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PATCH New Steve Sakoman 1 participant 8 messages Apr 4, 2023

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cover Patch review

Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Wednesday.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/5141

The following changes since commit 1c7d555379c4b0962bccd018870989050d87675f:

classes/package: Use gzip for extended package data (2023-03-27 16:29:20 -1000)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut

Geoffrey GIRY (1):
cve-check: Fix false negative version issue

Hitendra Prajapati (2):
curl: CVE-2023-23916 HTTP multi-header compression denial of service
qemu: fix compile error which imported by CVE-2022-4144

Martin Jansa (1):
bmap-tools: switch to main branch

Randy MacLeod (1):
vim: upgrade 9.0.1403 -> 9.0.1429

Shubham Kulkarni (1):
go-runtime: Security fix for CVE-2022-41723

Vijay Anusuri (1):
git: Security fix for CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946

 meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass                |   5 +-
 meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py                      |  37 +++
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/cve_check.py     |  19 ++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch          | 179 +++++++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch          | 122 +++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch          | 154 ++++++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch            | 184 ++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc             |   4 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc          |   1 +
 .../go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-41723.patch           | 156 ++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc           |   1 +
 ...ass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch | 236 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb              |   2 +-
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch            | 231 +++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb      |   1 +
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   4 +-
 16 files changed, 1332 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-41723.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/7 curl: CVE-2023-23916 HTTP multi-header compression denial of service

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9

---
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch            | 231 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb      |   1 +
 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch new file +231 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..054615963e
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+From 119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 08:33:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] content_encoding: do not reset stage counter for each header
+
+Test 418 verifies
+
+Closes #10492
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9]
+CVE: CVE-2023-23916
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/content_encoding.c  |   7 +-
+ lib/urldata.h           |   1 +
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |   2 +-
+ tests/data/test418      | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test418
+
+diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c
+index 91e621f..7e098a5 100644
+--- a/lib/content_encoding.c
++++ b/lib/content_encoding.c
+@@ -944,7 +944,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req;
+-  int counter = 0;
+ 
+   do {
+     const char *name;
+@@ -979,9 +978,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!encoding)
+         encoding = &error_encoding;  /* Defer error at stack use. */
+ 
+-      if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
+-        failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings",
+-              counter);
++      if(k->writer_stack_depth++ >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
++        failf(data, "Reject response due to more than %u content encodings",
++              MAX_ENCODE_STACK);
+         return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+       }    
+       /* Stack the unencoding stage. */
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index ad0ef8f..168f874 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ struct SingleRequest {
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH
+   struct dohdata doh; /* DoH specific data for this request */
+ #endif
++  unsigned char writer_stack_depth; /* Unencoding stack depth. */
+   BIT(header);       /* incoming data has HTTP header */
+   BIT(content_range); /* set TRUE if Content-Range: was found */
+   BIT(upload_done);  /* set to TRUE when doing chunked transfer-encoding
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 60e8176..40de8bc 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ test350 test351 test352 test353 test354 test355 test356 test357 \
+ test393 test394 test395 \
+ \
+ test400 test401 test402 test403 test404 test405 test406 test407 test408 \
+-test409 \
++test409 test418 \
+ \
+ test490 test491 test492 \
+ \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test418 b/tests/data/test418
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..50e974e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test418
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++HTTP
++gzip
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<data nocheck="yes">
++HTTP/1.1 200 OK
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++
++-foo-
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<server>
++http
++</server>
++ <name>
++Response with multiple Transfer-Encoding headers
++ </name>
++ <command>
++http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -sS
++</command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++<protocol crlf="yes">
++GET /%TESTNUMBER HTTP/1.1
++Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
++User-Agent: curl/%VERSION
++Accept: */*
++
++</protocol>
++
++# CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING is 61
++<errorcode>
++61
++</errorcode>
++<stderr mode="text">
++curl: (61) Reject response due to more than 5 content encodings
++</stderr>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +1 -0
index 899daf8eac..64e4fb5809 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2022-32221.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-35260.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-43552.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-23916.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/7 go-runtime: Security fix for CVE-2022-41723

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Shubham Kulkarni <[email protected]>

Disable cmd/internal/moddeps test, since this update includes PRIVATE track fixes.

