYTES_PER_ROW );print_hex_dump (KERN_ERR , buffer, -DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ,1 , - shadow_buf,SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ,0 ); +DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,META_BYTES_PER_ROW ,1 , + shadow_buf,META_BYTES_PER_ROW ,0 );if (row_is_guilty (shadow_row, shadow))pr_err ("%*c\n" ,shadow_pointer_offset (shadow_row, shadow),'^' ); - shadow_row +=SHADOW_BYTES_PER_ROW ; + shadow_row +=META_BYTES_PER_ROW ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 21/42 kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
Rework print_memory_metadata() to make it agnostic with regard to the way metadata is stored. Allow providing a separate metadata_fetch_row() implementation for each KASAN mode. Hardware tag-based KASAN will provide its own implementation that doesn't use shadow memory.
No functional changes for software modes.
---
Change-Id: I5b0ed1d079ea776e620beca6a529a861e7dced95
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 8 ++++++ mm/kasan/report.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 5 ++++ mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 5 ++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +8 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 1#endif +/* Metadata layout customization. */ +#define META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1 +#define META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16 +#define META_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK) +#define META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BYTES_PER_ROW * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) +#define META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2 +struct kasan_access_info {const void *access_addr;const void *first_bad_addr;
@@ -170,6 +177,7 @@ bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);const char *get_bug_type (struct kasan_access_info *info); +void metadata_fetch_row (char *buffer,void *row);#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) &&CONFIG_KASAN_STACK void print_address_stack_frame (const void *addr);
mm/kasan/report.c +27 -29
94 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/report_generic.c +5 -0
@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)return get_wild_bug_type (info); } +void metadata_fetch_row (char *buffer,void *row) +{ +memcpy (buffer,kasan_mem_to_shadow (row),META_BYTES_PER_ROW ); +} +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK static bool __must_check tokenize_frame_descr(const char **frame_descr, char *token, size_t max_tok_len,
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +5 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)return p; } +void metadata_fetch_row (char *buffer,void *row) +{ +memcpy (buffer,kasan_mem_to_shadow (row),META_BYTES_PER_ROW ); +} +void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr) {u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow (addr);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 22/42 kasan, arm64: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE
In reply to Andrey KonovalovSoftware tag-based KASAN provides its own tag checking machinery that can conflict with MTE. Don't allow enabling software tag-based KASAN when MTE is enabled.
---
Change-Id: Icd29bd0c6b1d3d7a0ee3d50c20490f404d34fc97
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48) - select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN + select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS if (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && !ARM64_MTE) select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 23/42 kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis patch adds a configuration option for a new KASAN mode called hardware tag-based KASAN. This mode uses the memory tagging approach like the software tag-based mode, but relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension feature for tag management and access checking.
---
Change-Id: I246c2def9fffa6563278db1bddfbe742ca7bdefe
--- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
lib/Kconfig.kasan +44 -17
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS bool -config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC +config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC bool config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
@@ -15,16 +18,19 @@ config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC config CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress) +# This option is only required for software KASAN modes. +# Old GCC versions don't have proper support for no_sanitize_address. +# See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=89124 for details. config CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS def_bool !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 80300 menuconfig KASAN bool "KASAN: runtime memory debugger" - depends on (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC) || \ - (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS) + depends on (((HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC) || \ + (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ + CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS) || \ + HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS depends on (SLUB && SYSFS) || (SLAB && !DEBUG_SLAB) - depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS - select CONSTRUCTORS select STACKDEPOT help Enables KASAN (KernelAddressSANitizer) - runtime memory debugger,
@@ -37,18 +43,24 @@ choice prompt "KASAN mode" default KASAN_GENERIC help - KASAN has two modes: generic KASAN (similar to userspace ASan, - x86_64/arm64/xtensa, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) and - software tag-based KASAN (a version based on software memory - tagging, arm64 only, similar to userspace HWASan, enabled with - CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS). + KASAN has three modes: + 1. generic KASAN (similar to userspace ASan, + x86_64/arm64/xtensa, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC), + 2. software tag-based KASAN (arm64 only, based on software + memory tagging (similar to userspace HWASan), enabled with + CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS), and + 3. hardware tag-based KASAN (arm64 only, based on hardware + memory tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS). + + All KASAN modes are strictly debugging features. - Both generic and tag-based KASAN are strictly debugging features. + For better error reports enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE. config KASAN_GENERIC bool "Generic mode" depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB + select CONSTRUCTORS help Enables generic KASAN mode.
@@ -61,8 +73,6 @@ config KASAN_GENERIC and introduces an overhead of ~x1.5 for the rest of the allocations. The performance slowdown is ~x3. - For better error detection enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE. - Currently CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot).
@@ -70,11 +80,15 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS bool "Software tag-based mode" depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB + select CONSTRUCTORS help Enables software tag-based KASAN mode. - This mode requires Top Byte Ignore support by the CPU and therefore - is only supported for arm64. This mode requires Clang. + This mode require software memory tagging support in the form of + HWASan-like compiler instrumentation. + + Currently this mode is only implemented for arm64 CPUs and relies on + Top Byte Ignore. This mode requires Clang. This mode consumes about 1/16th of available memory at kernel start and introduces an overhead of ~20% for the rest of the allocations.
@@ -82,15 +96,27 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS casting and comparison, as it embeds tags into the top byte of each pointer. - For better error detection enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE. - Currently CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot). +config KASAN_HW_TAGS + bool "Hardware tag-based mode" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS + depends on SLUB + help + Enables hardware tag-based KASAN mode. + + This mode requires hardware memory tagging support, and can be used + by any architecture that provides it. + + Currently this mode is only implemented for arm64 CPUs starting from + ARMv8.5 and relies on Memory Tagging Extension and Top Byte Ignore. + endchoice choice prompt "Instrumentation type" + depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS default KASAN_OUTLINE config KASAN_OUTLINE
@@ -114,6 +140,7 @@ endchoice config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST + depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS help The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that causes excessive stack usage in a lot of functions, see
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 24/42 arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) which is an armv8.5-a architecture extension.
Enable the correct asm option when the compiler supports it in order to allow the usage of ALTERNATIVE()s with MTE instructions.
---
Change-Id: I172e15e4c189f073e4c14a10276b276092e76536
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/Makefile | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -1591,6 +1591,9 @@ endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features" +config AS_HAS_ARMV8_5 + def_bool $(cc-option,-Wa$(comma)-march=armv8.5-a) + config ARM64_BTI bool "Branch Target Identification support" default y
@@ -1665,6 +1668,7 @@ config ARM64_MTE bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" default y depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + depends on AS_HAS_ARMV8_5 select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS help Memory Tagging (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides
arch/arm64/Makefile +5 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_AS_HAS_ARMV8_4), y) asm-arch := armv8.4-a endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_AS_HAS_ARMV8_5), y) +# make sure to pass the newest target architecture to -march. +asm-arch := armv8.5-a +endif + ifdef asm-arch KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wa,-march=$(asm-arch) \ -DARM64_ASM_ARCH='"$(asm-arch)"'
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 25/42 arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Provide helper functions to manipulate allocation and pointer tags for kernel addresses.
Low-level helper functions (mte_assign_*, written in assembly) operate tag values from the [0x0, 0xF] range. High-level helper functions (mte_get/set_*) use the [0xF0, 0xFF] range to preserve compatibility with normal kernel pointers that have 0xFF in their top byte.
