tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option
Subsystems (6)
v4 cover tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option
This is similar to TCP-MD5 in functionality but it's sufficiently different that packet formats and interfaces are incompatible. Compared to TCP-MD5 more algorithms are supported and multiple keys can be used on the same connection but there is still no negotiation mechanism.
Expected use-case is protecting long-duration BGP/LDP connections between routers using pre-shared keys. The goal of this series is to allow routers using the Linux TCP stack to interoperate with vendors such as Cisco and Juniper.
Both algorithms described in RFC5926 are implemented but the code is not very easily extensible beyond that. In particular there are several code paths making stack allocations based on RFC5926 maximum, those would have to be increased. Support for arbitrary algorithms was requested in reply to previous posts but I believe there is no real use case for that.
The current implementation is somewhat loose regarding configuration:
* Overlaping MKTs can be configured despite what RFC5925 says
* Current key can be deleted. RFC says this shouldn't be allowed but enforcing this belongs at an admin shell rather than in the kernel.
* If multiple keys are valid for a destination the kernel picks one in an unpredictable manner (this can be overridden).
These conditions could be tightened but it is not clear the kernel should spend effort to prevent misconfiguration from userspace.
The major change in this version is switching from per-socket to per-netns keys. This is quite a large change and means that keys can leak if not explicitly removed but the expected usecase is long-lived routing daemon anyway. The fact that key management no longer needs to be duplicate on listen sockets and active connection actually simplifies them.
The TCP_AUTHOPT option still needs to be enabled for each individual socket in order for AO keys to take effect.
Here are some known flaws and limitations:
* Crypto API is used with buffers on the stack and inside struct sock, this might not work on all arches. I'm currently only testing x64 VMs
* Interaction with TCP-MD5 not tested in all corners.
* Interaction with FASTOPEN not tested and unlikely to work because sequence number assumptions for syn/ack.
* No way to limit keys on a per-port basis (used to be implicit with per-socket keys).
* Not clear if crypto_ahash_setkey might sleep. If some implementation do that then maybe they could be excluded through alloc flags.
* Traffic key is not cached (reducing performance)
* No caching or hashing for key lookups so this will scale poorly with many keys
There is relatively little code sharing with the TCP_MD5SIG feature and earlier versions shared even less. Unlike MD5 the AO feature is kept separate from the rest of the TCP code and reusing code would require many unrelated cleanup changes.
I'm not convinced that "authopt" is particularly good naming convention, this name is a personal invention that does not appear anywhere else. The RFC calls this "tcp-ao". Perhaps TCP_AOSIG would be a better name and it would also make the close connection to TCP_MD5SIG more visible?
Some testing support is included in nettest and fcnal-test.sh, similar to the current level of tcp-md5 testing.
A more elaborate test suite using pytest and scapy is available out of
tree: https://github.com/cdleonard/tcp-authopt-test That test suite is much larger that the kernel code and did not receive many comments in previous ports so I will attempt to push it separately (if at all).
Changes for frr (old): https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/9442
That PR was made early for ABI feedback, it has many issues.
Changes for yabgp (old): https://github.com/cdleonard/yabgp/commits/tcp_authopt
This can be used for easy interoperability testing with cisco/juniper/etc. Would need updates for global keys to avoid leaks
Changes since PATCH v3:
* Made keys global (per-netns rather than per-sock).
* Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt with a table of keys (not sockets).
* Fix part of the shash/ahash conversion having slipped from patch 3 to patch 5
* Fix tcp_parse_sig_options assigning NULL incorrectly when both MD5 and AO are disabled (kernel build robot)
* Fix sparse endianness warnings in prefix match (kernel build robot)
* Fix several incorrect RCU annotations reported by sparse (kernel build robot)
Changes since PATCH v2:
* Protect tcp_authopt_alg_get/put_tfm with local_bh_disable instead of preempt_disable. This caused signature corruption when send path executing with BH enabled was interrupted by recv.
* Fix accepted keyids not configured locally as "unexpected". If any key is configured that matches the peer then traffic MUST be signed.
* Fix issues related to sne rollover during handshake itself. (Francesco)
* Implement and test prefixlen (David)
* Replace shash with ahash and reuse some of the MD5 code (Dmitry)
* Parse md5+ao options only once in the same function (Dmitry)
* Pass tcp_authopt_info into inbound check path, this avoids second rcu dereference for same packet.
* Pass tcp_request_socket into inbound check path instead of just listen socket. This is required for SNE rollover during handshake and clearifies ISN handling.
* Do not allow disabling via sysctl after enabling once, this is difficult to support well (David)
* Verbose check for sysctl_tcp_authopt (Dmitry)
* Use netif_index_is_l3_master (David)
* Cleanup ipvx_addr_match (David)
* Add a #define tcp_authopt_needed to wrap static key usage because it looks nicer.
* Replace rcu_read_lock with rcu_dereference_protected in SNE updates (Eric)
* Remove test suite
Changes since PATCH v1:
* Implement Sequence Number Extension
* Implement l3index for vrf: TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX as equivalent of TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX
* Expand TCP-AO tests in fcnal-test.sh to near-parity with md5.
* Show addr/port on failure similar to md5
* Remove tox dependency from test suite (create venv directly)
* Switch default pytest output format to TAP (kselftest standard)
* Fix _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant stack corruption on short sockopts. This was covered in test but error was invisible without STACKPROTECTOR=y
* Fix sysctl_tcp_authopt check in tcp_get_authopt_val before memset. This was harmless because error code is checked in getsockopt anyway.
* Fix dropping md5 packets on all sockets with AO enabled
* Fix checking (key->recv_id & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) instead of key->flags in tcp_authopt_key_match_exact
* Fix PATCH 1/19 not compiling due to missing "int err" declaration
* Add ratelimited message for AO and MD5 both present
* Export all symbols required by CONFIG_IPV6=m (again)
* Fix compilation with CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT=y CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG=n
* Fix checkpatch issues
* Pass -rrequirements.txt to tox to avoid dependency variation.
Changes since RFCv3:
* Implement TCP_AUTHOPT handling for timewait and reset replies. Write tests to execute these paths by injecting packets with scapy
* Handle combining md5 and authopt: if both are configured use authopt.
* Fix locking issues around send_key, introduced in on of the later patches.
* Handle IPv4-mapped-IPv6 addresses: it used to be that an ipv4 SYN sent to an ipv6 socket with TCP-AO triggered WARN
* Implement un-namespaced sysctl disabled this feature by default
* Allocate new key before removing any old one in setsockopt (Dmitry)
* Remove tcp_authopt_key_info.local_id because it's no longer used (Dmitry)
* Propagate errors from TCP_AUTHOPT getsockopt (Dmitry)
* Fix no-longer-correct TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL docs (Dmitry)
* Simplify crypto allocation (Eric)
* Use kzmalloc instead of __GFP_ZERO (Eric)
* Add static_key_false tcp_authopt_needed (Eric)
* Clear authopt_info copied from oldsk in __tcp_authopt_openreq (Eric)
* Replace memcmp in ipv4 and ipv6 addr comparisons (Eric)
* Export symbols for CONFIG_IPV6=m (kernel test robot)
* Mark more functions static (kernel test robot)
* Fix build with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y (kernel test robot)
Changes since RFCv2:
* Removed local_id from ABI and match on send_id/recv_id/addr
* Add all relevant out-of-tree tests to tools/testing/selftests
* Return an error instead of ignoring unknown flags, hopefully this makes it easier to extend.
* Check sk_family before __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create in tcp_set_authopt_key
* Use sock_owned_by_me instead of WARN_ON(!lockdep_sock_is_held(sk))
* Fix some intermediate build failures reported by kbuild robot
* Improve documentation
Changes since RFC:
* Split into per-topic commits for ease of review. The intermediate commits compile with a few "unused function" warnings and don't do anything useful by themselves.
* Add ABI documention including kernel-doc on uapi
* Fix lockdep warnings from crypto by creating pools with one shash for each cpu
* Accept short options to setsockopt by padding with zeros; this approach allows increasing the size of the structs in the future.
* Support for aes-128-cmac-96
* Support for binding addresses to keys in a way similar to old tcp_md5
* Add support for retrieving received keyid/rnextkeyid and controling the keyid/rnextkeyid being sent.
Leonard Crestez (19):
tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management
docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt
tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization
tcp: md5: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO
tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures
tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core
tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default
tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension
tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response
tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies
tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies
tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls
tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support
tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags
tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support
tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys
selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix
selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support
selftests: net/fcnal: Initial tcp_authopt support
Documentation/networking/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 + Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 88 + include/linux/tcp.h | 9 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 + include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h | 12 + include/net/tcp.h | 27 +- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 323 ++++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 137 ++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 + net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 68 +- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 1799 +++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 41 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 138 +- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 12 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 86 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 110 +- tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 329 +++- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 204 ++- 23 files changed, 3364 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst create mode 100644 include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
base-commit: f4f2970dfd87e5132c436e6125148914596a9863
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 1/19 tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management
This commit adds support to add and remove keys but does not use them further.