Backport from https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5c3e11bd0b5c0a86e5beffcd4339b86a902b21c3

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc          |   1 +
 .../go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-41723.patch           | 156 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-41723.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc +1 -0
index be9abb5b2d..f2a5fc3f7c 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2022-41715.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-41717.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-1962.patch \
+    file://CVE-2022-41723.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-41723.patch new file +156 -0

156 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/7 git: Security fix for CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from
https://github.com/git/git/commit/58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052
&
https://github.com/git/git/commit/cf8f6ce02a13f4d1979a53241afbee15a293fce9
& https://github.com/git/git/commit/bffc762f87ae8d18c6001bf0044a76004245754c

---
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch          | 179 +++++++++++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch          | 122 ++++++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch          | 154 +++++++++++++++
 .../git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch            | 184 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc             |   4 +
 5 files changed, 643 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch new file +179 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc9b448c5c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From 58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:45 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport
+
+When cloning a repository, Git must determine (a) what transport
+mechanism to use, and (b) whether or not the clone is local.
+
+Since f38aa83 (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL,
+2014-07-17), the latter check happens after the remote has been
+initialized, and references the remote's URL instead of the local path.
+This is done to make it possible for a `url.<base>.insteadOf` rule to
+convert a remote URL into a local one, in which case the `clone_local()`
+mechanism should be used.
+
+However, with a specially crafted repository, Git can be tricked into
+using a non-local transport while still setting `is_local` to "1" and
+using the `clone_local()` optimization. The below test case
+demonstrates such an instance, and shows that it can be used to include
+arbitrary (known) paths in the working copy of a cloned repository on a
+victim's machine[^1], even if local file clones are forbidden by
+`protocol.file.allow`.
+
+This happens in a few parts:
+
+ 1. We first call `get_repo_path()` to see if the remote is a local
+    path. If it is, we replace the repo name with its absolute path.
+
+ 2. We then call `transport_get()` on the repo name and decide how to
+    access it. If it was turned into an absolute path in the previous
+    step, then we should always treat it like a file.
+
+ 3. We use `get_repo_path()` again, and set `is_local` as appropriate.
+    But it's already too late to rewrite the repo name as an absolute
+    path, since we've already fed it to the transport code.
+
+The attack works by including a submodule whose URL corresponds to a
+path on disk. In the below example, the repository "sub" is reachable
+via the dumb HTTP protocol at (something like):
+
+    http://127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb/sub.git
+
+However, the path "http:/127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb" (that is, a top-level
+directory called "http:", then nested directories "127.0.0.1:NNNN", and
+"dumb") exists within the repository, too.
+
+To determine this, it first picks the appropriate transport, which is
+dumb HTTP. It then uses the remote's URL in order to determine whether
+the repository exists locally on disk. However, the malicious repository
+also contains an embedded stub repository which is the target of a
+symbolic link at the local path corresponding to the "sub" repository on
+disk (i.e., there is a symbolic link at "http:/127.0.0.1/dumb/sub.git",
+pointing to the stub repository via ".git/modules/sub/../../../repo").
+
+This stub repository fools Git into thinking that a local repository
+exists at that URL and thus can be cloned locally. The affected call is
+in `get_repo_path()`, which in turn calls `get_repo_path_1()`, which
+locates a valid repository at that target.
+
+This then causes Git to set the `is_local` variable to "1", and in turn
+instructs Git to clone the repository using its local clone optimization
+via the `clone_local()` function.
+
+The exploit comes into play because the stub repository's top-level
+"$GIT_DIR/objects" directory is a symbolic link which can point to an
+arbitrary path on the victim's machine. `clone_local()` resolves the
+top-level "objects" directory through a `stat(2)` call, meaning that we
+read through the symbolic link and copy or hardlink the directory
+contents at the destination of the link.
+
+In other words, we can get steps (1) and (3) to disagree by leveraging
+the dangling symlink to pick a non-local transport in the first step,
+and then set is_local to "1" in the third step when cloning with
+`--separate-git-dir`, which makes the symlink non-dangling.
+
+This can result in data-exfiltration on the victim's machine when
+sensitive data is at a known path (e.g., "/home/$USER/.ssh").
+
+The appropriate fix is two-fold:
+
+ - Resolve the transport later on (to avoid using the local
+   clone optimization with a non-local transport).
+
+ - Avoid reading through the top-level "objects" directory when
+   (correctly) using the clone_local() optimization.
+
+This patch merely demonstrates the issue. The following two patches will
+implement each part of the above fix, respectively.
+
+[^1]: Provided that any target directory does not contain symbolic
+  links, in which case the changes from 6f054f9 (builtin/clone.c:
+  disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28) will abort the
+  clone.
+
+Reported-by: yvvdwf <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/git/git/commit/58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052]
+CVE: CVE-2023-22490
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh
+
+diff --git a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ebd31a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test local clone with ambiguous transport'
++
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh"
++
++if ! test_have_prereq SYMLINKS
++then
++	skip_all='skipping test, symlink support unavailable'
++	test_done
++fi
++
++start_httpd
++
++REPO="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/sub.git"
++URI="$HTTPD_URL/dumb/sub.git"
++
++test_expect_success 'setup' '
++	mkdir -p sensitive &&
++	echo "secret" >sensitive/secret &&
++
++	git init --bare "$REPO" &&
++	test_commit_bulk -C "$REPO" --ref=main 1 &&
++
++	git -C "$REPO" update-ref HEAD main &&
++	git -C "$REPO" update-server-info &&
++
++	git init malicious &&
++	(
++		cd malicious &&
++
++		git submodule add "$URI" &&
++
++		mkdir -p repo/refs &&
++		touch repo/refs/.gitkeep &&
++		printf "ref: refs/heads/a" >repo/HEAD &&
++		ln -s "$(cd .. && pwd)/sensitive" repo/objects &&
++
++		mkdir -p "$HTTPD_URL/dumb" &&
++		ln -s "../../../.git/modules/sub/../../../repo/" "$URI" &&
++
++		git add . &&
++		git commit -m "initial commit"
++	) &&
++
++	# Delete all of the references in our malicious submodule to
++	# avoid the client attempting to checkout any objects (which
++	# will be missing, and thus will cause the clone to fail before
++	# we can trigger the exploit).
++	git -C "$REPO" for-each-ref --format="delete %(refname)" >in &&
++	git -C "$REPO" update-ref --stdin <in &&
++	git -C "$REPO" update-server-info
++'
++
++test_expect_failure 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary file-inclusion' '
++	git clone malicious clone &&
++	git -C clone submodule update --init &&
++
++	test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret
++'
++
++test_done
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch new file +122 -0