MTE_GRANULE_SIZE and related definitions are moved to mte-def.h header that doesn't have any dependencies and is safe to include into any low-level header.
---
Change-Id: I1b5230254f90dc21a913447cb17f07fea7944ece
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h | 20 +++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/mte.S | 16 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@#define ESR_ELx_FSC (0x3F)#define ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE (0x3C)#define ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT (0x10) +#define ESR_ELx_FSC_MTE (0x11)#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SERROR (0x11)#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS (0x08)#define ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT (0x04)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h new file +15 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Ltd. +*/ +#ifndef __ASM_MTE_DEF_H +#define __ASM_MTE_DEF_H + +#define MTE_GRANULE_SIZE UL(16) +#define MTE_GRANULE_MASK (~(MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)) +#define MTE_TAG_SHIFT 56 +#define MTE_TAG_SIZE 4 +#define MTE_TAG_MASK GENMASK((MTE_TAG_SHIFT + (MTE_TAG_SIZE - 1)), MTE_TAG_SHIFT) +#define MTE_TAG_MAX (MTE_TAG_MASK >> MTE_TAG_SHIFT) + +#endif /* __ASM_MTE_DEF_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h new file +56 -0
56 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h +14 -6
@@ -5,14 +5,16 @@#ifndef __ASM_MTE_H#define __ASM_MTE_H -#define MTE_GRANULE_SIZE UL(16) -#define MTE_GRANULE_MASK (~(MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)) -#define MTE_TAG_SHIFT 56 -#define MTE_TAG_SIZE 4 +#include <asm/compiler.h> +#include <asm/mte-def.h> + +#define __MTE_PREAMBLE ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE ".arch_extension memtag\n"#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/page-flags.h> +#include <linux/types.h> #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
@@ -45,7 +47,9 @@ long get_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task);int mte_ptrace_copy_tags (struct task_struct *child,long request,unsigned long addr,unsigned long data); -#else +void mte_assign_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size); + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ /* unused if !CONFIG_ARM64_MTE, silence the compiler */ #define PG_mte_tagged 0
@@ -80,7 +84,11 @@ static inline int mte_ptrace_copy_tags(struct task_struct *child,return -EIO ; } -#endif +static inline void mte_assign_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_MTE_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +48 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/lib/mte.S +16 -0
@@ -149,3 +149,19 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mte_restore_page_tags) ret SYM_FUNC_END(mte_restore_page_tags) + +/* + * Assign allocation tags for a region of memory based on the pointer tag + * x0 - source pointer + * x1 - size + * + * Note: The address must be non-NULL and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned and + * size must be non-zero and MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned. + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_assign_mem_tag_range) +1: stg x0, [x0] + add x0, x0, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE + subs x1, x1, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE + b.gt 1b + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_assign_mem_tag_range)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 26/42 arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
The hardware tag-based KASAN for compatibility with the other modes stores the tag associated to a page in page->flags.
Due to this the kernel faults on access when it allocates a page with an initial tag and the user changes the tags.
Reset the tag associated by the kernel to a page in all the meaningful places to prevent kernel faults on access.
Note: An alternative to this approach could be to modify page_to_virt(). This though could end up being racy, in fact if a CPU checks the PG_mte_tagged bit and decides that the page is not tagged but another CPU maps the same with PROT_MTE and becomes tagged the subsequent kernel access would fail.
---
Change-Id: I8451d438bb63364de2a3e68041e3a27866921d4e
--- arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c +5 -0
@@ -371,6 +371,11 @@ static void swsusp_mte_restore_tags(void)unsigned long pfn = xa_state.xa_index;struct page *page =pfn_to_online_page (pfn); +/* +* It is not required to invoke page_kasan_tag_reset(page) +* at this point since the tags stored in page->flags are +* already restored. +*/ mte_restore_page_tags (page_address (page), tags);mte_free_tag_storage (tags);
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +9 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,15 @@ static void mte_sync_page_tags(struct page *page, pte_t *ptep, bool check_swap)return ; } +page_kasan_tag_reset (page); +/* +* We need smp_wmb() in between setting the flags and clearing the +* tags because if another thread reads page->flags and builds a +* tagged address out of it, there is an actual dependency to the +* memory access, but on the current thread we do not guarantee that +* the new page->flags are visible before the tags were updated. +*/ +smp_wmb ();mte_clear_page_tags (page_address (page)); }
arch/arm64/mm/copypage.c +9 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,15 @@ void copy_highpage(struct page *to, struct page *from)if (system_supports_mte () &&test_bit (PG_mte_tagged, &from->flags)) {set_bit (PG_mte_tagged, &to->flags); +page_kasan_tag_reset (to); +/* +* We need smp_wmb() in between setting the flags and clearing the +* tags because if another thread reads page->flags and builds a +* tagged address out of it, there is an actual dependency to the +* memory access, but on the current thread we do not guarantee that +* the new page->flags are visible before the tags were updated. +*/ +smp_wmb ();mte_copy_page_tags (kto, kfrom); } }
arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c +9 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ bool mte_restore_tags(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page)if (!tags)return false; +page_kasan_tag_reset (page); +/* +* We need smp_wmb() in between setting the flags and clearing the +* tags because if another thread reads page->flags and builds a +* tagged address out of it, there is an actual dependency to the +* memory access, but on the current thread we do not guarantee that +* the new page->flags are visible before the tags were updated. +*/ +smp_wmb ();mte_restore_page_tags (page_address (page), tags);return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 27/42 arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Add the implementation of the in-kernel fault handler.
When a tag fault happens on a kernel address:
* MTE is disabled on the current CPU,
* the execution continues.
When a tag fault happens on a user address:
* the kernel executes do_bad_area() and panics.
The tag fault handler for kernel addresses is currently empty and will be filled in by a future commit.
---
Change-Id: I9b8aa79567f7c45f4d6a1290efcf34567e620717
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +23 -0
@@ -200,13 +200,36 @@ do { \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \ }while (0 ) +/* +* The Tag Check Flag (TCF) mode for MTE is per EL, hence TCF0 +* affects EL0 and TCF affects EL1 irrespective of which TTBR is +* used. +* The kernel accesses TTBR0 usually with LDTR/STTR instructions +* when UAO is available, so these would act as EL0 accesses using +* TCF0. +* However futex.h code uses exclusives which would be executed as +* EL1, this can potentially cause a tag check fault even if the +* user disables TCF0. +* +* To address the problem we set the PSTATE.TCO bit in uaccess_enable() +* and reset it in uaccess_disable(). +* +* The Tag check override (TCO) bit disables temporarily the tag checking +* preventing the issue. +*/ static inline void uaccess_disable(void) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(0), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); +__uaccess_disable (ARM64_HAS_PAN ); }static inline void uaccess_enable (void ) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); +__uaccess_enable (ARM64_HAS_PAN ); }
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +45 -0
63 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH mm v11 27/42] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler
Quoted 30 lines · Andrey Konovalov
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +20
-0@@ -200,13 +200,36 @@ do { \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \ }while (0 ) +/* +* The Tag Check Flag (TCF) mode for MTE is per EL, hence TCF0 +* affects EL0 and TCF affects EL1 irrespective of which TTBR is +* used. +* The kernel accesses TTBR0 usually with LDTR/STTR instructions +* when UAO is available, so these would act as EL0 accesses using +* TCF0. +* However futex.h code uses exclusives which would be executed as +* EL1, this can potentially cause a tag check fault even if the +* user disables TCF0. +* +* To address the problem we set the PSTATE.TCO bit in uaccess_enable() +* and reset it in uaccess_disable(). +* +* The Tag check override (TCO) bit disables temporarily the tag checking +* preventing the issue. +*/ static inline void uaccess_disable(void) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(0), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); +
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h do { \ · line 234
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +3
-0__uaccess_disable (ARM64_HAS_PAN ); }static inline void uaccess_enable (void ) { + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); +__uaccess_enable (ARM64_HAS_PAN ); }
I think that's insufficient if CONFIG_ARM64_PAN is disabled. In the !PAN case, the get/put_user() accessors use standard LDR/STR instructions which would follow the TCF rather than TCF0 mode checking. However, they don't use the above uaccess_disable/enable() functions.
