Cryptomount detached headers
v3 cover Cryptomount detached headers
Updates since v2:
* Address uneeded ret variable pointed out by Patrick
* Rebased onto latest master with keyfile and security changes. I don't think this actually changed these patches though.
Conceptually the approach is different than the previous detach header series because this one uses the disk objects read hook to hook reads to the disk in scan() and recover_key() such that if there is an associated header file, the hook will cause the read to return data from the header file instead of from the source disk.
For this the read hook implementation needed to be upgaded because prior it didn't get the read buffer sent from the read caller and so could not modify its contents. Patch #1 updates the hook accordingly and all instances of its use, but doesn't functionally change how GRUB operates.
The second patch adds the header option to cryptomount and the read hook to the source disk during the scan() and recover_key() stages. The benefit of this approach is its simpler/less code and does not require the modification of backends, except to potentially cause a failure in scan() if the backend doesn't support the current implementation of detached headers, as with the GELI backend. This implementation requires that the crypto volume header reside at the beginning of the volume. GELI has its header at the end, which is why it can not currently be supported. In theory, GELI could be supported if extra assumptions about its source access pattern during scan() and recovery_key() were made. I don't use GELI, no one seems to be asking for GELI detached headers, and I don't think that GELI even support detached headers with the official tools. So for me, not supporting crypto volumes with headers at the end of the disk is not a big deal. With the patch series each backend gets the header file through cargs, so it can implement detached headers by solely operating on that file instead of the hooked source disk. In the the future, a flag can be added to the cryptodisk_dev_t that backends can sent when registering to enabled/disable the use of the read hook, if the backend needs to read from both the detached header file and the source disk.
Glenn
Glenn Washburn (3):
disk: Allow read hook callback to take read buffer to potentially
modify it
cryptodisk: Add support for using detached header files
docs: Add documentation on detached header option to cryptomount
docs/grub.texi | 13 +++-- grub-core/commands/blocklist.c | 10 ++-- grub-core/commands/loadenv.c | 8 +-- grub-core/commands/testload.c | 4 +- grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- grub-core/disk/geli.c | 4 ++ grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c | 4 +- grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 14 +++--- grub-core/kern/disk.c | 12 ++--- grub-core/lib/progress.c | 11 ++-- grub-core/net/net.c | 2 +- include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 2 + include/grub/disk.h | 6 +-- include/grub/file.h | 2 + 14 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
Range-diff against v2:
1: 91fa9a8eb ! 1: a74dfb620 disk: Allow read hook callback to take read buffer to potentially modify it
@@ Commit message
hook. Also changed is that now when the read hook callback is called it can also indicate what error code should be sent back to the read caller.
+ Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <[email protected]>
+ Reviewed-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
+
## grub-core/commands/blocklist.c ##
@@ grub-core/commands/blocklist.c: print_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned num,
}
2: f16d0a8b0 ! 2: 39bbab75c cryptodisk: Add support for using detached header files
@@ Commit message
Also add a --header (short -H) option to cryptomount which takes a file argument.
+ Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <[email protected]>
+ Reviewed-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
+
## grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ##
@@ grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c: enum
OPTION_PASSWORD,
@@ grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c: cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev)
+cryptodisk_read_hook (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned offset,
+ unsigned length, char *buf, void *data)
+{
-+ grub_err_t ret = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx_t ctx = data;
+
+ if (ctx->hdr_file == NULL)
@@ grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c: cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev)
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+
-+ return ret;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
static grub_cryptodisk_t
@@ include/grub/cryptodisk.h: struct grub_cryptomount_args
## include/grub/file.h ##
@@ include/grub/file.h: enum grub_file_type
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
- /* File holding the encryption key */
+ /* File holding the encryption key. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CRYPTODISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+ /* File holding the encryption metadata header */
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CRYPTODISK_DETACHED_HEADER,
3: f13a6e840 ! 3: 2deb90d33 docs: Add documentation on detached header option to cryptomount
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
docs: Add documentation on detached header option to cryptomount
+ Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <[email protected]>
+ Reviewed-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
+
## docs/grub.texi ##
@@ docs/grub.texi: Alias for @code{hashsum --hash crc32 arg @dots{}}. See command @command{hashsum}
@node cryptomount
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 1/3 disk: Allow read hook callback to take read buffer to potentially modify it
It will be desirable in the future to allow having the read hook modify the data passed back from a read function call on a disk or file. This adds that infrustructure and has no impact on code flow for existing uses of the read hook. Also changed is that now when the read hook callback is called it can also indicate what error code should be sent back to the read caller.