122 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch new file +154 -0

154 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch new file +184 -0

184 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc +4 -0
index 235cb8e4c0..36318eed20 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
            file://CVE-2022-41903-10.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-41903-11.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-41903-12.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-22490-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-22490-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-22490-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-23946.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/7 qemu: fix compile error which imported by CVE-2022-4144

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/61c34fc && https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/8efec0ef8bbc1e75a7ebf6e325a35806ece9b39f

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc           |   1 +
 ...ass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch | 236 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 237 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
index 600a2af022..5466303c94 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-3.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-4.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-5.patch \
+           file://hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch new file +236 -0

236 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/7 cve-check: Fix false negative version issue

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Geoffrey GIRY <[email protected]>

NVD DB store version and update in the same value, separated by '_'. The proposed patch check if the version from NVD DB contains a "_", ie 9.2.0_p1 is convert to 9.2.0p1 before version comparison.

[YOCTO #14127]

(cherry picked from commit 7d00f6ec578084a0a0e5caf36241d53036d996c4)
---
 meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass            |  5 ++-
 meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py                  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/cve_check.py | 19 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass +4 -1
index 87a59d5c6d..05b9cb47dc 100644
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
     """
     Connect to the NVD database and find unpatched cves.
     """
-    from oe.cve_check import Version
+    from oe.cve_check import Version, convert_cve_version
 
     pn = d.getVar("PN")
     real_pv = d.getVar("PV")
@@ -317,6 +317,9 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
                 if cve in cve_whitelist:
                     ignored = True
 