The current user space support is affected as well but luckily we just skip tag checking on the uaccess routines if !PAN since the kernel TCF is 0. With the in-kernel MTE, TCF may be more strict than TCF0.
My suggestion is to simply make CONFIG_ARM64_MTE depend on (or select) PAN. Architecturally this should work since PAN is required for ARMv8.1, so present with any MTE implementation. This patch is on top of -next, though it has a Fixes tag in 5.10:
--------------------------8<---------------------------
From ecc819804c1fb1ad498d7ced07e01e3b3e055a3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 10:15:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: mte: Ensure CONFIG_ARM64_PAN is enabled with MTE
The uaccess routines like get/put_user() rely on the user TCF0 mode setting for tag checking. However, if CONFIG_ARM64_PAN is disabled, these routines would use the standard LDR/STR instructions and therefore the kernel TCF mode. In 5.10, the kernel TCF==0, so no tag checking, but this will change with the in-kernel MTE support.
Make ARM64_MTE depend on ARM64_PAN.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -1673,6 +1673,8 @@ config ARM64_MTE default y depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI depends on AS_HAS_ARMV8_5 + # Required for tag checking in the uaccess routines + depends on ARM64_PAN select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS help Memory Tagging (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides
Re: [PATCH mm v11 27/42] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler
Quoted 13 lines · Catalin Marinas
Review
Quoted 7 lines
static inline void
uaccess_enable(void)
{(quoted diff) +3
-0+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1), + ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)); + __uaccess_enable(ARM64_HAS_PAN); }I think that's insufficient if
CONFIG_ARM64_PANis disabled. In the !PAN case, the get/put_user() accessors use standard LDR/STR instructions which would follow the TCF rather than TCF0 mode checking. However, they don't use the above uaccess_disable/enable() functions.
Quoted 9 lines
The current user space support is affected as well but luckily we just skip tag checking on the uaccess routines if !PAN since the kernel TCF is 0. With the in-kernel MTE, TCF may be more strict than TCF0.
My suggestion is to simply make
CONFIG_ARM64_MTEdepend on (or select) PAN. Architecturally this should work since PAN is required for ARMv8.1, so present with any MTE implementation. This patch is on top of -next, though it has a Fixes tag in 5.10:
Agreed, since PAN is required for ARMv8.1 we should not find any implementation of MTE that lacks PAN.
Quoted 12 lines
--------------------------8<---------------------------
Fromecc819804c1fb1ad498d7ced07e01e3b3e055a3fMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 10:15:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: mte: EnsureCONFIG_ARM64_PANis enabled with MTEThe uaccess routines like get/put_user() rely on the user TCF0 mode setting for tag checking. However, if
CONFIG_ARM64_PANis disabled, these routines would use the standard LDR/STR instructions and therefore the kernel TCF mode. In 5.10, the kernel TCF==0, so no tag checking, but this will change with the in-kernel MTE support.
Quoted 4 lines
Make
ARM64_MTEdepend onARM64_PAN.Fixes 89b94df9dfb1 ("arm64: mte: Kconfig entry")Signed-off-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Quoted 25 lines
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)=======================================
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-1--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig@@ -1673,6 +1673,8 @@ config ARM64_MTE» default·y
» depends·on·ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE·&&·ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI » depends·on·AS_HAS_ARMV8_5
+» #·Required·for·tag·checking·in·the·uaccess·routines +» depends·on·ARM64_PAN
» select·ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
» help
» ··Memory·Tagging·(part·of·the·ARMv8.5·Extensions)·provides
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Vincenzo
PATCH v11 28/42 arm64: kasan: Allow enabling in-kernel MTE
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) feature and requires it to be enabled. MTE supports
This patch adds a new mte_enable_kernel() helper, that enables MTE in Synchronous mode in EL1 and is intended to be called from KASAN runtime during initialization.
The Tag Checking operation causes a synchronous data abort as a consequence of a tag check fault when MTE is configured in synchronous mode.
As part of this change enable match-all tag for EL1 to allow the kernel to access user pages without faulting. This is required because the kernel does not have knowledge of the tags set by the user in a page.
Note: For MTE, the TCF bit field in SCTLR_EL1 affects only EL1 in a similar way as TCF0 affects EL0.
MTE that is built on top of the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature hence we enable it as part of this patch as well.
---
Change-Id: I4d67497268bb7f0c2fc5dcacefa1e273df4af71d
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr);u8 mte_get_random_tag (void );void *mte_set_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size,u8 tag); +void mte_enable_kernel (void ); +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ static inline u8 mte_get_ptr_tag (void *ptr)
@@ -49,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)return addr; } +static inline void mte_enable_kernel (void ) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +7 -0
@@ -129,6 +129,13 @@ void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)return ptr; } +void mte_enable_kernel (void ) +{ +/* Enable MTE Sync Mode for EL1. */ +sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1, SCTLR_ELx_TCF_MASK, SCTLR_ELx_TCF_SYNC); +isb (); +} +static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (u64 tcf0) {/* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +20 -3
@@ -40,9 +40,15 @@ #define TCR_CACHE_FLAGS TCR_IRGN_WBWA | TCR_ORGN_WBWA #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS -#define TCR_KASAN_FLAGS TCR_TBI1 +#define TCR_KASAN_SW_FLAGS TCR_TBI1 #else -#define TCR_KASAN_FLAGS 0 +#define TCR_KASAN_SW_FLAGS 0 +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define TCR_KASAN_HW_FLAGS SYS_TCR_EL1_TCMA1 | TCR_TBI1 +#else +#define TCR_KASAN_HW_FLAGS 0 #endif /*
@@ -427,6 +433,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) */ mov_q x5, MAIR_EL1_SET #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + mte_tcr .req x20 + + mov mte_tcr, #0 + /* * Update MAIR_EL1, GCR_EL1 and TFSR*_EL1 if MTE is supported * (ID_AA64PFR1_EL1[11:8] > 1).