Similar to tcp md5 a single pointer to a struct tcp_authopt_info* struct is added to struct tcp_sock, this avoids increasing memory usage. The data structures related to tcp_authopt are initialized on setsockopt and only freed on socket close.
--- include/linux/tcp.h | 9 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 + include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h | 12 ++ include/net/tcp.h | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 80 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 81 +++++++++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 ++ net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 30 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 311 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 + 11 files changed, 545 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
include/linux/tcp.h +9 -0
@@ -140,10 +140,12 @@ struct tcp_request_sock {static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk (const struct request_sock *req) {return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; } +struct tcp_authopt_info ; +struct tcp_sock {/* inet_connection_sock has to be the first member of tcp_sock */ struct inet_connection_sock inet_conn;u16 tcp_header_len;/* Bytes of tcp header to send */ u16 gso_segs;/* Max number of segs per GSO packet */
@@ -403,10 +405,14 @@ struct tcp_sock {/* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */ struct tcp_md5sig_info __rcu *md5sig_info;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +struct tcp_authopt_info __rcu *authopt_info; +#endif +/* TCP fastopen related information */ struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen_req;/* fastopen_rsk points to request_sock that resulted in this big * socket. Used to retransmit SYNACKs etc. */
@@ -453,10 +459,13 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock {int tw_ts_recent_stamp;u32 tw_tx_delay;#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG struct tcp_md5sig_key *tw_md5_key;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +struct tcp_authopt_info *tw_authopt_info; +#endif };static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk (const struct sock *sk) {return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk;
include/net/net_namespace.h +4 -0
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@#include <net/netns/can.h> #include <net/netns/xdp.h> #include <net/netns/smc.h> #include <net/netns/bpf.h> #include <net/netns/mctp.h> +#include <net/netns/tcp_authopt.h> #include <net/net_trackers.h> #include <linux/ns_common.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/notifier.h>
@@ -176,10 +177,13 @@ struct net {#endif struct sock *diag_nlsk;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SMC )struct netns_smc smc;#endif +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT ) +struct netns_tcp_authopt tcp_authopt; +#endif } __randomize_layout;#include <linux/seq_file_net.h> /* Init's network namespace */
include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h new file +12 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ +#define __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ + +#include <linux/mutex.h> + +struct netns_tcp_authopt { +struct hlist_head head; +struct mutex mutex; +}; + +#endif /* __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ */
include/net/tcp.h +1 -0
@@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);#define TCPOPT_WINDOW 3/* Window scaling */ #define TCPOPT_SACK_PERM 4/* SACK Permitted */ #define TCPOPT_SACK 5/* SACK Block */ #define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP 8/* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */ #define TCPOPT_MD5SIG 19/* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */ +#define TCPOPT_AUTHOPT 29/* Auth Option (RFC5925) */ #define TCPOPT_MPTCP 30/* Multipath TCP (RFC6824) */ #define TCPOPT_FASTOPEN 34/* Fast open (RFC7413) */ #define TCPOPT_EXP 254/* Experimental */ /* Magic number to be after the option value for sharing TCP * experimental options. See draft-ietf-tcpm-experimental-options-00.txt
include/net/tcp_authopt.h new file +80 -0
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include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +81 -0
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net/ipv4/Kconfig +14 -0
@@ -740,5 +740,19 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG RFC2385 specifies a method of giving MD5 protection to TCP sessions. Its main (only?) use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers on the Internet. If unsure, say N. + +config TCP_AUTHOPT + bool "TCP: Authentication Option support (RFC5925)" + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CMAC + help + RFC5925 specifies a new method of giving protection to TCP sessions. + Its intended use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers + on the Internet. It obsoletes TCP MD5 (RFC2385) but is incompatible. + + If unsure, say N.
net/ipv4/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV) += tcp_nv.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO) += tcp_veno.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE) += tcp_scalable.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP) += tcp_lp.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH) += tcp_yeah.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS) += tcp_illinois.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) += tcp_authopt.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += tcp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += udp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += cipso_ipv4.o obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm4_policy.o xfrm4_state.o xfrm4_input.o \
net/ipv4/tcp.c +30 -0
@@ -270,10 +270,11 @@#include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/inet_common.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <net/mptcp.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -3602,10 +3603,16 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,case TCP_MD5SIG :case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT : err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse (sk, optname, optval, optlen);break ;#endif +case TCP_AUTHOPT : + err =tcp_set_authopt (sk, optval, optlen); +break ; +case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY : + err =tcp_set_authopt_key (sk, optval, optlen); +break ;case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT :/* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window * before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection. */ if (val <0 )
@@ -4251,10 +4258,33 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,if (!err &©_to_user (optval, &zc, len)) err = -EFAULT ;return err; }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +case TCP_AUTHOPT : { +struct tcp_authopt info; +int err; + +if (get_user (len, optlen)) +return -EFAULT ; + +lock_sock (sk); + err =tcp_get_authopt_val (sk, &info); +release_sock (sk); + +if (err) +return err; + len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(info)); +if (put_user (len, optlen)) +return -EFAULT ; +if (copy_to_user (optval, &info, len)) +return -EFAULT ; +return 0 ; + } +#endif +default :return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }if (put_user (len, optlen))
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c new file +311 -0
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net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +2 -0
@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/inet_hashtables.h> #include <net/tcp.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> #include <net/transp_v6.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/inet_common.h> #include <net/timewait_sock.h> #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -2276,10 +2277,11 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)tcp_clear_md5_list (sk);kfree_rcu (rcu_dereference_protected (tp->md5sig_info,1 ), rcu); tp->md5sig_info = NULL; }#endif +tcp_authopt_clear (sk);/* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */ if (inet_csk (sk)->icsk_bind_hash)inet_put_port (sk);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 2/19 docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt
In reply to Leonard CrestezThe .rst documentation contains a brief description of the user interface and includes kernel-doc generated from uapi header.
--- Documentation/networking/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
Documentation/networking/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -100,10 +100,11 @@ Contents: strparser switchdev sysfs-tagging tc-actions-env-rules tcp-thin + tcp_authopt team timestamping tipc tproxy tuntap
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst new file +51 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 3/19 tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization
In reply to Leonard CrestezThe crypto_shash API is used in order to compute packet signatures. The API comes with several unfortunate limitations:
1) Allocating a crypto_shash can sleep and must be done in user context.
2) Packet signatures must be computed in softirq context
3) Packet signatures use dynamic "traffic keys" which require exclusive access to crypto_shash for crypto_setkey.
The solution is to allocate one crypto_shash for each possible cpu for each algorithm at setsockopt time. The per-cpu tfm is then borrowed from softirq context, signatures are computed and the tfm is returned.
The pool for each algorithm is allocated on first use.
--- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 16 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +16 -0
@@ -4,10 +4,24 @@#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h> #include <net/netns/tcp_authopt.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> +/* According to RFC5925 the length of the authentication option varies based on +* the signature algorithm. Linux only implements the algorithms defined in +* RFC5926 which have a constant length of 16. +* +* This is used in stack allocation of tcp option buffers for output. It is +* shorter than the length of the MD5 option. +* +* Input packets can have authentication options of different lengths but they +* will always be flagged as invalid (since no such algorithms are supported). +*/ +#define TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT 16 + +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp ; +/** * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925 * * Key structure lifetime is protected by RCU so send/recv code needs to hold a * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key.