+                version_start = convert_cve_version(version_start)
+                version_end = convert_cve_version(version_end)
+
                 if (operator_start == '=' and pv == version_start) or version_start == '-':
                     vulnerable = True
                 else:
meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py +37 -0
index 67f0644889..c508865738 100644
@@ -172,3 +172,40 @@ def get_cpe_ids(cve_product, version):
         cpe_ids.append(cpe_id)
 
     return cpe_ids
+
+def convert_cve_version(version):
+    """
+    This function converts from CVE format to Yocto version format.
+    eg 8.3_p1 -> 8.3p1, 6.2_rc1 -> 6.2-rc1
+
+    Unless it is redefined using CVE_VERSION in the recipe,
+    cve_check uses the version in the name of the recipe (${PV})
+    to check vulnerabilities against a CVE in the database downloaded from NVD.
+
+    When the version has an update, i.e.
+    "p1" in OpenSSH 8.3p1,
+    "-rc1" in linux kernel 6.2-rc1,
+    the database stores the version as version_update (8.3_p1, 6.2_rc1).
+    Therefore, we must transform this version before comparing to the
+    recipe version.
+
+    In this case, the parameter of the function is 8.3_p1.
+    If the version uses the Release Candidate format, "rc",
+    this function replaces the '_' by '-'.
+    If the version uses the Update format, "p",
+    this function removes the '_' completely.
+    """
+    import re
+
+    matches = re.match('^([0-9.]+)_((p|rc)[0-9]+)$', version)
+
+    if not matches:
+        return version
+
+    version = matches.group(1)
+    update = matches.group(2)
+
+    if matches.group(3) == "rc":
+        return version + '-' + update
+
+    return version + update
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/cve_check.py +19 -0
index d0b2213703..22ffeffd29 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,25 @@ class CVECheck(OESelftestTestCase):
         self.assertTrue( result ,msg="Failed to compare version with suffix '1.0_patch2' < '1.0_patch3'")
 
 
+    def test_convert_cve_version(self):
+        from oe.cve_check import convert_cve_version
+
+        # Default format
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("8.3"), "8.3")
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version(""), "")
+
+        # OpenSSL format version
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("1.1.1t"), "1.1.1t")
+
+        # OpenSSH format
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("8.3_p1"), "8.3p1")
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("8.3_p22"), "8.3p22")
+
+        # Linux kernel format
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("6.2_rc8"), "6.2-rc8")
+        self.assertEqual(convert_cve_version("6.2_rc31"), "6.2-rc31")
+
+
     def test_recipe_report_json(self):
         config = """
 INHERIT += "cve-check"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/7 vim: upgrade 9.0.1403 -> 9.0.1429

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Randy MacLeod <[email protected]>

Fixes CVE-2023-1127, CVE-2023-1170, CVE-2023-1175,
       CVE-2023-1264, CVE-2023-1355
(cherry picked from commit 2415072c3800feb164dd4d1fa0b56bd141a5cbd8)
---
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +2 -2
index 1225005b0c..94eabfa197 100644
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://no-path-adjust.patch \
            "
 
-PV .= ".1403"
-SRCREV = "e764d1b4219e6615a04df1c3a6a5c0210a0a7dac"
+PV .= ".1429"
+SRCREV = "1a08a3e2a584889f19b84a27672134649b73da58"
 
 # Remove when 8.3 is out
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/7 bmap-tools: switch to main branch

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Martin Jansa <[email protected]>

* master branch was removed upstream:
downloads/git2/github.com.intel.bmap-tools $ git remote prune origin Pruning origin
URL: https://github.com/intel/bmap-tools
* [pruned] refs/heads/master
* [pruned] refs/pull/73/merge

* downloads/git2/github.com.intel.bmap-tools $ git branch -a --contains c0673962a8ec1624b5189dc1d24f33fe4f06785a main
release-3.0

(cherry picked from commit 369fee186d6916322b9be9d936b654d0c5910cb3)
---
 meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb +1 -1
index 97b88ec033..6a93cacc18 100644
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ SECTION = "console/utils"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/intel/${BPN};branch=master;protocol=https"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/intel/${BPN};branch=main;protocol=https"
 
 SRCREV = "db7087b883bf52cbff063ad17a41cc1cbb85104d"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1