@@ -447,6 +457,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) /* clear any pending tag check faults in TFSR*_EL1 */ msr_s SYS_TFSR_EL1, xzr msr_s SYS_TFSRE0_EL1, xzr + + /* set the TCR_EL1 bits */ + mov_q mte_tcr, TCR_KASAN_HW_FLAGS 1: #endif msr mair_el1, x5
@@ -456,7 +469,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__cpu_setup) */ mov_q x10, TCR_TxSZ(VA_BITS) | TCR_CACHE_FLAGS | TCR_SMP_FLAGS | \ TCR_TG_FLAGS | TCR_KASLR_FLAGS | TCR_ASID16 | \ - TCR_TBI0 | TCR_A1 | TCR_KASAN_FLAGS + TCR_TBI0 | TCR_A1 | TCR_KASAN_SW_FLAGS +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + orr x10, x10, mte_tcr + .unreq mte_tcr +#endif tcr_clear_errata_bits x10, x9, x5 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VA_BITS_52
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 29/42 arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
The gcr_user mask is a per thread mask that represents the tags that are excluded from random generation when the Memory Tagging Extension is present and an 'irg' instruction is invoked.
gcr_user affects the behavior on EL0 only.
Currently that mask is an include mask and it is controlled by the user via prctl() while GCR_EL1 accepts an exclude mask.
Convert the include mask into an exclude one to make it easier the register setting.
Note: This change will affect gcr_kernel (for EL1) introduced with a future patch.
---
Change-Id: Id15c0b47582fb51594bb26fb8353d78c7d0953c1
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct thread_struct {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE u64 sctlr_tcf0; -u64 gcr_user_incl; +u64 gcr_user_excl;#endif };
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +15 -14
@@ -156,23 +156,22 @@ static void set_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0)preempt_enable (); } -static void update_gcr_el1_excl (u64 incl) +static void update_gcr_el1_excl (u64 excl) { -u64 excl = ~incl &SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ;/* -* Note that 'incl' is an include mask (controlled by the user via -* prctl()) while GCR_EL1 accepts an exclude mask. +* Note that the mask controlled by the user via prctl() is an +* include while GCR_EL1 accepts an exclude mask. * No need for ISB since this only affects EL0 currently, implicit * with ERET. */ sysreg_clear_set_s (SYS_GCR_EL1 ,SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK , excl); } -static void set_gcr_el1_excl (u64 incl) +static void set_gcr_el1_excl (u64 excl) { - current->thread.gcr_user_incl = incl; -update_gcr_el1_excl (incl); + current->thread.gcr_user_excl = excl; +update_gcr_el1_excl (excl); }void flush_mte_state (void )
@@ -187,7 +186,7 @@ void flush_mte_state(void)/* disable tag checking */ set_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE );/* reset tag generation mask */ -set_gcr_el1_excl (0 ); +set_gcr_el1_excl (SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ); }void mte_thread_switch (struct task_struct *next)
@@ -198,7 +197,7 @@ void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)/* avoid expensive SCTLR_EL1 accesses if no change */ if (current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 != next->thread.sctlr_tcf0)update_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (next->thread.sctlr_tcf0); -update_gcr_el1_excl (next->thread.gcr_user_incl); +update_gcr_el1_excl (next->thread.gcr_user_excl); }void mte_suspend_exit (void )
@@ -206,13 +205,14 @@ void mte_suspend_exit(void)if (!system_supports_mte ())return ; -update_gcr_el1_excl (current->thread.gcr_user_incl); +update_gcr_el1_excl (current->thread.gcr_user_excl); }long set_mte_ctrl (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long arg) {u64 tcf0; -u64 gcr_incl = (arg &PR_MTE_TAG_MASK ) >>PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT ; +u64 gcr_excl = ~((arg &PR_MTE_TAG_MASK ) >>PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT ) & +SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ;if (!system_supports_mte ())return 0 ;
@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ long set_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg)if (task != current) { task->thread.sctlr_tcf0 = tcf0; - task->thread.gcr_user_incl = gcr_incl; + task->thread.gcr_user_excl = gcr_excl; }else {set_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (tcf0); -set_gcr_el1_excl (gcr_incl); +set_gcr_el1_excl (gcr_excl); }return 0 ;
@@ -245,11 +245,12 @@ long set_mte_ctrl(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg)long get_mte_ctrl (struct task_struct *task) {unsigned long ret; +u64 incl = ~task->thread.gcr_user_excl &SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ;if (!system_supports_mte ())return 0 ; - ret = task->thread.gcr_user_incl <<PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT ; + ret = incl <<PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT ;switch (task->thread.sctlr_tcf0) {case SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_NONE :
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 30/42 arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
When MTE is present, the GCR_EL1 register contains the tags mask that allows to exclude tags from the random generation via the IRG instruction.
With the introduction of the new Tag-Based KASAN API that provides a mechanism to reserve tags for special reasons, the MTE implementation has to make sure that the GCR_EL1 setting for the kernel does not affect the userspace processes and viceversa.
Save and restore the kernel/user mask in GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit.
---
Change-Id: I0081cba5ace27a9111bebb239075c9a466af4c84
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h | 5 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-def.h +0 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,5 @@#define MTE_TAG_SHIFT 56#define MTE_TAG_SIZE 4#define MTE_TAG_MASK GENMASK((MTE_TAG_SHIFT + (MTE_TAG_SIZE - 1)), MTE_TAG_SHIFT) -#define MTE_TAG_MAX (MTE_TAG_MASK >> MTE_TAG_SHIFT)#endif /* __ASM_MTE_DEF_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte-kasan.h +5 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ u8 mte_get_random_tag(void);void *mte_set_mem_tag_range (void *addr,size_t size,u8 tag);void mte_enable_kernel (void ); +void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag);#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
@@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ static inline void mte_enable_kernel(void) { } +static inline void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h +2 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@#include <asm/pgtable-types.h> +extern u64 gcr_kernel_excl; +void mte_clear_page_tags (void *addr);unsigned long mte_copy_tags_from_user (void *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long n);
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +3 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ int main(void)#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel)); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + DEFINE(THREAD_GCR_EL1_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.gcr_user_excl));#endif BLANK (); DEFINE(S_X0, offsetof(struct pt_regs, regs[0]));
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +41 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +28 -3
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@#include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> +u64 gcr_kernel_excl__ro_after_init ; +static void mte_sync_page_tags (struct page *page,pte_t *ptep,bool check_swap) {pte_t old_pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep);
@@ -129,6 +131,26 @@ void *mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)return ptr; } +void mte_init_tags (u64 max_tag) +{ +static bool gcr_kernel_excl_initialized; + +if (!gcr_kernel_excl_initialized) { +/* +* The format of the tags in KASAN is 0xFF and in MTE is 0xF. +* This conversion extracts an MTE tag from a KASAN tag. +*/ +u64 incl =GENMASK (FIELD_GET (MTE_TAG_MASK >>MTE_TAG_SHIFT , + max_tag),0 ); + + gcr_kernel_excl = ~incl &SYS_GCR_EL1_EXCL_MASK ; + gcr_kernel_excl_initialized = true; + } + +/* Enable the kernel exclude mask for random tags generation. */ +write_sysreg_s (SYS_GCR_EL1_RRND | gcr_kernel_excl,SYS_GCR_EL1 ); +} +void mte_enable_kernel (void ) {/* Enable MTE Sync Mode for EL1. */
@@ -171,7 +193,11 @@ static void update_gcr_el1_excl(u64 excl)static void set_gcr_el1_excl (u64 excl) { current->thread.gcr_user_excl = excl; -update_gcr_el1_excl (excl); + +/* +* SYS_GCR_EL1 will be set to current->thread.gcr_user_excl value +* by mte_set_user_gcr() in kernel_exit, +*/ }void flush_mte_state (void )
@@ -197,7 +223,6 @@ void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)/* avoid expensive SCTLR_EL1 accesses if no change */ if (current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 != next->thread.sctlr_tcf0)update_sctlr_el1_tcf0 (next->thread.sctlr_tcf0); -update_gcr_el1_excl (next->thread.gcr_user_excl); }void mte_suspend_exit (void )
@@ -205,7 +230,7 @@ void mte_suspend_exit(void)if (!system_supports_mte ())return ; -update_gcr_el1_excl (current->thread.gcr_user_excl); +update_gcr_el1_excl (gcr_kernel_excl); }long set_mte_ctrl (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long arg)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 31/42 kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
free_reserved_area() memsets the pages belonging to a given memory area. As that memory hasn't been allocated via page_alloc, the KASAN tags that those pages have are 0x00. As the result the memset might result in a tag mismatch.