--- grub-core/commands/blocklist.c | 10 ++++++---- grub-core/commands/loadenv.c | 8 +++++--- grub-core/commands/testload.c | 4 +++- grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c | 4 ++-- grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 14 +++++++------- grub-core/kern/disk.c | 12 ++++++------ grub-core/lib/progress.c | 11 +++++++---- grub-core/net/net.c | 2 +- include/grub/disk.h | 6 +++--- 9 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/blocklist.c +6 -4
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ print_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned num, }/* Helper for grub_cmd_blocklist. */ -static void +static grub_err_t read_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector,unsigned offset,unsigned length, -void *data) +char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),void *data) {struct blocklist_ctx *ctx = data;
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ read_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned offset, unsigned length, }if (!length) -return ; +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ;print_blocklist (ctx->start_sector, ctx->num_sectors,0 ,0 , ctx); ctx->num_sectors =0 ; }
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ read_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned offset, unsigned length, }if (!length) -return ; +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ;if (length & (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE -1 )) {
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ read_blocklist (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned offset, unsigned length, ctx->start_sector = sector; ctx->num_sectors = length >>GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ; } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } static grub_err_t
grub-core/commands/loadenv.c +5 -3
@@ -352,16 +352,16 @@ struct grub_cmd_save_env_ctx };/* Store blocklists in a linked list. */ -static void +static grub_err_t save_env_read_hook (grub_disk_addr_t sector,unsigned offset,unsigned length, -void *data) +char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),void *data) {struct grub_cmd_save_env_ctx *ctx = data;struct blocklist *block; block =grub_malloc (sizeof (*block));if (! block) -return ; +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; block->sector = sector; block->offset = offset;
@@ -374,6 +374,8 @@ save_env_read_hook (grub_disk_addr_t sector, unsigned offset, unsigned length, ctx->tail = block;if (! ctx->head) ctx->head = block; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } static grub_err_t
grub-core/commands/testload.c +3 -1
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+" );/* Helper for grub_cmd_testload. */ -static void +static grub_err_t read_progress (grub_disk_addr_t sector __attribute__ ((unused)),unsigned offset __attribute__ ((unused)),unsigned len, +char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),void *data __attribute__ ((unused))) {for (; len >=GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE ; len -=GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE )
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ read_progress (grub_disk_addr_t sector __attribute__ ((unused)),if (len)grub_xputs ("." );grub_refresh (); +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } static grub_err_t
grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c +2 -2
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ hfsplus_read_compressed_real (struct grub_hfsplus_file *node, {grub_memcpy (buf, node->cbuf + pos, len);if (grub_file_progress_hook && node->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , len, node->file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , len,NULL , node->file);return len; }
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ hfsplus_read_compressed_real (struct grub_hfsplus_file *node,grub_memcpy (buf, node->cbuf + (pos %HFSPLUS_COMPRESS_BLOCK_SIZE ), curlen);if (grub_file_progress_hook && node->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , curlen, node->file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , curlen,NULL , node->file); buf += curlen; pos += curlen; len -= curlen;
grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c +7 -7
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ read_block (struct grub_ntfs_rlst *ctx, grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t num)grub_memset (buf,0 , nn *GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN ); buf += nn *GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN ;if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , nn *GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN , +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , nn *GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN ,NULL , ctx->file); } }
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ read_block (struct grub_ntfs_rlst *ctx, grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t num)if (buf) buf +=GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN ;if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 ,GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN , +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 ,GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN ,NULL , ctx->file); nn--; }
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ read_block (struct grub_ntfs_rlst *ctx, grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t num)if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file)grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , tt << (ctx->comp.log_spc - +GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR ), + +GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR ),NULL , ctx->file); buf += tt << (ctx->comp.log_spc +GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR ); }