@@ -33,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info {u8 keylen;/** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN ];/** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; +/** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; };/** * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt *
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +191 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 4/19 tcp: md5: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis chunk of code is identical between the implementation of TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO so rename and refactor
--- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +1 -1
@@ -1688,11 +1688,11 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void);static inline void tcp_put_md5sig_pool (void ) {local_bh_enable (); } -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data (struct tcp_md5sig_pool *,const struct sk_buff *, +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data (struct ahash_request *,const struct sk_buff *,unsigned int header_len);int tcp_md5_hash_key (struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp,const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key);/* From tcp_fastopen.c */
net/ipv4/tcp.c +20 -18
@@ -4400,16 +4400,31 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void)local_bh_enable ();return NULL ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_get_md5sig_pool); -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data (struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, +int tcp_md5_hash_key (struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp,const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) +{ +u8 keylen =READ_ONCE (key->keylen);/* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ +struct scatterlist sg; + +sg_init_one (&sg, key->key, keylen); +ahash_request_set_crypt (hp->md5_req, &sg,NULL , keylen); + +/* We use data_race() because tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */ +return data_race (crypto_ahash_update (hp->md5_req)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_md5_hash_key); +#endif /* CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT ) + +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data (struct ahash_request *req,const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int header_len) {struct scatterlist sg;const struct tcphdr *tp =tcp_hdr (skb); -struct ahash_request *req = hp->md5_req;unsigned int i;const unsigned int head_data_len =skb_headlen (skb) > header_len ?skb_headlen (skb) - header_len :0 ;const struct skb_shared_info *shi =skb_shinfo (skb);struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
@@ -4432,31 +4447,18 @@ int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp,if (crypto_ahash_update (req))return 1 ; } skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) -if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data (hp, frag_iter,0 )) +if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data (req, frag_iter,0 ))return 1 ;return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data); -int tcp_md5_hash_key (struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp,const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) -{ -u8 keylen =READ_ONCE (key->keylen);/* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ -struct scatterlist sg; - -sg_init_one (&sg, key->key, keylen); -ahash_request_set_crypt (hp->md5_req, &sg,NULL , keylen); - -/* We use data_race() because tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */ -return data_race (crypto_ahash_update (hp->md5_req)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_md5_hash_key); - -#endif +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) */ void tcp_done (struct sock *sk) {struct request_sock *req;
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -1381,11 +1381,11 @@ int tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,if (crypto_ahash_init (req)) goto clear_hash;if (tcp_v4_md5_hash_headers (hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; -if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data (hp, skb, th->doff <<2 )) +if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data (hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff <<2 )) goto clear_hash;if (tcp_md5_hash_key (hp, key)) goto clear_hash;ahash_request_set_crypt (req,NULL , md5_hash,0 );if (crypto_ahash_final (req))
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -750,11 +750,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash,if (crypto_ahash_init (req)) goto clear_hash;if (tcp_v6_md5_hash_headers (hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; -if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data (hp, skb, th->doff <<2 )) +if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data (hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff <<2 )) goto clear_hash;if (tcp_md5_hash_key (hp, key)) goto clear_hash;ahash_request_set_crypt (req,NULL , md5_hash,0 );if (crypto_ahash_final (req))
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 5/19 tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures
In reply to Leonard CrestezComputing tcp authopt packet signatures is a two step process:
* traffic key is computed based on tcp 4-tuple, initial sequence numbers and the secret key.
* packet mac is computed based on traffic key and content of individual packets.
The traffic key could be cached for established sockets but it is not.
A single code path exists for ipv4/ipv6 and input/output. This keeps the code short but slightly slower due to lots of conditionals.
On output we read remote IP address from socket members on output, we can't use skb network header because it's computed after TCP options.
On input we read remote IP address from skb network headers, we can't use socket binding members because those are not available for SYN.
--- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 9 + net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 441 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 450 insertions(+)
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +9 -0
@@ -68,10 +68,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info {u32 src_isn;/** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; }; +/* TCP authopt as found in header */ +struct tcphdr_authopt { +u8 num; +u8 len; +u8 keyid; +u8 rnextkeyid; +u8 mac[0 ]; +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT void tcp_authopt_clear (struct sock *sk);int tcp_set_authopt (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen);int tcp_get_authopt_val (struct sock *sk,struct tcp_authopt *key);int tcp_set_authopt_key (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen);
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +441 -0
451 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v4 05/19] tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
Hi Leonard,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on f4f2970dfd87e5132c436e6125148914596a9863]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Leonard-Crestez/tcp-Initial-support-for-RFC5925-auth-option/20211223-234349 base: f4f2970dfd87e5132c436e6125148914596a9863 config: sh-randconfig-m031-20211228 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211228/202112281504.urPHITqZ-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: sh4-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/2e5c7ea0fadcbbea7804802dc89d10bb7924dd74
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Leonard-Crestez/tcp-Initial-support-for-RFC5925-auth-option/20211223-234349 git checkout 2e5c7ea0fadcbbea7804802dc89d10bb7924dd74
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=sh SHELL=/bin/bash net/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
cc1: warning: arch/sh/include/mach-rsk: No such file or directory [-Wmissing-include-dirs]
cc1: warning: arch/sh/include/mach-rsk: No such file or directory [-Wmissing-include-dirs] net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:217:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'tcp_authopt_free' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
217 | void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/linux/tcp.h:19,
from include/net/tcp_authopt.h:7,
from net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:3:
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c: In function 'tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key':
>> include/net/sock.h:389:37: error: 'struct sock_common' has no member named 'skc_v6_rcv_saddr'; did you mean 'skc_rcv_saddr'?
389 | #define sk_v6_rcv_saddr __sk_common.skc_v6_rcv_saddr
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:574:70: note: in expansion of macro 'sk_v6_rcv_saddr'
574 | err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, 16);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> include/net/sock.h:388:45: error: 'struct sock_common' has no member named 'skc_v6_daddr'; did you mean 'skc_daddr'?
388 | #define sk_v6_daddr __sk_common.skc_v6_daddr
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:577:70: note: in expansion of macro 'sk_v6_daddr'
577 | err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_daddr, 16);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c: In function 'tcp_authopt_hash_packet':
>> include/net/sock.h:389:37: error: 'struct sock_common' has no member named 'skc_v6_rcv_saddr'; did you mean 'skc_rcv_saddr'?
389 | #define sk_v6_rcv_saddr __sk_common.skc_v6_rcv_saddr
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:811:38: note: in expansion of macro 'sk_v6_rcv_saddr'
811 | saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> include/net/sock.h:388:45: error: 'struct sock_common' has no member named 'skc_v6_daddr'; did you mean 'skc_daddr'?
388 | #define sk_v6_daddr __sk_common.skc_v6_daddr
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:812:38: note: in expansion of macro 'sk_v6_daddr'
812 | daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~ At top level:
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:863:12: warning: '__tcp_authopt_calc_mac' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
863 | static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +389 include/net/sock.h
4dc6dc7162c08b Eric Dumazet 2009-07-15 368
68835aba4d9b74 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-30 369 #define sk_dontcopy_begin __sk_common.skc_dontcopy_begin
68835aba4d9b74 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-30 370 #define sk_dontcopy_end __sk_common.skc_dontcopy_end
4dc6dc7162c08b Eric Dumazet 2009-07-15 371 #define sk_hash __sk_common.skc_hash
5080546682bae3 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-02 372 #define sk_portpair __sk_common.skc_portpair
05dbc7b59481ca Eric Dumazet 2013-10-03 373 #define sk_num __sk_common.skc_num
05dbc7b59481ca Eric Dumazet 2013-10-03 374 #define sk_dport __sk_common.skc_dport
5080546682bae3 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-02 375 #define sk_addrpair __sk_common.skc_addrpair
5080546682bae3 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-02 376 #define sk_daddr __sk_common.skc_daddr
5080546682bae3 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-02 377 #define sk_rcv_saddr __sk_common.skc_rcv_saddr
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 378 #define sk_family __sk_common.skc_family
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 379 #define sk_state __sk_common.skc_state
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 380 #define sk_reuse __sk_common.skc_reuse
055dc21a1d1d21 Tom Herbert 2013-01-22 381 #define sk_reuseport __sk_common.skc_reuseport
9fe516ba3fb29b Eric Dumazet 2014-06-27 382 #define sk_ipv6only __sk_common.skc_ipv6only
26abe14379f8e2 Eric W. Biederman 2015-05-08 383 #define sk_net_refcnt __sk_common.skc_net_refcnt
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 384 #define sk_bound_dev_if __sk_common.skc_bound_dev_if
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 385 #define sk_bind_node __sk_common.skc_bind_node
8feaf0c0a5488b Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2005-08-09 386 #define sk_prot __sk_common.skc_prot
07feaebfcc10cd Eric W. Biederman 2007-09-12 387 #define sk_net __sk_common.skc_net
efe4208f47f907 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-03 @388 #define sk_v6_daddr __sk_common.skc_v6_daddr
efe4208f47f907 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-03 @389 #define sk_v6_rcv_saddr __sk_common.skc_v6_rcv_saddr
33cf7c90fe2f97 Eric Dumazet 2015-03-11 390 #define sk_cookie __sk_common.skc_cookie
70da268b569d32 Eric Dumazet 2015-10-08 391 #define sk_incoming_cpu __sk_common.skc_incoming_cpu
8e5eb54d303b7c Eric Dumazet 2015-10-08 392 #define sk_flags __sk_common.skc_flags
ed53d0ab761f5c Eric Dumazet 2015-10-08 393 #define sk_rxhash __sk_common.skc_rxhash
efe4208f47f907 Eric Dumazet 2013-10-03 394
43f51df4172955 Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 395 /* early demux fields */
43f51df4172955 Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 396 struct dst_entry *sk_rx_dst;
43f51df4172955 Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 397 int sk_rx_dst_ifindex;
43f51df4172955 Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 398 u32 sk_rx_dst_cookie;
43f51df4172955 Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 399
^1da177e4c3f41 Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 400 socket_lock_t sk_lock;
9115e8cd2a0c6e Eric Dumazet 2016-12-03 401 atomic_t sk_drops;
9115e8cd2a0c6e Eric Dumazet 2016-12-03 402 int sk_rcvlowat;
9115e8cd2a0c6e Eric Dumazet 2016-12-03 403 struct sk_buff_head sk_error_queue;
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 404 struct sk_buff_head sk_receive_queue;
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 405 /*
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 406 * The backlog queue is special, it is always used with
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 407 * the per-socket spinlock held and requires low latency
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 408 * access. Therefore we special case it's implementation.