Untag the address to avoid spurious faults.
---
Change-Id: If12b4944383575b8bbd7d971decbd7f04be6748b
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
mm/page_alloc.c +5 -0
@@ -7659,6 +7659,11 @@ unsigned long free_reserved_area(void *start, void *end, int poison, const char* alias for the memset(). */ direct_map_addr =page_address (page); +/* +* Perform a kasan-unchecked memset() since this memory +* has not been initialized. +*/ + direct_map_addr =kasan_reset_tag (direct_map_addr);if ((unsigned int )poison <=0xFF )memset (direct_map_addr, poison,PAGE_SIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 32/42 arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovHardware tag-based KASAN uses the memory tagging approach, which requires all allocations to be aligned to the memory granule size. Align the allocations to MTE_GRANULE_SIZE via ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN when CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled.
---
Change-Id: I51ebd3f9645e6330e5a92973bf7c86b62d632c2b
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h +3 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#define __ASM_CACHE_H#include <asm/cputype.h> +#include <asm/mte-kasan.h> #define CTR_L1IP_SHIFT 14#define CTR_L1IP_MASK 3
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS #define ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN (1ULL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) +#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS ) +#define ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN MTE_GRANULE_SIZE#endif #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 33/42 arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers
In reply to Andrey KonovalovThis patch add a set of arch_*() memory tagging helpers currently only defined for arm64 when hardware tag-based KASAN is enabled. These helpers will be used by KASAN runtime to implement the hardware tag-based mode.
The arch-level indirection level is introduced to simplify adding hardware tag-based KASAN support for other architectures in the future by defining the appropriate arch_*() macros.
---
Change-Id: I42b0795a28067872f8308e00c6f0195bca435c2a
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 9 +++++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +9 -0
@@ -230,6 +230,15 @@ static inline const void *__tag_set(const void *addr, u8 tag)return (const void *)(__addr |__tag_shifted (tag)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +#define arch_enable_tagging () mte_enable_kernel() +#define arch_init_tags (max_tag) mte_init_tags(max_tag) +#define arch_get_random_tag () mte_get_random_tag() +#define arch_get_mem_tag (addr) mte_get_mem_tag(addr) +#define arch_set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) \ + mte_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag)) +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +/* * Physical vs virtual RAM address space conversion. These are * private definitions which should NOT be used outside memory.h
mm/kasan/kasan.h +26 -0
@@ -243,6 +243,32 @@ static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)#define reset_tag (addr) ((void *)arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr))#define get_tag (addr) arch_kasan_get_tag(addr) +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS + +#ifndef arch_enable_tagging +#define arch_enable_tagging () +#endif +#ifndef arch_init_tags +#define arch_init_tags (max_tag) +#endif +#ifndef arch_get_random_tag +#define arch_get_random_tag () (0xFF) +#endif +#ifndef arch_get_mem_tag +#define arch_get_mem_tag (addr) (0xFF) +#endif +#ifndef arch_set_mem_tag_range +#define arch_set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) ((void *)(addr)) +#endif + +#define hw_enable_tagging () arch_enable_tagging() +#define hw_init_tags (max_tag) arch_init_tags(max_tag) +#define hw_get_random_tag () arch_get_random_tag() +#define hw_get_mem_tag (addr) arch_get_mem_tag(addr) +#define hw_set_mem_tag_range (addr, size, tag) arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag)) + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +/* * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 34/42 kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovHardware tag-based KASAN has granules of MTE_GRANULE_SIZE. Define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE to MTE_GRANULE_SIZE for CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS.
---
Change-Id: I5d1117e6a991cbca00d2cfb4ba66e8ae2d8f513a
--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
mm/kasan/kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) +#else +#include <asm/mte-kasan.h> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE MTE_GRANULE_SIZE +#endif +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)#define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 35/42 kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN
In reply to Andrey KonovalovWith the intoduction of hardware tag-based KASAN some kernel checks of this kind:
ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
will be updated to:
if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
x86 and s390 use a trick to #undef CONFIG_KASAN for some of the code that isn't linked with KASAN runtime and shouldn't have any KASAN annotations.
Also #undef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC with CONFIG_KASAN.
---
Change-Id: I2a622db0cb86a8feb60c30d8cb09190075be2a90
--- arch/s390/boot/string.c | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/s390/boot/string.c +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #undef CONFIG_KASAN +#undef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC#include "../lib/string.c" int strncmp (const char *cs,const char *ct,size_t count)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS#undef CONFIG_KASAN +#undef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */ #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 36/42 kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks
In reply to Andrey KonovalovSome #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN checks are only relevant for software KASAN modes (either related to shadow memory or compiler instrumentation). Expand those into CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS.