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ read_block (struct grub_ntfs_rlst *ctx, grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t num)if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file)grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , nn << (ctx->comp.log_spc - +GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR ), + +GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR ),NULL , ctx->file); } ctx->target_vcn += nn;
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,grub_memcpy (dest, ctx->attr->sbuf + ofs - ctx->attr->save_pos, n);if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , n, ctx->file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , n,NULL , ctx->file);if (n == len)return 0 ;
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs, n = len;grub_memcpy (dest, &ctx->attr->sbuf[o], n);if (grub_file_progress_hook && ctx->file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , n, ctx->file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , n,NULL , ctx->file);if (n == len) goto quit; dest += n;
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs,grub_memcpy (dest, ctx->attr->sbuf, len);if (grub_file_progress_hook && file) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , len, file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , len,NULL , file); } quit:
grub-core/kern/disk.c +6 -6
@@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ grub_disk_read_small (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,if (err)return err;if (disk->read_hook) - (disk->read_hook) (sector + (offset >>GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ), - offset & (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE -1 ), - size, disk->read_hook_data); -return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; + err = (disk->read_hook) (sector + (offset >>GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ), + offset & (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE -1 ), + size, buf, disk->read_hook_data); +return err; }/* Read data from the disk. */
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,if (disk->read_hook) (disk->read_hook) (sector,0 , agglomerate << (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_BITS +GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ), - disk->read_hook_data); + buf, disk->read_hook_data); sector += agglomerate <<GRUB_DISK_CACHE_BITS ; size -= agglomerate << (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_BITS +GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS );
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, {if (disk->read_hook) (disk->read_hook) (sector,0 , (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE <<GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ), - disk->read_hook_data); + buf, disk->read_hook_data); sector +=GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE ; buf = (char *) buf + (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE <<GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS ); size -= (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE <<GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS );
grub-core/lib/progress.c +7 -4
@@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 800 -static void +static grub_err_t grub_file_progress_hook_real (grub_disk_addr_t sector __attribute__ ((unused)),unsigned offset __attribute__ ((unused)), -unsigned length,void *data) +unsigned length, +char *buf __attribute__ ((unused)),void *data) {static int call_depth =0 ;grub_uint64_t now;
@@ -42,11 +43,11 @@ grub_file_progress_hook_real (grub_disk_addr_t sector __attribute__ ((unused)), file->progress_offset += length;if (call_depth) -return ; +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; e =grub_env_get ("enable_progress_indicator" );if (e && e[0 ] =='0' ) { -return ; +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } call_depth =1 ;
@@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ grub_file_progress_hook_real (grub_disk_addr_t sector __attribute__ ((unused)), last_progress_update_time = now; } call_depth =0 ; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; }GRUB_MOD_INIT (progress)
grub-core/net/net.c +1 -1
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ grub_net_fs_read_real (grub_file_t file, char *buf, grub_size_t len) total += amount; file->device->net->offset += amount;if (grub_file_progress_hook) -grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , amount, file); +grub_file_progress_hook (0 ,0 , amount,NULL , file);if (buf) {grub_memcpy (ptr, nb->data, amount);
include/grub/disk.h +3 -3
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ extern grub_disk_dev_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_disk_dev_list);struct grub_partition ; -typedef void (*grub_disk_read_hook_t ) (grub_disk_addr_t sector, -unsigned offset,unsigned length, -void *data); +typedef grub_err_t (*grub_disk_read_hook_t ) (grub_disk_addr_t sector, +unsigned offset,unsigned length, +char *buf,void *data);/* Disk. */ struct grub_disk
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 2/3 cryptodisk: Add support for using detached header files
In reply to Glenn WashburnUsing the disk read hook mechanism, setup a read hook on the source disk which will read from the given header file during the scan and recovery cryptodisk backend functions. Disk read hooks are executed after the data has been read from the disk. This is okay, because the read hook is given the read buffer before its sent back to the caller. In this case, the hook can then overwrite the data read from the disk device with data from the header file sent in as the read hook data. This is transparent to the read caller. Since the callers of this function have just opened the source disk, there are no current read hooks, so there's no need to save/restore them nor consider if they should be called or not.