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 409 * Note : rmem_alloc is in this structure to fill a hole
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 410 * on 64bit arches, not because its logically part of
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 411 * backlog.
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 412 */
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 413 struct {
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 414 atomic_t rmem_alloc;
b178bb3dfc30d9 Eric Dumazet 2010-11-16 415 int len;
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 416 struct sk_buff *head;
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 417 struct sk_buff *tail;
fa438ccfdfd3f6 Eric Dumazet 2007-03-04 418 } sk_backlog;
f35f821935d8df Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 419 struct llist_head defer_list;
f35f821935d8df Eric Dumazet 2021-11-15 420 ---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
PATCH v4 6/19 tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core
In reply to Leonard CrestezThe tcp_authopt features exposes a minimal interface to the rest of the TCP stack. Only a few functions are exposed and if the feature is disabled they return neutral values, avoiding ifdefs in the rest of the code. This approach is different from MD5.
There very few interactions with MD5 but tcp_parse_md5sig_option was modifed to parse AO and MD5 simultaneously. If both are present the packet is droppped as required by RFC5925.
Add calls into tcp authopt from send, receive and accept code.
--- include/net/tcp.h | 24 +++- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 136 +++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 270 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 40 ++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 50 ++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 12 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 85 +++++++++++- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 49 ++++++- 10 files changed, 643 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp.h +23 -1
@@ -422,11 +422,33 @@ int tcp_mmap(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, struct vm_area_struct *vma);#endif void tcp_parse_options (const struct net *net,const struct sk_buff *skb,struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx,int estab,struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc); -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option (const struct tcphdr *th); +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT ) +int tcp_parse_sig_options (const struct tcphdr *th, +const u8 **md5ptr, +const u8 **aoptr); +#else +static inline int tcp_parse_sig_options (const struct tcphdr *th, +const u8 **md5ptr, +const u8 **aoptr) +{ + *aoptr =NULL ; + *md5ptr =NULL ; +return 0 ; +} +#endif +static inline const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option (const struct tcphdr *th) +{ +const u8 *md5, *ao; +int ret; + + ret =tcp_parse_sig_options (th, &md5, &ao); + +return (md5 && !ao && !ret) ? md5 :NULL ; +}/* * BPF SKB-less helpers */ u16 tcp_v4_get_syncookie(struct sock *sk, struct iphdr *iph,
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +136 -0
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include/uapi/linux/snmp.h +1 -0
@@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ enumLINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH ,/* TCPDuplicateDataRehash */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS ,/* TCPDSACKRecvSegs */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS ,/* TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS ,/* TCPMigrateReqSuccess */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE ,/* TCPMigrateReqFailure */ +LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE ,/* TCPAuthOptFailure */ __LINUX_MIB_MAX };/* linux Xfrm mib definitions */ enum
net/ipv4/proc.c +1 -0
@@ -295,10 +295,11 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_list[] = {SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TcpDuplicateDataRehash" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH ),SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TCPDSACKRecvSegs" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS ),SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS ),SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TCPMigrateReqSuccess" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS ),SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TCPMigrateReqFailure" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE ), +SNMP_MIB_ITEM ("TCPAuthOptFailure" ,LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE ), SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL };static void icmpmsg_put_line (struct seq_file *seq,unsigned long *vals,unsigned short *type,int count)
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +270 -0
350 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +30 -10
@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@#include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/prefetch.h> #include <net/dst.h> #include <net/tcp.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> #include <net/inet_common.h> #include <linux/ipsec.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <linux/errqueue.h> #include <trace/events/tcp.h>
@@ -4173,43 +4174,60 @@ static bool tcp_fast_parse_options(const struct net *net, tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tp->tsoffset;return true; } -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT )/* -* Parse MD5 Signature option +* Parse MD5 and AO options +* +* md5ptr: pointer to content of MD5 option (16-byte hash) +* aoptr: pointer to start of AO option (variable length) */ -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option (const struct tcphdr *th) +int tcp_parse_sig_options (const struct tcphdr *th,const u8 **md5ptr,const u8 **aoptr) {int length = (th->doff <<2 ) -sizeof (*th);const u8 *ptr = (const u8 *)(th +1 ); + *md5ptr =NULL ; + *aoptr =NULL ; +/* If not enough data remaining, we can short cut */ -while (length >=TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ) { +while (length >=4 ) {int opcode = *ptr++;int opsize;switch (opcode) {case TCPOPT_EOL : -return NULL ; + goto out;case TCPOPT_NOP : length--;continue ;default : opsize = *ptr++;if (opsize <2 || opsize > length) -return NULL ; -if (opcode ==TCPOPT_MD5SIG ) -return opsize ==TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ? ptr :NULL ; + goto out; +if (opcode ==TCPOPT_MD5SIG && opsize ==TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ) + *md5ptr = ptr; +if (opcode ==TCPOPT_AUTHOPT ) + *aoptr = ptr -2 ; } ptr += opsize -2 ; length -= opsize; } -return NULL ; + +out: +/* RFC5925 2.2: An endpoint MUST NOT use TCP-AO for the same connection +* in which TCP MD5 is used. When both options appear, TCP MUST silently +* discard the segment. +*/ +if (*md5ptr && *aoptr) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_parse_md5sig_option); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_parse_sig_options);#endif /* Sorry, PAWS as specified is broken wrt. pure-ACKs -DaveM * * It is not fatal. If this ACK does _not_ change critical state (seqs, window)
@@ -5992,10 +6010,12 @@ void tcp_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk);tcp_set_state (sk,TCP_ESTABLISHED ); icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = tcp_jiffies32; +tcp_authopt_finish_connect (sk, skb); +if (skb) { icsk->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set (sk, skb);security_inet_conn_established (sk, skb);sk_mark_napi_id (sk, skb); }
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +43 -7
108 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +12 -0
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@* Arnt Gulbrandsen, <[email protected]> * Jorge Cwik, <[email protected]> */ #include <net/tcp.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> #include <net/busy_poll.h> static bool tcp_in_window (u32 seq,u32 end_seq,u32 s_win,u32 e_win) {
@@ -300,10 +301,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo) BUG_ON(tcptw->tw_md5_key && !tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool()); } } }while (0 );#endif +tcp_authopt_time_wait (tcptw,tcp_sk (sk));/* Get the TIME_WAIT timeout firing. */ if (timeo < rto) timeo = rto;
@@ -342,10 +344,19 @@ void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk)if (twsk->tw_md5_key) kfree_rcu(twsk->tw_md5_key, rcu); }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +if (tcp_authopt_needed) { +struct tcp_timewait_sock *twsk =tcp_twsk (sk); + +/* twsk only contains sock_common so pass NULL as sk. */ +if (twsk->tw_authopt_info) +tcp_authopt_free (NULL , twsk->tw_authopt_info); + } +#endif }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tcp_twsk_destructor);/* Warning : This function is called without sk_listener being locked. * Be sure to read socket fields once, as their value could change under us.
@@ -532,10 +543,11 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk,#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG newtp->md5sig_info =NULL ;/*XXX*/ if (newtp->af_specific->md5_lookup (sk, newsk)) newtp->tcp_header_len +=TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED ;#endif +tcp_authopt_openreq (newsk, sk, req);if (skb->len >=TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len) newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len; newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss;tcp_ecn_openreq_child (newtp, req); newtp->fastopen_req =NULL ;
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +83 -2
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net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +44 -5
111 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 7/19 tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced.
Enforcement is only at the setsockopt level, this should be enough to ensure that the tcp_authopt_needed static key never turns on.
No effort is made to handle disabling when the feature is already in use.
--- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 ++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +6 -0
@@ -987,10 +987,16 @@ tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks) Default: 1000 +tcp_authopt - BOOLEAN + Enable the TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925), a replacement for TCP + MD5 Signatures (RFC2835). + + Default: 0 + UDP variables ============= udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +1 -0
@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { };#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (tcp_authopt_needed_key);#define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +extern int sysctl_tcp_authopt;void tcp_authopt_free (struct sock *sk,struct tcp_authopt_info *info);void tcp_authopt_clear (struct sock *sk);int tcp_set_authopt (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen);int tcp_get_authopt_val (struct sock *sk,struct tcp_authopt *key);
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +39 -0
@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@#include <net/udp.h> #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> #include <net/ping.h> #include <net/protocol.h> #include <net/netevent.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> static int two =2 ;static int three__maybe_unused =3 ;static int four =4 ;static int thousand =1000 ;
@@ -472,10 +473,37 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write,return ret; }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int proc_tcp_authopt (struct ctl_table *ctl, +int write,void *buffer,size_t *lenp, +loff_t *ppos) +{ +int val = sysctl_tcp_authopt; +struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .mode = ctl->mode, + .maxlen =sizeof (val), + .extra1 =SYSCTL_ZERO , + .extra2 =SYSCTL_ONE , + }; +int err; + + err =proc_dointvec_minmax (&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +if (err) +return err; +if (sysctl_tcp_authopt && !val) { +net_warn_ratelimited ("Enabling TCP Authentication Option is permanent\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + sysctl_tcp_authopt = val; +return 0 ; +} +#endif +static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { { .procname ="tcp_max_orphans" , .data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, .maxlen =sizeof (int ),
@@ -583,10 +611,21 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min, .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + { + .procname = "tcp_authopt", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_tcp_authopt, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif { } }; static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { {
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +26 -1
@@ -4,10 +4,15 @@#include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <linux/kref.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through +* a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. +*/ +int sysctl_tcp_authopt; +/* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (tcp_authopt_needed_key);EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_authopt_needed_key);/* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */
@@ -425,17 +430,30 @@ static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst,memset (dst + srclen,0 , dstlen - srclen);return err; } +static int check_sysctl_tcp_authopt (void ) +{ +if (!sysctl_tcp_authopt) { +net_warn_ratelimited ("TCP Authentication Option disabled by sysctl.\n" ); +return -EPERM ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +int tcp_set_authopt (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen) {struct tcp_authopt opt;struct tcp_authopt_info *info;int err;sock_owned_by_me (sk); + err =check_sysctl_tcp_authopt (); +if (err) +return err; err =_copy_from_sockptr_tolerant ((u8 *)&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen);if (err)return err;
@@ -453,14 +471,18 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)int tcp_get_authopt_val (struct sock *sk,struct tcp_authopt *opt) {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);struct tcp_authopt_info *info; +int err; +memset (opt,0 ,sizeof (*opt));sock_owned_by_me (sk); + err =check_sysctl_tcp_authopt (); +if (err) +return err; -memset (opt,0 ,sizeof (*opt)); info =rcu_dereference_check (tp->authopt_info,lockdep_sock_is_held (sk));if (!info)return -ENOENT ; opt->flags = info->flags &TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ;
@@ -481,10 +503,13 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)struct netns_tcp_authopt *net =sock_net_tcp_authopt (sk);struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg;int err;sock_owned_by_me (sk); + err =check_sysctl_tcp_authopt (); +if (err) +return err;if (!ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; err =_copy_from_sockptr_tolerant ((u8 *)&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 8/19 tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension
In reply to Leonard CrestezAdd a compute_sne function which finds the value of SNE for a certain SEQ given an already known "recent" SNE/SEQ. This is implemented using the standard tcp before/after macro and will work for SEQ values that are without 2^31 of the SEQ for which we know the SNE.
For updating we advance the value for rcv_sne at the same time as rcv_nxt and for snd_sne at the same time as snd_nxt. We could track other values (for example snd_una) but this is good enough and works very easily for timewait socket.
This implementation is different from RFC suggestions and doesn't require additional flags. It does pass tests from this draft:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-touch-sne/
--- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 34 ++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +34 -0
@@ -66,10 +66,14 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info {u32 flags;/** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */ u32 src_isn;/** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; +/** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ +u32 rcv_sne; +/** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ +u32 snd_sne; };/* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt {u8 num;
@@ -185,10 +189,34 @@ static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req(struct request_sock *req, structif (info) return __tcp_authopt_inbound_check((struct sock *)req, skb, info, opt); }return 0 ; } +void __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,struct tcp_authopt_info *info,u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 seq) +{ +struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + +if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info =rcu_dereference_protected (tp->authopt_info, +lockdep_sock_is_held ((struct sock *)tp)); +if (info) +__tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne (tp, info, seq); + } +} +void __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,struct tcp_authopt_info *info,u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 seq) +{ +struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + +if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info =rcu_dereference_protected (tp->authopt_info, +lockdep_sock_is_held ((struct sock *)tp)); +if (info) +__tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne (tp, info, seq); + } +}#else static inline int tcp_set_authopt (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
@@ -235,8 +263,14 @@ static inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skbstatic inline int tcp_authopt_inbound_check_req (struct request_sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,const u8 *opt) {return 0 ; } +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 seq) +{ +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 seq) +{ +}#endif #endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +96 -2
140 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -0
@@ -3517,10 +3517,11 @@ static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)static void tcp_rcv_nxt_update (struct tcp_sock *tp,u32 seq) {u32 delta = seq - tp->rcv_nxt;sock_owned_by_me ((struct sock *)tp); +tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne (tp, seq); tp->bytes_received += delta;WRITE_ONCE (tp->rcv_nxt, seq); }/* Update our send window.
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +1 -0
@@ -67,10 +67,11 @@ static void tcp_event_new_data_sent(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk);struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);unsigned int prior_packets = tp->packets_out; +tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne (tp,TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->end_seq);WRITE_ONCE (tp->snd_nxt,TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->end_seq);__skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_write_queue);tcp_rbtree_insert (&sk->tcp_rtx_queue, skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 9/19 tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis is a special code path for acks and resets outside of normal connection establishment and closing.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +2 -0
@@ -369,10 +369,11 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, {struct netns_tcp_authopt *net =sock_net_tcp_authopt (sk);return tcp_authopt_lookup_send (net, addr_sk,-1 ); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__tcp_authopt_select_key);static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create (struct sock *sk) {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
@@ -1182,10 +1183,11 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location,* try to make it obvious inside the packet. */ memset (hash_location,0 ,TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN );return err; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_authopt_hash); static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, int recv_id,
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +59 -0
92 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 10/19 tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt.
Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt.
--- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 7 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +7 -0
@@ -115,10 +115,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key(int tcp_authopt_hash (char *hash_location,struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,struct tcp_authopt_info *info,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb); +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply ( +char *hash_location, +struct tcp_authopt_info *info, +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, +__be32 saddr, +__be32 daddr, +struct tcphdr *th);int __tcp_authopt_openreq (struct sock *newsk,const struct sock *oldsk,struct request_sock *req);static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq (struct sock *newsk,const struct sock *oldsk,struct request_sock *req)
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +144 -0
164 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 11/19 tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies
In reply to Leonard CrestezThe code in tcp_v4_send_ack and tcp_v4_send_reset does not allocate a full skb so special handling is required for tcp-authopt handling.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +81 -3
@@ -644,10 +644,50 @@ void tcp_v4_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)__tcp_v4_send_check (skb, inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_daddr); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcp_v4_send_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +/** tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply - Insert TCPOPT_AUTHOPT if required +* +* returns number of bytes (always aligned to 4) or zero +*/ +static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply (const struct sock *sk, +struct sk_buff *skb, +__be32 *optptr, +struct tcphdr *th) +{ +struct tcp_authopt_info *info; +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; +u8 rnextkeyid; + +if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_TIME_WAIT ) + info =tcp_twsk (sk)->tw_authopt_info; +else + info =rcu_dereference_check (tcp_sk (sk)->authopt_info,lockdep_sock_is_held (sk)); +if (!info) +return 0 ; + key_info =__tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); +if (!key_info) +return 0 ; + *optptr =htonl ((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT <<24 ) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT <<16 ) | + (key_info->send_id <<8 ) | + (rnextkeyid)); +/* must update doff before signature computation */ + th->doff +=TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT /4 ; +tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply ((char *)(optptr +1 ), + info, + key_info, +ip_hdr (skb)->daddr, +ip_hdr (skb)->saddr, + th); + +return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT ; +} +#endif +/* * This routine will send an RST to the other tcp. * * Someone asks: why I NEVER use socket parameters (TOS, TTL etc.) * for reset.