---
Change-Id: I91e661e2c1627783cb845d877c6371dfc8779505
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h | 5 +++-- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 3 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 2 +- include/linux/kasan.h | 7 ++++--- include/linux/moduleloader.h | 3 ++- include/linux/string.h | 2 +- mm/ptdump.c | 13 ++++++++----- scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 ++ 16 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ config BROKEN_GAS_INST config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET hex - depends on KASAN + depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS default 0xdfff800000000000 if (ARM64_VA_BITS_48 || ARM64_VA_BITS_52) && !KASAN_SW_TAGS default 0xdfffc00000000000 if ARM64_VA_BITS_47 && !KASAN_SW_TAGS default 0xdffffe0000000000 if ARM64_VA_BITS_42 && !KASAN_SW_TAGS
arch/arm64/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ head-y := arch/arm64/kernel/head.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS), y) KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT := 4 -else +else ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC), y) KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT := 3 endif
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +1 -1
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ USER(\label, ic ivau, \tmp2) // invalidate I line PoU#define NOKPROBE (x)#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOKASAN (name)#else #define EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOKASAN (name) EXPORT_SYMBOL(name)
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +1 -1
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@* address space for the shadow region respectively. They can bloat the stack * significantly, so double the (minimum) stack size when they are in use. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )#define KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET _AC(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET, UL)#define KASAN_SHADOW_END ((UL(1) << (64 - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)) \ + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h +3 -2
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@#ifndef __ASM_STRING_H#define __ASM_STRING_H -#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN +#if !(defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))#define __HAVE_ARCH_STRRCHRextern char *strrchr (const char *,int c);
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ extern void *__memset(void *, int, __kernel_size_t);void memcpy_flushcache (void *dst,const void *src,size_t cnt);#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) +#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) && \ + !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__)/* * For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +1 -1
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__primary_switched) bl __pi_memset dsb ishst // Make zero page visible to PTW -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) bl kasan_early_init #endif #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h +1 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ __efistub_strncmp = __pi_strncmp; __efistub_strrchr = __pi_strrchr; __efistub___clean_dcache_area_poc = __pi___clean_dcache_area_poc; -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) __efistub___memcpy = __pi_memcpy; __efistub___memmove = __pi_memmove; __efistub___memset = __pi_memset;
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c +2 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)/* use the top 16 bits to randomize the linear region */ memstart_offset_seed = seed >>48 ; -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))/* * KASAN does not expect the module region to intersect the * vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for each
arch/arm64/kernel/module.c +4 -2
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS )) gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOWARN; -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))/* don't exceed the static module region - see below */ module_alloc_end =MODULES_END ;
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size) NUMA_NO_NODE, __builtin_return_address(0));if (!p &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS ) && - !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN )) + !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) && + !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))/* * KASAN can only deal with module allocations being served * from the reserved module region, since the remainder of
arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c +3 -3
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@enum address_markers_idx {PAGE_OFFSET_NR =0 ,PAGE_END_NR , -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )KASAN_START_NR ,#endif };
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ enum address_markers_idx {static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = { {PAGE_OFFSET ,"Linear Mapping start" }, {0 /* PAGE_END */ ,"Linear Mapping end" }, -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) {0 /* KASAN_SHADOW_START */ ,"Kasan shadow start" }, {KASAN_SHADOW_END ,"Kasan shadow end" }, #endif
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ void ptdump_check_wx(void)static int ptdump_init (void ) { address_markers[PAGE_END_NR ].start_address =PAGE_END ; -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) address_markers[KASAN_START_NR ].start_address =KASAN_SHADOW_START ;#endif ptdump_initialize ();
include/linux/kasan-checks.h +1 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@* even in compilation units that selectively disable KASAN, but must use KASAN * to validate access to an address. Never use these in header files! */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )bool __kasan_check_read (const volatile void *p,unsigned int size);bool __kasan_check_write (const volatile void *p,unsigned int size);#else
include/linux/kasan.h +4 -3
@@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start,#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) && !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ) +#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) && \ + !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC )/* * These functions provide a special case to support backing module
@@ -247,12 +248,12 @@ static inline void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start,int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size);void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm); -#else /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ +#else /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ static inline int kasan_module_alloc (void *addr,size_t size) {return 0 ; }static inline void kasan_free_shadow (const struct vm_struct *vm) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ +#endif /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr);
include/linux/moduleloader.h +2 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ void module_arch_cleanup(struct module *mod);/* Any cleanup before freeing mod->module_init */ void module_arch_freeing_init (struct module *mod); -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) && !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC ) +#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) && \ + !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC )#include <linux/kasan.h> #define MODULE_ALIGN (PAGE_SIZE << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)#else
include/linux/string.h +1 -1
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of o#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE ) -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )extern void *__underlying_memchr (const void *p,int c,__kernel_size_t size)__RENAME (memchr); extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);extern void *__underlying_memcpy (void *p,const void *q,__kernel_size_t size)__RENAME (memcpy);
mm/ptdump.c +8 -5
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@#include <linux/ptdump.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )/* * This is an optimization for KASAN=y case. Since all kasan page tables * eventually point to the kasan_early_shadow_page we could call note_page()
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static int ptdump_pgd_entry(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,struct ptdump_state *st = walk->private;pgd_t val =READ_ONCE (*pgd); -#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >4 && defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) +#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >4 && \ + (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))if (pgd_page (val) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_p4d)))return note_kasan_page_table (walk, addr);#endif
@@ -51,7 +52,8 @@ static int ptdump_p4d_entry(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,struct ptdump_state *st = walk->private;p4d_t val =READ_ONCE (*p4d); -#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >3 && defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) +#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >3 && \ + (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))if (p4d_page (val) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pud)))return note_kasan_page_table (walk, addr);#endif
@@ -71,7 +73,8 @@ static int ptdump_pud_entry(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,struct ptdump_state *st = walk->private;pud_t val =READ_ONCE (*pud); -#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >2 && defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) +#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >2 && \ + (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ))if (pud_page (val) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pmd)))return note_kasan_page_table (walk, addr);#endif
@@ -91,7 +94,7 @@ static int ptdump_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,struct ptdump_state *st = walk->private;pmd_t val =READ_ONCE (*pmd); -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN ) +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )if (pmd_page (val) ==virt_to_page (lm_alias (kasan_early_shadow_pte)))return note_kasan_page_table (walk, addr);#endif
scripts/Makefile.lib +2 -0
@@ -148,10 +148,12 @@ endif # we don't want to check (depends on variables KASAN_SANITIZE_obj.o, KASAN_SANITIZE) # ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN),y) +ifneq ($(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS),y) _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \ $(KASAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KASAN_SANITIZE)y), \ $(CFLAGS_KASAN), $(CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE)) endif +endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y) _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 37/42 kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime
In reply to Andrey KonovalovProvide implementation of KASAN functions required for the hardware tag-based mode. Those include core functions for memory and pointer tagging (tags_hw.c) and bug reporting (report_tags_hw.c). Also adapt common KASAN code to support the new mode.