This hook assumes that the header is at the start of the volume, which is not the case for some formats (eg. GELI). So GELI will return an error if a detached header is specified. It also can only be used with formats where the detached header file can be written to the first blocks of the volume and the volume could still be unlocked. So the header file can not be formatted differently from the on-disk header. If these assumpts are not met, detached header file processing must be specially handled in the cryptodisk backend module.
The hook will be called potentially many times by a backend. This is fine because of the assumptions mentioned and the read hook reads from absolute offsets and is stateless.
Also add a --header (short -H) option to cryptomount which takes a file argument.
--- grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- grub-core/disk/geli.c | 4 ++ include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 2 + include/grub/file.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +88 -4
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ enumOPTION_PASSWORD ,OPTION_KEYFILE ,OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET , -OPTION_KEYFILE_SIZE +OPTION_KEYFILE_SIZE , +OPTION_HEADER }; static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
@@ -56,9 +57,16 @@ static const struct grub_arg_option options[] = {"key-file", 'k', 0, N_("Key file"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, {"keyfile-offset", 'O', 0, N_("Key file offset (bytes)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_INT}, {"keyfile-size", 'S', 0, N_("Key file data size (bytes)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_INT}, + {"header", 'H', 0, N_("Read header from file"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} }; +struct cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx +{ +grub_file_t hdr_file; +}; +typedef struct cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx *cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx_t ; +/* Our irreducible polynom is x^128+x^7+x^2+x+1. Lowest byte of it is: */ #define GF_POLYNOM 0x87static inline int GF_PER_SECTOR (const struct grub_cryptodisk *dev)
@@ -1004,6 +1012,30 @@ cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev)grub_free (dev); } +static grub_err_t +cryptodisk_read_hook (grub_disk_addr_t sector,unsigned offset, +unsigned length,char *buf,void *data) +{ +cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx_t ctx = data; + +if (ctx->hdr_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT ,N_ ("header file not found" )); + +if (grub_file_seek (ctx->hdr_file, + (sector *GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE ) + offset) + == (grub_off_t) -1 ) +return grub_errno; + +if (grub_file_read (ctx->hdr_file, buf, length) != (grub_ssize_t ) length) + { +if (grub_errno ==GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,N_ ("header file too small" )); +return grub_errno; + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + static grub_cryptodisk_t grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source,
@@ -1012,6 +1044,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name,grub_err_t ret =GRUB_ERR_NONE ;grub_cryptodisk_t dev;grub_cryptodisk_dev_t cr; +struct cryptodisk_read_hook_ctx read_hook_data = {0 };int askpass =0 ;char *part =NULL ;
@@ -1020,11 +1053,46 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name,if (dev)return dev; +if (cargs->hdr_file !=NULL ) + { +/* +* Set read hook to read header from a file instead of the source disk. +* Disk read hooks are executed after the data has been read from the +* disk. This is okay, because the read hook is given the read buffer +* before its sent back to the caller. In this case, the hook can then +* overwrite the data read from the disk device with data from the +* header file sent in as the read hook data. This is transparent to the +* read caller. Since the callers of this function have just opened the +* source disk, there are no current read hooks, so there's no need to +* save/restore them nor consider if they should be called or not. +* +* This hook assumes that the header is at the start of the volume, which +* is not the case for some formats (eg. GELI). It also can only be used +* with formats where the detached header file can be written to the +* first blocks of the volume and the volume could still be unlocked. +* So the header