@@ -659,10 +699,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check);* Exception: precedence violation. We do not implement it in any case. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG #define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED +#elif defined(OPTION_BYTES_TCP_AUTHOPT ) +#define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT#else #define OPTION_BYTES sizeof(__be32)#endif static void tcp_v4_send_reset (const struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -712,12 +754,29 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)memset (&arg,0 ,sizeof (arg)); arg.iov[0 ].iov_base = (unsigned char *)&rep; arg.iov[0 ].iov_len =sizeof (rep.th); net = sk ?sock_net (sk) :dev_net (skb_dst (skb)->dev); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT )rcu_read_lock (); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +/* Unlike TCP-MD5 the signatures for TCP-AO depend on initial sequence +* numbers so we can only handle established and time-wait sockets. +*/ +if (tcp_authopt_needed && sk && + sk->sk_state !=TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV && + sk->sk_state !=TCP_LISTEN ) { +int tcp_authopt_ret =tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply (sk, skb, rep.opt, &rep.th); + +if (tcp_authopt_ret) { + arg.iov[0 ].iov_len += tcp_authopt_ret; + goto skip_md5sig; + } + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG hash_location =tcp_parse_md5sig_option (th);if (sk &&sk_fullsock (sk)) {const union tcp_md5_addr *addr;int l3index;
@@ -755,11 +814,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) addr = (union tcp_md5_addr *)&ip_hdr (skb)->saddr; key =tcp_md5_do_lookup (sk1, l3index, addr,AF_INET );if (!key) goto out; - genhash =tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb (newhash, key,NULL , skb);if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) goto out; }
@@ -775,10 +833,13 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr ((__u8 *) &rep.opt[1 ], key,ip_hdr (skb)->saddr,ip_hdr (skb)->daddr, &rep.th); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +skip_md5sig:#endif /* Can't co-exist with TCPMD5, hence check rep.opt[0] */ if (rep.opt[0 ] ==0 ) {__be32 mrst =mptcp_reset_option (skb);
@@ -828,12 +889,14 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ctl_sk->sk_mark =0 ;__TCP_INC_STATS (net,TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS );__TCP_INC_STATS (net,TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS );local_bh_enable (); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) out: +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG ) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT )rcu_read_unlock ();#endif }/* The code following below sending ACKs in SYN-RECV and TIME-WAIT states
@@ -850,10 +913,12 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk,struct {struct tcphdr th;__be32 opt[(TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED >>2 ) #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + (TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED >>2 ) +#elif defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT >>2 ) #endif ]; } rep;struct net *net =sock_net (sk);struct ip_reply_arg arg;
@@ -881,10 +946,23 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, rep.th.seq =htonl (seq); rep.th.ack_seq =htonl (ack); rep.th.ack =1 ; rep.th.window =htons (win); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +if (tcp_authopt_needed) { +int aoret, offset = (tsecr) ?3 :0 ; + + aoret =tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply (sk, skb, &rep.opt[offset], &rep.th); +if (aoret) { + arg.iov[0 ].iov_len += aoret; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + key =NULL ; +#endif + } + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) {int offset = (tsecr) ?3 :0 ; rep.opt[offset++] = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 12/19 tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls
In reply to Leonard CrestezThe RFC requires that TCP can report the keyid and rnextkeyid values being sent or received, implement this via getsockopt values.
The RFC also requires that user can select the sending key and that the sending key is automatically switched based on rnextkeyid. These requirements can conflict so we implement both and add a flag which specifies if user or peer request takes priority.
Also add an option to control rnextkeyid explicitly from userspace.
--- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 25 ++++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 40 ++++++++- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 31 +++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +25 -0
@@ -42,10 +42,35 @@ new flags. RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. +Key selection +------------- + +On getsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT) information is provided about keyid/rnextkeyid in +the last send packet and about the keyid/rnextkeyd in the last valid received +packet. + +By default the sending keyid is selected to match the rnextkeyid value sent by +the remote side. If that keyid is not available (or for new connections) a +random matching key is selected. + +If the ``TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_KEYID`` flag is set then the sending key is selected +by the `tcp_authopt.send_local_id` field and recv_rnextkeyid is ignored. If no +key with local_id == send_local_id is configured then a random matching key is +selected. + +The current sending key is cached in the socket and will not change unless +requested by remote rnextkeyid or by setsockopt. + +The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current +key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in +`tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send +instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch +its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +38 -2
@@ -70,10 +70,45 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info {u32 dst_isn;/** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ u32 rcv_sne;/** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ u32 snd_sne; + +/** +* @send_keyid: keyid currently being sent +* +* This is controlled by userspace by userspace if +* TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID, otherwise we try to match recv_rnextkeyid +*/ +u8 send_keyid; +/** +* @send_rnextkeyid: rnextkeyid currently being sent +* +* This is controlled by userspace if TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is set +*/ +u8 send_rnextkeyid; +/** +* @recv_keyid: last keyid received from remote +* +* This is reported to userspace but has no other special behavior attached. +*/ +u8 recv_keyid; +/** +* @recv_rnextkeyid: last rnextkeyid received from remote +* +* Linux tries to honor this unless TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID is set +*/ +u8 recv_rnextkeyid; + +/** +* @send_key: Current key used for sending, cached. +* +* Once a key is found it only changes by user or remote request. +* +* Field is protected by the socket lock and holds a kref to the key. +*/ +struct tcp_authopt_key_info __rcu *send_key; };/* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt {u8 num;
@@ -95,22 +130,23 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key);int tcp_set_authopt_key (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen);struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key (const struct sock *sk,struct tcp_authopt_info *info,const struct sock *addr_sk, -u8 *rnextkeyid); +u8 *rnextkeyid, +bool locked);static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key (const struct sock *sk,const struct sock *addr_sk,struct tcp_authopt_info **info,u8 *rnextkeyid) {if (tcp_authopt_needed) { *info =rcu_dereference (tcp_sk (sk)->authopt_info);if (*info) -return __tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid); +return __tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid, true); }return NULL ; } int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location,
include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +31 -0
@@ -346,10 +346,24 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig {/** * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` */ enum tcp_authopt_flag { +/** +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID: keyid controlled by sockopt +* +* If this is set `tcp_authopt.send_keyid` is used to determined sending +* key. Otherwise a key with send_id == recv_rnextkeyid is preferred. +*/ +TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID = (1 <<0 ), +/** +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID: Override rnextkeyid from userspace +* +* If this is set then `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is sent on outbound +* packets. Other the recv_id of the current sending key is sent. +*/ +TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID = (1 <<1 ),/** * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept * such connections.
@@ -361,10 +375,27 @@ enum tcp_authopt_flag {* struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option */ struct tcp_authopt {/** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ __u32 flags; +/** +* @send_keyid: `tcp_authopt_key.send_id` of preferred send key +* +* This is only used if `TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID` is set. +*/ +__u8 send_keyid; +/** +* @send_rnextkeyid: The rnextkeyid to send in packets +* +* This is controlled by the user iff TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is +* set. Otherwise rnextkeyid is the recv_id of the current key. +*/ +__u8 send_rnextkeyid; +/** @recv_keyid: A recently-received keyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ +__u8 recv_keyid; +/** @recv_rnextkeyid: A recently-received rnextkeyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ +__u8 recv_rnextkeyid; };/** * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` *
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +104 -3
185 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -664,11 +664,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, info =tcp_twsk (sk)->tw_authopt_info; else info =rcu_dereference_check (tcp_sk (sk)->authopt_info,lockdep_sock_is_held (sk));if (!info)return 0 ; - key_info =__tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + key_info =__tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid, false);if (!key_info)return 0 ; *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | (key_info->send_id << 8) |
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -901,11 +901,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(const struct sock *sk, *info =tcp_twsk (sk)->tw_authopt_info; else *info =rcu_dereference (tcp_sk (sk)->authopt_info);if (!*info)return 0 ; - *key =__tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid); + *key =__tcp_authopt_select_key (sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid, false);if (*key)return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT ;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 13/19 tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis is a parallel feature to tcp_md5sig.tcpm_ifindex support and allows applications to server multiple VRFs with a single socket.
The ifindex argument must be the ifindex of a VRF device and must match exactly, keys with ifindex == 0 (outside of VRF) will not match for connections inside a VRF.
Keys without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX will ignore ifindex and match both inside and outside VRF.
--- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 11 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +1 -0
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ expand over time by increasing the size of `struct tcp_authopt_key` and adding new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored + * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections.
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +2 -0
@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info {u8 alg_id;/** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ u8 keylen;/** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN ]; +/** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ +int l3index;/** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr;/** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; };
include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +11 -0
@@ -400,15 +400,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt {* enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 <<0 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 <<1 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 <<2 ), +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 <<3 ), };/** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */
@@ -450,10 +452,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key {* @addr: Key is only valid for this address * * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; +/** +* @ifindex: ifindex of vrf (l3mdev_master) interface +* +* If the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX flag is set then key only applies for +* connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. +* +* This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` +*/ +int ifindex; };/* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +66 -5
170 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 14/19 tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags
In reply to Leonard CrestezAdd flags to allow marking individual keys and invalid for send or recv. Making keys assymetric this way is not mentioned in RFC5925 but RFC8177 requires that keys inside a keychain have independent "accept" and "send" lifetimes.
Flag names are negative so that the default behavior is for keys to be valid for both send and recv.
Setting both NOSEND and NORECV for a certain peer address can be used on a listen socket can be used to mean "TCP-AO is required from this peer but no keys are currently valid".
--- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +4 -0
@@ -401,16 +401,20 @@ struct tcp_authopt {* * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 <<0 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 <<1 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 <<2 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 <<3 ), +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 <<4 ), +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 <<5 ), };/** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +8 -1
@@ -358,10 +358,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_autint l3index =-1 ;hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (key, &net->head, node,0 ) {if (send_id >=0 && key->send_id != send_id)continue ; +if (key->flags &TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND ) +continue ;if (key->flags &TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND )if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr (key, addr_sk))continue ;if (key->flags &TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX ) {if (l3index <0 )
@@ -607,11 +609,13 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt)#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV)int tcp_set_authopt_key (struct sock *sk,sockptr_t optval,unsigned int optlen) {struct tcp_authopt_key opt;struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
@@ -1492,10 +1496,13 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk,if (l3index != key->l3index)continue ; } *anykey = true; +// If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that +if (key->flags &TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV ) +continue ;if (recv_id >=0 && key->recv_id != recv_id)continue ;if (better_key_match (result, key)) result = key;else if (result)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 15/19 tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis allows making a key apply to an addr/prefix instead of just the full addr. This is enabled through a custom flag, default behavior is still full address match.