---
Change-Id: I8a8689ba098174a4d0ef3f1d008178387c80ee1c
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 + include/linux/kasan.h | 24 ++++++--- include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- include/linux/page-flags-layout.h | 2 +- mm/kasan/Makefile | 5 ++ mm/kasan/common.c | 15 +++--- mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 19 +++++-- mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c | 42 +++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 mm/kasan/hw_tags.c create mode 100644 mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +2 -2
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kaslr_offset(void) (__force __typeof__(addr))__addr; \ }) -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )#define __tag_shifted (tag) ((u64)(tag) << 56)#define __tag_reset (addr) __untagged_addr(addr)#define __tag_get (addr) (__u8)((u64)(addr) >> 56)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kaslr_offset(void)#define __tag_shifted (tag) 0UL#define __tag_reset (addr) (addr)#define __tag_get (addr) 0 -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline const void *__tag_set (const void *addr,u8 tag) {
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -1713,6 +1714,8 @@ static void cpu_enable_mte(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) cleared_zero_page = true; mte_clear_page_tags(lm_alias(empty_zero_page)); } + +kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu (); }#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)/* Conditionally switch to GIC PMR for interrupt masking */ if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking ())init_gic_priority_masking (); + +kasan_init_hw_tags (); }static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr (struct device_node *dn)
include/linux/kasan.h +17 -7
@@ -189,25 +189,35 @@ static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS - -void __init kasan_init_sw_tags (void ); +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr);bool kasan_report (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool is_write,unsigned long ip); -#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ - -static inline void kasan_init_sw_tags (void ) { } +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag (const void *addr) {return (void *)addr; } -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS*/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +void __init kasan_init_sw_tags (void ); +#else +static inline void kasan_init_sw_tags (void ) { } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +void kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu (void ); +void __init kasan_init_hw_tags (void ); +#else +static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu (void ) { } +static inline void kasan_init_hw_tags (void ) { } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
include/linux/mm.h +1 -1
@@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid) }#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )static inline u8 page_kasan_tag (const struct page *page) {return (page->flags >>KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT ) &KASAN_TAG_MASK ;
include/linux/page-flags-layout.h +1 -1
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@#define LAST_CPUPID_SHIFT 0#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )#define KASAN_TAG_WIDTH 8#else #define KASAN_TAG_WIDTH 0
mm/kasan/Makefile +5 -0
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_init.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_quarantine.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_hw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_shadow.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_hw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) # Function splitter causes unnecessary splits in __asan_load1/__asan_store1
@@ -27,10 +29,13 @@ CFLAGS_init.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_quarantine.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_report_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_report_hw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_report_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_shadow.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) +CFLAGS_hw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) CFLAGS_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME) obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) := common.o report.o obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o report_generic.o shadow.o quarantine.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) += hw_tags.o report_hw_tags.o obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o report_sw_tags.o shadow.o sw_tags.o
mm/kasan/common.c +7 -8
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)*/ static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone (unsigned int object_size) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ))return 0 ;return
@@ -184,14 +184,14 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) { -return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset; +return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset; }struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object) {BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct kasan_free_meta ) >32 ); -return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; +return (void *)reset_tag (object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; }void kasan_poison_slab (struct page *page)
@@ -273,9 +273,8 @@ void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, alloc_info =get_alloc_info (cache, object);__memset (alloc_info,0 ,sizeof (*alloc_info)); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) - object =set_tag (object, -assign_tag (cache, object, true, false)); +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) + object =set_tag (object,assign_tag (cache, object, true, false));return (void *)object; }
@@ -349,10 +348,10 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, redzone_end =round_up ((unsigned long )object + cache->object_size,KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )) tag =assign_tag (cache, object, false, keep_tag); -/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */ unpoison_range (set_tag (object, tag), size);poison_range ((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE );
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c new file +89 -0
89 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/kasan.h +15 -4
@@ -154,6 +154,11 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info (struct kmem_cache *cache,const void *object); +void poison_range (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); +void unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size); + +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) +static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem (const void *shadow_addr) { return (void *)(((unsigned long)shadow_addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
@@ -165,9 +170,6 @@ static inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)return (addr >=kasan_shadow_to_mem ((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START )); } -void poison_range (const void *address,size_t size,u8 value); -void unpoison_range (const void *address,size_t size); -/** * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access. * @addr: the accessed address
@@ -179,6 +181,15 @@ void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);bool check_memory_region (unsigned long addr,size_t size,bool write,unsigned long ret_ip); +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ + +static inline bool addr_has_metadata (const void *addr) +{ +return true; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +bool check_invalid_free (void *addr);void *find_first_bad_addr (void *addr,size_t size);
@@ -215,7 +226,7 @@ static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }static inline void quarantine_remove_cache (struct kmem_cache *cache) { }#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS )void print_tags (u8 addr_tag,const void *addr);
mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c new file +42 -0
42 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* -* This file contains tag-based KASAN specific error reporting code. +* This file contains software tag-based KASAN specific error reporting code. * * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
mm/kasan/shadow.c +1 -1
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )) *shadow = tag; -else +else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */ *shadow = size &KASAN_GRANULE_MASK ; } }
mm/kasan/sw_tags.c +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* -* This file contains core tag-based KASAN code. +* This file contains core software tag-based KASAN code. * * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc. * Author: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 38/42 kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler
In reply to Andrey KonovalovAdd error reporting for hardware tag-based KASAN. When CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled, print KASAN report from the arm64 tag fault handler.
SAS bits aren't set in ESR for all faults reported in EL1, so it's impossible to find out the size of the access the caused the fault. Adapt KASAN reporting code to handle this case.
---
Change-Id: I3780fe7db6e075dff2937d3d8508f55c9322b095
--- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/report.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +14 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/hardirq.h> #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/page-flags.h>
@@ -298,10 +299,23 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,do_exit (SIGKILL ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS static void report_tag_fault (unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs) { +bool is_write = ((esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) >> ESR_ELx_WNR_SHIFT) !=0 ; + +/* +* SAS bits aren't set for all faults reported in EL1, so we can't +* find out access size. +*/ +kasan_report (addr,0 , is_write, regs->pc); } +#else +/* Tag faults aren't enabled without CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS. */ +static inline void report_tag_fault (unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr, +struct pt_regs *regs) { } +#endif static void do_tag_recovery (unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs)
mm/kasan/report.c +8 -3
@@ -62,9 +62,14 @@ static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info) {pr_err ("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n" ,get_bug_type (info), (void *)info->ip); -pr_err ("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n" , - info->is_write ?"Write" :"Read" , info->access_size, - info->access_addr, current->comm,task_pid_nr (current)); +if (info->access_size) +pr_err ("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n" , + info->is_write ?"Write" :"Read" , info->access_size, + info->access_addr, current->comm,task_pid_nr (current)); +else +pr_err ("%s at addr %px by task %s/%d\n" , + info->is_write ?"Write" :"Read" , + info->access_addr, current->comm,task_pid_nr (current)); }static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (report_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 39/42 kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata
In reply to Andrey KonovalovKernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is freed. Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive reports with hardware tag-based KASAN.
Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current() annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports.
With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE is disabled after the first one.
Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB).
---
Change-Id: I39f3c4d4f29299d4fbbda039bedf230db1c746fb
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +++- mm/page_poison.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +3 -1
@@ -1202,8 +1202,10 @@ static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages)/* s390's use of memset() could override KASAN redzones. */ kasan_disable_current (); -for (i =0 ; i < numpages; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < numpages; i++) { +page_kasan_tag_reset (page + i);clear_highpage (page + i); + }kasan_enable_current (); }
mm/page_poison.c +1 -1
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static void poison_page(struct page *page)/* KASAN still think the page is in-use, so skip it. */ kasan_disable_current (); -memset (addr,PAGE_POISON ,PAGE_SIZE ); +memset (kasan_reset_tag (addr),PAGE_POISON ,PAGE_SIZE );kasan_enable_current ();kunmap_atomic (addr); }
mm/slub.c +16 -13
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, {#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED /* -* When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. +* When CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. * Normally, this doesn't cause any issues, as both set_freepointer() * and get_freepointer() are called with a pointer with the same tag. * However, there are some issues with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG code. For
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_dereference(const struct kmem_cache *s,static inline void *get_freepointer (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object) { + object =kasan_reset_tag (object);return freelist_dereference (s, object + s->offset); }
@@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp)BUG_ON (object == fp);/* naive detection of double free or corruption */ #endif + freeptr_addr = (unsigned long )kasan_reset_tag ((void *)freeptr_addr); *(void **)freeptr_addr =freelist_ptr (s, fp, freeptr_addr); }
@@ -539,8 +541,8 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr, unsigned int length) {metadata_access_enable (); -print_hex_dump (level, text,DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS ,16 ,1 , addr, - length,1 ); +print_hex_dump (level,kasan_reset_tag (text),DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS , +16 ,1 , addr, length,1 );metadata_access_disable (); }
@@ -571,7 +573,7 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, p = object +get_info_end (s); -return p + alloc; +return kasan_reset_tag (p + alloc); } static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
@@ -584,7 +586,8 @@ static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,unsigned int nr_entries;metadata_access_enable (); - nr_entries =stack_trace_save (p->addrs,TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT ,3 ); + nr_entries =stack_trace_save (kasan_reset_tag (p->addrs), +TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT ,3 );metadata_access_disable ();if (nr_entries <TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT )
@@ -748,7 +751,7 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,static void init_object (struct kmem_cache *s,void *object,u8 val) { -u8 *p = object; +u8 *p =kasan_reset_tag (object);if (s->flags &SLAB_RED_ZONE )memset (p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
@@ -778,7 +781,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,u8 *addr =page_address (page);metadata_access_enable (); - fault =memchr_inv (start, value, bytes); + fault =memchr_inv (kasan_reset_tag (start), value, bytes);metadata_access_disable ();if (!fault)return 1 ;
@@ -874,7 +877,7 @@ static int slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page) pad = end - remainder;metadata_access_enable (); - fault =memchr_inv (pad,POISON_INUSE , remainder); + fault =memchr_inv (kasan_reset_tag (pad),POISON_INUSE , remainder);metadata_access_disable ();if (!fault)return 1 ;
@@ -1119,7 +1122,7 @@ void setup_page_debug(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *addr)return ;metadata_access_enable (); -memset (addr,POISON_INUSE ,page_size (page)); +memset (kasan_reset_tag (addr),POISON_INUSE ,page_size (page));metadata_access_disable (); }
@@ -1572,10 +1575,10 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,* Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch * the redzone. */ -memset (object,0 , s->object_size); +memset (kasan_reset_tag (object),0 , s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags &SLAB_RED_ZONE ) ? s->red_left_pad :0 ; -memset ((char *)object + s->inuse,0 , +memset ((char *)kasan_reset_tag (object) + s->inuse,0 , s->size - s->inuse - rsize); }
@@ -2891,10 +2894,10 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,stat (s,ALLOC_FASTPATH ); } -maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr (s, object); +maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr (s,kasan_reset_tag (object));if (unlikely (slab_want_init_on_alloc (gfpflags, s)) && object) -memset (object,0 , s->object_size); +memset (kasan_reset_tag (object),0 , s->object_size); out:slab_post_alloc_hook (s, objcg, gfpflags,1 , &object);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 40/42 kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
In reply to Andrey KonovalovHardware tag-based KASAN is now ready, enable the configuration option.