file can not be formatted differently from the on-disk +* header. If these assumpts are not met, detached header file processing +* must be specially handled in the cryptodisk backend module. +* +* This hook needs only be set once and will be called potentially many +* times by a backend. This is fine because of the assumptions mentioned +* and the read hook reads from absolute offsets and is stateless. +*/ + read_hook_data.hdr_file = cargs->hdr_file; + source->read_hook = cryptodisk_read_hook; + source->read_hook_data = (void *) &read_hook_data; + } +FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr) { +/* +* Loop through each cryptodisk backend that is registered (ie. loaded). +* If the scan returns NULL, then the backend being tested does not +* recognize the source disk, so move on to the next backend. +*/ dev = cr->scan (source, cargs);if (grub_errno) -return NULL ; + goto error_no_close;if (!dev)continue ;
@@ -1041,7 +1109,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, cargs->key_data =grub_malloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE );if (cargs->key_data ==NULL ) -return NULL ; + goto error_no_close;if (!grub_password_get ((char *) cargs->key_data,GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE )) {
@@ -1066,9 +1134,13 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, error:cryptodisk_close (dev); + error_no_close: dev =NULL ; cleanup: +if (cargs->hdr_file !=NULL ) + source->read_hook =NULL ; +if (askpass) { cargs->key_len =0 ;
@@ -1260,6 +1332,18 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args)return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR , (N_ ("failed to read key file" ))); } +if (state[OPTION_HEADER ].set)/* header */ + { +if (state[OPTION_UUID ].set) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +N_ ("cannot use UUID lookup with detached header" )); + + cargs.hdr_file =grub_file_open (state[OPTION_HEADER ].arg, +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CRYPTODISK_DETACHED_HEADER ); +if (cargs.hdr_file ==NULL ) +return grub_errno; + } +if (state[OPTION_UUID ].set)/* uuid */ {int found_uuid;
@@ -1473,7 +1557,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cryptodisk)grub_disk_dev_register (&grub_cryptodisk_dev); cmd =grub_register_extcmd ("cryptomount" , grub_cmd_cryptomount,0 ,N_ ("[ [-p password] | [-k keyfile" -" [-O keyoffset] [-S keysize] ] ]" +" [-O keyoffset] [-S keysize] ] ] [-H file]" " <SOURCE|-u UUID|-a|-b>" ),N_ ("Mount a crypto device." ), options);grub_procfs_register ("luks_script" , &luks_script);
grub-core/disk/geli.c +4 -0
@@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ geli_scan (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs)grub_disk_addr_t sector;grub_err_t err; +/* Detached headers are not implemented yet */ +if (cargs->hdr_file !=NULL ) +return NULL ; +if (2 *GRUB_MD_SHA256 ->mdlen +1 >GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_UUID_LENGTH )return NULL ;
include/grub/cryptodisk.h +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#define GRUB_CRYPTODISK_HEADER 1#include <grub/disk.h> +#include <grub/file.h> #include <grub/crypto.h> #include <grub/list.h> #ifdef GRUB_UTIL
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ struct grub_cryptomount_argsgrub_uint8_t *key_data;/* recover_key: Length of key_data */ grub_size_t key_len; +grub_file_t hdr_file; };typedef struct grub_cryptomount_args *grub_cryptomount_args_t ;
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ enum grub_file_typeGRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ,/* File holding the encryption key. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CRYPTODISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY , +/* File holding the encryption metadata header */ +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CRYPTODISK_DETACHED_HEADER ,/* File we open n grub-fstest. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FSTEST,/* File we open n grub-mount. */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 3/3 docs: Add documentation on detached header option to cryptomount
In reply to Glenn Washburn--- docs/grub.texi | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +10 -3