This is equivalent to TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX from TCP_MD5SIG and has the same use-cases.
--- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 10 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +1 -0
@@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) + * It is possible to match with a fixed prefixlen (default is full address) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections.
include/net/tcp_authopt.h +2 -0
@@ -47,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info {u8 keylen;/** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN ];/** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ int l3index; +/** @prefix: Length of addr match (default full) */ +int prefixlen;/** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr;/** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; };
include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +10 -0
@@ -403,18 +403,21 @@ struct tcp_authopt {* @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) +* @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN: Valid value in `tcp_authopt.prefixlen`, otherwise +* match full address length */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 <<0 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 <<1 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 <<2 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 <<3 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 <<4 ),TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 <<5 ), +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN = (1 <<6 ), };/** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */
@@ -465,10 +468,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key {* connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. * * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` */ int ifindex; +/** +* @prefixlen: length of prefix to match +* +* Without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN flag this is ignored and a full +* address match is performed. +*/ +int prefixlen; };/* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +59 -4
163 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 16/19 tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys
In reply to Leonard Crestez--- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +10 -0
@@ -69,10 +69,20 @@ The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in `tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +99 -1
135 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v4 16/19] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi Leonard,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on f4f2970dfd87e5132c436e6125148914596a9863]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Leonard-Crestez/tcp-Initial-support-for-RFC5925-auth-option/20211223-234349 base: f4f2970dfd87e5132c436e6125148914596a9863 config: riscv-randconfig-c006-20211226 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211226/202112260500.dMAhM2XB-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: clang version 14.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project a9e8b1ee7fd44b53c555a7823ae8fd1a8209c520)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install riscv cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-riscv64-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/78eca32fd5749f14aa4db0d123364a310f70392b
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Leonard-Crestez/tcp-Initial-support-for-RFC5925-auth-option/20211223-234349 git checkout 78eca32fd5749f14aa4db0d123364a310f70392b
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=riscv SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/iio/accel/ net/ipv4/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c:1742:36: warning: unused variable 'tcp_authopt_seq_ops' [-Wunused-const-variable]
static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = {
^1 warning generated.
vim +/tcp_authopt_seq_ops +1742 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
1741
> 1742 static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { 1743 .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start,
1744 .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next,
1745 .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop,
1746 .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show,
1747 };
1748
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
PATCH v4 17/19 selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix
In reply to Leonard CrestezThis is in preparation for reusing the same option for TCP-AO
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 50 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +25 -25
@@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ struct sock_args {const char *clientns;const char *serverns;const char *password;const char *client_pw; -/* prefix for MD5 password */ -const char *md5_prefix_str; +/* prefix for MD5/AO*/ +const char *key_addr_prefix_str;union {struct sockaddr_in v4;struct sockaddr_in6 v6; - } md5_prefix; -unsigned int prefix_len; + } key_addr; +unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len;/* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex;/* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev;
@@ -264,16 +264,16 @@ static int tcp_md5sig(int sd, void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *argsint rc; md5sig.tcpm_keylen = keylen;memcpy (md5sig.tcpm_key, args->password, keylen); -if (args->prefix_len) { +if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { opt =TCP_MD5SIG_EXT ; md5sig.tcpm_flags |=TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX ; - md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->prefix_len; - addr = &args->md5_prefix; + md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + addr = &args->key_addr; }memcpy (&md5sig.tcpm_addr, addr, alen);if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >=0 ) || args->bind_key_ifindex >=1 ) { opt =TCP_MD5SIG_EXT ;
@@ -309,17 +309,17 @@ static int tcp_md5_remote(int sd, struct sock_args *args)int alen;switch (args->version) {case AF_INET : sin.sin_port =htons (args->port); - sin.sin_addr = args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + sin.sin_addr = args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; addr = &sin; alen =sizeof (sin);break ;case AF_INET6 : sin6.sin6_port =htons (args->port); - sin6.sin6_addr = args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + sin6.sin6_addr = args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; addr = &sin6; alen =sizeof (sin6);break ;default :log_error ("unknown address family\n" );
@@ -705,11 +705,11 @@ enum addr_type {ADDR_TYPE_LOCAL ,ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE ,ADDR_TYPE_MCAST ,ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL ,ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE , - ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX, + ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX, };static int convert_addr (struct sock_args *args,const char *_str,enum addr_type atype) {
@@ -745,32 +745,32 @@ static int convert_addr(struct sock_args *args, const char *_str,break ;case ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE : desc ="expected remote" ; addr = &args->expected_raddr;break ; -case ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX : - desc ="md5 prefix" ; +case ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX : + desc ="key addr prefix" ;if (family ==AF_INET ) { - args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_family =AF_INET ; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + args->key_addr.v4.sin_family =AF_INET ; + addr = &args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; }else if (family ==AF_INET6 ) { - args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_family =AF_INET6 ; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + args->key_addr.v6.sin6_family =AF_INET6 ; + addr = &args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; }else return 1 ; sep =strchr (str,'/' );if (sep) { *sep ='\0' ; sep++;if (str_to_uint (sep,1 , pfx_len_max, - &args->prefix_len) !=0 ) { -fprintf (stderr,"Invalid port\n" ); + &args->key_addr_prefix_len) !=0 ) { +fprintf (stderr,"Invalid prefix\n" );return 1 ; } }else { - args->prefix_len =0 ; + args->key_addr_prefix_len =0 ; }break ;default :log_error ("unknown address type\n" );exit (1 );
@@ -835,13 +835,13 @@ static int validate_addresses(struct sock_args *args)if (args->remote_addr_str &&convert_addr (args, args->remote_addr_str,ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE ) <0 )return 1 ; -if (args->md5_prefix_str && -convert_addr (args, args->md5_prefix_str, -ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX ) <0 ) +if (args->key_addr_prefix_str && +convert_addr (args, args->key_addr_prefix_str, +ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX ) <0 )return 1 ;if (args->expected_laddr_str &&convert_addr (args, args->expected_laddr_str,ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL ))
@@ -2020,11 +2020,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])break ;case 'X' : args.client_pw = optarg;break ;case 'm' : - args.md5_prefix_str = optarg; + args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg;break ;case 'S' : args.use_setsockopt =1 ;break ;case 'f' :
@@ -2079,17 +2079,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])return 1 ; } }if (args.password && - ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.md5_prefix_str) || + ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.key_addr_prefix_str) || args.type !=SOCK_STREAM )) {log_error ("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n" );return 1 ; } -if (args.md5_prefix_str && !args.password) { +if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) {log_error ("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n" );return 1 ; }if (iter ==0 ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 18/19 selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support
In reply to Leonard CrestezAdd support for configuring TCP Authentication Option. Only a single key is supported with default options.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 145 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +145 -11
@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@#include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <time.h> #include <errno.h> #include <getopt.h> +#include <stdbool.h> #include <linux/xfrm.h> #include <linux/ipsec.h> #include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
@@ -104,10 +105,12 @@ struct sock_args { } key_addr;unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len;/* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex; +const char *authopt_password; +/* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev;const char *expected_server_dev;int expected_ifindex;