---
Change-Id: I6eb1eea770e6b61ad71c701231b8d815a7ccc853
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48) select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS if (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && !ARM64_MTE) + select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS if (HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && ARM64_MTE) select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog
PATCH v11 41/42 kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode
In reply to Andrey KonovalovAdd documentation for hardware tag-based KASAN mode and also add some clarifications for software tag-based mode.
---
Change-Id: Ib46cb444cfdee44054628940a82f5139e10d0258
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +59 -21
@@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ Overview -------- KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector designed to -find out-of-bound and use-after-free bugs. KASAN has two modes: generic KASAN -(similar to userspace ASan) and software tag-based KASAN (similar to userspace -HWASan). +find out-of-bound and use-after-free bugs. KASAN has three modes: +1. generic KASAN (similar to userspace ASan), +2. software tag-based KASAN (similar to userspace HWASan), +3. hardware tag-based KASAN (based on hardware memory tagging). -KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert validity checks before every -memory access, and therefore requires a compiler version that supports that. +Software KASAN modes (1 and 2) use compile-time instrumentation to insert +validity checks before every memory access, and therefore require a compiler +version that supports that. Generic KASAN is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version 8.3.0 or later. Any supported Clang version is compatible, but detection of
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is only supported since Clang 11. Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang. Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm, arm64, xtensa, s390 -and riscv architectures, and tag-based KASAN is supported only for arm64. +and riscv architectures, and tag-based KASAN modes are supported only for arm64. Usage -----
@@ -28,14 +30,16 @@ To enable KASAN configure kernel with:: CONFIG_KASAN = y -and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable generic KASAN) and -CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (to enable software tag-based KASAN). +and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable generic KASAN), +CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (to enable software tag-based KASAN), and +CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS (to enable hardware tag-based KASAN). -You also need to choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. -Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces -smaller binary while the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. +For software modes, you also need to choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and +CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types. +The former produces smaller binary while the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. -Both KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators. +Both software KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators, +hardware tag-based KASAN currently only support SLUB. For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE. To augment reports with last allocation and freeing stack of the physical page,
@@ -196,17 +200,24 @@ and the second to last. Software tag-based KASAN ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -Tag-based KASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of modern arm64 CPUs to -store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. Like generic KASAN it -uses shadow memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory +Software tag-based KASAN requires software memory tagging support in the form +of HWASan-like compiler instrumentation (see HWASan documentation for details). + +Software tag-based KASAN is currently only implemented for arm64 architecture. + +Software tag-based KASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of arm64 CPUs +to store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. Like generic KASAN +it uses shadow memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory cell (therefore it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory). -On each memory allocation tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags the -allocated memory with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned pointer. +On each memory allocation software tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags +the allocated memory with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned +pointer. + Software tag-based KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert checks before each memory access. These checks make sure that tag of the memory that is being accessed is equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this -memory. In case of a tag mismatch tag-based KASAN prints a bug report. +memory. In case of a tag mismatch software tag-based KASAN prints a bug report. Software tag-based KASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that emits callbacks to check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow
@@ -215,9 +226,36 @@ simply printed from the function that performs the access check. With inline instrumentation a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated brk handler is used to print bug reports. -A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would -use hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and -manual shadow memory manipulation. +Software tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through +pointers with 0xFF pointer tag aren't checked). The value 0xFE is currently +reserved to tag freed memory regions. + +Software tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of +kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. + +Hardware tag-based KASAN +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Hardware tag-based KASAN is similar to the software mode in concept, but uses +hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and +shadow memory. + +Hardware tag-based KASAN is currently only implemented for arm64 architecture +and based on both arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) introduced in ARMv8.5 +Instruction Set Architecture, and Top Byte Ignore (TBI). + +Special arm64 instructions are used to assign memory tags for each allocation. +Same tags are assigned to pointers to those allocations. On every memory +access, hardware makes sure that tag of the memory that is being accessed is +equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this memory. In case of a +tag mismatch a fault is generated and a report is printed. + +Hardware tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through +pointers with 0xFF pointer tag aren't checked). The value 0xFE is currently +reserved to tag freed memory regions. + +Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of +kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? --------------------------------------------
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PATCH v11 42/42 kselftest/arm64: Check GCR_EL1 after context switch
In reply to Andrey KonovalovFrom: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
This test is specific to MTE and verifies that the GCR_EL1 register is context switched correctly.
It spawns 1024 processes and each process spawns 5 threads. Each thread writes a random setting of GCR_EL1 through the prctl() system call and reads it back verifying that it is the same. If the values are not the same it reports a failure.
Note: The test has been extended to verify that even SYNC and ASYNC mode setting is preserved correctly over context switching.
---
Change-Id: Ia917684a2b8e5f29e705ca5cbf360b010df6f61e
--- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/Makefile | 2 +- .../arm64/mte/check_gcr_el1_cswitch.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/check_gcr_el1_cswitch.c
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Limited -CFLAGS += -std=gnu99 -I. +CFLAGS += -std=gnu99 -I. -lpthread SRCS := $(filter-out mte_common_util.c,$(wildcard *.c)) PROGS := $(patsubst %.c,%,$(SRCS))
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/check_gcr_el1_cswitch.c new file +155 -0
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