@@ -4526,19 +4526,26 @@ Alias for @code{hashsum --hash crc32 arg @dots{}}. See command @command{hashsum} @node cryptomount @subsection cryptomount -@deffn Command cryptomount [ [@option{-p} password] | [@option{-k} keyfile [@option{-O} keyoffset] [@option{-S} keysize] ] ] device|@option{-u} uuid|@option{-a}|@option{-b} +@deffn Command cryptomount [ [@option{-p} password] | [@option{-k} keyfile [@option{-O} keyoffset] [@option{-S} keysize] ] ] [@option{-H} file] device|@option{-u} uuid|@option{-a}|@option{-b} Setup access to encrypted device. A passphrase will be requested interactively, if neither the @option{-p} nor @option{-k} options are given. The option @option{-p} can be used to supply a passphrase (useful for scripts). Alternatively the @option{-k} option can be used to supply a keyfile with options @option{-O} and @option{-S} optionally supplying the offset and size, -respectively, of the key data in the given key file. - +respectively, of the key data in the given key file. The @option{-H} options can +be used to supply cryptomount backends with an alternative header file (aka +detached header). Not all backends have headers nor support alternative header +files (currently only LUKS1 and LUKS2 support them). Argument @var{device} configures specific grub device (@pxref{Naming convention}); option @option{-u} @var{uuid} configures device with specified @var{uuid}; option @option{-a} configures all detected encrypted devices; option @option{-b} configures all geli containers that have boot flag set. +Devices are not allowed to be given as key files nor as detached header files. +However, this limitation can be worked around by using blocklist syntax. So +for instance, @code{(hd1,gpt2)} can not be used, but @code{(hd1,gpt2)0+} will +achieve the desired result. + GRUB suports devices encrypted using LUKS, LUKS2 and geli. Note that necessary modules (@var{luks}, @var{luks2} and @var{geli}) have to be loaded manually before this command can be used. For LUKS2 only the PBKDF2 key derivation
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 36 lines · Glenn Washburn
Updates since v2:
* Address uneeded ret variable pointed out by Patrick
* Rebased onto latest master with keyfile and security changes. I don't think this actually changed these patches though.Conceptually the approach is different than the previous detach header series because this one uses the disk objects read hook to hook reads to the disk in
scan()andrecover_key()such that if there is an associated header file, the hook will cause the read to return data from the header file instead of from the source disk.For this the read hook implementation needed to be upgaded because prior it didn't get the read buffer sent from the read caller and so could not modify its contents. Patch #1 updates the hook accordingly and all instances of its use, but doesn't functionally change how GRUB operates.
The second patch adds the header option to cryptomount and the read hook to the source disk during the
scan()andrecover_key()stages. The benefit of this approach is its simpler/less code and does not require the modification of backends, except to potentially cause a failure inscan()if the backend doesn't support the current implementation of detached headers, as with the GELI backend. This implementation requires that the crypto volume header reside at the beginning of the volume. GELI has its header at the end, which is why it can not currently be supported. In theory, GELI could be supported if extra assumptions about its source access pattern duringscan()andrecovery_key()were made. I don't use GELI, no one seems to be asking for GELI detached headers, and I don't think that GELI even support detached headers with the official tools. So for me, not supporting crypto volumes with headers at the end of the disk is not a big deal. With the patch series each backend gets the header file through cargs, so it can implement detached headers by solely operating on that file instead of the hooked source disk. In the the future, a flag can be added to thecryptodisk_dev_tthat backends can sent when registering to enabled/disable the use of the read hook, if the backend needs to read from both the detached header file and the source disk.
Quoted 7 lines
Glenn
Glenn Washburn (3):
disk: Allow read hook callback to take read buffer to potentially
modify it
cryptodisk: Add support for using detached header files
docs: Add documentation on detached header option to cryptomount
For all the patches Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>...
Big thank you for all working on this!
Daniel