@@ -254,10 +257,75 @@ static int switch_ns(const char *ns)close (fd);return ret; } +/* Fill key identification fields: address and ifindex */ +static void tcp_authopt_key_fill_id (struct tcp_authopt_key *key,struct sock_args *args) +{ +if (args->key_addr_prefix_str) { + key->flags |=TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND ; +switch (args->version) { +case AF_INET : +memcpy (&key->addr, &args->key_addr.v4,sizeof (args->key_addr.v4)); +break ; +case AF_INET6 : +memcpy (&key->addr, &args->key_addr.v6,sizeof (args->key_addr.v6)); +break ; +default : +log_error ("unknown address family\n" ); +exit (1 ); + } +if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { + key->flags |=TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN ; + key->prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + } + } + +if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >=0 ) || args->bind_key_ifindex >=1 ) { + key->flags |=TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX ; + key->ifindex = args->ifindex; +log_msg ("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX set ifindex=%d\n" , key->ifindex); + }else { +log_msg ("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX off\n" , key->ifindex); + } +} + +static int tcp_del_authopt (int sd,struct sock_args *args) +{ +struct tcp_authopt_key key; +int rc; + +memset (&key,0 ,sizeof (key)); + key.flags |=TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL ; +tcp_authopt_key_fill_id (&key, args); + + rc =setsockopt (sd,IPPROTO_TCP ,TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY , &key,sizeof (key)); +if (rc <0 ) +log_err_errno ("setsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY) del fail" ); + +return rc; +} + +static int tcp_set_authopt (int sd,struct sock_args *args) +{ +struct tcp_authopt_key key; +int rc; + +memset (&key,0 ,sizeof (key)); +strcpy ((char *)key.key, args->authopt_password); + key.keylen =strlen (args->authopt_password); + key.alg =TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96 ; +tcp_authopt_key_fill_id (&key, args); + + rc =setsockopt (sd,IPPROTO_TCP ,TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY , &key,sizeof (key)); +if (rc <0 ) +log_err_errno ("setsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY) add fail" ); + +return rc; +} +static int tcp_md5sig (int sd,void *addr,socklen_t alen,struct sock_args *args) {int keylen =strlen (args->password);struct tcp_md5sig md5sig = {};int opt =TCP_MD5SIG ;
@@ -1541,10 +1609,15 @@ static int do_server(struct sock_args *args, int ipc_fd)if (args->password &&tcp_md5_remote (lsd, args)) {close (lsd); goto err_exit; } +if (args->authopt_password &&tcp_set_authopt (lsd, args)) { +close (lsd); + goto err_exit; + } +ipc_write (ipc_fd,1 );while (1 ) {log_msg ("waiting for client connection.\n" );FD_ZERO (&rfds);FD_SET (lsd, &rfds);
@@ -1663,10 +1736,13 @@ static int connectsock(void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args) goto out;if (args->password &&tcp_md5sig (sd, addr, alen, args)) goto err; +if (args->authopt_password &&tcp_set_authopt (sd, args)) + goto err; +if (args->bind_test_only) goto out;if (connect (sd, addr, alen) <0 ) {if (errno !=EINPROGRESS ) {
@@ -1852,11 +1928,11 @@ static int ipc_parent(int cpid, int fd, struct sock_args *args)wait (&status);return client_status; } -#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf" +#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:A:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf"#define OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1001#define OPT_NO_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1002static struct option long_opts[] = { {"force-bind-key-ifindex" ,0 ,0 ,OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX },
@@ -1897,14 +1973,15 @@ static void print_usage(char *prog)" -L len send random message of given length\n" " -n num number of times to send message\n" "\n" " -M password use MD5 sum protection\n" " -X password MD5 password for client mode\n" -" -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5 key\n" -" --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX off\n" -" --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX on\n" +" -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5/AO key\n" +" --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force disable binding key to ifindex\n" +" --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force enable binding key to ifindex\n" " (default: only if -I is passed)\n" +" -A password use RFC5925 TCP Authentication Option with password\n" "\n" " -g grp multicast group (e.g., 239.1.1.1)\n" " -i interactive mode (default is echo and terminate)\n" "\n" " -0 addr Expected local address\n"
@@ -1915,17 +1992,64 @@ static void print_usage(char *prog)" -b Bind test only.\n" " -q Be quiet. Run test without printing anything.\n" , prog, DEFAULT_PORT); } -int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +/* Needs explicit cleanup because keys are global per-namespace */ +void cleanup_tcp_authopt (struct sock_args *args) +{ +int fd; + +if (!args->authopt_password) +return ; + + fd =socket (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,0 ); +if (fd <0 ) { +log_err_errno ("Failed to create socket" ); +return ; + } +tcp_del_authopt (fd, args); +close (fd); +} + +static bool cleanup_done; +static struct sock_args args = { + .version =AF_INET , + .type =SOCK_STREAM , + .port =DEFAULT_PORT , +}; + +void cleanup (void ) +{ +if (cleanup_done) +return ; + cleanup_done = true; +cleanup_tcp_authopt (&args); +} + +void signal_handler (int num) +{ +cleanup (); +} + +void atexit_handler (void ) +{ +cleanup (); +} + +/* Explicit cleanup is required for TCP-AO because keys are global. */ +static void register_cleanup (void ) { -struct sock_args args = { - .version =AF_INET , - .type =SOCK_STREAM , - .port =DEFAULT_PORT , +struct sigaction sa = { + .sa_handler = signal_handler, }; +sigaction (SIGINT , &sa,NULL ); +atexit (atexit_handler); +} + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{struct protoent *pe;int both_mode =0 ;unsigned int tmp;int forever =0 ;int fd[2 ];
@@ -2022,10 +2146,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.client_pw = optarg;break ;case 'm' : args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg;break ; +case 'A' : + args.authopt_password = optarg; +break ;case 'S' : args.use_setsockopt =1 ;break ;case 'f' : args.use_freebind =1 ;
@@ -2085,12 +2212,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.type != SOCK_STREAM)) {log_error ("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n" );return 1 ; } -if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) { -log_error ("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n" ); +if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password && !args.authopt_password) { +log_error ("Prefix range for authentication requires -M or -A\n" ); +return 1 ; + } + +if (args.key_addr_prefix_len && args.authopt_password) { +log_error ("TCP-AO does not support prefix match, only full address\n" );return 1 ; }if (iter ==0 ) {fprintf (stderr,"Invalid number of messages to send\n" );
@@ -2113,10 +2245,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])fprintf (stderr,"Local (server mode) or remote IP (client IP) required\n" );return 1 ; } +register_cleanup (); +if (interactive) { prog_timeout =0 ; msg =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 19/19 selftests: net/fcnal: Initial tcp_authopt support
In reply to Leonard CrestezTests are mostly copied from tcp_md5 with minor changes.
It covers VRF support but only based on binding multiple servers: not multiple keys bound to different interfaces.
Also add a specific -t tcp_authopt to run only these tests specifically.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 329 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 327 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh +327 -2
@@ -817,10 +817,330 @@ ipv4_ping() } ################################################################################ # IPv4 TCP +# +# TCP Authentication Option Tests +# + +# try to enable tcp_authopt sysctl +enable_tcp_authopt() +{ + if [[ -e /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt ]]; then + sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_authopt=1 + fi +} + +# check if tcp_authopt is compiled with a client-side bind test +has_tcp_authopt() +{ + run_cmd_nsb nettest -b -A ${MD5_PW} -r ${NSA_IP} +} + +# Verify /proc/net/tcp_authopt is empty in all namespaces +check_tcp_authopt_key_leak() +{ + local ns cnt + + for ns in $NSA $NSB $NSC; do + if ! ip netns list | grep -q $ns; then + continue + fi + cnt=$(ip netns exec "$ns" cat /proc/net/tcp_authopt | wc -l) + if [[ $cnt != 1 ]]; then + echo "FAIL: leaked tcp_authopt keys in netns $ns" + ip netns exec $ns cat /proc/net/tcp_authopt + return 1 + fi + done +} + +log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak() +{ + check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + log_test $? 0 "TCP-AO: Key leak check" +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Single address config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + # client in prefix + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Prefix config" + + # client in prefix, wrong password + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client uses wrong password" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client uses wrong password" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + # client outside of prefix + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout due to MD5 mismatch" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -c ${NSB_LO_IP} -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client address not in configured prefix" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Simple correct config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default VRF pw" + + test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0 +} + +test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0() +{ + # This particular test needs tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 for Global server to accept VRF connections + local old_tcp_l3mdev_accept + old_tcp_l3mdev_accept=$(get_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept) + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Global server, Key bound to ifindex=0 rejects VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key bound to ifindex=0 accepts non-VRF connection" + log_start + + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts non-VRF connection" + + # restore value + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept="$old_tcp_l3mdev_accept" +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default VRF pw" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in def VRF and VRF, conn in def VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in dev VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with def VRF pw" +} + +only_tcp_authopt() +{ + log_section "TCP Authentication Option" + + setup + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 no VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 no VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf + + setup "yes" + setup_vrf_dup + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf +} + # # MD5 tests without VRF # ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf() {
@@ -1202,10 +1522,11 @@ ipv4_tcp_novrf() show_hint "Should fail 'Connection refused'" run_cmd nettest -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv4_tcp_vrf() { local a
@@ -1254,13 +1575,14 @@ ipv4_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -s & sleep 1 run_cmd nettest -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" - # run MD5 tests + # run MD5+AO tests setup_vrf_dup ipv4_tcp_md5 + ipv6_tcp_md5_vrf cleanup_vrf_dup # # enable VRF global server #
@@ -2685,10 +3007,11 @@ ipv6_tcp_novrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" done ipv6_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv6_tcp_vrf() { local a
@@ -2753,13 +3076,14 @@ ipv6_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -s & sleep 1 run_cmd nettest -6 -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" - # run MD5 tests + # run MD5+AO tests setup_vrf_dup ipv6_tcp_md5 + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf cleanup_vrf_dup # # enable VRF global server #
@@ -4125,10 +4449,11 @@ do ipv6_bind|bind6) ipv6_addr_bind;; ipv6_runtime) ipv6_runtime;; ipv6_netfilter) ipv6_netfilter;; use_cases) use_cases;; + tcp_authopt) only_tcp_authopt;; # setup namespaces and config, but do not run any tests setup) setup; exit 0;; vrf_setup) setup "yes"; exit 0;; esac
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1